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Abstract 
There is a paucity of literature addressing Iran’s consistently high income inequality rates 
during the past four decades. Available studies, after the 1979 Islamic revolution, typically 
combine poverty with inequality research but focus decidedly on the former. Perhaps, due to 
this poverty orientation, they seek inequality determinants within the pool of post-
revolutionary government policy. This thesis however suggests a pre-revolutionary structural 
cause, rather than a post-revolutionary policy determinant, for the observed inequality. It 
contends that many of the income distribution patterns in Iran are related to the economy’s 
reliance on oil revenues, which overwhelm administrative efforts in reshaping national and 
regional income distribution. The study has wider theoretical implications by showing that 
rentier states reinforce patterns of income distribution. 
 The period under empirical study (1997-2010) begins with the tenure of 
President Khatami’s first government and ends in the twilight years of President 
Ahmadinejad’s second administration. Annual household survey micro data is used to 
measure and present a number of income distribution findings which are brought together to 
build a picture of recent national and regional inequality trends using appropriate 
decomposition methodologies. 
In the main, the findings support the rentier notion of an urban bias and the 
existence of a rich elite whose fortunes mostly determine annual inequality fluctuations. 
Inter-regional and intra-regional inequalities are both high, with evidence of an increasing 
income gap between rural provinces. There is a growing gap between public sector and 
private sector headed households and a persistently high urban rural divide. Interestingly, 
regional inter-ethnic inequality is falling. At the end of the thesis, separate urban and rural 
wealth asset indices are created for Iran to mitigate the influence of short-term oil revenue 
shocks, which may affect money metric inequality measures. 
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CBI   Central Bank of Iran 
IRNA   Islamic Republic of Iran’s News Agency 
NIOC   National Iranian Oil Company 
COICOP  Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose 
HE   Aggregate household expenditure 
HEWI   Aggregate household expenditure without investment 
HEWID   Aggregate household expenditure without investment and durables 
EEHE    Aggregate equivalence household expenditure 
EEHEWI  Aggregate equivalence household expenditure without investment 
EEHEWID  Aggregate equivalence household exp. without investment or durables 
CURD   Coordinated Urban-Rural Development 
 
Glossary 
Shahrestan  This term refers to all Iranian towns and cities apart from Tehran 
Basiji   A member of the “Basij-e Mostazafin”, a post-revolutionary voluntary militia 
Bazaaris   From the word “Bazaar” refers to the merchant class 
Aashnaa  An acquaintance 
Party   From the term “Party Baazi” refers to a person of influence 
Jahad-e Sazandegi The construction crusade 
Bonyad-e Maskan Housing Foundation 
Bonyad-e Mostazafan Foundation of the oppressed 
Bonyad-e Shahid  Foundation of the martyred 
Bonyads   A collective term for the revolutionary ‘charitable’ trusts set up after 1979 
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A. Introduction 
Ever since 1979, the Iranian economy has experienced continuous upheavals. The period 
began with an Islamic revolutionary administration advocating largely state socialist policies, 
which included pushing through an agenda of substantial nationalization and asset 
redistribution within a very short period of time (Behdad, 1989). Simultaneously, non-
governmental organizations with a revolutionary zeal for rural development were setup to 
provide housing, infrastructure and health services to Iran’s most deprived regions 
(Amirahmadi, 1986). 
 From 1980 to 1988, a catastrophic eight-year war with Iraq ensued, resulting in a 
pattern of rapid urban agglomeration, rural disintegration and the complete disruption of the 
pre-revolutionary economic system (Sharbatoghlie, 1991). Rationing, subsidies, coupons, 
price controls, multiple exchange rates, trade restrictions, and international embargoes 
characterized economic life for ordinary Iranians. An attempt at normalization, economic 
liberalization and industrialization followed the war, under the presidency of Hashemi 
Rafsanjani. Notably, accessibility to higher education was widely increased. However, erratic 
growth, a lax monetary policy and high inflation created uncertainty and flux in the economy. 
 From 1997, President Khatami pursued a policy of further economic liberalization, 
privatization and industrialization. By the end of his term, government revenues were still 
dominated by oil exports, and subsidies on fuel and public utilities had mushroomed (Machin 
and Vignoles, 2004). Under President Ahmadinejad’s administration from 2005, the 
government espoused its commitment to redistribution in favour of the poor combined with a 
drive towards regional equality (Salehi-Isfahani, 2008). In this regard, President 
Ahmadinejad and his ministers dramatically increased the number of official visits to the 
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provinces.1 An ambitious program was also initiated to lift general subsidies, with the 
intention of using a portion of the savings to eventually target the most needy (Guillaume et 
al., 2011). The government benefited from rising oil prices but at the same time the economy 
became more dependent on oil exports. Oil revenue as a percentage of GDP rose from 20% 
in 1997 to 38% in 20082. Towards the end of this period, international sanctions on Iran were 
intensified, and by mid 2012 Iran was under the harshest sanctions regime since the 
nationalization of the oil industry in 1951. 
 Hence, Iran’s post-revolutionary economy is characterized by numerous fluctuations 
and turns of fortune. Many economic indicators for this period are characterized by dramatic 
trends or high volatility. Between 1979 and September 2012 the value of the currency fell by 
a factor of 350 against the US dollar. In 1976 53% of Iran’s population lived in rural areas, 
dropping to 31.5% by 2006.  In welfare terms poverty has decreased, higher education 
enrolment has dramatically increased and rural infrastructure and health services have 
improved (Salehi-Isfahani, 2006a). 
 But there is one measure that has remained largely stable throughout this period. By 
and large income inequality has not been prone to significant fluctuations or long lasting 
diminishing or increasing trends. This constancy is despite the dramatic changes in other 
post-revolutionary economic indicators. The immovability of inequality, and the failure to 
move towards a more equal distribution of income, evokes further curiosity given that 
egalitarianism occupies a central position in Iran’s political discourse, and is implicitly 
referred to as a condition for growth in the revolutionary constitution of the Islamic Republic3. 
                                                 
1
 For an account of these visits see http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/iran-
blog/2012/apr/19/mahmoud-ahmadinejad-provincial-visits-protests 
2
 Source: World Bank, Iran Country Data 
3
 “In strengthening the foundations of the economy, the fundamental consideration will be 
fulfillment of the material needs of man in the course of his overall growth and development. This 
principle contrasts with other economic systems, where the aim is concentration and accumulation 
of wealth and maximization of profit. In materialist schools of thought, the economy represents an 
end in itself, so that it comes to be a subversive and corrupting factor in the course of man's 
development. In Islam, the economy is a means, and all that is required of a means is that it should 
be an efficient factor contributing to the attainment of the ultimate goal.” The Constitution of the 
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Indeed, one would expect many of the post-revolutionary policies of extensive asset 
redistribution, poverty reduction, rural infrastructural investment and expansion of higher 
education to have had a significant impact on inequality. Yet, they haven’t. This paradox has 
not been directly addressed by academic research. Empirical studies of Iran’s income 
distribution are usually part of, and subordinate to, larger poverty studies. Beyond the 
reporting of the headline inequality figures and confirming their constancy, they offer little 
extra insight. The challenge of inequality research in Iran is this very ‘consistency’. It is 
problematic to convincingly relate constant inequality to volatile post-revolutionary economic 
trends. 
 Since 1979, almost all economic research carried out on Iran has been through a 
post-revolutionary lens. This is to a large extent understandable given the initial considerable 
shock to the economy from the Islamic revolution, the war with Iraq, and the substantial 
economic adjustments that followed. But what if there are economic indicators that are not 
fundamentally related to post-revolutionary policy? Are we not in danger of overlooking them 
because of our fixation with the government’s performance after the revolution? Is income 
distribution one of these economic indicators? We suspect that it is, and this forms the 
premise of our thesis. 
 If we put aside our post-revolutionary lens for a moment, and rather than examining 
what has changed since the revolution, we focus instead on what remains the same. The 
major indistinguishable characteristic of Iran’s economy pre and post revolution is its 
reliance on oil revenues. We hypothesize that the rentier nature of the state, from its 
considerable dependence on oil export revenues, has reinforced structural income 
inequalities, and that the dominance of oil revenues provides the best explanation for the 
inability of successive administrations to shift the income distribution. 
                                                                                                                                          
Islamic Republic of Iran, Bern University, International Constitutional Law, 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html 
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 In order to examine this premise, we set ourselves two objectives. Given the paucity 
of research on income inequality in Iran, our first and primary objective is to measure and 
analyse the major patterns and trends of Iran’s income distribution. The bulk of our thesis is 
dedicated to this empirical task. Our second objective is to survey the literature and propose 
a link between the rentier nature of a state and the likely income inequality patterns. By 
matching our empirical findings with the expected patterns we hope to be able to shed some 
light on the hypothesis. 
 
B. Specific research questions 
As noted in the introduction, little research has been carried out on income distribution 
patterns and trends in Iran, due to the stable, if high, income inequality rate. In order to shed 
more light on the inequality measure, we propose to break it down into its geographic 
components and its vertical and horizontal facets. In doing so, we hope to provide answers 
to the following broad questions. 
 
Descriptive empirical questions 
1. What are the recent levels and trends of urban and rural national inequality? 
2. What are the geographic component contributions to overall inequality? 
3. What are the levels of inequality between the provinces? 
4. What is the pattern of income inequality within the provinces? 
5. What are the trends of urban/rural disparity? 
6. What is the level of ethnic inequality? 
 
Analytical empirical Questions 
1. What factors account for the small year on year fluctuations in the national inequality 
measure? 
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2. What structural effect does direct government expenditure of a rentier state have on 
income distribution? 
3. How are subsidies affecting inequality, and what is the likely effect of their removal? 
4. Are urban and rural areas within provinces converging? Is there evidence of 
polarization? 
5. What are the differences of the urban/rural divide along the national income 
distribution? 
6. Are ethnic inequalities converging or diverging? 
7. What are the income distribution differences between private and public sector 
headed households? 
8. Can an effective asset index be created for Iran from existing household data to 
provide an alternative inequality measure? 
 
In conclusion to this thesis we examine to see whether the findings match our hypothesized 
rentier theory implications for income inequality. 
 Chapter two discusses in detail possible links between an economy dominated by oil 
revenues and the pattern of inequality. In general terms, however, we can sum up our 
expectations of inequality in a rentier state as thus. We expect to see an urban bias in 
government expenditure, with a few urban centres dominating the contribution to inequality. 
The fortunes of the rich elite are expected to dominate the income inequality trend. The 
public sector should yield the richer households as this sector has direct access to state oil 
rents. Urban and rural disparities are not expected to diminish given the government urban 
bias, and the excess labour capacity present in urban areas. We do not expect to see 
convergence between the provinces, as the initial regional rentier advantage followed by 
urban agglomeration should lead to a few provinces dominating others. Conversely, the 
poorest provinces will find it difficult to catch up. 
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 Given the lack of linkages between the domestic economy and the oil industry, we 
do not expect oil led growth or increases in household income to be a factor in determining 
inequality within the provinces. Kuznets’ inverse U shaped inequality curve should therefore 
be redundant in a rentier setting. Finally if Persians dominate the ruling rentier class, there 
should be a non-diminishing inequality trend between this ethnicity and the others.  
 As already noted, the primary objective of this thesis is to arrive at a big picture of 
Iran’s major vertical and horizontal inequality patterns. Post-revolutionary Iran is an apt 
choice for the study of income distribution in a rentier state, because not only does it have 
an economy reliant on oil exports, but it is also characterized by revolutionary Islamic 
administrators who have, openly at least, been committed to reducing income inequality. 
The case study of Iran sheds light on how rentier structures can hamper policies aimed at 
bringing about a more equal distribution of income. 
 
C. Rationale and motivation 
a. Academic rationale 
Three major academic objectives underlie this study. The first derives directly from the 
paucity of inequality research in Iran. Answers to significant income distribution questions 
are currently not to be found in published research. What is the urban GINI figure for Tehran? 
What is the rural sector’s contribution to overall inequality? Are Persian dominated regions 
pulling away from ethnic ones? This research gap drives the motivation to find out the 
answers to a number of inequality puzzles related to Iran. Although we aim to examine these 
findings in the context of a ‘rentier theory framework’, such empirical data may also prove 
useful for academics researching other aspects of Iran’s economy, or indeed may be utilized 
by researchers in other fields of Iranian studies.  
 The second academic motivation is a desire to invite further academic study on the 
income distribution field in Iran and other rentier states. We suggest that in such countries 
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income inequality is characterized by a unique structural pattern, which is worthy of further 
research. Currently, economists may find it challenging to research one particular aspect of 
inequality in Iran, such as gender, occupation or religion in isolation, without being aware of 
other major inequality trends. For instance, religious inequality may be a microcosm of wider 
ethnic inequality, or certain occupational inequalities may be related to disparities between 
the private and public sector. By being aware of dominant inequality patterns, researchers 
can factor them into their study and arrive at more conclusive findings. The creation of an 
asset index in chapter seven provides a simple household wealth assessment tool to 
encourage Iran researchers of all fields to take into account the inequality and wealth 
aspects of their studies. 
 Finally by examining the current patterns of inequality in Iran, we can develop an 
understanding of where Iran is heading if current trends continue. This should assist policy 
makers in targeting their attention to the appropriate areas of the economy. A realization that 
the distribution of income is a structural problem in Iran and most probably in other rentier 
states, lends support to proponents of policies that advocate a reduction in the role of oil 
exports in the economy. 
  It is hoped that this study proves significant by empirically providing new data on 
income inequality patterns in Iran and by theoretically exploring the income distribution 
implications of rentier state theory. 
 
b. Personal motivation 
For ten years 1999-2009, falling within the period of this empirical study, I managed an 
online Persian and English news website in Tehran. Our news service was widely read 
inside and outside Iran and had a dedicated ‘Iran economy’ category. We had an average of 
a dozen employees during this time. Until 2008, and the onset of the global financial crisis, 
this was a period of relative stable growth, and steady wage increases. Despite this, due to 
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rapidly increasing property and rent prices, it was virtually impossible for many of the staff to 
move a step up the relative economic ladder or even dare to dream of owning a property in 
central Tehran. I came to the view that economic mobility was rare and not directly linked to 
educational achievement or hours of hard work in the office. It is important to note that these 
observations were anecdotal in nature and not based on any data. 
 I also regularly took many road trips throughout Iran. Often, I would drive by 
abandoned villages and townships in one region, only to arrive in a thriving urban centre in 
another. There were also many isolated industrial complexes dotted along the way. The 
geographical difference in income distribution was apparent to the untrained eye. 
 In Tehran and the other big cities, residents who had the necessary funds would 
mostly look to land and property speculation as an investment avenue, rather than invest in 
long-term business activities. Many of the property developers were for instance doctors 
who alongside their medical practices looked for a shorter-term but more lucrative trade. It 
was an economy seemingly characterized by high income inequality, which did not offer a 
straightforward transitional route to an upper income group via the most expected routes 
such as higher education, employment and private sector promotion. Meanwhile, many 
landowners, small and big, in the suburbs of major urban centres would effortlessly become 
rich, as urban agglomeration took hold.  
 If the ‘expected’ economic factors, such as education, would in the main, not allow 
individuals to move to relatively higher income groups, then surely nor would the policies 
aimed at boosting such factors. The thinking behind this thesis arose out of this simple logic. 
The led to the premise that Iran is characterized by a structural inequality pattern, which is 
difficult to shift by the government, utilizing standard sectoral policy tools. 
 In the course of compiling this thesis I have met the two economists who have 
arguably contributed the most to Iran’s poverty and inequality literature for the past two 
decades. They provided extra motivation and guidance. Before the empirical research 
process, I had an extensive meeting with Professor Mohammad Tabibian in Tehran, 
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regarding his book (in Persian) on poverty and inequality in Iran (Tabibian, 2000). Towards 
the end of my research, at a conference in London, I met Professor Djavad Salehi-Isfahani 
who has published many papers (in English) on Iranian welfare economics (Salehi-Isfahani, 
2006b, Salehi-Isfahani, 2007, Majbouri and Salehi-Isfahani, 2008, Salehi-Isfahani, 2008, 
Salehi-Isfahani, 2010). Both academics have been widely cited throughout this study. 
D. Research approach 
Of the two research objectives of this study, the empirical one is the most challenging. It 
would be academically sensible to focus on just one particular aspect of inequality in Iran 
and combine that with other published data to arrive at a conclusion. However such 
published data is not available. Beyond the availability of the national income inequality rate, 
there is a scarcity of money metric inequality analysis. Even with the national inequality rate, 
publications do not always make it clear how the measure has been arrived at. 
 Without such data, it is difficult to report a definitive finding on one particular aspect 
of inequality in isolation. For instance, regional inequality may be investigated, but without 
having some indication of urban/rural disparities, one cannot draw conclusions as to whether 
the witnessed inequality between two regions is a regional one or simply an urban/rural one. 
Furthermore, in order to link the empirical findings to the theoretical implications of rentier 
theory on income distribution, a core number of inequality patterns and trends need to be 
measured and analysed. One or two characteristics are not sufficient to establish that Iran’s 
income distribution is in line with the theorized structural inequality pattern of a rentier state. 
 Thus, it was deemed necessary to make the thesis primarily empirical in nature and 
concentrate on deriving the major patterns and trends of Iran’s income distribution. 
Alongside this wide empirical approach, an attempt has been made throughout the study to 
point out the significance of the main findings as they relate to inequality patterns in a rentier 
setting. 
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E. Scope and limitations 
Given the extensive empirical task at hand, the scope of the research was purposefully 
limited by two intuitive restrictions: 
1. The major patterns and trends of income distribution would only be measured and 
analysed, rather than also taking on an investigation of their individual determinants 
2. Only results pertaining to the rentier theory inequality hypothesis would be reported. 
 
It will therefore be outside the scope of this study to rigorously test for all possible 
determinants of inequality and claim causation. There are many potential deterministic 
factors of national and regional inequality, such as education, health, transport, infrastructure, 
water resources, agricultural investment, proximity from urban clusters, provincial investment 
etc. which may all have a bearing on inequality in Iran. These specific research areas are 
worthy of study in their own right. Our concern is with deriving the main patterns and trends 
of income distribution and examining whether they match the expected rentier predictions. 
 
F. Empirical methodology and data 
This study relies fundamentally on urban and rural annual household surveys 
carried out by the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI). The integrity of this data is assumed to be 
sound. Without the availability of micro data from the SCI, this research project would not 
have been viable. During multiple trips to Iran, throughout the period of the research, the SCI 
supplied the author with the latest raw primary unit data, along with relevant clarifications. At 
first, the sampling weights for the datasets were not made available, and they were 
estimated by the author using national census data. However, during the midpoint of the 
study, exact sampling weights dating back to 1997 were released by the SCI, and all 
calculations and analyses were repeated using the official weights. Over four hundred 
29 
 
thousand household samples have been used in our calculations for the period of 1997-
2010. 
For reasons explored in chapter three, expenditures rather than income data have 
been used as a proxy to derive a pattern of income distribution. The expenditure datasets 
were processed using queries written by the author, to re-categorize them into a standard 
format. Separate urban and rural equivalence scales have been devised to distinguish 
between urban and rural households, and to account for different family sizes and the 
makeup of adults and children.  
 The processing of raw micro data presents many challenges, but it also provided the 
author with many opportunities to carry out custom analysis. Micro data allows for richer 
analysis than the traditional use of average aggregate data (Carlos, 2001). For instance the 
author was able to standardize the categorising of expenditures, to build custom 
consumption aggregates, to create and implement an equivalence expenditure scale, to 
decompose the data into numerous components, to carry out intricate horizontal income 
distribution comparisons and to construct an urban and rural wealth asset index. 
 The asset index methodology is outlined in detail in chapter seven. The reasoning 
behind its construction was to provide an alternative tool to the traditional money metric 
inequality methodologies, and it was deemed particularly appropriate for a rentier state such 
as Iran, which is prone to macro-economic shocks. 
Although the primary data sources for this study are the SCI’s annual household 
surveys, a number of other datasets were also utilized such as: 
 
 SCI urban and rural CPI figures 
 Central Bank of Iran CPI figures 
 SCI census data 
 SCI household population data 
 SCI migration data 
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 SCI provincial accounts 
 SCI yearbook for general macro-economic indicators 
 The World Bank database 
 The IMF ‘World Economic Outlook Database’ 
 
Any data source that does not derive from the author’s own calculations and measurements 
is cited alongside the respective chart or table.  
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G. Thesis outline 
Introduction 
The introduction outlines the significance of the inequality paradox in Iran, and the 
suggested approach to addressing this gap in the research. We introduce the hypothesis 
that a rentier state, such as Iran, reinforces structural patterns of inequality, which are not 
effectively addressed by government sectoral policy. The specific research questions, scope 
and limitations of the study are highlighted. We establish why the core of the study is 
dedicated to the empirical measurement and analysis of the major inequality patterns in Iran.  
The empirical methodology and sources of data are briefly described. At the end of the 
introduction a summary of the thesis chapters is provided. 
 
Chapter 1 – Literature Review 
This chapter explores the broad literature on income distribution, and suggests that Iran’s 
inequality patterns cannot be adequately assessed using existing approaches. Income 
inequality debates relating to growth, demography and politics are briefly discussed. 
 
Chapter 2 – Iran, income inequality and the rentier state 
A critical survey of the current academic research approach to income distribution in Iran is 
carried out, and it is suggested that an extension of the rentier literature may provide a better 
framework for addressing the country’s seemingly immovable and consistently high income 
inequality rate. The scarcity of research on Iran’s income distribution is highlighted despite 
welfare economics occupying the heart of Iran’s political economy discourse. Existing 
research is demonstrated to stem from a post-revolutionary perspective and is coupled with 
a fixation on poverty. Both these factors have diverted researchers away from investigating 
the possible structural nature of Iran’s observed inequality. We finish the chapter by combing 
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through rentier theory literature and considering how a host of vertical and horizontal 
inequalities may be difficult to remedy in a rentier state. 
 
Chapter 3 -  
 
Chapter 4 – Methodology 
The methodology chapter starts by providing an account of Iran’s annual household surveys. 
We briefly explore the methodology of the surveys themselves. The benefits of using micro 
data in relation to our study are outlined. The processing of the datasets in preparation for 
the inequality calculations is described. We explore possible proxy candidates for income 
distribution and the reasoning behind finally settling for expenditure data. The choice of an 
appropriate consumption aggregate is also discussed and an empirical comparison is made 
between the various options. Given that the author did not come across an equivalence 
scale for Iran, a separate urban and rural expenditure scale is created to adjust household 
expenditures for family size and makeup. Empirical comparisons between non-scaled and 
scaled data are made. The chapter finishes by surveying the inequality tools to be used in 
the study, and by suggesting methodological improvements for future research. 
 
Chapter 5 – Vertical inequality 
This chapter opens by explaining why we have chosen to empirically examine the 1997-
2010 period. The derived national inequality measures are presented. The urban bias of 
government expenditures is investigated. The small fluctuations apparent in the inequality 
rate are analysed and we suggest that they are mostly related to the top income group and 
the urban/rural divide. We go on to present how the distribution of income has evolved 
during this period. The inequality effect of subsidies and their recent lifting is explored. The 
final section is dedicated to the geographic decomposition of inequality. The ‘Theil index’ 
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inequality measure is broken down into its urban, rural and provincial components, and the 
contribution of these components to the overall inequality rate is presented and discussed. 
 
Chapter 6 – Inter-provincial inequalities 
This chapter starts by considering the significance of regional inequality in Iran. It briefly 
surveys the different approaches adopted by Iran researchers in explaining provincial 
disparities. We go on to present the levels of inter-provincial inequality and thematically map 
the inequalities separately for the urban and rural sectors. We dismiss the traditionally 
accepted notion of Iran being characterized by a rich central region surrounded by a ring of 
poorer periphery provinces. For the period under study, the provinces are examined for 
signs of convergence and polarization. Finally, in the context of the hypothesized rentier 
theory predictions, we test for the relationship between growth and convergence. 
 
Chapter 6 – Horizontal inequalities 
Following chapter five’s focus on inter-provincial inequalities, in this chapter we examine four 
other horizontal inequalities. The differences in ‘within inequality’ between the provinces, the 
urban/rural divide, ethnic regional inequality and the disparity between public and private 
sector headed households. The levels of intra-provincial (within) inequality are presented, 
and their geographic and urban/rural dimensions considered. We test for Kuznets inverted U 
shaped curve in the context of a rentier state. A detailed analysis of the urban/rural divide is 
carried out by comparing how different sections of their respective distributions compare 
against each other. The geographic manifestation of this disparity is also presented. We 
then compare the mean household expenditures of the ethnic dominated regions of Iran 
against the Persian dominated regions. For each ethnicity, we test for signs of convergence 
between the Persian regions and other ethnic regions. Finally we end the chapter by 
examining the horizontal inequality between public and private sector headed households. 
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The inequality ‘between and within’ these two groups, as well as the urban and rural 
dimensions of their disparity is analysed. 
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Chapter 7 – Asset index 
In order to present an alternative to a money-metric inequality measure prone to oil shocks, 
we create an urban and rural asset index for Iran. The reasoning behind their creation, as 
well as the advantages and disadvantages of such wealth indices are discussed. We outline 
the methodological and data challenges of finding the perfect asset mix from the annual 
household survey data. Finally, both the urban and rural asset indices are presented and 
tested for coherence and robustness. They can be used as a quick, reliable and simple 
inequality tool by other researchers to derive a wealth score for any household in Iran, 
without going through the cumbersome and time consuming process of compiling and 
processing expenditure data. 
 
Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
In the concluding chapter we look back at our initial hypothesis and research questions, and 
examine how this research fits into the overall economics literature. The major findings 
arising from the methodology, the literature, the empirical study and the creation of the asset 
index are presented. The empirical findings are presented in tabular format. Based on these 
results, policy recommendations for Iran and possibly other rentier states are outlined. The 
limitations of our analysis and possible avenues of future research following on from this 
thesis are highlighted. Finally, we end the chapter by considering the wider implications of 
our findings. 
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1.0 Literature Review 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter briefly presents the multifaceted approaches within the literature to inequality. 
Debates pertaining to the causality of income distribution such as growth, demography and 
politics are introduced.  A more in-depth literature review focussing on income distribution in 
Iran is provided in chapter two. 
1.2 Defining inequality  
Inequality is not self defining (Cowell, 2000). It is open to a vast array of equally valid 
interpretations. These definitions can be framed by considering what is being distributed and 
amongst whom. As well as money metric measures, such as income, expenditure and 
assets, the ‘what’ can refer to broader concepts of inequality, such as the ease of access to 
education, health or other public goods, or inequality in the availability of capital, social 
mobility and opportunity.  
 The ‘whom’ in inequality analysis is also an open field and as well as other 
measurable units, may refer to the individual, the household, a geographic region or different 
occupations. 
 Within the following literature review we adopt the most commonly used definition of 
inequality by economists, focusing on the distribution of income. This definition is narrowed 
further in the empirical chapters by considering only the distribution of expenditure amongst 
households.  
 Our references to vertical inequality denote the differences between expenditures of 
households within the same group; for instance, the income distribution within Iran, or in the 
rural sector or in the public sector. 
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Horizontal inequality is often the forgotten dimension of income inequality analysis 
(Stewart et al., 2005) and denotes inequality between groups. Frances Stewart, who coined 
the term, defines it as the “existence of severe inequalities between culturally defined groups” 
(Stewart, 2001, p.3). For the purposes of this research, our definition is broader and 
horizontal inequality measures will be estimated between groups which also differ in ‘non-
cultural’ ways. 
 
1.3 The significance of inequality 
 The debate on inequality was, and is to some extent even today dominated by the 
question of whether inequality matters (Jencks, 2002). This debate was sparked by the 
influential paper by Kuznets (1955). By contending that the level of inequality is a by-product 
of growth, Kuznets inadvertently relegated the perception of inequality from an economic 
indicator of grave concern to an inevitable ‘symptom’ of economic growth.  As Stewart 
(Stewart, 2000b, p.5) puts it, the Kuznets curve has sometimes been “used as an excuse, 
for taking no action on income distribution.” 
 Looking at levels of income per capita (not growth of income) across countries, 
Kuznets’ general contention was that inequality would rise during the initial stages of 
development, eventually peak and then start to lower in the latter stages, giving rise to his 
famous inverted U shaped inequality curve. He suggested that this was primarily caused by 
the dynamics of a switch from an agricultural rural based economy to an industrial urban one. 
 Further empirical studies on growth and income distribution have led to at best a 
mixed verdict on the Kuznets theory (Anand and Kanbur, 1993, Deininger and Squire, 1998), 
and a large critical literature has emerged questioning both the premise of the theory and its 
public policy consequences. 
 Critics of the Kuznets theory can be grouped into three broad camps, although they 
are not mutually exclusive. The first camp question the purported mechanism behind the 
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inverted U shaped curve as being a consequence of a sectoral shift from agriculture to 
industry and suggest alternative economic and non-economic indicators as the cause. For 
instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) propose institutional and political changes as the 
primary factors, which result from the growing power and influence of the masses over the 
elite.  Another suggested mechanism is an asset distribution explanation. The initial growing 
inequality in the ownership of assets is diminished as labour incomes rise relative to 
diminishing returns on capital (Aghion and Bolton, 1997). 
 Critics of the theory in the second camp completely reject the notion of an inverted U 
shaped curve all-together. Ahluwalia (1976) finds no evidence of a link between growth of 
per capita income and inequality. Country studies show that inequality has improved during 
growth periods in some and worsened in others, with no obvious linkage to their stage of 
development (Bruno et al., 1996, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002). 
 The third camp takes what can be considered as almost a dichotomous view to 
Kuznets, contending, that in the main, more equal income distribution enables higher growth 
(Adelman and Morris, 1973). It challenges the very notion of the ‘grow first and redistribute 
later’ school of thought. Alesina and Perotti (1994) find that income inequality is inversely 
related to investment and hence growth. They argue that socio-political instability fuelled by 
income inequality brings about this negative relationship. Investigating countries with 
democracies, Persson and Tabellini (1991, p.617) find that “income inequality is harmful for 
economic growth” as it leads to skewed political policies, which do not protect property rights 
and do not optimize return on investment. Perotti (1996) links fertility negatively to the 
income share of the middle class, contending that more equality will reduce the birth rate 
and aid growth. 
 While the mechanisms linking high growth to low inequality may seem anecdotal, 
the main consequence of the critical literature on the Kuznets theory has not been to 
establish an alternative link to growth, but rather to question the validity of the post-
Kuznetsian predicament of choosing between growth or equality for developing nations. This 
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can be seen by looking at the evolution of language by the World Bank from a report in 1974 
(Chenery et al., 1974) which while acknowledging that “active intervention was required to 
manage the distributional consequences of growth processes” (Kanbur, 2000, p.3), is at the 
same time implicitly acknowledging that inequality may be an inevitable consequence of 
growth. But by 1990 the World Bank (World Bank, 1990) was arguing that growth and 
equality could go hand in hand. 
 This view of inequality as a significant economic indicator, which can be influenced 
independently of growth, has brought the literature on the non-growth factors affecting 
inequality to more prominence. Inequality now has a firm footing as a topic of significance in 
its own right. In 1996, the Presidential Address in the Royal Economics Society by Anthony 
Atkinson was titled “Bringing Income Distribution in from the Cold” (Gregorio and Lee, 2002b, 
p.1). This renewed interest for inequality has led to a surge of research exploring the non-
growth factors behind unequal income distribution and the mechanisms for tackling it. 
 
1.4 Factors of influence on income distribution 
1.4.1 Macroeconomic factors 
Apart from growth there are a host of other macroeconomic factors which may 
impact inequality (Kaasa, 2003). Higher inflation has been found to worsen the real incomes 
of the poor in relation to the rich. Bulíř (1998), looking at a set of developing and developed 
economies (including Iran), finds that there is enough evidence to suggest that a lower 
inflation rate will improve the distribution of income, but this is not a simple linear relationship, 
and inflation has a lesser effect as it becomes lower. The relationship is most prominent for 
low to middle income countries with very high inflation rates. There are conflicting studies on 
inflation with Gustafsson and Johansson (1999) finding that the link between inflation and 
inequality may be reversed by introducing a very progressive tax system. 
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 The link between unemployment and inequality is perhaps better established. 
Björklund (1991) finds a link between higher unemployment and worsening income 
distribution for Sweden. Gustafsson and Johansson (1999) find that very high 
unemployment tends to worsen the situation of those at the bottom of the income scale. 
Martínez et al. (2001) find a mixed relationship for OECD countries. However, they also find 
that the poorest are hit by high unemployment. An excess labour supply keeps wages down 
for the most unskilled jobs. 
 Other suggested macroeconomic factors which negatively impact income 
distribution, include the notion that a shrinking of the industrial sector and an expanding 
service sector increases inequality (Levy and Murnane, 1992), as specialized industrial 
skilled workers transit to low paid unskilled jobs. Boyd (1988) and Milanovic (1994) suggest 
that a large public sector reduces income inequality, as wage transfers from the government 
have an equalizing effect. Lee (2005) finds that a large public sector may initially have the 
reverse effect of increasing inequality by the government favouring certain industries and 
elites over others. 
 
1.4.2 Education 
 Demographic causation of income distribution has gained much prominence within 
the literature. Perhaps the most prominent of these are the studies carried out on links 
between inequality and education. It has long been established that more education tends to 
increase the levels of future income (Schultz, 1961); (Gregorio and Lee, 2002a). More 
recently, Stewart (2009) contends that inequality in access to education affects the future 
income of households.There is also a consensus on the general “positive economic returns 
to education” (Salverda et al., 2011, p. 427). However, the link between education and 
income distribution is more complex. For instance in a cross-country study Schutz et al. 
(2008) find that family background (the initial economic wellbeing of a household) affects the 
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educational performance of the children. This can reinforce existing inequalities and cause 
entrenchment or even a worsening of the prevailing income distribution (Machin and 
Vignoles, 2004). Related to this, is the prospect of a highly subsidized higher education 
system at the cost of primary and secondary education. This can lead to negative income 
distribution outcomes (Tilak, 1989). Indeed, a Kuznetsian inverted U shaped relationship 
between educational attainment and inequality has been suggested (Cornia and Kiiski, 
2001). Tilak (1989) even recommends that “Education planners should aim at shortening the 
period of transitional increase of inequality to the extent possible.” Clearly, while there is 
acknowledgment that education may help to reduce poverty and increase absolute levels of 
income, although even this is disputed when the quality and scalability of education is poor, 
see (Wedgwood, 2007), its relationship to the distribution of income is more uncertain. 
 
1.4.3 Health 
 The negative relationship between poverty and health is established in the literature, 
with causality running both ways (Gupta and Mitra, 2004, Salway et al., 2007, Anand and 
Ravallion, 1993). The very poor often do not have sufficient access to health care and the 
very unhealthy have insufficient access to income streams. The linkages between health 
and inequality are however more indeterminate. Although our concern is with health as a 
determinant of inequality rather than as an outcome of it, most studies adopt the reverse 
hypothesis. For instance, Kawachi et al.(1997) link higher income inequality in societies to 
higher mortality and lower social capital. The theoretical mechanisms explaining the impact 
of health on inequality relate to access to labour markets, education, social networks and 
marriage. Marriage being significant as this will affect the total ‘household income’ if 
equivalence scales are not used to account for household numbers. However, looking at a 
large number of empirical studies on causal links between health and income inequality 
Leigh et al. (2009, p.24) conclude no “statistically significant relationship either across 
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countries or over time.” This is not to say that there is no relationship between the two, as 
linkages could be unique (positive or negative) to each specific economic, social or 
geographic setting. Lynch et al. (2000) also attest to no simple relationship between health 
and inequality and suggest complex structural mechanisms determine how one affects the 
other.  
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1.4.4. Age, ethnicity, gender 
Many other demographic factors such as gender, ethnicity and age have been put 
forward as determinants of inequality. For instance older and younger age groups have 
relatively lower incomes (Midwinter, 2006). There is considerable literature on the 
augmenting effect of ethnic diversity on income inequality (Lazear, 1995, Borjas, 1999, 
Malan, 2000, Robinson, 2002) although there are dissenting voices such as (Shi and Sai, 
2009) and (Sullivan, 2011). These studies characterize the role of ethnicity in terms of 
language diversity (Lazear, 1995), networking and role models within communities (Borjas, 
1999), race (Malan, 2000) and relate the concept of ethnically diverse countries 
experiencing relatively more inequality (Robinson, 2002). Alesina and Glaeser (2004) report 
attitudes to race as one of the main determinants explaining the high inequality in the US as 
compared to Europe.  
The most glaring inequality is perhaps the one between men and women. Despite 
high inequalities in developing nations, perhaps due to data availability, gender inequality 
studies have been more prominent in developed nations. Apart from the commonly cited pay 
gap between men and women, Gregory (2009) outlines a number of other major areas 
where gender can affect income distribution. These can be in employment participation with 
social and legal barriers preventing women from applying for jobs. The particular 
occupations women enter into, and have easier access to, can also have a bearing on 
income distribution as different industries and employment sectors offer different pay rates. 
Male and female earnings tend to diverge from the typical woman’s child bearing and child 
caring age, with men earning more as they become older. This is referred to as the 
“motherhood penalty” or “family gap” (Gregory, 2009, p.293). Then there is gender bias in 
promotions and job assignments. Bias in other areas such as education and health can also 
contribute to inequality in the job market. One of the overlooked gender inequalities is in the 
household itself. Most inequality studies (as with this thesis) use the household as the 
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ultimate micro unit of measure. This means that within inequalities, between men and 
women or adults and children in the household itself are overlooked and not accounted for.  
 
1.4.5 Horizontal and regional inequalities 
Horizontal inequality deserves attention from a policy standpoint as it can highlight 
income differences among sections of society which may need to be addressed by a 
targeted approach and cannot be rectified sufficiently by a broader policy drive designed to 
reduce vertical income inequality. A good example demonstrating the need for a distinct 
policy approach can be highlighted by the experience of South American nations vis a vis 
their indigenous populations (Thorp et al., 2006). Without the existence of targeted policies 
for these indigenous groups, they would have simply been side-lined in a more general 
national drive for reducing inequality. It also follows that reducing horizontal inequality is 
sometimes the most efficient method of reducing vertical inequality or indeed meeting 
another broader economic objective. Stewart (2001) points to the tackling of unemployment 
in South Africa by focusing on black youths for example. 
The significance of intra-provincial inequalities (inequality within provinces) has 
gained prominence recently, especially in relation to studies on China (Gravier-
Rymaszewska et al., 2010, Lin, 2009, Long and Ng, 2001). Essentially this is a study of 
vertical inequality but at a more localized level; the comparison of these vertical inequalities 
across the provinces allows us to define it as a horizontal inequality. As well as finding out 
the income distribution of a particular province, these inequalities are also identified in 
research studies in order to assess the rate of provincial growth on the local welfare of the 
population.  
Studies looking at regional conflict also factor in intra-provincial inequality, although 
this is combined with other factors to determine its significance. For example, Stewart 
(2000a) argues that a low level of inequality may lead a region to be more politically united in 
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conflict, but a high level of intra-provincial inequality may also be exploited by local leaders 
to drive home the message of conflict with other groups. 
 
1.4.6 Political economy of inequality 
Apart from horizontal inequalities, other political aspects of inequality have also 
received attention in the literature. These can be viewed from three perspectives. One 
approach has been the study of voting patterns, taxation and the electoral system itself and 
their effects on the income distribution. For instance Huber and Stephens (2001) find that 
federalism leads to less national social spending, with targeted local expenditure being 
preferred. Similarly, Persson and Tabellini (2003) report that constitutional structures affect 
distribution policy. They find that proportional representation (PR) leads to more national 
redistribution than the single past the post system of parliamentary elections which favour 
localized spending. Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002), in an empirical study, find that purchases of 
goods and services (such as schools and hospitals) which are easier to target 
geographically are preferred in first past the post systems. Proportional representative 
systems prefer transfers (subsidies, pensions) which “are easier to target across social 
groups”. Iversen and Soskice (2006) confirm that to a large extent electoral systems 
determine redistribution policy, with coalition governments (arising mostly from a PR 
electoral system) favouring more national redistribution. Looking at the determinants of the 
stark difference in inequality between the US and Europe, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) cite 
political and legal systems as one of the main contributors. Summarizing a whole series of 
such studies, McCarty and Pontusson (2009) conclude that democracy in itself is not 
enough to eliminate or substantially reduce inequality. Different political makeups lead to 
varied patterns of income distribution. This becomes even clearer if the overall inequality 
measure is disaggregated. 
46 
 
Research on electoral systems and inequality is closely related to the taxation 
system. More progressive taxation systems are assumed to be equality enhancing. However, 
in advanced democracies it is argued that the income distribution itself will determine tax 
policy (Voitchovsky, 2009). This relationship between the distribution of income and voting is 
not straightforward. For a start “the pivotal voter may not correspond to the median voter” 
(Voitchovsky 2009, p. 556). The decisive voting block may lie elsewhere in the distribution 
due to other factors and not be determined purely by the tax regime. For instance 
redistribution systems which are universal and also benefit the middle class may lead to 
more progressive taxes and more redistribution. This leads us to the literature on the role of 
the welfare state on inequality. 
The welfare state plays a dual role of what can be termed horizontal and vertical 
redistribution. Horizontal distribution, in the form of social insurance programs, aim to 
smooth life time income for all and is typically earnings related (Hills, 2004). Vertical 
distribution in a welfare state aims to redistribute income from the rich to the poor. Although 
it must be noted that our primary concern is with inequality; a modern welfare state may 
have other purposes than merely redistribution of current income McCarty and Pontusson 
(2009), such as re-training and education (although this can be argued to be another form of 
horizontal distribution). Countries with more vertical distribution would be expected to 
achieve a bigger reduction in inequality. However, this is not generally found to be the case. 
In fact Korpi and Palme (1998) argue that rather than having fixed benefits targeted at low 
income groups, welfare programs should be more universal and earnings related to 
ameliorate inequality. In a cross-country study of eleven OECD countries, they find that this 
approach is more likely to achieve gains in poverty reduction and more equal income 
distribution. They note that well established social insurance institutions (horizontal 
distribution) are crucial as the mechanism of lowering inequality. This ‘paradox’ as they 
describe it, is due to less universal support for the welfare state in countries which focus on 
vertical distribution rather than benefits for all. This inevitably leads to a lower welfare budget 
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with less of an impact. Social insurance programs are also assumed to provide more of a 
working incentive to attract people to the labour market. The effect of welfare programs and 
social provisions cannot be assessed in isolation in regards to inequality. Social composition 
plays a large role in the effectiveness of redistribution by a welfare state (Esping-Andersen 
and Myles, 2009). For instance lone parenthood in the UK and USA is more prominent 
among low-educated women than other countries. Hence egalitarian commitments may 
require different mechanisms for achieving the same objectives. It must be noted that the 
studies outlined so far relate to advanced democracies. The role of the welfare state and 
more generally the public sector is less certain in developing countries. Indeed, Lee (2005), 
in a large cross-country study, finds that large public sectors worsen income inequality in 
non-advanced democracies, and improve it in fully fledged democracies. This he suggests is 
due to non-democracies favouring partisan groups closer to the administration. 
Related to this is a literature family which considers a specific set of unsustainable 
policies termed ‘economic populism’, where “the redistributive objective is the central part of 
the paradigm” (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991, p.9). Populism is defined by Dornbush and 
Edwards (1991) as a set of policies which have a mandate from a large section of society 
but end up hurting the majority, with the groups they were supposed to benefit the most 
experiencing the worst repercussions. Usually attributed to Latin American nations, these 
policies start with radical initiatives to increase growth, generate employment and 
redistribute income. They arise from ‘populist’ concerns of a stagnant and unfair economy. 
Referring to populist economic policies in reaction to such concerns, Sachs (1989, p.30) 
contends that the level of inequality brings about a demand for redistribution, 
“The income distribution in Latin America is a reason for moral concern and a provocation to 
action.” 
Such populist policies are not constrained by inflation targets, preserving foreign 
exchange reserves or avoiding deficits. Populist economics also arises in nations with weak 
political institutions, where politicians are perceived as being part of the ‘rich elite’ and 
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paying only lip service to income re-distribution. This atmosphere gives rise to an 
administration which initiates policies to demonstrate that they represent the “common man” 
and that they are not in the “pockets of the elite” (Acemoglu et al., 2013, p.2). 
 By increasing real wages, the demand for goods and services grows. Higher growth 
and income redistribution vindicate the populist economic policies. Bottlenecks on the supply 
side, the running down of foreign exchange reserves from imports, and rising inflation soon 
lead to an economic crisis. This tends to result in a devaluation of the currency and 
reduction of subsidies. The devaluation causes massive capital flight running down foreign 
reserves further and negatively impacting investment and growth (Dornbush and Edwards 
1991). This results in a severe real wage decrease, undoing the initial primary objective of 
income re-distribution. 
1.5 How Iran fits into the inequality literature 
Before we delve into inequality studies on Iran, it is worth considering how the 
economic inequality determinants mentioned so far, namely, growth, macroeconomic 
indicators and demographics factors relate to inequality in Iran. Our contention is that none 
of these determinants satisfactorily explain the constant and consistently high inequality 
witnessed in Iran over the past decades. 
As we will see in the subsequent chapters, ever since inequality figures were 
compiled for Iran, they have been high and they have remained consistently high. There is 
no consistent pattern of a fall, rise or a Kuznets inverted U shaped curve during the last four 
decades, despite rising, falling and then rising GDP/capita figures. In chapter four of this 
study, we find no evidence of an inverted U shaped inequality curve in a time-series study 
for Iran, and similarly in chapter six we find no cross-regional evidence for such a 
relationship. 
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Crucially, the Kuznet’s mechanism for income inequality falling4 is reliant on the idea 
of urban surplus labour being absorbed into the economy and wages rising. It is also reliant 
on the idea of migration from a relatively equal rural to a more unequal urban sector 
(Kuznets, 1955, p.7-8). However, this is not the case in Iran on both fronts. The rural sector 
exhibits almost comparable inequality to the urban sector as we will see in chapter four. 
Surplus labour in Iran has also persisted post revolution (the average unemployment figure 
for the period under study 1997-2009 has been above 12.5%5). Karl (2004, p.13) draws 
attention to the prevalence of “under-skilled and underemployed workers” in the urban 
sectors of oil economies. This is supported by Cornia and Kiiski (2001) who suggest that 
countries well endowed with natural resources tend to have greater inequality because of 
capital-based technology and a lower need for unskilled labour. The argument is that the 
urban supply of underskilled labour is never effectively absorbed into the economy. Thus the 
mechanisms for Kuznet’s inverted U shape do not exist. 
 Similarly demographic factors do not explain the consistent inequality in Iran. The 
post-revolutionary government has substantially improved literacy rates and extended the 
availability of higher education across the country (Majbouri and Salehi-Isfahani, 2008).  The 
specific effect of education as a variable on income inequality in Iran has not been studied 
extensively and we should be cautious of commenting on its various dynamics; apart from 
commenting that despite considerable educational improvements, overall national income 
inequality seems to have remained consistent for the past four decades. Indeed, over 25% 
of the unemployed in 2008 are reported as having a higher education degree by the SCI.6 
Similarly, there has been a considerable extension of health care services in Iran during both 
the pre and post-revolutionary period (Jafari et al., 2010). As we will see in chapter six, 
                                                 
4
 After an initial growth period of augmenting inequality has led to a certain income per capita being 
reached. 
5
 Source: World Bank 
6
 See the ‘1387’ summary statistics for Iran in www.amar.org.ir. The figures also show the 
unemployed enjoying a higher literacy rate of 97% as opposed to 87% for the employed population. 
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although ethnic income inequalities in Iran still persist, in the most part they seem to be 
falling.  
 The effects of gender on overall inequality are much harder to gauge given the lack 
of data regarding the distribution of expenditure and income within households rather 
between households. However, given the legal and social barriers facing Iranian women, 
anecdotally at the very least, one can attest to gender bias affecting inequality. For instance, 
Iranian women are legally barred from certain occupational posts and in terms of wealth 
inheritance are disadvantaged in relation to their male counterparts. Nevertheless, this does 
not explain the consistently high income inequality both before and after the 1979 revolution. 
The political causality literature on inequality is perhaps more apt in Iran’s case. The 
literature on voting systems is difficult to relate to Iran’s electoral system, given the very 
restricted and ‘unique’ elective process in the country. However, the choice of a central 
rather than a federal system of governance has implications for regional, ethnic and national 
inequality patterns. Iran’s sensitivity to potential internal conflict has its roots in the relatively 
recent notion of a centralized administration in its modern history. A series of political and 
military measures were instituted by Reza Shah Pahlavi in the 1930s to integrate and 
suppress ethnic independence aspirations and to direct national economic development by 
direct central rule over the provinces. During the past 80 years this central administration 
has been tested repeatedly from small insurrections to complete regional declarations of 
independence (Khorshidi et al., 2010). Each time the central government has reacted by 
asserting its centralization instincts rather than being tempted by a federal ideology. This 
characteristic of the central government’s outlook towards the provinces has not shifted 
during the past 80 years. 
This political preamble is significant as it highlights the sensitivity of the government 
in Tehran towards perceived inequality between the provinces and in particular ethnicities. In 
effect, one of the repercussions of central economic control over the provinces is the implicit 
obligation by the ruling administration to ensure a degree of equality between them. A 
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liability which would perhaps not exist, if economic power and planning was put in the hands 
of the provinces themselves. This also allows the central administration to engage in wider 
scale universal national redistribution schemes such as subsidies and price controls, rather 
than focusing on local regional projects. 
Regional inequalities in Iran, as we will see in chapter six, are very high, but on 
disaggregation, the empirical analysis will show that they account for a very small proportion 
of overall inequality in Iran.  There is also no sign of overall convergence between the 
provinces.7 
The ‘populist’ label given to President Ahmadinejad’s government 2005-2013 may 
lead to a notion of populism being behind the inequality pattern prevailing in Iran during this 
period. However, although there are certainly elements of populist economics apparent in 
his administration’s policies, they are not fully in line with populism as defined by Dornbusch 
and Edwards (1991). For a start the initial conditions of widespread poverty and stagnation 
did not exist before his presidency. As Salehi-Isfahani (2008) points out during Khatami’s 
administration, preceding Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the growth rate was positive and stable, 
and the poverty rate had fallen substantially. The urban poverty head count ratio fell steadily 
from 0.3 to 0.1 (Salehi-Isfahani 2008). The inequality rate was high, but it had not increased.  
An extensive subsidies and price control regime was already in place before 
Ahmadinejad’s term in office, and their existence was not due to a new wave of populist 
policies. The move to remove such subsidies is chronicled in populist economics literature 
as coming about due to a fiscal crisis (Dornbush and Edwards 1991). However, in Iran’s 
case the decision to remove subsidies came about before any fiscal crisis. Indeed, (Guillame 
et al. 2011, p. 8) in the chronicling of the subsidy reform program in Iran, state that the 
removal of subsidies was not intended to nor “expected to contribute to fiscal consolidation”.  
There is no doubt that the global financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent recession, as 
                                                 
7
 Although there is a sign of slight urban convergence and considerable rural divergence. But the net 
overall effect is no convergence. 
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well as the imposition of sanctions by the UN security council added a sense of urgency to 
remove the subsidy regime, but it was not the cause nor trigger of their removal. In fact as 
we will see there is a fall in inequality in 2008 due to negative growth, before the subsidy 
reform program. 
The extensive compensatory cash payment scheme which came into being in lieu of 
the removal of subsidies can be viewed as an exercise in populism. These payments would 
represent a substantial portion of income for the very poor. The direct receipt of cash 
payments would perhaps in the short run at least also increase the popularity for a 
government rather than the more indirect nature of subsidies. Nevertheless, it must be 
recognized that any removal of universal subsidies would require some type of targeted 
financial compensatory payment. Viewed from this perspective, such direct financial 
payments could be argued as being a first necessary compensatory measure rather than a 
pre-determined populist one. 
A common symptom of engaging in populist economics is eventual forced currency 
depreciation. The Iranian Riyal’s sudden and substantial depreciation in 2012 seems to fit 
this model. However, it must be remembered that the Iranian Riyal has been in a state of 
depreciation ever since the Islamic revolution of 1979. The recent currency depreciation, 
while inevitable, was also triggered by the sudden loss of oil revenues due to international oil 
sanctions. 
While there are undoubtedly strands of populism present in President 
Ahmadinejad’s reign, they do not in themselves explain the income distribution prevailing in 
Iran and the failure to bring about a trend of falling inequality. Furthermore many of these 
populist strands have been prevalent both before and after Iran’s 1979 revolution and are 
not exclusive to President Ahmadinejad’s government. This leads us to take a look at the 
historical context of inequality in Iran. 
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2.0 Iran, income inequality and the rentier state 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by calling attention to the significance of vertical and horizontal 
inequalities in Iran.  Despite the lack of emphatic research, clues point to considerable 
regional disparities and a consistently high level of national inequality. The need for research 
in this field is made all the more compelling in Iran’s case due to the distinct ethnic and 
cultural inter-provincial differences. 
A critique of the existing approach in explaining the consistently high levels of 
income inequality in Iran is provided. The major criticism put forward is a tendency by 
researchers to look upon the subject with a post-revolutionary mind-set and give rise to 
literature dominated by the evaluation of the Islamic regime’s economic performance rather 
than investigating national and regional inequality in their own right. Hence, the existing 
research suffers from a tendency to ignore the significant structural consistencies that have 
persisted in the Iranian economy both before and after the revolution. In short, a habit of 
looking at what has changed rather than what remains the same. 
Finally, we hypothesize that the best explanatory factor for the consistently high 
level of vertical inequality and vast regional disparities is the Iranian economy’s major 
reliance on external revenue from oil exports. We argue that despite the best efforts of 
administrators to bring about more equitable income distribution, as long as government 
revenues do not derive from domestic productive processes, vertical and horizontal income 
inequalities will persist at consistently high levels. In this endeavour, we bring together 
rentier, vertical and horizontal income inequality literature. 
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2.2 Historical and contemporary context 
Iran’s policy makers have glaringly waved the dual flags of economic and regional equality 
for at least the past five decades. The 1963 White Revolution is an example of a collection of 
mostly land reform policies which, outwardly in any case, aimed to tackle both issues 
(Doroudian, 1976). The motivation and the blueprint of the White Revolution reforms have 
been criticized (Mahdavy, 1965) but at the very least these redistributive policies clearly 
demonstrate the need for central government to be seen to be tackling inequality in the eyes 
of the public. Despite these reforms, consistent national income inequality and “considerable 
variations in regional expenditure inequality” (Pesaran, 1976, p. 277) persisted up to the late 
1970s (Pesaran and Gahvary, 1978). Indeed some observers claim that the populist 1979 
revolution materialized due to increased economic inequalities and the disengagement of 
the rural populace (Muller and Seligson, 1987). 
It is therefore no surprise that the post-revolutionary constitution makes explicit 
references to tackling economic inequality. A distinct article in the constitution is dedicated to 
regional economic parity 8 and the role of the economy is described by the constitution as a 
means, not an end. An egalitarian Islamic economy is what the founders of the revolution 
had in mind (Behdad, 1994). Emphasizing Islam, it is made manifestly clear that the ultimate 
aim of the economy is not the “concentration and accumulation of wealth and maximization 
of profit” but the overall growth and development of each individual.9 Although historic 
                                                 
8
 Article 48 “There must be no discrimination among the various provinces with regard to the 
exploitation of natural resources, utilization of public revenues, and distribution of economic 
activities among the various provinces and regions of the country, thereby ensuring that every 
region has access to the necessary capital and facilities in accordance with its needs and capacity for 
growth.” The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Bern University, International 
Constitutional Law, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html 
 
9
 “In strengthening the foundations of the economy, the fundamental consideration will be 
fulfillment of the material needs of man in the course of his overall growth and development. This 
principle contrasts with other economic systems, where the aim is concentration and accumulation 
of wealth and maximization of profit. In materialist schools of thought, the economy represents an 
end in itself, so that it comes to be a subversive and corrupting factor in the course of man's 
development. In Islam, the economy is a means, and all that is required of a means is that it should 
be an efficient factor contributing to the attainment of the ultimate goal.” The Constitution of the 
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constitutions of most nations are perhaps befittingly idealistic in nature, in Iran’s case this is 
a constitution drawn up barely three decades ago by the founding fathers of the modern 
Islamic regime. Its chapter on the economy reads as much like a party political manifesto of 
policies to be implemented as it does a long-term legal framework. Indeed, in line with the 
constitution, shortly after the revolution wealth redistribution began in earnest (Behdad, 2000) 
with economic planning grounded in socialist ideals (Salehi-Isfahani, 2006a). 
After thirty years these foundational objectives have not been abandoned. President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power on an electoral mandate of improving wealth 
distribution10. This mantra coupled with the numerous highly publicized visits of the 
President to the provinces11, are testament to the rhetoric of equitable wealth distribution 
and regional homogeneity which reside enduringly, side by side, at the heart of Iran’s post-
revolutionary economic doctrine. As Salehi-Isfahani (2008, p. Abstract) aptly puts it “Despite 
nearly three decades of revolutionary government rule, poverty and inequality remain the 
central issues of political debate in Iran.”  
 
2.3 Consistent income inequality 
Given the prominence of an egalitarian society at the heart of Iran’s official economic 
discourse, it is perhaps surprising how little research has been published on national and 
regional income inequality in Iran. As this vast territory of research remains mostly 
unexplored, the few existent research publications have, understandably, initially focussed 
on the invaluable ‘headline’ indicators.12  
                                                                                                                                          
Islamic Republic of Iran, Bern University, International Constitutional Law, 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html 
 
10
 See for example "Ahmadinejad to focus subsidies on Iran's poor", 2008 Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSBLA54169320080625 
11
 “President Wraps Up 21
st
 Trip”, Iran Daily Newspaper, Number 2710, Saturday November 18, 2006 
12
 For example Assadzadeh and Paul (2004) look at 3 particular years and derive national poverty 
figures as well as decomposing the figures into occupations and large geographic regions (not 
provinces). Salehi-Esfahani (2008) derives national poverty and income distribution figures for rural 
and urban areas as a whole. Tabibian’s (2000) detailed study, on poverty in particular, provides 
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Two of the most comprehensive empirical studies on income inequality in post 
revolutionary Iran find that despite a steady fall in poverty after the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, 
household expenditure inequality has remained fairly consistent; estimated on average to be 
above 0.40 on the GINI index13 (Salehi-Isfahani, 2008, Tabibian, 2000). As expenditure is 
used to approximate for income, and given the higher proportional savings of the very rich to 
the very poor, income distribution may even be more unequal in Iran. When it comes to 
comparing the very poor with the very rich, studies find that since the mid 1990s the poorest 
decile have gained in expenditure share relative to the richest decile (Salehi-Isfahani, 2006b, 
p.25, Tabibian, 2000, pp.152-158), however the overall rate of income inequality has more 
or less remained constant. There is also a general consensus that income distribution 
became slightly worse during the years of 1991-1992 when war rationing was ended and 
many consumer prices were left to be decided by the market (Salehi-Isfahani, 2006b, 
Tabibian, 2000, Assadzadeh, 1997, quoted in Assadzadeh and Paul 2004 p.645).  
 
  
                                                                                                                                          
household characteristics of poorer families, effects of subsidies on those families and is much more 
policy oriented. 
13
 The latest national GINI index measure published is by Salehi-Isfahani (2008) for the year 2005. 
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Figure 2.1.1 Iran poverty headcount ratio as calculated by Salehi Isfahani, 1977-2005 
  
Sources: Poverty Lines from Assadzadeh & Paul (2004), 1977-1983 (SCI Publications),  
1984-2005 Salehi Isfahani, Compiled by Salehi Isfahani without the timelines (2007) 
 
 
Figure 2.1.2 GINI Index, inequality of household expenditures Iran 1971-2005 
 
Sources: 1971-73: Pesaran (1976); 1977-83: Behdad (1989); 1984-05:Salehi-Isfahani using Household Survey 
Data, Compiled by Salehi Isfahani without the timelines (2007) 
 
This high level of consistent inequality at first appears unexpected given the vast 
array of revolutionary redistribution efforts over the past three decades. There is a very 
sharp but short-lived decline in inequality immediately after the revolution. This seems to 
suggest that nationalizations and the forceful initial expropriations of income bearing assets 
from those deemed to be closely associated with the pre-revolutionary Pahlavi regime 
(Behdad, 1989) and their redistribution to other sections of the community, lower on the 
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income ladder at that time, has had the most noticeable effect on lowering income inequality. 
This is in line with Stewart’s (2000b, p.10) assertion (but not recommendation) that only 
“very radical action involving asset redistribution” can lead to a significant short-term fall in 
income inequality. Salehi-Isfahani (2008) conjectures that the sudden fall in post-
revolutionary inequality may also be due to the high income bias in the large wave of 
Iranians fleeing the country. 
Both explanations are facets of what Nomani and Behdad (2006, p.33) term post-
revolutionary “Structural Involution”, a structural change resulting from  a “postrevolutionary 
[sic] economic crisis”. Putting income distribution studies on Iran and the literature on post-
revolutionary structural change side by side, it can be argued that the only dramatic 
decrease in national income inequality has come about, for only a brief period, at the very 
beginning of the Islamic Revolution, due to the disintegration of the pre-revolutionary 
economic structures. Post-revolutionary policies since that time have not noticeably 
decreased overall income inequality.  
 
2.4 Persistent regional disparities 
Studies also point to substantial inter regional disparities. Assadzadeh and Paul (2004) find 
large differences in the poverty head-count ratios between various geographic regions in 
Iran for the years of 1983, 1988 and 1993. For example in1993 the head-count poverty ratio 
for Southeastern Iran is given as 0.513 and Northern Iran as 0.250. A report by the United 
Nations and Iran’s Budget and Planning Organization (1999) provides Human Development 
Index (HDI) figures on a provincial basis. These highlight vast regional variations. In the 
most extreme example Sistan and Baluchestan has a HDI figure of 0.54 to Tehran’s figure of 
0.84.  Tabibian (2000) finds that in 1997 the average annual household expenditure in 
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Tehran was more than double the expenditure in Sistan and Baluchestan province.14 
(Sharbatoghlie, 1991) provides numerous urban, rural, provincial and inter city development 
measures to indicate an unequal economic map of Iran. Hence, as with vertical inequality, 
considerable regional horizontal inequalities have also persisted post revolution. 
2.5 Significance of inequality in Iran 
The significance of high national vertical inequality on economic growth (Deininger and 
Squire, 1996, Kuznets, 1955) and on a whole host of social well-being indicators grouped 
loosely under the term ‘social capital’ (Kawachi et al., 1997) has been extensively debated 
by the literature. It is not the purpose of this study to cover the debates on the consequences 
of vertical inequality. However it is worth mentioning two specific lines of argument that 
relate to Iran. 
Empirical studies on Iran seem to indicate a downward trend for poverty, but 
consistently high-income inequality. However, as Ravallion (2001, pp. 17-21) concludes in 
his study of 50 developing countries, high income inequality impedes the poverty reduction 
consequences of growth. In order for the Iranian government to reach its millennium and fifth 
development plan goal of eradicating poverty15, more attention has to be paid to income 
inequality. 
An additional argument is that high income inequality in Iran has contributed to the 
stagnation of the manufacturing sector. Karshenas (1990, p. 204) describes the process of 
how high income inequality in the 1970s led to a “branch economy”. This builds on the idea 
that numerous small production units will supply a small “luxury market” created by a 
lopsided consumption pattern. “The characteristics of income distribution never allowed the 
market for new manufacturing products to become a mass consumption market” (Karshenas, 
1990, p.203). 
                                                 
14
 Tabibian (2000, pp. 54-55) gives a figure of 17,416,755 Riyals average annual expenditure in 1997 
for a household in Tehran and a figure of 7,556,950 for Sistan and Baluchestan province. 
15
 See http://www.undp.org.ir/poverty.aspx for more details 
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The significance of inter and intra-regional inequalities for economic development 
has gained considerable recognition recently (Azzoni, 2001, Arbia et al., 2005, Kanbur and 
Zhang, 2005, Puga, 1999). Stewart (2001) concludes that horizontal inequalities can have 
severe consequences for economic development. These consequences are amplified if the 
inequality is between distinct “culturally defined groups” (Stewart, 2001, p.3). Although 
relations between Iran’s ethnic communities are in the most amicable (Mostofi and Afary, 
2008)16, it is significant that most of the poorest provinces are culturally and ethnically 
distinct. The bottom three provinces in the UNDP (1999) Human Development Index report 
for Iran are Sistan & Baloochestan (Balooch ethnicity), Kurdistan (Kurdish ethnicity) and 
Kohgiluyeh Boyer-Ahmad (mostly Lurs/Bakhtiaris). 
As well as carrying out a study of national vertical inequality in Iran, we will also 
disaggregate the data on a provincial basis. Official pronouncements in Iran cite “Tehran”, a 
primate city, by its own name but sum up the names of all other cities by the single word 
“Shahrestan”. This is an innate recognition, within Iranian society, of a gap between the 
capital city and other regions. However evidence also points to significant inequalities 
amongst the “Shahrestans” themselves (Assadzadeh and Paul, 2004, Sharbatoghlie, 1991). 
Intra-regional inequalities are also recognized as being significant in determining 
regional policy, and any policies designed to improve inter-regional inequalities should take 
into account its effects on intra-regional equality (Reuter, 2004, Stewart, 2005, Stewart et al., 
2009).  
Østby  (2006) carries out a survey of 55 developing countries for the risk of conflict 
related to horizontal inequalities and finds “that what is required to secure peace in 
developing countries is the combination of politically and economically inclusive government.” 
Therefore, the study of the extent and evolution of regional disparities in Iran should be 
significant for future economic development policies and national political stability. 
                                                 
16
 Although, it is interesting to note that one of the main terrorist threats to the Iranian government 
is from Jundallah, with a small support base in the poorest province of Iran, Sistan and Baluchistan.  
For more informatoin http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jundallah 
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Deriving a pattern of functional inequality in Iran is also significant as it may provide 
clues to fluctuations and consistencies in vertical inequality. Immediately after the revolution, 
Behdad (1989, p.337) refers to a considerable shift in income distribution “in favour of wage 
and salary workers” in the urban economy. Interestingly, this is during the same period that 
Salehi-Isfahani (2008) reports a considerable improvement in vertical income inequality. One  
could explain the other, and this is in line with short lived income inequality improvements 
witnessed in populist Latin American administrations, who also improved (but only 
temporarily) income distribution by considerably increasing wages (Dornbusch and Edwards 
1990). We take a brief look at the inequality between public and private sector headed 
households in chapter six. 
 
2.6 Gaps in income inequality research on Iran 
The existing literature has failed to answer the question of high vertical and seemingly high 
horizontal inequalities in Iran satisfactorily due to both empirical and intuitive gaps in 
research. 
 
2.6.1 Few inter-regional empirical studies 
Empirical research on inter provincial economic inequalities is sparse. Assadzadeh and Paul 
(2004) look at poverty across arbitrary geographic regions17 within Iran for the years of 1983, 
1988 and 1993, but not inter-regional income inequality. Grouping provinces into 
approximate geographic regions while producing crisper summarized results, suffers 
intuitively as a number of Iran’s provinces display distinct ethnic and cultural characteristics. 
Valuable insight into their economic prospects will be muffled when averaging out their 
results with other nearby provinces. Tabibian (2000) and Salehi-Isfahani (2008) provide an 
                                                 
17
 i.e. Northern, Northeastern, Southern etc… rather than the actual provinces. This could have been 
due to small sample sizes at the provincial level. 
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urban-rural breakdown for national income inequality but this gives us no clues as to the 
differences between various regions. 
Tabibian (2000) does provide provincial figures for average annual household 
expenditure, but only for the year of 1997 and without any analysis. Inter-provincial HDI 
figures for 1996 are published by the 1999 UNDP and Iran’s Budget and Planning 
Organization Report, and they provide some clues into regional income differences for that 
year, but these are more concerned with ‘development’ indicators rather than a money-
metric measure of inequality. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive study of inter-regional disparities in Iran is by 
Sharbatoghlie (1991). The latest year covered in the study is 1986, two years before the end 
of the Iran-Iraq war and before Iran’s economic revival commenced. The study’s focus 
however is not on income inequality but it is rather an analysis of the general welfare, 
development and economic performance of the provinces.  Najafi and Shooshtarian (2006) 
look at rural and urban poverty for the year of 2003. The rural-urban poverty gap highlighted 
in their study hints at regional income inequality. Noorbakhsh (2003), within the convergence 
literature family, examines inter-provincial average consumption expenditure per capita and 
average income per capita for the two years of 1991 and 2001. A rural-urban split is also 
provided.  Utilizing provincial population weights Noorbaksh (2003, p.14) concludes 
“considerable increase in inequality amongst the urban areas of provinces though there has 
been a decrease in inequality amongst rural areas of provinces.” Published provincial 
averages rather than primary unit data is used in the study and the conclusions are based 
on only two individual years of data. The focus of the study is on convergence and 
polarization. The scale of income inequality between the provinces, their ranking in relation 
to each other and the inequality determinants are not explored. 
All the above studies clearly point to large regional disparities in Iran, but as of yet 
no comprehensive study of these inequalities has been carried out. Numerous crucial policy 
questions remain unanswered simply due to a lack of empirical research. What is the extent 
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of regional inequality? Are Iran’s provinces converging or diverging? What is their 
contribution to overall inequality? How much does the urban/rural divide account for 
observed inequalities?  How does this inequality manifest itself among different ethnic 
groups? This research aims to provide answers to a number of these fundamental questions. 
2.6.2 No time series research 
The limited data provided by the aforementioned studies also tend to be based on isolated 
snapshots in time. As we will see later in this study, this approach can be troublesome in a 
rentier economy which is prone to macroeconomic shocks. There is no evolutionary study of 
annual regional inequality in Iran pre or post revolution. This lack of a trend, makes it difficult 
for researchers to arrive confidently at any conclusions regarding the effects of evolving 
national and regional government policy on income inequality. 
 
2.6.3 No intra-regional analysis 
While inter regional analysis can at best be described as extremely limited, published intra 
regional research is possibly non-existent post revolution18.  Pesaran (1976) reports on pre-
revolution intra-regional inequality. He finds that there is some evidence for Kuznets theory 
of low income inequality for the very poor and very rich regions, and a higher income 
inequality for middle income regions. To the best knowledge of this author, there is no 
research paper on the evolution of household expenditure distribution within each individual 
province post revolution. Again many questions of significance for policy makers and 
researchers remain unanswered. What is the spread of inequality within the provinces? 
Does Iran have regions with low inequality? Do the poorest provinces also display the worst 
income inequality? Has income inequality improved over time within the provinces? Is within 
                                                 
18
 This author has not found any evolutionary study of intra-regional inequalities for the post-
revolutionary period. 
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inequality linked to the rate of growth? Such valuable policy insights may only be gained 
after comprehensive empirical research, which this study will partialy attempt to address. 
The gap in the research is not purely empirical. Let us take an intuitive step back 
and look at how the few existent studies have approached the topic of income inequality in 
Iran. 
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2.7 Existing approaches by the literature to income inequality in Iran 
2.7.1 Coupling poverty with income distribution 
Income inequality in Iran has received little empirical attention over the past three decades. 
This is partly due to a genuine lack of available data outside Iran and a misguided notion 
that economic data sources inside Iran are limited (Salehi-Isfahani, 2006a, p.2). However, 
another reason for the constancy of income inequality in Iran not being convincingly 
addressed is the habit of empirical research papers to treat both Iran’s poverty and income 
inequality trends under the same banner19. This inevitably leads to income inequality taking 
a back seat in the discussions and conclusions, ironically enough because of its very 
constancy. 
 Whereas, post-revolution poverty in Iran displays up and down trends and is thereby 
more suited to cause and effect analysis, income inequality remains largely uniform. Apart 
from observing that “overall inequality in Iran has not been only resilient to policy changes 
but also to the revolution itself”(Salehi-Isfahani, 2008, p. 33), the underlying reasons for this 
resilience have not been adequately explored nor explained. 
 
2.7.2 The pre-revolution / post-revolution approach 
Given the coupling of high income inequality with poverty and the revolution’s aim of 
eradicating both (Amuzegar, 2005), references to inequality by economists are in the context 
of evaluating the Iranian regime’s post-revolutionary performance rather than assessing the 
underlying causes of Iran’s high and consistent income inequality in its own right. Just 
because the 1979 revolution aimed to reduce income inequality, it does not follow that we 
                                                 
19
 For example look at the titles of all the three main studies since the revolution: 
(Assadzadeh 1997) “Income Distribution and Poverty in Iran” 
(Tabibian 2000).  “Poverty and  Income Distribution in Iran. 
 (Salehi-Isfahani, D. 2008). "Poverty, inequality, and populist politics in Iran." 
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should address this issue by investigating what the revolution failed or did not fail to 
accomplish. 
The two most extensive empirical studies on Iran’s income inequality highlight 
policies adopted by the post-revolutionary regime and then judge the effects of those 
policies on poverty and income inequality (Salehi-Isfahani, 2008, Tabibian, 2000). While this 
approach is intuitively understandable, the danger is that it can unwittingly paper over 
fundamentals of the Iranian economy that persisted both before and after the revolution and 
are to an extent independent of administrative policy. These fundamentals may indeed be 
more explanatory than post-revolutionary policy when it comes to explaining income 
inequality and regional disparities. Salehi-Isfahani (2008, p. 29) alludes to this in his own 
study when commenting on the consistency of income inequality, “A possible lesson from 
this observation is that, unlike poverty, inequality outcomes are structural and are not easily 
affected by policy or in this case even a social revolution.” Tabibian (2000) also contends 
that growth, both before and after the revolution, seems to have had an adverse effect on  
income inequality. This clearly points to some type of structural causation within the 
economy that has not been remedied by either pre or post-revolutionary administrations. 
As already discussed, the data available seems to suggest that despite contrasting 
socialist and liberal macro policies over the past three decades, income inequality has 
remained consistently high. Therefore, the danger of focussing on post 1979 policy making 
is to give both unfair credit and apportion unfair blame to government policies and to ignore 
more fundamental structures and relations within the economy which have remained 
immune to the revolutionary zeal. 
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2.7.3 Iran’s post-revolutionary inequality riddle 
The question, which then emerges, is why national and inter-regional economic inequalities 
have seemingly remained consistent despite the revolutionary redistributive policies of the 
Islamic regime? 
 Perhaps a more productive intuitive approach to answering our inequality question is 
not to look at changes, which have taken place before or after the revolution, but to observe 
what has remained the same. In short, it is in the similarities of the economy present before 
and after the revolution where we are most likely to find our explanations for consistent and 
persistent national and regional income inequalities. 
If the conclusion of the limited income inequality research on Iran is that post 
revolution, the rungs of the economic ladder have remained the same and redistribution 
efforts have simply switched the people standing on them (Behdad, 1989, p.353, Salehi-
Isfahani, 2008, p.33), the next question which then needs to be answered is why have the 
rungs of the ladder remained the same? 
In this respect two main factors dominate Iran’s economy and its regions both pre 
and post revolution; its reliance on oil, and its vast geography with numerously distinct 
provincial characteristics. Without jumping to conclusions, before a comprehensive empirical 
study is carried out, we can at least make a reasonable assumption that it is within this 
political economy framework, i.e. a framework which applies to both pre and post-
revolutionary Iran that we are most likely to find satisfactory explanations. 
The political economy question for the purposes of our empirical research is: 
Are there inherent characteristics within a resource rich economy which, despite the 
redistributive efforts of the central government, make it difficult to reduce national and 
regional income inequality? 
In order to develop this framework, we now turn our attention to rentier and regional 
inequality literature as it relates to Iran, which provide the theoretical underpinnings for this 
research. 
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2.8 Vertical inequality in a rentier state 
The theory of rentierism, is not so much a theory but rather an observation of economic and 
socio-political structures that take shape in a country dependent on external sources of 
revenue deriving from a domestic natural resource. The concept of a ‘rentier state’ was put 
forward by Mahdavy (1970) in relation to the growing reliance of Iran’s economy on rising oil 
revenues from the late 1950s. 20 Generalizing Iran’s case to other oil-rich economies 
Mahdavy concluded that “oil revenues received by the governments of the oil exporting 
countries have very little to do with the production processes of their domestic economies” 
(Mahdavy, 1970, p.429). Mahdavy compares this to the inflow of gold into 16th century Spain. 
Sachs and Warner (1995, p.1) in their well known ‘resource curse’ paper also refer to how 
“resource-poor Netherlands eclipsed Spain, despite the overflow of gold and silver from the 
Spanish colonies in the New World”. Rentier theory can be looked upon as a special case of 
the resource curse literature family. 
As oil revenues become the major source of revenue for the state and the economy, 
there is an intuitive transition from a rentier economy to a rentier state, because the 
government derives its major share of revenue from an external revenue source. These 
revenues are external to the domestic economy and a very small minority is engaged in their 
generation, “the rest of the society is only engaged in the distribution and utilisation of this 
wealth” (Beblawi, 1987, p.51). Notably the government’s role becomes solely an “allocative” 
one (Luciani, 1987, p.70). We will now extend the rentier theory literature into how it may 
lead to consistently high national and regional income inequalities. 
 
2.8.1 Implications of rentier theory for inequality 
A large part of a nation’s inequality pattern derives from fundamental structures shaped in 
the past (Stewart, 2000b), such as the entrenched distribution of capital. In Iran, families, 
                                                 
20
 It is interesting to note that Mahdavy (1970)  realized the negative impact of growing oil revenues 
on the structure of Iran’s economy before the major rise of oil revenues in the 1970s. 
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state and pseudo state organizations are still typically the end-nodes of such a distribution of 
capital rather than private corporations with millions of shareholders (Maloney, 2000). 
Stewart (2000b, p.10) points out that for most economies unless there is “very radical action 
involving asset redistribution” major improvements in income distribution should not be 
expected in the short run. 
What is particularly interesting in Iran’s case is that despite the very radical asset 
redistributive policies following the revolution (Behdad, 1994), and over thirty years of 
encouragement of an equality inducing ‘Basiji culture’21 we find that the level of inequality 
has still not changed. A forewarning for Iran’s policymakers that inequality in Iran is not so 
easily shifted, should have come from the land reform program of the White Revolution in 
1963, which also failed to bring about the desired equality enhancing outcomes (Pesaran, 
1976, Mahdavy, 1965).  To find an explanation for this entrenched inequality we turn to the 
fundamental nature of Iran’s economy which has been reliant on oil since the early 1960s, a 
state whose revenue has been dominated by external oil rents. 
Although we wish to highlight the rentier implications for inequality, it should be 
noted that many non-rentier states may have many common structural characteristics 
impacting on their income distribution. For instance political institutions in the hands of a rich 
elite or weak fiscal systems are common in many developing countries. Although, the rentier 
nature of a state may be a barrier to shifting income distribution, its removal is not sufficient 
in achieving such an objective. In figure 2.1.2b we can see that three non-rentier countries in 
close proximity to Iran have also not shifted their income distribution significantly. Although 
in Egypt and Pakistan’s case they display considerably less inequality. 
  
                                                 
21
 See http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13900903000330 (in Persian) on President 
Ahmadinejad’s speech exalting ‘Basiji culture’ for being able to eradicate income inequality. The 
term Basiji refers to “Basij-e Mostazafin”, meaning the "Mobilization of the Oppressed". 
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Figure 2.1.2b Gini coefficients, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, 1990-2010 
 
 
Rentier state theory is not primarily concerned with income inequality, nor does it 
make any explicit predictions regarding its dynamics, nevertheless in the founding paper on 
the rentier state, Mahdavy (1970, p.466) succinctly sums up the core problem of inequality in 
a rentier setting: 
“The problems [of income distribution] are more serious in Rentier States because of the 
concentration of vast external rents in few hands. The temptations for a government 
bureaucracy to turn into a rentier class with its own independent source of income are 
considerable.”  
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It is precisely this “independent source of income” accruing to the central state, 
devoid of linkages with the domestic economy which has numerous implications for vertical 
and horizontal income distribution.  
Gray (2011) provides a critique of classic rentier theory. He argues that 
phenomenon such as globalization and technological change have affected the Persian Gulf 
Arab states and that they have entered into a ‘late rentierism’ stage. This is less apparent in 
Iran where a sustained sovereign wealth fund has not been successfully established, and 
unlike sheikhdoms such as Dubai, Iran is still heavily reliant on its oil revenues. Furthermore, 
as far as income inequality is concerned, it is still mostly the political institutions which 
determine the distribution of economic resources. Hertog (2013, p.2) accepts that Persian 
Gulf states (GCC) are integrated into the global economy and have established non-oil 
economic activities but describes much of this late diversification as being “driven by state-
owned companies” and describes it as “more sophisticated rent recycling.” 
 Even Gray (2011, p.37) accepts that in the Persian Gulf “rentierism remains the 
theory with the most utility and cogency in explaining the political dynamics”. Hence in the 
case of Iran we can extend the classic rentier theory literature to a non-exhaustive list of 
implicit income inequality predictions. Nevertheless Gray’s contention remains valid that 
rentier states have the ability to evolve and modify their nature.  
Our contention is that the structure of a rentier state in Iran reinforces a unique set 
of income distribution dynamics which are not always pulling in the same direction. In the 
next sections, we peruse the literature investigating the income distribution implications of a 
number of classic rentier traits, including: fiscal weakness, domination of rentier classes, 
populist poverty alleviation, shrinking rural sector and provincial inequality. 
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2.8.2 Weak fiscal setup 
Given the consistent inflow of large oil revenues rentier states veer towards subsidies and 
find it politically hard to introduce strong fiscal tools. Note the unrest in Iran following the 
introduction of the 2008 VAT tax and the rationing of heavily subsidized fuel.22 VAT is not 
even a progressive tax, yet its introduction has been politically opposed by the higher 
income Bazzaris (traditional merchants). The situation was the same before the revolution, 
Mehran (1975, quoted in Behdad 1989, p. 333) finds that Iran’s fiscal system  "had virtually 
no equalizing effects". This structural caveat in Iran’s economy has been present both before 
and after the revolution.  Garaibeh (1987), in his study of the tax policies of Kuwait, notes 
that taxes are not imposed “simply because revenue is not needed” due to high external oil 
revenues. Yates (1996, p.36) takes the debate one step further and argues that “engaging in 
extractive fiscal policy” would be unpopular and would endanger the survival of the powers 
administrating the rentier state. 
Whatever the reasoning, by not having strong fiscal measures in place, rentier 
states, such as Iran, lose one of their most important redistributive ‘power tools’ for shaping 
the pattern of income inequality. In a recent paper, Stewart, Brown et al. (2009) make 
proposals as to the type of tax measures which should be put into place to alleviate vertical 
and horizontal inequalities. However, by definition, fiscal measures are simply not possible in 
a rentier state with very limited fiscal tools, such as Iran. 
 
2.8.3 Rentier classes 
Rentier states lead to the formation of rentier classes (Beblawi, 1987, First, 1974, Luciani, 
1987, Mahdavy, 1970, Yates, 1996). This results from the almost purely allocative nature of 
the government, and its administrators playing such a big role in distributing the revenue. 
These class formations result in persistent structural functional inequalities. As (Nomani and 
                                                 
22
 See “As Economic Unrest Intensifies, Ahmadinejad Backs Down”, Fox News, 15
th
 October 2008, 
http://foxforum.blogs.foxnews.com/2008/10/15/alireza_1015/ 
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Behdad, 2007) note  “An important objective of our class approach to the study of the 
workforce in Iran is the identification of structured inequalities in economic activities.” 
Evidence of the structural nature of these inequalities is the failure of the 1979 revolution to 
undo these class structures. Initially (1979-1980), extensive nationalization and expropriation 
of enterprises and individual assets took place. Behdad (1989, pp. 329-333) demonstrates 
that the new nationalized enterprises, considerably increased wages in real terms among 
workers and axed many managerial jobs. "Thus, between 1978 and 1981, in the urban 
economy, the functional distribution of income changed significantly in favor of wage and 
salary workers and against those who received their income in the form of profit, interest, 
and real estate rental payments." This corroborates with the very sudden and equally short 
lived improvement in national income inequality in Salehi-Isfahani’s (2008, p.20) study.  
 However, shortly after “with the normalization [italics are this author’s addition] 
process, which started in 1981, the redistributive trend was reversed” (Behdad, 1989, p.337).  
The implication here is that there is a ‘normal’ mode of class structure in Iran that is to be 
expected. In his study of Gabon’s oil boom, Yates (1996) argues that through its public 
expenditure, a rentier state, via discretionary contracts, favourable loans, untargeted 
subsidies and other rent seeking activities, creates a set of rentier classes in the economy. 
Public sector administrators and the urban service sector are the principal winners. 
In Iran’s case, the people in the classes may be different but the pre-revolution class 
structures return after a short transitional revolutionary period. Tabibian (2000, p.215) finds 
that rises in the oil price significantly benefit the highest income decile more than any other 
income group. 
To illustrate this point further, let us have a look at the literature on the post-
revolutionary trusts setup in Iran with the aim of bringing about better wealth distribution, 
namely the ‘Bonyads’. These ‘charitable’ foundations were setup to take over much of Iran’s 
expropriated and nationalized assets and industry. Their role was a dual one of development 
and wealth distribution (Maloney, 2000). Commanding a huge portion of Iran’s industrial 
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capacity (Behdad, 2000, p.112), profits were supposed to be dispensed to the needy rather 
than ‘rich capitalists’. In Maloney’s words the Bonyad23 was “the centrepiece of the Islamic 
Republic’s commitment to social justice and a more equitable distribution of the national 
wealth” (Maloney, 2000, p.155). In her critique of these foundations, Maloney argues that far 
from helping Iran’s economic development, due to favourable treatment, tax exemptions and 
political clout, they have managed to “muscle out the small businessman” (Maloney, 2000, 
p.163). Bjorvatn and Selvik (2008, p.2318), describing the Bonyads as “shadow economic 
forces”, argue that these organizations operate on the basis of patronage and friendships 
with close associates receiving lucrative  contracts. 
Thus, as illustrated by the example of the Bonyads, the rentier nature of the state 
imposes structural functional inequalities despite considerable initial efforts by the 
government to disrupt such inequalities. In his study of occupational inequalities for the year 
1997, Tabibian (2000, pp. 75-76) finds that the higher income deciles are dominated by 
public sector workers and the service industry, whereas the lowest income decile consists of 
mainly private sector and agricultural workers. The reliance of Iran’s economy on oil rents 
has significant consequences for inherent functional inequalities. 
 
2.8.4 Globally uncompetitive industry 
In her study of the Libyan revolution and the subsequent oil bonanza, Ruth First (1974, 
p.169) refers to a notion of public policy described as “shooting pigeons with rockets”. This is 
the idea that a rentier state funds projects that may be intended to please rather than to 
produce.  As the state is the main allocator of resources in a rentier state, the temptation for 
administrators is to choose the populist route. Abdel-Fadil (1987, p.84) finds that during the 
1970s oil boom rentier states spent “a sizeable portion of their revenues” on construction 
projects. Lavish highways, dams and residential housing schemes took precedence over 
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 Maloney (2000) was referring to the biggest Bonyad, the Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan 
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industrialization. Construction projects are viewed as being immediately visible and hence 
populist in nature (Seers, 1978, quoted in Abdel-Fadil 1987, p.84). A booming service sector 
develops around these rent-funded public works, leading to occupation inequality between 
workers in services, industry and agriculture. 
 First (1980) argues that even sectors which use oil as an input tend to be neglected 
as their production is “highly complicated” and they can simply be imported. See this quote 
from an official in Iran’s National Oil Company (Stern, 2006), “Given the fact that our 
refineries are out-dated and that NIOC does not have the necessary funds to build new 
refineries and that the private sector does not engage in the business of construction of 
refineries due to the low profits involved, import of gasoline is more economically feasible 
than building refineries.” The National Iranian Oil Company official is berating the fact that 
funds are not made available to them for long-term projects. 
 
2.8.5 Helping the poor but worsening inequality 
The general consensus is that poverty rates in Iran have dropped since the Islamic 
revolution (Salehi-Isfahani, 2008, Tabibian, 2000). Economic growth and numerous 
government policies may be poverty reducing. However, we wish to survey the literature and 
highlight two specific policies by the Iranian government to improve general welfare, as they 
are good examples of how despite their poverty reduction attributes, these policies have not 
reduced and may have in fact increased income inequality. 
Yates (1996, p.23) alludes to a mentality by administrators in rentier states which 
leads them to believe that they “can purchase their development.” He argues that 
development is often seen as a product rather than a process. Similarly, Ruth First (1974, 
p.162), in her look at economic administrators in oil rich Libya, asserts, “The idea seems to 
be that money can buy anything, and that more than enough money can buy everything.” 
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In essence, blunt direct financial instruments are favoured over the development of 
productive capacity. One specific policy by the Iranian government has been the use of 
extensive subsidies on fuel, basic foodstuffs and the utilities to decrease poverty (Najafi and 
Shooshtarian, 2006). While this will help the poor, Tabibian (2000) in his study of Iran’s 
1996/199724 household surveys finds that the rich, in absolute terms, are benefitting much 
more from the subsidies than the poor, hence it is a policy measure which actually tends to 
worsen income inequality. He finds that in 1996, whereas the richest income decile 
purchased almost 100 litres of heavily subsidized petrol per month, the poorest decile barely 
purchased 5 litres25 (Tabibian, 2000, p.93).  Tabibian goes on to estimate that the subsidies 
accruing from fuel to the top income decile is equivalent to the total household budget of the 
bottom decile. He also finds that the rich are benefitting much more from energy subsidies 
but not from basic foodstuffs where the benefits are more even. Hence, oil rents in the form 
of fuel and utility subsidies, while helping to reduce poverty, are accruing more to the rich 
than the poor in absolute terms worsening income inequality. 
The second policy of the post-revolutionary government we wish to highlight has 
been the encouragement of direct non-financial and financial aid to the poor. Tabibian (2000, 
pp.127-134) finds that most of the financial aid for the calendar year 1997/199826  does 
indeed reach the poor. More than 37% of direct financial aid reaches the poorest decile. 
However, the situation with non-financial aid is quite different. Non-financial aid can take the 
form of basic foodstuffs and household items. The top income decile receives 38% of the 
non-financial aid compared to 4% for the lowest decile. Whereas financial aid is dispensed 
via the welfare ministry and charitable organizations, non-financial aid is typically dispensed 
through public sector companies to their workers. The top administrators having access to 
first pickings (Tabibian, 2000, p.132). 
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 1375 in Iran’s calendar. 
25
 Please note that this figure has been construed from a chart provided by Tabibian (2000) and not 
from a table. 
26
 1376 in Iran’s calendar 
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The key to the success of such ‘welfare purchases’ by the state is the selection of 
appropriate distribution channels. Rentier states tend to encourage a huge role for the public 
sector and give rise to a top down allocative pyramid. In such an environment, mass 
subsidies and even some forms of direct aid do not improve and may even worsen income 
inequality. 
 
2.8.6 Brain drain 
It is interesting to note that Iran’s economy seems to have been incapable of 
absorbing much of its newly educated skilled workforce. According to an IMF report 
(Carrington and Detragiache, 1999) 15% of Iran’s tertiary educated population emigrated to 
the United States and the percentage to OECD countries was 25%. This is a cautionary tale 
that the failure of the domestic economy to absorb a large proportion of the newly educated 
population will inevitably diminish positive effects of educational investment on income 
inequality.  
 
2.8.7 Regional and horizontal inequalities in a rentier state 
Before we look at how high levels of inter-regional inequality may come about and persist in 
a rentier state, it is worth making the point that even in the regions where the oil is generated 
the local economy does not seem to benefit many of the residents. Mahdavy (1970) noticed 
a fixed negligible contribution to the local regional economy by the oil industry. What 
Hirschman (1958) would have termed a lack of “forward and backward linkages”. Mahdavy 
found that increasing oil revenues did not require further inputs from the local economy, nor 
were there any forward linkages, as there were no domestic upstream industries. Abdel-
Fadil (1987, p.84) in his study of oil-rich Arab countries reaches the same conclusion, 
“linkages between the oil sector and the rest of the economy are very limited in oil-rentier 
states”. 
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 As well as regions, rentier classes control which cultural activities and which 
ethnicities receive the most funding (Yates 1996). Depending on the allocative objectives, 
this can improve or worsen horizontal inequalities.  
 
2.8.8 Rural-urban income inequality 
Ruth First (1974, p.120), in her study of the Libyan oil boom, puts forward the idea that in a 
rentier state the usual development process of ‘rural to industrial to services’ is reversed.  
Due to the central government’s expenditure of oil revenues, the services sector “grows to 
elephantine proportions.” This in turn leads to a rapid process of urbanization and rural-
urban disparity. 
 During Iran’s twenty year oil boom from 1956 to 1976, the number of managers in 
the urban sector grew by 400%, in the rural sector it grew by 13%.27 During 1959-1976, “the 
ratio of urban to rural consumption expenditures per capita doubled” (Sharbatoghlie, 1991, 
p.96). During this oil boom period, Sharbatoghlie (1991) asserts that rural-urban income 
distribution inequalities took shape due to the inflow of employment, capital and 
entrepreneurship into the cities. Amirahmadi (1986, p.516) contends that by the mid 1970s 
the income gap between the rural and urban areas was 8:1. Karshenas (1990, p.228) points 
out how in an oil economy public sector expenditure in parallel with a large subsistence 
agricutlural sector will lead to a “worsening distribution of income”. 
 
2.8.9 Inter-provincial income inequality 
In order to tackle the topic of how a rentier state may give rise to persistent regional 
inequalities, we briefly turn our attention to convergence literature. 
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 Source: The Statistical Year book of 1966 and 1980, table provided in p.95 SHARBATOGHLIE, A. 
1991. Urbanization and regional disparities in post-revolutionary Iran, Boulder, Colo., Westview 
Press. 
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 Convergence literature is focussed on growth and we are concerned specifically 
with income inequality. Although it is not the intended purpose of this literature review to 
cover the general literature on regional inequalities and to only focus on inequality as it 
relates to a rentier state, for the sake of seeing how a rent seeking economy fits into the 
existing literature family, we will take a brief look at the two main schools of thought on 
regional inequality. 
The neo-classical view of regional inequality is that given perfect factor mobility and 
perfect competition regional inequalities are temporal and will disappear over time 
(Williamson, 1965, Solow, 1956). Factor price convergence comes about due to capital and 
labour mobility, and regional convergence occurs due to diminsihing returns to capital and 
labour. Williamson’s (1965) inverted U shape curve is a ‘Kuzentsian’ view of regional growth,  
namely that regional inequalities are low at the beginning of development, reach a peak 
during the middle cycle, “while mature growth has produced regional convergence” 
(Williamson, 1965, p.44). 
Myrdal’s (1957) circular and cumulative causation theory (CC theory) envisages a 
virtuous circle of capital, talent and higher than average returns accumulating in favoured 
regions, and a viscious circle of “backwash” effects on the other regions. Although, Myrdal 
also mentions positive “spread” effects, his argument is focussed on divergence. Similarly, 
Kaldor (1966, 1970), although with a different CC theory, emphasizes how regional 
divergence can occur during growth. The current consensus seems to be that of 
convergence within specific subsets of developed economies (Jian et al., 1996). Sachs and 
Warner (1995) divide nations into closed and open economies, and find that economies 
connected by free trade tend to converge, unlike closed economies.  
The convergence evidence on regions within developing countries is mixed. The 
countries most often cited in the studies are China, India, Brazil and the South East Asian 
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nations28, none of which can be described as ‘rentier states’. However, in China’s case, a 
crucial piece of insight can be gained from the numerous coastal-inland inequality studies, 
and this is where we find an analogy with the rentier states. For China’s ‘central planning’ 
implies certain regions may be favoured over others. As Jian, Sachs et al. (1996, p. 4) put it, 
“Tendencies towards convergence in centrally planned economies would therefore tend to 
be somewhat accidental in character. Central planners might or might not allocate capital to 
the poorer regions... However, given the strong lobbying pressures of state enterprises in 
the socialist system, it is more likely that bureaucratic allocations of physical capital will tend 
to flow to existing concentrations of state enterprises, rather than to new geographical areas.” 
Although it would be a mischaracterization to describle Iran as a centrally planned 
economy (See Salehi-Isfahani, 2006a, p.3), the allocative power of a rentier government 
makes it the key player in determining the fate of the provinces. Rents may accrue to some 
prvoinces more than others. In effect, rent seeking if concentrated in particular provinces, 
can manipulate regional factor mobility and factor price conversion. In the only published 
study (known by this author) of rent seeking on regional convergence in Iran, Dreger, 
Rahmani et al. (2007, p.11) use “private sector demand deposits” from bank balance sheets 
in Iran as a proxy for regional GDP and investigate the effect of rent seeking on 
convergence. The authors find “the presence of rent-seeking activities seems to weaken the 
convergence process. The impact of rent-seeking turns out to be higher if there is an 
increase in government expenditures which provides the opportunity for more rent seeking.”  
Rent seeking (different from the notion of a rentier state) describes any activity 
which realizes gains by ‘non-productive’ behavior (Krueger, 1974, Tullock, 1967). In a rentier 
state, this may take the form of biased tenders, overpriced public contracts, lucrative import 
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  For a good review of regional convergence literature on China see KANBUR, R. & ZHANG, X. 
2005. Fifty Years of Regional Inequality in China: a Journey Through Central Planning, Reform, and 
Openness. Review of Development Economics, 9, 87-106. For India, RAVALLION, M. & DATT, G. 2002. 
Why has economic growth been more pro-poor in some states of India than others? Journal of 
Development Economics, 68, 381-400. For Brazil, AZZONI, C. 2001. Economic growth and regional 
income inequality in Brazil. The Annals of Regional Science, 35, 133-152, FERREIRA, A. 2000. 
Convergence in Brazil: Recent Trends and Long-Run Prospects. Applied Economics, 32, 479-89. 
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licenses, illegal construction permits, subsidized loans, discretionary grants etc. Our 
contention on the effects of a rentier state directly on regional income inequality are two fold.  
Firstly, rent seeking activities may occur in certain regions more than others. This 
would be the not-so-accidental ‘historical accident’ cited in agglomeration literature 
(Ottaviano and Puga, 1998, p.15) leading to one region having “first nature” advantages over 
others (Krugman, 1993a, p.129). In Iran’s case, Dreger, Rahmani et al. (2007) find that rent 
seeking activities are concentrated in Tehran. These rent seeking activities draw in talented, 
educated and entrepreunial people from other regions (Murphy et al., 1993). Businesses 
agglomerate in Tehran, and “Even many businesses located in other regions are organized 
from Tehran” (Dreger et al., 2007, p. 10). 
Secondly, persistent rents work against spread effects and regional convergence 
tendencies. That is not to say that the main urban hubs accruing rent may not converge, but 
that the rest of the non-hub regions may never have a chance to catchup as long as extra 
rent consistently benefits the hubs. In effect, the “second nature” advantages of these hubs 
(Krugman, 1993a, p.129), i.e. the concentration of demand, supply and transportation is 
given an extra boost by more rents year on year. Urban hubs such as Tehran, Karaj, 
Esfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Mashhad (identified as lying in hub provinces by (Farmanesh, 2009, 
p.22) benefit from capacious annual construction projects29, whereas as a number of studies 
point to a lack of investment in inter-regional transport as a major cause of inequality and 
poverty in Iran’s poorer regions (Farmanesh, 2009, Piran, 2000, Sadeghi et al., 2001). 
Certain provinces stay at the top of the income rankings and others firmly rooted to the 
bottom. This is indeed confirmed by one of this study’s empirical findings in chapter 5 (See 
figure 5.5.3). 
Thus the initial external oil revenues allocated by the government can benefit certain 
regions over others boosting the rapid growth of certain urban hubs. This inital advantage is 
                                                 
29
 For example, Tehran has the biggest Metro system in the Middle East and all the other urban hubs 
mentioned i.e. Karaj, Esfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz and Mashhad are constructing Metro systems. The Karaj 
metro is simply an extension of the Tehran metro. 
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amplfied as rents attract more rents leaving regions ‘ouside the system’ struggling to 
catchup. 
Two words of caution on using convergence literature to insinuate increasing or 
decreasing regional income inequality. Firstly, inter-regional convergence may mask 
differing and divergent intra-regional inequalities. If using household surveys as a data 
source for example, the average household income for two regions may be converging but 
their individual income inequalities worsening. Indeed, according to Puga (1999, p.30), 
Esteban (1997) finds that while there has been convergence between European Community 
countries in the 1980s, there has been a “rise in income inequalities between European 
regions within each country .” Arbia, Dominicis et al. (2005) find a similar result for the EU for 
the period 1977-2002. Therefore, in our research as well as testing for inter-regional 
convergence in Iran, we will need to test for the evolution of individual intra-regional 
inequalities during the same period. Reuter (2004) carries out such a study of intra-regional 
disparities in China. Significantly, he finds considerable variations of intraregional inequality 
between the various provinces, and that these have a significant impact on inequality as a 
whole. 
The second point to bear in mind when using a convergence approach for a rentier 
state is that what’s on paper regarding regional per capita GDP differs from real incomes of 
the vast majority of individuals. As Yates (1996, p.31) puts it, “Perhaps the most highly 
visible distortion in the rentier economy is the measurement and distribution of income.” 
Dividing total regional GDP figures by population to arrive at a GDP per capita average will 
most probably not accurately reflect the per capita income of the population as the “black 
gold”, as Yates terms ‘oil rents’, is in the coffers of corporations and rentier elites. Therefore 
the use of expenditure surveys to test for convergence may lead to different results that 
those carried out by GDP/capita. 
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2.9 Concluding remarks 
It would not be erudite to sum up all the effects and hypothesize the net effect of Iran’s 
rentier nature on income distribution as the factors of influence may differ in veracity both 
geographically and over time.  We can merely point to several overall trends which we would 
expect to observe based on the rentier literature. 
 
1. Income inequality is not necessarily linked to growth in a rentier state 
Incremental growth in a rentier state, in itself, may not have a beneficial or adverse 
effect on inequality distribution as it is highly correlated with oil revenues. Rentier 
theory contends that oil revenues have a very weak linkage to the domestic 
economy. Taken to its extreme, if additional government revenues do not derive 
from domestic economic activity, then unless there is a deliberate change in policy, 
the distribution of those revenues will be determined by the existing pattern of 
income distribution. This contention is to some extent supported by the contradictory 
research results of the effects of rising oil revenues on income distribution in Iran, 
with some researchers suggesting a decrease in inequality (Moradi, 2009) and 
some an increase (Tabibian, 2000).  
 
2. Sustained inequality 
Following from point one, as long as oil rents dominate state revenues, it becomes 
difficult to initiate and sustain a decrease in income inequality. Certain classes will 
always fight for and have favourable access to rents (Luciani 1987, Yates 1996). 
While this skewed allocation of resources is unwavering, the weak fiscal system 
(Garaibeh 1987) and large untargeted subsidies will mitigate any compensatory re-
distributional policies. In short, the effects of oil rents overwhelm domestic economic 
policies in bringing about changes to the income distribution pattern. 
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3. Urban/rural divide 
Horizontal income distribution will be in favour of the booming cities and a significant 
rural/urban divide will persist. The sectoral bias in favour of the service industry 
(Ruth 1974), the overvalued currency and the urban bias in government 
expenditures all contribute to more favourable incomes in urban areas and a shift 
both in terms of population and income towards the urban sector. 
 
4. Within urban inequality becomes significant 
Despite periods of sustained growth, within urban inequalities will persist and 
increase in proportion. According to rentier theory, oil led growth, may not in itself 
create long term employment as it has weak linkages to the domestic economy. 
Urban surplus labour ensures sustained inequality within urban areas (Karl 2004), 
while the increasing income and population share of the urban sector ensures a rise 
in the share of urban inequality to overall national inequality. 
 
5. Fluctuations in inequality determined by the fortunes of the rich 
As rent seekers are by definition those who end up forming the richer income groups, 
fluctuations in oil revenues affect them the most and fluctuations in overall inequality 
are manifested in their plight (Tabibian 2000). Their disproportionately large share of 
total income ensures that their plight is the significant factor behind changes in the 
overall inequality figure and not the fortunes of the poor. 
These observations are to a large degree supported by the inequality findings presented in 
chapters 4 to 6 of this study. 
Due to a lack of empirical research there is much we do not know regarding regional 
inequalities in Iran. The debate on income inequality has taken a back seat to poverty. The 
existing research only tackles income inequality as an afterthought when discussing poverty. 
85 
 
Ironically, this is probably due to its very constancy, which makes it less attractive to 
empirical economists looking for cause and effect relationships. 
We argue that it is this very consistency both before and after the Islamic Revolution 
of 1979 which gives us a clue regarding the probable structural nature of national and 
regional inequality in Iran. One good candidate for the structural causation is the economy’s 
reliance on oil exports. It is argued that oil rents may be causing consistent vertical, 
horizontal and functional inequalities to persist in Iran. 
  
86 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will outline the empirical methodological framework adopted by this study in 
carrying out the inequality measurements presented in chapters four, five and six. Chapter 
seven, which relates to the creation of an inequality measure based on assets, includes its 
own methodology section as this is integral to explaining the derivation of the weights for the 
asset index. 
This chapter is broken down into three main sections. In section one, we provide an 
introduction to Iran’s annual household survey, as it accounts for the main source of our raw 
data. In section two, we explain how we processed the raw data in arriving at a consumption 
aggregate for each household. Finally, in section three we present the main inequality tools 
which have been used in carrying out our calculations. Further clarification on methodology 
is provided throughout other chapters as necessary.  
 
3.2 Iran’s annual household surveys 
3.2.1 Background 
Although, we make use of a wide variety of data sources such as the World Bank, IMF, UN 
and Iran’s Central Bank, all the raw data and indeed the bulk of our analysis is based on 
annual surveys carried out by the Statistical Centre of Iran. Iran’s very first urban household 
income and expenditure survey was carried out as far back as 193530 by Iran’s Melli Bank 
(See SCI, 2003)  in order to derive a living expenditure index.31 No additional surveys were 
carried out for 24 years, when in 195932 a survey of living expenditure in 23 cities was 
carried out again by the Melli Bank. In 1963, the Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) commenced 
                                                 
30
 Iranian calendar year 1314 
31
 At that time the Melli Bank (National Bank) had a dual role as a commercial and a central bank. In 
1960 its central bank operations were replaced by Bank Markazi (The Central Bank). 
32
 Iranian calendar year 1338 
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annual rural household expenditure and income surveys. In 1965, the Central Bank of Iran 
(CBI) started urban household income and expenditure surveys. This has been carried out 
annually ever since. Additionally, in 1968 the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) also started to 
carry out annual urban household surveys. In 1974, as well as expenditure, income levels 
were also surveyed by the SCI. These household surveys have been conducted annually 
ever since by the SCI except for the years of 1976, 1978 and 1981.33  
In summary, annual rural household surveys are only published by the SCI, whereas 
annual urban household surveys are carried out and published by both by the SCI and CBI. 
In addition, the SCI provides access to primary unit record data for every rural and urban 
household survey since 1984. This author obtained the latest unit record data for every year 
since 1984, as well as published reports for previous years. 
 
3.2.2 SCI methodology 
The methodology of data collection and compilation by the SCI has evolved over time. The 
current methodology, compiled from publications by (Salehi-Isfahani, 2008, Tabibian, 2000, 
SCI, 2003, ILO, SCI, 2000, Vakili-Rad, 1978, Gerami et al., 2002) as well as based on our 
own observations and inquiries has been construed by the author as follows. 
 
Household coverage 
National coverage, no particular geographical areas are excluded. However, the following 
individuals are excluded: 
 Households of Iranian nationals living abroad 
 Individuals in collective housing, such as patients in hospitals, prisoners, collective 
religious dwellings, public military housing 
                                                 
33
 Iranian calendar years 1355, 1357 and 1360 respectively. 
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 Individuals without fixed dwellings, i.e. on construction sites and residing in informal 
housing. This can be particularly significant in Iran’s case, as it has been host to 
millions of refugees from neighbouring war torn Iraq and Afghanistan. Often, these 
refugees do not have a fixed place of abode. They also tend to represent the lower 
income earners. Thus the exclusion of refugee data may lead to lower inequality and 
misleading income distribution findings. Spatially, refugees in Iran are also clustered 
in certain specific urban areas34 and this can have consequences for 
unrepresentative regional inequality findings. Many disadvantaged members of the 
population who are non-refugees may also not have a fixed place of abode. Figure 
3.2.1 shows the UN estimated trend of Iran’s refugee population. For our period of 
empirical analysis (1997 to 2010) the refugee population ranges from one to two 
million. 
Figure 3.2.1 Iran’s Refugee population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database 
  
                                                 
34
 See “Afghan refugees given repatriation extension”, IRIN, 8 February 2007, 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=70450  
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The following households are included in the annual survey: 
 Private households of just one or more individuals 
 Non-Iranian nationals resident in Iran 
 Armed forces residing in private housing within or outside military bases 
 
Sampling and stratification 
The separate rural and urban surveys are stratified at the provincial level until 2008 when 
the stratification also takes place at the Primary Sample Unit (PSU) level. Exact weighting 
data is provided from 1997 onwards35 and this is the year chosen for the start of our analysis. 
We do occasionally use the year 1990 for comparison purposes. For this year we have 
estimated the weights based on the 1986 census data.36 Population alone does not 
determine the sampling size for each province; other variables of significance for the SCI 
also have a bearing on the sample size. The sampling consists of a two stage process of 
Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) and Ultimate Sampling Units (USUs).  The number of PSUs 
is arrived at by dividing the provincial sample size by five. The sampling frames for the PSUs 
are the list of census blocks from 1996, using cluster sampling. From each PSU, five 
households are randomly selected using systematic sampling. The overall response rate is 
very high, despite the large size of the questionnaire. For the year 2003 the response rate is 
given as 99% (ILO, 2005). Each month, one twelfth of the evenly distributed households are 
approached with the questionnaire. This is for practical manpower purposes and to even out 
seasonal fluctuations.  
  
                                                 
35
 Although this weighting data was only made available by the SCI two years after our study had 
already begun. The calculations were repeated using the exact weights. 
36
 We have derived weights for each province based on the number of households in the sample in 
proportion to the total number of households in the province as reported by the census. 
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Recall periods 
A mix of recall and documentation is used to collect the expenditure data. The recall period 
for most perishable expenditure items is thirty days, rather a long period for consumption 
recall. In the early days of the survey, there was a two day recall period for such items. The 
recall period for durables is one year. Depending on the income source, the recall period is 
either one month or one year. The recall period combined with the survey taking place 
evenly throughout the year results in the annual survey not reflecting the economic 
circumstances of that exact calendar year. This should be taken into account when 
comparing measures based on household surveys with other economic data. 
Despite being solar based37, the Iranian solar Hejri year, does not begin and end on 
the same date as its Gregorian equivalent. Typically the Iranian New Year falls on the 21st of 
March. For example the year 1382 starts on the 21st of March 2003 and ends on the 20th of 
March 2004. For the purposes of this study we denote 1382 as simply 2003. Thus we will 
refer to the “2003 household survey”, when in reality it relates to 21 March 2003 to 20 March 
2004. In appendix 3A we have provided a list of recent Iranian calendar years and their 
Gregorian equivalents. 
 
The sample data 
There are annual fluctuations in the sample size. One extreme example is a sample size of 
27,148 households in 1984 but only 5,614 households in 1986. Tabibian (2000, p.145) 
reports gross inconsistencies for the primary unit data of the household survey of 1991.38 He 
cites “significant differences” [author’s translation] in the data when compared with 1990 and 
1992. For many indicators he interpolates the results of 1990 and 1992 to arrive at a figure 
for 1991; in effect disregarding the data from 1991. For the period of concern to us 1997-
                                                 
37
 This is not strictly true as the number of days in the two calendars slightly differ due to the solar 
Hejri calendar following the vernal equinox. This difference becomes noticeable during respective 
leap years. 
38
 Iranian calendar year 1370 
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2010, the lowest annual sample was 17,477 for 1998 and the highest was 39,088 for 2008. 
In total over four hundred thousand household samples were used in our calculations. 
Appendix 3B outlines the urban and rural sample sizes for each year under study. 
 
The following broad categories of data are collected from the households: 
 Expenditure – hundreds of durable, non-durable goods and services. These are 
extremely detailed but only comply with COICOP39 from 2004 onwards.  
 Income – dozens of income channels including informal ones. Income data is 
recorded separately for each individual. 
 Demographic characteristics  
 Education attainment of members  
 Employment status of members  
 Occupation of members  
 Ownership of selected assets  
 Housing characteristics 
 
3.3 The raw micro data 
The household survey data was obtained during annual visits to the Statistical Centre of Iran 
in Tehran, Iran. On certain occasions, clarification on methodological issues relating to the 
data was provided by staff members. The data is made available by the Statistical Centre of 
Iran in Microsoft Access tables. As the tables have no ‘meaningful’ names or field headings, 
a separate document providing information on the tables as well as the survey questionnaire 
itself are needed to decipher the database. 
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 Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (United Nations statistical 
methodology) 
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Figure 3.3.1 Screenshot of a table in the 2005 rural household survey 
 
 
Figure 3.3.2 Screenshot of the food expenditure questionnaire in the 2006 survey 
 
 
From 1997 onwards, the SCI provides the exact sampling weights for the households. For 
the years before that census provincial data is necessary in order to estimate the probability 
weights for a household being selected from a particular province. For each section of the 
questionnaire, the responses of the households are stored in distinct tables. Rural and urban 
tables are separate. For each household we have detailed data on its characteristics, 
income and expenditure. 
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3.3.1 Why the use of raw micro data? 
Despite the time consuming nature of preparing, processing and analysing the raw data 
made available by the SCI, it afforded the author several notable advantages: 
 
Standardized grouping of expenditure data 
Individual household expenditures on various items were collated into desirable groupings. 
Rather than simply summing up individual item expenditures per the inset household survey 
‘expenditure categories’, further subgroups were created using the specific product codes. 
 
Table 3.3.1 Custom survey expenditure grouping  
Survey grouping Author grouping 
Food Food40 
Drink and tobacco Drink and tobacco 
Clothing Clothing 
Rent and utilities Rent 
Utilities 
Household items Household items 
Medical expenses Medical expenses 
Transport costs Transport costs 
Post and telecommunications Post and telecommunications 
Leisure Leisure 
Eating out and hotels Holiday accommodation 
Eating out 
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous 
Durables and other Durables 
Education 
Medical insurance 
Investment Investment 
 
This custom grouping allowed expense categories of interest such as ‘Education’ to become 
distinct and an expense category in its own right. ‘Medical insurance expenses’ which were 
                                                 
40
 Ideally this should be broken down further into home production and purchases.  
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embedded in the ‘Durables’ category were summed up with other ‘Medical expenses’ to 
derive an overall medical expenses category for each household. Similarly ‘Eating Out’ 
expenses were added to ‘Food’ expenses following the recommendation by Deaton and 
Zaidi (2002) who provide a guideline for computing expenditure aggregates. The custom 
grouping carried out allows for more convenient and standardized data comparison with 
other countries for this author and also other researchers who may wish to use the modified 
datasets in future. Specifically, in reference to this study, the custom expenditure 
categorization and analysis allowed for: 
 
 The proportion of food expenditure to be used in determining the household 
scaling weights for urban and rural households 
 Specific utility expenses were used in evaluating subsidy distribution (chapter 
four) 
 Expenditure categories were used to pinpoint the reason for the fall in real 
expenditures in 2008 (chapter 4) 
The SCI does now provide a simple summation of food (not including eating out) and non-
food expenditures. However, even with these figures there can be anomalies. For example 
for a number of urban households in 1999 the non-food expenditure reported by the SCI 
differs from the author’s calculations from the raw data.41  
 
Custom consumption aggregates 
By making using of the micro data and custom groupings of expenditure, the author was 
afforded a flexible tool in deriving a number of consumption aggregates for each household. 
This allowed for the comparison of inequality measures which are based on different 
                                                 
41
 Expenditure items have been calculated using computer queries. Manual calculations were carried 
out on a sample urban and rural household to verify figures. The databases used by the author are 
the latest databases made available by SCI at the time of publication. 
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underlying consumption aggregates. For example, income inequality measures were 
compared including and omitting a combination of durables and investment expenditures. 
These are presented later in this chapter. 
 
Equivalence expenditures 
Using the household characteristics data the author was able to derive equivalence 
expenditures for each household based both on household size and makeup. For instance a 
household with one adult and one child is differentiated from a household with three adults 
and two children. Urban and rural households are also scaled differently. 
 
Intra and inter-regional inequality 
Without the use of primary unit data, the evaluation of inequality ‘between and within’ 
regions and their contribution to national inequality would not be possible, as detailed 
provincial inequality data for the period under study was not published elsewhere. For 
instance, without micro data we would not be able to find out what the contribution of Tehran 
is to Iran’s overall inequality. 
 
Intricate distribution comparisons 
Richer distribution analysis and observations such as decile analysis, pen’s parade and 
rural/urban shifts would not have been possible with aggregate measures. 
 
Creation of the asset index 
The creation of the asset index in chapter seven relied on asset micro data for individual 
households. 
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Transparency of inequality findings 
Most importantly perhaps, both the author and readers of this study are able to fully see how 
the raw data was processed and how the final inequality figures were arrived at.  These 
‘figures behind the figures’ allow for a better interpretation and evaluation of the results. 
 
3.3.2 Processing the data 
 
Cleaning up the data 
The expenditure field for a number of tables had to be cleaned up. As numbers in some 
have leading zeros and others do not. Some fields also have the @ sign rather than a 0. 
 
Subgroups 
Software queries based on product codes were written to collate and aggregate 
expenditures for each household into custom groups. These expenditure categories differ 
slightly from the groupings provided by the SCI survey design. 
 
Expenditure Interval 
Based on the expenditure interval (monthly or annual) for each expenditure category, a total 
annual expenditure was drawn up for each household. Monthly expenditures were simply 
multiplied by twelve. 
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Table 3.3.2 Recall periods for expenditure groupings  
Category Interval 
Clothing Monthly 
Drink and Tobacco Monthly 
Durables Annual 
Eating Out Monthly 
Education Annual 
Food Monthly 
Holiday Accommodation Monthly 
Household Items Monthly 
Investment Annual 
Leisure Monthly 
Medical Expenses Monthly 
Medical Insurance Annual 
Miscellaneous Monthly 
Post and Telecommunications Monthly 
Rent Monthly 
Transport Costs Monthly 
Utilities Monthly 
 
It may have been more appropriate for the SCI survey to have used an annual recall period 
for ‘Holiday accommodation’ rather than a monthly recall period. 
 
3.3.3 Choosing a proxy for inequality 
Two critical preliminary questions arise in carrying out this inequality study; inequality 
between ‘whom’ and inequality between ‘what’? For instance, Yu, Luo et al. (2007) 
speculate that inequality within rural villages is not of concern in China, and do not break 
down aggregate village data into individual household data when analysing inequality. After 
some initial calculations, we found significant inequality within rural areas, individual 
provinces and districts in Iran. We therefore chose to investigate the smallest economic unit 
possible for our analysis. Given the lack of expenditure data for individuals within 
households, the end nodes of our analysis are households. This has particular significance 
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for our decomposition of inequality in chapter four. Much of the observed overall inequality 
could be due to inequality between the members of a household but our study is implicitly 
treating the household as a homogenous unit. We do remedy for this to some extent by 
using an equivalence scale to weight households by size and makeup, but we are in effect 
ignoring these intra household inequalities.  
The question of ‘what’ to measure is a more open one (Stewart, 2000b). We have 
the option of looking at inequality of access to education, health, jobs or other social/public 
goods; we can consider the inequality of wealth in terms of all tangible and financial assets; 
or opt for more traditional monetary measures such as income and expenditure.  Indeed, 
given the discussions pertaining to the rentier state in chapter two it may be more apt for our 
study to look at the inequality of wealth and opportunity in Iran. However, given the 
measurable data in hand, our focus is primarily limited to expenditure inequality. In chapter 
seven we do create an asset index for Iran and present it as an alternative for inequality 
analysis in specific circumstances. As the bulk of this study presents a wide array of vertical 
and horizontal inequality comparisons, it would have been beyond the scope of this research 
to have presented them using a non-monetary metric.  In the end, our decision simply boiled 
down to the classic dilemma of which monetary measure to use, ‘income’ or ‘expenditure’ 
data. 
Before we explain our decision to use expenditure data, it is apt to point out a few 
advantages of using income data, apart from the obvious one of income being the measure 
whose distribution we are addressing, when we refer to ‘income inequality’. Primarily, 
income data would have partly dealt with the household being misrepresented as a 
homogenous unit, as income data is available on an individual basis from the SCI. However, 
as this would still exclude non income earners, in practice in the majority of cases, all the 
members of the household  apart from the head would be unrepresented. Income data also 
allows for the investigation of functional income distribution, i.e. exploring the sources of 
income. This can be a very useful exercise for studying rentier income distribution, as it 
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would become clear what proportion of income is derived directly from public pensions, 
public sector wages, rents from property, interest from savings etc. This can then be 
compared to an otherwise comparable non-rentier state. Income is also “more unequally 
distributed than expenditure” (Haughton and Khandker, 2009, p. 108) and by utilizing 
expenditure inequality we are most probably understating income inequality. This is 
especially poignant in the context of cross-country comparisons, where many of the GINI 
coefficients from industrialized countries will have been prepared on the basis of income. In 
essence, we are not comparing like with like. Ideally both income and expenditure data 
should be used and compared for various inequality measures. However, given the limited 
scope of this research and the number of measurements which would need to be computed 
and analysed, we opted solely for expenditure data. 
Despite the numerous cited benefits of the income measure, its biggest deficiency is 
the unreliability of the figures. In Iran (as in other countries), not only are individuals reluctant 
to provide accurate income data, but for those who are self-employed, farmers or stake 
holders in small businesses, it can be an accounting hodgepodge in attempting to accurately 
isolate personal income. Income can be highly variable for workers in the informal market, 
seasonal in nature and lumpy. Certain households may also engage in significant barter 
trade; the expenditure data accounts for this by estimating an expenditure cost for all goods 
and services received. However, expenditure data can also miss out on certain ‘internal’ 
expenditures such as DIY work on home improvement. Nevertheless, the consensus in the 
literature is that the preferred method of evaluating income distribution in developing 
countries is to use consumption as a proxy for income (Deaton, 1997). 
Deriving individual consumption however is itself often a proxy exercise, usually 
achieved by refining household expenditure data (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). Given this 
double proxy process (consumption for expenditure and expenditure for income), the final 
figures should not be viewed as an accurate measurement of income distribution but merely 
as an indication. The derived ‘patterns and trends’ can be more confidently accepted as they 
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reflect the spatial pattern and evolution of income distribution over time. As already noted, 
household expenditure data tends to underestimate income differences (Deaton, 1997). This 
underestimation is amplified in Iran where significant untargeted subsidies on basic food 
items and utilities have been prevalent. Lanjouw (Lanjouw, 2009) argues that consumption 
expenditures are also an indication of how successfully a household can “access credit 
markets or household savings” when low incomes are prevalent in the economy and are 
thus a better indication of long term welfare. Other researchers such as (McGregor and 
Borooah, 1992), (Slesnick, 1994), (David and Stephanie, 1999) also recommend the use of 
expenditure rather than income data for inequality analysis. It is perhaps more genuine to 
define inequality for our purposes as the inequality of household expenditures, in short 
‘expenditure inequality’ rather than income inequality. 
Recently there has been a recognition of asset index measurement as a proxy for 
inequality (McKenzie, 2005), this may provide a good solution to overcoming the untargeted 
subsidy regime in Iran up to 2011. The creation of an asset index is tackled in chapter seven. 
In conclusion to this section, for the purposes of the inequality measurements presented in 
chapters four, five and six, we are making use of household expenditure data.  
 
3.3.4 Provincial boundaries and time series data 
Throughout the period under study 1997 to 2010, the number of provinces has periodically 
increased. This presented no particular difficulties in the data processing, as this increase 
involved bigger provinces being broken down into smaller ones and there was no 
geographic overlapping. In the 2010 household survey, the last series of data in our study, 
the data is categorized between 30 provinces. In mid-2010 the province of Tehran was 
divided into 2 provinces, introducing the additional province of Alborz. Thus, despite Iran 
having 31 provinces at the time of publication, the latest dataset in our analysis is broken 
down into 30 provinces.  
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Time series and cross sectional data 
After a number of initial calculations, it became clear that using snapshots of cross sectional 
data for inequality analysis would lead to misleading conclusions as there were annual 
fluctuations in both vertical and horizontal inequalities. A demonstration of misleading results 
using cross section analysis is illustrated in chapter six, which relates to divergence analysis. 
This should act as a caution for researchers (especially when looking at rentier states with 
highly fluctuating macro indicators) who use just two years and arrive at conclusions 
regarding inequality trends. This made it necessary to look at the whole of the 1997-2010 
time period for inequality patterns such as the national GINI, regional inequalities, 
divergence etc. Cross section analysis is used for data displaying more consistent trends 
such as urbanization, population and income share. 
 
3.4 Deriving a consumption aggregate 
Deaton and Zaidi (2002) outline a step by step approach for deriving a household 
consumption aggregate based on expenditure data in the hope of standardizing this practice 
and making researchers more familiar with the issues involved. The authors implicitly 
recommend that researchers publish a description of how their consumption aggregates 
have been arrived at alongside their results. To a significant degree the derivation of our 
consumption aggregate builds on these guidelines, however there are a number of 
exceptions for one intuitive reason. 
While consumption aggregates may tell us more about welfare levels, when it comes to 
income distribution, a narrowed focus on consumption may substantially underestimate the 
income accruing to richer households. Consumption aggregates may be an appropriate 
proxy in identifying poorer families but if defined too narrowly, they may underestimate the 
extent of the inequality distribution as more and more expenditure items are excluded. In fact, 
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it may be more intuitive to derive a consumption aggregate for poverty analysis and a 
separate one for inequality analysis. 
When deciding on what non-food expenditures to include in the consumption aggregate, 
Deaton and Zaidi (2002) suggest testing for the elasticity of the subgroup to the total 
expenditure of the household. This reasoning is used to exclude health expenditure, which 
exhibits a low elasticity in their study. Other problematic expenditure categories such as 
education, which also exhibit low elasticity, and are related to the ages of the children in the 
household, are however included, as is the practice by most other researchers. Lump 
expenditures, such as durables and housing, are included by their estimated ‘use value’.  
In this study, all expenditure items are aggregated, apart from investment. The 
reasoning is that there is only ‘so much’ that can be spent on food and consumption. For the 
period under study in Iran, substantial subsidies existed on fuel, utilities and food items. 
Limiting the core of the consumption aggregate to these expenditures, would risk 
underestimating the prevalence of inequality. Where, the household owns their home, 
equivalent rental values, provided in the survey data, have been used as a proxy for housing. 
As no purchase data exists for existing durables in the household (i.e. year purchased 
and initial price) and as there is no comprehensive list of durables (although a simple asset 
list does exist), it is not possible to estimate a ‘use value’ for all the durables in the 
household. In view of this, all durable expenditures have been included. Excluding durables 
would narrow the consumption aggregate considerably. If our analysis were concerned with 
identifying households below a certain poverty line, including such lump expenditures would 
lead to a significant underestimate of such households. However, when it comes to looking 
at the extent of expenditure inequality, the number of richer households would not be 
represented sufficiently. 
Following a similar line of reasoning, it could be argued that investment expenditures 
should also be included in our expenditure aggregate (we could no longer refer to it as the 
‘consumption’ aggregate). The difficulty is that the list of the investment expenditure items is 
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by no means exhaustive and is not necessarily a good proxy for income as investments can 
be transferred from one form to another (and differ year to year).  
In order to see the effects of different consumption aggregates on our inequality 
measures, three separate expenditure aggregates were prepared. One which includes all 
expenditures, one which excludes investment and one which excludes both durables and 
investment. See table 3.5.3 later in this chapter for a comparison of the GINI figure using the 
three different expenditure aggregates. 
In the end, aggregate expenditure without investment but including durables was opted 
for. This also proved practical as the data for 1997 lacked investment data. A look at 
summary aggregate expenditure data provided by the SCI also seems to suggest they have 
derived an aggregate of expenditures by including durables and omitting investments. 
 
3.5 Deriving an equivalence scale 
Given the varying number of individuals and different demographic characteristics of the 
sample households, it is appropriate to use an equivalence expenditure scale to adjust for 
these differences. Clearly seven members of a household with a total expenditure tally of 
$2,000 per year are not as well-off as a one member household with the same annual 
expenditure.  As the author found no published equivalence scales for Iranian households, 
one was created. There is no accepted standard for household expenditure adjustment. 
Deaton and Zaidi (2002), suggest various approaches to equivalence scales; including 
carrying out behavioural analysis, using questions to obtain subjective estimates, or by using 
an arbitrary approach that sets a scale in some reasonable way. All these adjustment 
practices seem to stick to three broad principles. 
The first is that households located in significantly different economic environments 
should not be adjusted in the same manner. Lancaster et al. (1999a) note that “it is unwise 
to use the same scale value for different countries in the inequality comparisons”. In 
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practice, this means that researchers use custom or accepted equivalence scales for the 
particular region under study. For this reason we have created a different equivalence scale 
for urban and rural areas. 
The second principle is that the different members of the household have differing needs 
based on their demographic characteristics. Children and the elderly may have lesser or 
perhaps higher monetary needs that adults; there may be differences between the 
expenditure needs of males and females. In practice this usually leads to researchers 
deflating the expenditure needs of children (and sometimes women).  The amount by which 
the expenditure needs of a child are deemed to be less than that of an adult can be 
estimated for the region. In the US for example, the National Research Council (1995) 
recommends a figure of 0.7 to be used as the ratio of a child’s expenditure relative to an 
adult’s.  This is to reflect the relatively high education, health, clothing and activity costs as 
compared to poor countries where Deaton and Zaidi (2002) recommend a figure of 0.25 or 
0.33. Whereas the two previous studies define a child simply as an individual under 18, 
other studies such as Lancaster et al. (1999a) divide up children into three different age 
categories to more accurately reflect their expenditure needs. In their study expenditure 
needs are also differentiated by sex. 
We have opted to treat individuals under 18 as children and assigned an adult 
expenditure ratio of 0.65 for children in urban areas and 0.55 for children in rural ones. The 
lower ratio for rural areas is due to the lower share of education expenditure in total 
expenditure. In 2007, see Figure 3.5.1, weighted education expenditure in rural households 
constituted 0.8% of total expenditures whereas the figure was 2.0% for urban households. 
The third principle is that bigger households may benefit from economies of scale. The 
distinction between public and private goods determines the degree of economies of scale 
(Dr ze and Srinivasan, 1997). This follows from the idea put forward by (Engel, 1895) that 
the proportion of food expenditure is inversely related to household income. Food and other 
private goods dominate the expenditure of poorer households rather than say ‘housing’ 
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which is a shared good. Hence equivalence scales for developing countries assume a 
smaller degree of economy of scale than for developed economies. Our methodology 
follows in the same footsteps outlined above. We used the following formula as put forward 
by the US National Research Council (Poverty et al., 1995, p.59): 
(A + PK)F 
A The number of adults 
K The number of children (all those aged below 18) 
P Child expenditure proportion of an adult 
F Reflects the economies of scale 
 
The suggested values by the US National Research Council are to put P near 0.70 and F 
between 0.65 and 0.75 (for the United States). When setting poverty thresholds, we may 
wish to select a reference family (say 2 adults and 2 children) and compute other families as 
a ratio of the scale value of that family to the scale value of our reference family. 
Deaton and Zaidi (2002) suggest using a value of 0.25 to 0.33 for P in poorer 
countries and 0.9 for F. This is based on private goods such as food expenditure 
contributing a major proportion to the overall household expenditure. Dreze and Srinvasan 
(1997) show that if all goods are private then costs rise in proportion to the number of people 
in the household, and if all goods are public (hence shared) then the number of people does 
not affect costs. If food dominates household expenditure, the scope for economies of 
scales is small. 
Following these recommendations, in calculating the values to be used for our 
equivalence scale, total weighted food expenditures as a proportion of total expenditures 
(excluding investment) were calculated both for rural and urban households. 
Table 3.5.1 Household food expenditures as a proportion of total expenditures, 2007 
Food as a % of total expenditures, urban 19.9% 
Food as a % of total expenditures, rural 34.4% 
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Figure 3.5.1 Total weighted household urban expenditure makeup, 2007 
 
 
Figure 3.5.2 Total weighted household rural expenditure makeup, 2007 
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As can be seen the percentage of food expenditures is substantially higher in rural areas 
and the percentage of a shared good such as rent is much smaller. This would suggest the 
use of two separate equivalence scales for rural and urban areas. Although the percentage 
of food expenditures in Iran’s rural areas is high, with the exception of Brazil and South 
Africa, it is less than the food expenditure percentages under study by Deaton and Zaidi 
(2002). Based on the recommendations of the National Research Council (1995) and the 
comparative study by Deaton and Zaidi (2002) the following equivalence scale values were 
deemed appropriate for our study. 
 
Table 3.5.2 Equivalence scale values for Iran’s urban and rural households 
 P F 
Urban 0.65 0.75 
Rural 0.55 0.85 
  
Based on these values an equivalence scale for each household was calculated and the 
corresponding aggregate expenditures were scaled accordingly. A comparison of inequality 
measures between the modified and original aggregate expenditures in urban areas is 
presented in Table 3.5.3 for 2007. 
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Table 3.5.3 Comparison of urban GINI coefficients, 2007 
 GINI (official weights) GINI (calculated weights) 
HE 0.47145 0.47143 
HEWI 0.40298 0.40304 
HEWID 0.36808 0.36819 
EEHE 0.47521 0.47509 
EEHEWI 0.40758 0.40754 
EEHEWID 0.37458 0.37461 
 
HE  Aggregate household expenditure 
HEWI  Aggregate household expenditure without investment 
HEWID  Aggregate household expenditure without investment and durables 
EEHE   Aggregate equivalence household expenditure 
EEHEWI  Aggregate equivalence household expenditure without investment 
EEHEWID  Aggregate equivalence household expenditure without investment and 
durables 
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3.5.1 Scaled expenditures v nominal expenditures 
Decomposition of inequality was carried out using the econometric package STATA module 
‘ineqdeco’ by Professor Stephen P. Jenkins42. In computing the results, the final composition 
of the household expenditure to be used in the calculations had to be decided upon.  One 
set of options related to what expenditures should be left in or out of the aggregate 
expenditure; the other set of options related to whether equivalence expenditure should be 
used to compensate for household makeup. 
In the end, aggregate household expenditures without investment were used (but 
including durables). Expenditures were scaled for household makeup and measurements 
were weighted according to official provincial weights to reflect the provincial stratification 
inherent in the survey data. 
Following the recommendation by Deaton and Zaidi (2002), the author has 
calculated equivalence expenditures from the raw nominal figures before going on to 
analyze inequality outcomes. All inequality figures published are based on equivalence 
expenditures unless stated otherwise. For the sake of completeness, a comparison was 
made between measures based on equivalence v nominal expenditures for the year 2007, in 
order to identify where the differences in the results would lie. 
 
Higher GINI figure 
Table 3.5.4 National GINI figures (weighted total of rural and urban), 2007 
EEHEWI (equivalence) 0.43569 
HEWI (nominal) 0.42235 
The first difference is evident in the overall GINI figure. Although the difference is small, it 
does reflect the fact that a higher GINI figure is derived if using equivalence expenditure 
                                                 
42
 Before settling for ‘ineqdeco’ the Theil index was calculated for the urban sector of 2006 manually 
using equations in Microsoft Excel. After verification of the inequality figure, ineqdeco was utilized 
for subsequent decomposition and inequality calculations.  
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data. Even a small difference in the GINI index impacts many in a populous area (Robinson, 
2002). 
Lower contribution of rural sector to inequality 
But more revealing and intuitively palatable is the difference in the decomposition of 
inequality for the same year, 2007. 
 
Table 3.5.5 Comparison of EEHEWI and HEWI decomposition, 2007 
EEHEWI     
  Rural Urban 
GE (1) 0.28529 0.30679 
Income share 0.18015 0.81985 
GINI 0.39308 0.40758 
Contribution 15% 72% 
 
HEWI     
  Rural Urban 
GE (1) 0.30532 0.29701 
Income share 0.21456 0.78544 
GINI 0.41501 0.40298 
Contribution 20% 72% 
 
The nominal expenditure data apportions a bigger share of overall income to the rural 
grouping and it also leads to more inequality within the rural group. Both of these outcomes 
combine within the Theil index (GE1) to result in a bigger inequality contribution from the 
rural sector. Underlying this result is the fact that the average number of children and adults 
in the rural grouping differ significantly from the urban group. This fact is ignored and 
‘papered over’ if we apportion inequality between these two groups using nominal 
expenditure data. By using equivalence expenditures the author has ‘factored in’ such 
expenditure differences due to different household sizes. The equivalence figures tellingly 
account for the larger observed family sizes in rural households.  
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Table 3.5.6 Average number of adults and children 2007 (weighted) 
Weighted mean Average no. of children Average no. of adults 
Urban 1.12 2.75 
Rural 1.56 2.92 
 
This comparison was also carried out for 2010 to make sure it did not just relate to one 
particular year. As can be seen from Tables 3.1.1 and 3.2.2, the difference in the two 
methodologies leads to a difference of five absolute percentage points for the contribution of 
the rural sector to overall inequality, for both 2007 and 2010. 
 
Table 3.5.7 Rural sector contribution to inequality, 2010 
Rural sector, 2010 Household expenditure 
scaled by household size 
Nominal household 
expenditure 
Income share 15.2% 17.7% 
Contribution to overall inequality 13.2% 18.6% 
 
Higher urban to rural expenditure ratio 
The difference between nominal and equivalence expenditure ratios also becomes clear 
when calculating urban to rural mean expenditure ratios. Given the larger rural family sizes, 
if nominal figures are used, the urban to rural ratio is much lower than if households are 
scaled for the number of adults and children. This is apparent in Table 3.5.8. 
For instance, in 2005 using nominal expenditures the urban to rural ratio is 1.61 but 
using equivalence data the ratio is 2.00. By using nominal data, inequality calculations would 
underestimate the horizontal inequality between the urban and rural sector. 
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Table 3.5.8 Urban to Rural mean expenditure ratio 1997 to 2010 
Year 
U:R 
HEWI 
U:R 
EEHEWI 
1997 1.61 2.02 
1998 1.58 1.98 
1999 1.56 1.94 
2000 1.59 2.02 
2001 1.68 2.13 
2002 1.67 2.15 
2003 1.63 2.00 
2004 1.56 1.94 
2005 1.61 2.00 
2006 1.64 2.04 
2007 1.68 2.10 
2008 1.76 2.13 
2009 1.69 2.07 
2010 1.67 2.02 
 
Regional Discrepancies 
As with urban to rural comparisons, not accounting for household size can also have 
implications for inter-regional inequalities. Using nominal data will lead to an underestimation 
of inequality between an urban dominated province and one with a considerable rural 
population. As can be seen in Table 3.5.9 using equivalence expenditure the mean ratio of 
expenditure between Tehran and Sistan & Baluchistan province is 3.11 as opposed to 2.36 
using nominal data. 
 
Table 3.5.9 Mean expenditure in Riyals, Tehran v Sistan Baluchistan, 2010 
 
EEHEWI HEWI 
Sistan & 
Baluchistan 
19,000,000 54,600,000 
Tehran 59,000,000 129,000,000 
Ratio 3.11 2.36 
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Despite the advantages of scaling for household size, there are times when the use of non-
scaled data is more appropriate for our study. For instance, when looking at subsidies on 
utilities in chapter four, we are interested in actual household expenditure rather than 
wishing to ‘apportion’ this household expenditure to individuals. Non scaled data is also 
appropriate when we wish to simply report absolute mean expenditures rather than make 
comparisons or investigate inequality trends. 
 
3.5.2 Anomalies and weights 
At the beginning of this research, there were no official weights provided for household data 
by the SCI. However, the SCI now provides the weights it has utilized for annual surveys 
from 1997 onwards. Although in the end, we substituted official weights for all our 
calculations, given our initial estimation of weights, this provided an opportunity for a 
comparison between this author’s weights and the official weights. A brief description of this 
comparison is provided in appendix 3C. Also included is a discussion of minor data 
anomalies. 
  
114 
 
3.6 Inequality tools 
The traditional axiomatic approach deems an inequality measurement desirable if it broadly 
meets five axioms (Litchfield, 1999): 
1. Pigou-Dalton Principle – if an income transfer from a poorer to a richer individual 
occurs, inequality does not fall 
2. Income scale independence – if all incomes change by the same proportion, 
inequality is not affected 
3. Population principle – Inequality measure should be independent of the size of the 
population 
4. Anonymity – Other than income, the inequality measure is not concerned with other 
characteristics of individuals 
5. Decomposability – Inequality of subgroups should be ‘related’43 to the overall group.  
However, in this study, we do not stick to only measurements which meet all these five 
axioms and a more pragmatic approach is taken.  Inequality measures tend to provide the 
same overall outcome in terms of ranking and when looking at trends; “the choice of one 
measure over another is not of crucial importance in the discussion of income (or 
expenditure) distribution.” (Haughton and Khandker, 2009, p. 107). 
We have adopted measurements which are deemed to be the most appropriate for 
each particular section of our data analysis. These include the use of the GINI coefficient, 
the General Entropy family of measures, most significant of which is the Theil index for 
decomposition purposes, Stochastic dominance (Pen’s Parade), Atkinson index, Sigma 
Convergence, Polarization, Decile Analysis and Alpha means. Below we take a more 
detailed look at the GINI and Theil index as these two measures are used extensively 
                                                 
43
 The degree of decomposability defers from measure to measure. For example the GINI coefficient 
is decomposable under certain circumstances, whereas the General Entropy measures are always 
completely and additively decomposable. 
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throughout the study. The other measurement tools are briefly introduced in context, 
alongside their respective results in the pursuing chapters. 
 
GINI Index 
Due to its simple intuitive appeal, the GINI coefficient is the mostly widely recognized and 
quoted measurement of income inequality (Coudouel et al., 2002). That in itself often makes 
it a ‘must have’ measurement in national studies of inequality, as it provides a basis for 
comparison with other countries. 
 
Figure 3.6.1 Lorenz curve 
Reproduced from: (Haughton and Khandker, 2009) 
 
 
Based on the Lorenz curve, as seen in figure 3.6.1, a simple graphical representation of the 
GINI is the area (A) divided by the total area (A+B) under the 45 degree line of equality. As 
the scale of the axes is from 0 to 1, (A+B) is equal to 0.5. It can therefore be shown that 
A/(A+B) is also equivalent to 2*A. 
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A simple mathematical representation of the GINI coefficient is related to the covariance 
between the income of an individual Y, the rank of the individual in the distribution F,  and 
the average income (Bellù and Liberati, 2006b).  
 
y / F) (Y, cov 2  Gini 
 
Y Individual income 
F Income rank in the distribution (0 poorest to 1 for the richest) 
y  Mean income 
 
The GINI coefficient has a universal appeal of being widely cited and meeting the five 
aforementioned axioms44. 
However, as an inequality measure it suffers from a number of setbacks. Although 
its universal nature, allows for cross-country comparisons, the GINI coefficient is derived 
from diverse measurement techniques across countries which makes straightforward cross 
country comparisons troublesome, especially where the methodology is not outlined 
explicitly. Even for the same country, different researchers may opt for different treatments 
of the raw data. For example in our study we are scaling households for size and makeup 
whereas the Statistical Centre of Iran does not make this adjustment in its figures. 
Furthermore, the coefficient provides an indication of inequality but little about the 
intricate nature of the distribution. As a single measurement figure, it cannot provide extra 
information regarding changes in the fortunes of the poor or rich. This is illustrated in chapter 
four’s comparison of the rural sector between 1990 and 1997. A fall in the GINI figure occurs 
between these two dates, but the nature of the distribution change is seen much more 
clearly with the use of a Pen Parade. 
  
                                                 
44
 The GINI index is not additively decomposable and can only be decomposed in special 
circumstances 
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The GINI coefficient gives the same weight to those at the top and bottom of the 
distribution. It is therefore difficult to attribute annual changes in the GINI to a particular 
group within the income distribution. We remedy for this by making using of General Entropy 
measures which can be manipulated to be more sensitive to the top or bottom of the 
distribution and by additionally comparing decile income shares. 
Despite the statistical drawbacks of the GINI coefficient (Cowell, 1998) it can be 
more confidently used to compare inequality between regions in a single country where 
measurement techniques and policies are uniform. As well as measuring the GINI for Iran’s 
provinces, we will also be measuring the GINI index for Iran’s urban and rural sector from 
1997 to 201045. 
 
Theil index 
The GINI coefficient, although decomposable if income groups do not overlap, does not 
provide the straightforward between group and within group additive decomposability of 
overall inequality, unlike the Theil index, which is a member of the General Entropy 
inequality measures (Conceição and Ferreira, 2000). For   individuals of income  , The 
formula for the family of General Entropy measures (GE) is given as: 
  ( )  
 
 (   )
 [
 
 
∑ (
  
 ̅
)
   
 
   
  ] 
 
α is a parameter representing the weight given to different parts of the distribution. For lower 
values of α, the GE measure is more sensitive to changes in lower incomes and for higher 
values of α (more than 1) more sensitive to changes in higher incomes. For    , i.e. GE(1) 
is equivalent to Theil. 
Theil = [
 
 
∑
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 ̅
     ] 
 
                                                 
45
 We will also measure the GINI for 1990 for comparative purposes. 
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Inequality between m different groups 
m  Number of groups 
iw  Group i’s income share 
in  Group i’s population share 
 
Given the additive characteristic of within group and between group inequality, the Theil 
index will be used to assess the contribution of Iran’s urban and rural population, as well 
as its provinces to Iran’s inequality. Please note that in practice the end nodes of our 
decomposition data are households and not individuals.  
 
 
TIran = TRuralUrban + TRegion + TIndividuals 
TIran Overall Theil inequality for Iran 
TRuralUrban Weighted average of inequality between the rual and urban areas 
TRegion Weighted average of inequality between the regions within rural and urban areas 
TIndividuals Weighted average of inequality between individuals within regions in rural and urban sectors 
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The format of the Theil expresssion presented here is based on (Takahiro, 2003). 
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srin is the ‘population’ of each individual in each region of every sector equivalent 
to 1 in our case. 
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sriy is the income of individual i in region r in sector s 
Y  is the total income of all individuals 






  sri
irs
y
 
N is the total population of all individuals 
 
The Theil index decomposition sheds light on the principal geographic contributors to 
income inequality in Iran and provides guidance for policy makers, highlighting regions 
of particular concern. As with the GINI coefficient, the Theil index can be modified and 
extended for more analysis. For example population rather than income can be used to 
weight the inequality differences. General entropy measurements more sensitive to the 
lower or upper income scale are additionally carried out in chapter four by inputting 
different values for the parameter  . 
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3.7 Improvements on our methodology 
While attempting to adopt a sound methodology given the constraints and wide scope of the 
empirical research, the author acknowledges many methodological caveats and 
improvements which may be remedied in future research. A number of these include: 
 
1. The survey data itself, as with most household survey secondary data, may be 
subject to bias. The interviewer, interviewee and the questions themselves may be 
biased. Most significantly, there could be significant gender bias. As most 
household heads are men, women may have provided alternate answers. As 
already mentioned there are also many who are excluded from such surveys.  This 
could be partly remedied by investigating the original field methodology and making 
appropriate adjustments to the raw data. 
2. It is also likely that the poorest and richest households are ‘missed’ by such surveys 
due to lack of access. This would mean inequality findings are underestimated. It 
would be apt to develop an estimate of the extent of missing households from the 
poles of the distribution and factor this into the measurements. 
3. Rather than taking an arbitrary approach to estimating the equivalence scale, 
another approach would be to ‘calculate’ the equivalence scale from the 
expenditure data. See the approach by Lancaster et al (1999b). 
4. When we delete households with missing values we may me causing a bias 
towards richer households as poorer households are more likely to lead to missing 
values (Cortinovis et al., 1993). A better approach to missing values may be needed. 
“However, attributing mean scores for missing values reduces variation among 
households, and increases the potential for clumping and truncation.” (Vyas and 
Kumaranayake, 2006, p.463) 
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5. Our study is concerned with the composition, observed patterns and trends of 
inequality and is not concerned with how household characteristics relate to 
underlying inequality. Although decomposing the GE (1) measure provides valuable 
information on the geographic location and composition of inequality, this 
methodology is very limited in pointing out the potential household determinants of 
inequality. Our findings are primarily descriptive in nature. Regression based 
decomposition techniques are designed to identify possible determinant variables. 
Fields (1997) proposes a technique which assesses the contribution of specific 
income sources or household characteristics to inequality. The result is independent 
of the inequality measurement used. This methodology has been used recently by 
Morduch and Sicular (2002a) and Wan and Zhou (2005) among others. This 
methodology would be appropriate for an extension of this study to investigate 
household characteristics. 
6. Income data as well as expenditure data can be used in estimating inequalities and 
a comparison can be made between the two sets of figures. 
7. While we use a separate and rural and urban CPI, the underlying prices may differ 
in the two sectors. We are merely looking at expenditures but real prices may be 
lower in rural areas than in urban ones. In addition to the separate CPI, it would be 
beneficial to construct an urban rural exchange rate using the expenditure data. 
8. Ideally separate provincial CPI and PPP indexes should be constructed for each 
province to account for differences in the underlying prices of goods and services, 
say between the capital city of Tehran and an outlying province with a relatively 
higher rural population such as Sistan and Baluchistan. 
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3.8 Conclusion and summary 
This study makes extensive use of the raw databases from the annual household surveys of 
the Statistical Centre of Iran. The findings presented in subsequent chapters rely on the 
integrity of this secondary data. The choice of raw data over aggregate data or summary 
household data provided by the SCI, was driven by a number of considerations: 
 
1. The desire to follow a particular methodology, such as the re-categorization of 
expenditure data and use of equivalence scales. 
2. The need to analyse particular expenditure categories for purposes such as the 
analysis of subsidies, or for the construction of the asset index. 
3. To be able to carry out intricate and specific inequality calculations, such as the 
urban share of the poorest decile, or the overall inequality contribution of Tehran. 
4. To be fully aware of the underlying data and methodology used in arriving at our 
findings. 
Expenditure rather than income data was used in constructing an aggregate for 
each household. The expenditure data was ‘cleaned up’, re-categorized and before 
settling on the final expenditure aggregate, different aggregates were tested for 
inequality distribution. It was deemed necessary to create an equivalence scale for 
household size, as the author was unable to find one in the existing published literature. 
Households were scaled using a separate urban and rural equivalence scale. 
A number of inequality tools are used throughout the research and are presented in 
context alongside the findings. As well as the GINI figure, the GE(1) Theil index is used 
extensively for inequality decomposition calculations. A summary of STATA modules 
used for the major calculations is provided in appendix 3D. 
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Summary of major methodological steps 
1 The data Iran’s annual urban and rural household surveys 
 
2  Consumption a proxy for income Clean up data. Re-categorize individual 
expenditures into new expenditure categories. 
Derive an appropriate expenditure aggregate 
estimate from household expenditure data. Use 
methodology as outlined in (Deaton and Zaidi, 
2002) 
 
3 Equivalence scales  Create a separate urban and rural equivalence 
scale based on household size and the number of 
adults and children. Apply to all households. 
 
4 GINI coefficient To build up a picture of national and provincial 
vertical inequality. 
5 Theil decomposition To estimate the contribution of rural-urban, inter-
regional and intra-regional inequality to overall 
inequality. To identify the main geographic 
components of inequality. 
 
6 Use of other inequality tools Deciles, Pen Parade, Alpha Means, Sigma 
Divergence, Polarization etc. to derive more 
intricate and specific inequality patterns and trends. 
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The methodology itself led to several findings. Relating to Iran, there is the revelation of the 
unrealistic constant urban/rural population share for the years 1997 to 2004 resulting from 
official weights (see appendix 3C for further details). Two wider implications also arose. The 
use of an equivalence scale may not have a major effect on the overall GINI figure, but it 
leads to considerable differences in the decomposition of vertical inequality and the 
measurements of horizontal inequalities where family size matters, such as inter-provincial 
and urban/rural inequality. It also became clear that given the macroeconomic fluctuations in 
a Rentier state, researchers should be aware of using isolated snapshot years in arriving at 
inequality patterns and trends. The choice of different annual pairings within a broader 
period can lead to contradictory results. 
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4. Vertical inequality 
4.1 Introduction 
Vertical and horizontal income inequality measurements relating to Iran are rarely analysed 
in depth or systematically decomposed in published research. This is perhaps due to the 
observed consistency in the year on year GINI figure, which provides little clues as to the 
patterns and determinants of the underlying inequality. Using the methodology and data 
sources outlined in the previous chapter, the results of this study on the level, pattern and 
composition of vertical expenditure inequality in Iran will be presented. The aim of this 
chapter is twofold: 
1. Empirically, to measure, analyse and report the levels, patterns and geographic 
composition of Iran’s national expenditure inequality from 1997 to 201046 and to fill 
this gap in the literature. 
2. Theoretically, to ascertain whether the weight of the findings support the implicit 
implications of rentier theory for vertical income distribution. 
The empirical findings of the research are numerous and wide ranging. Only results 
directly addressing the two outlined objectives will be presented. Supporting calculations are 
presented in the appendix. The chapter is broken down into two broad sections. We first 
investigate the broad patterns of vertical inequality during the 1997-2010 period, and we 
subsequently decompose it into its geographic components. 
4.2 Summary of results 
The results broadly support implicit rentier theory predictions on income distribution. Our 
findings point to a consistently high vertical inequality level year on year, with a sudden and 
sustained drop in 2008 due to a decrease in the expenditure share for the richest grouping. 
Indeed we will demonstrate that in general the observed inequality fluctuations for this period 
                                                 
46
 Due to data availability at the time of research, the exact time period under study may differ 
slightly depending on the particular analysis being carried out. 
127 
 
are manifested mostly in the top income group. There is a clear and growing urban income 
distribution bias in sync with government expenditure, with a consistent urban/rural divide 
which mirrors the national GINI figure. Energy subsidies benefit the richer income groups 
and recent fuel rationing has had a minimal effect on overall income distribution. 
Although growth and government expenditure have not affected income inequality 
fluctuations directly, government expenditure has affected inequality composition by 
favouring the urban sector. This pattern has been broken (or perhaps temporarily disrupted) 
in 2008. Following the global financial crisis, a drop in output, a drop in oil rents and a real 
fall in mean household expenditures has reduced inequality and kept it constant until 2010. 
The inequality decrease has manifested itself in a shift of income from the richest decile to 
other income groups. 
The geographic breakdown of Iran’s vertical inequality reveals a growing inequality 
contribution by urban areas and especially from ‘within’ the urban areas rather than between 
them. Government expenditure has led to an increase in urban income and population share, 
‘dragging in’ with it the inequality component of the rural areas.  As we will see, inequality in 
Tehran alone, now accounts for a quarter of all national inequality. 
The inequality contribution arising ‘between’ urban areas is actually on the decrease but 
rising ‘within’ inequality is offsetting this decrease for the total urban contribution to inequality. 
Conversely when it comes to rural areas, in-between inequality is on the increase and within 
inequality is decreasing. The income and population transfer to urban areas has led to a 
more locally homogenous but nationally fragmented rural sector. A direct horizontal 
comparison of the urban and rural sector is presented in chapter six. The wider implications 
of these findings are presented in the conclusion to this chapter. 
4.3 The period under study, 1997- 2010 
Before we present our findings, a brief note about the period under study. Iran’s post-
revolutionary economic activity was dominated by immediate and extreme structural 
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changes post 1979, and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988. From 1989 to 1997 the 
economy started a period of normalisation under the presidency of Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani. As a number of ‘poverty/inequality’ studies have already been carried out 
covering periods of Rafsanjani’s presidency (Tabibian, 2000, Assadzadeh, 1997), we have 
opted to cover the period which starts with the presidency of Mohammad Khatami and ends 
with the twilight years of President Ahmadinejad’s governance.  Having a bearing on our 
decision was the availability of exact weighting data for household expenditures by the 
Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) from the year 1997 onwards. For data consistency reasons 
we chose this as our cut off point. Occasionally for the purpose of confirming trends we 
compare the data to 1990, for which we estimated household provincial weights by using 
census data. 
Figure 4.3.1 Growth and oil rents 1997-2009 
  Source: World Bank 
 
 
From 1997 to 2005, President Khatami, continued Rafsanjani’s broad policy of 
industrialization, privatization and liberalization. Although this led to a period of sustained 
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growth and a fall in poverty (Salehi-Isfahani, 2008), inequality levels remained unaltered (as 
we will see later in this chapter). We contend that this is largely due to a lack of change in 
the rentier structure of the economy. 
Oil rents accounted for an increasing share of the GDP. As for their disbursement, 
despite the privatization program, by the end of his tenure the economy was still dominated 
by a large public sector in the shape of state or ‘pseudo state’ companies. Fiscal re-
allocative measures remained ineffective and the government share of revenue from 
taxation remained constantly low and actually fell as a percentage of GDP from 11% to 8% 
during his tenure.  General energy subsidies (favouring the rich as we will see) still remained 
in place by 2005. In absolute terms, by the year 2000 Khatami’s government is reported to 
have paid twice the amount of subsidies as in 1996.47 
President Ahmadinejad’s presidency was marked by a declared mantra of reducing 
national and regional inequalities as stated in Iran’s fourth five year development plan (2004-
2009).  Fuel rationing was introduced (mid 2007) and at the very end of our research period 
(December 2010) a process of removing general subsidies started in earnest. The global 
recession affected Iran from 2008 reducing oil export revenues and decreasing the growth 
rate. Since 2010, general subsidies have largely been lifted; however the rapid depreciation 
of the currency in 2012 has led to the nominal lifting of subsidies to be negated significantly 
in real terms and inflation has risen sharply. 
International sanctions on goods, services and financial transfers have been 
considerably tightened on Iran. Oil exports have fallen as a result. Unfortunately, we do not 
have any data post 2010 for the purposes of this study and are unable to measure the 
impact of the latest economic developments, which are considerable in magnitude, on Iran’s 
income distribution. 
  
                                                 
47
 See the article by the Iranian economist Sohrab Behdad 
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero052101.  
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4.4 Headline inequality measurements 
The national GINI figures computed on the basis of ‘equivalence household expenditure 
excluding investment’ using the methodology set out in chapter three are presented in Table 
4.4.1. These figures have been scaled to take into account household size and makeup. The 
SCI does not follow our methodology and to indicate the level of discrepancy a comparison 
of these GINI measurements with the SCI figures is provided in figure 4.4.1. 
 
Figure 4.4.1 Computed national GINI measurements v SCI figures  
 
Separate SCI rural and urban GINI figures were not available for comparison. 
 
Both sets of measurements follow the same trend, but it is evident that our measurements 
(which take into account household size and makeup) indicate a slightly higher level of 
inequality. 
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 Table 4.4.1 Iran GINI figures, 1997-2009 
Equivalence household expenditure without investment 
 
Year 
GINI 
Overall 
S.E 
GINI 
Urban 
S.E 
GINI 
Rural 
S.E 
1997 0.430 0.0033 0.400 0.00412 0.394 0.00401 
1998 0.431 0.00322 0.397 0.00404 0.413 0.00376 
1999 0.426 0.00334 0.398 0.00421 0.398 0.00342 
2000 0.432 0.00327 0.402 0.00402 0.396 0.00377 
2001 0.441 0.00357 0.413 0.00439 0.389 0.00301 
2002 0.442 0.00367 0.414 0.00452 0.387 0.0033 
2003 0.419 0.0035 0.393 0.00427 0.371 0.0038 
2004 0.427 0.00343 0.398 0.00415 0.395 0.00533 
2005 0.426 0.00363 0.402 0.00437 0.387 0.00366 
2006 0.438 0.00336 0.412 0.00405 0.400 0.00332 
2007 0.436 0.00387 0.408 0.00469 0.393 0.00415 
2008 0.412 0.00347 0.378 0.00416 0.379 0.00338 
2009 0.413 0.00433 0.382 0.00506 0.387 0.00465 
2010 0.409 0.00379 0.382 0.00447 0.381 0.00354 
 
Figure 4.4.2 Iran overall/urban/rural GINI, 1997-2010 
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The results in table 4.4.1 show a national GINI index which fluctuates between a 0.41 and 
0.44 range from 1997 to 2010. A calculation of the Atkinson inequality measures is also 
reported in appendix 4A to confirm this inequality trend. Although the figures appear to be 
fairly homogeneous, four main findings of interest emerge from these measurements: 
 
1. Iran’s GINI index still remains consistently high 
Fluctuating between 0.41 and 0.4448 the GINI index for 1997-2010 is largely in line with 
reported pre and post Islamic revolution figures49. Pesaran (1976) computes GINI figures 
fluctuating within a 0.42 to 0.45 range for the years 1969 to 1972. Behdad (1989) calculates 
a range of 0.40 to 0.43 (urban only) for the period of 1980 to 1984. Salehi-Isfahani’s (2008) 
GINI figures for the period 1984 to 2005 range from 0.43 to 0.46. The only ‘outliers’ are the 
urban GINI figures reported by Behdad (1989) for the years 1977 and 1979, the two years 
immediately preceding and succeeding the Islamic Revolution.50 We can conclude that for 
(at least) the past four decades Iran has consistently belonged to the club of nations 
manifesting a GINI coefficient of over 0.40. Despite numerous pre and post-revolutionary 
government policies to tackle inequality, it has not decreased. 
 
2.Urban / rural expenditure ratio 
For the period under study, the national GINI figure is higher than either the urban or rural 
GINI figures on their own, suggesting an observable impact of the urban/rural divide upon 
the overall GINI.51  In figure 4.4.3 we plot the ratios of the calculated equivalence mean 
                                                 
48
 These comparisons have been rounded to 2 decimal places for clarity 
49
 Please note that figures calculated by third parties are based on different methodologies and are 
not reported to be based on ‘equivalence expenditure’. 
50
 The urban GINI figures reported by Behdad (1989) are 0.4998 for 1977 and 0.4702 for 1979. 
51
 Pesaran (1976) also suggests such a relationship for the pre-revolution period. See PESARAN, M. 
H. (ed.) 1976. Income Distribution and Its Major Determinants in Iran: Aspen Institute for Humanistic 
Studies. 
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expenditures of urban to rural households alongside the national GINI figure, and this 
relationship becomes clearer. The table of the measurements is in appendix 4B. 
 
Figure 4.4.3 Mean urban : rural household expenditure (Equivalence Scale) 
 
For the period 1997 to 2007 we find a 0.8 positive correlation52 between the mean urban to 
rural expenditures and fluctuations in the national GINI figure. This does not assert a cause 
and effect relationship, but it does present a picture of the significant role of the urban-rural 
divide on inequality fluctuations for this particular period. This relationship holds during this 
period of relative economic stability and sustained economic growth, but it breaks down after 
a real fall in household expenditures in 2008. As we will see later in this chapter, in 2008, the 
loss of income share by the top decile is the primary factor behind the fall in the GINI figure.  
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3. National GINI figure is driven by the urban GINI 
Figure 4.4.2 clearly demonstrates that trends in the National GINI index are determined 
mostly by the urban GINI coefficient and not the rural GINI. Looking at the data behind the 
GINI figures, it becomes clear that this dominance is due to the urban sector’s major and still 
growing ‘income’ share53.  Using the same equivalence expenditure methodology, urban 
income share for 1990 was compared to that of 2009: 
 
Table 4.4.2 Income share urban sector 1990 v 2009 
Year Income share urban Population share 
1990 70.8% 57.4% 
2009 84.6% 72.7% 
 
As can be seen in table 4.4.2, the reason for the increase in urban household income share 
is directly related to the increase in the urban household population share from 57.4% to 
72.7%.  
 
4. There is a sharp drop in inequality in 2008 
The results reveal a sudden drop in inequality in 2008 from 0.436 in 2007 to 0.412.  This 
lower level of inequality is sustained for the years of 2009 and 2010. This reduction in 
inequality has been manifested in a loss of income share for the very rich from 33% in 2007 
to 30.6% in 2008 (see the decile analysis later in this chapter).  
An obvious culprit for the 2008 fall in inequality is the regularly cited and much publicized 
(Guillaume et al., 2011) government policy of fuel rationing, introduced in July 2007 as a first 
step in removing inequality enhancing subsidies. As we can see in figure 4.4.4 this has 
indeed resulted in a more even fuel expenditure pattern among households.  
                                                 
53
 Please note that references to ‘income’ are based on proxy calculations using expenditure data. In 
effect the research is studying expenditures and not income directly. 
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Figure 4.4.4  Change in household fuel expenditure by decile, 2007 v 2008 
 
 
The poorest decile and the middle classes increase their nominal fuel expenditure much 
more than the three richest deciles which lose against all the other deciles in terms of 
expenditure share. Despite this notable change in mean household expenditure, when 
looked at in aggregate terms (see Figure 4.4.5), the changes in the decile mean 
expenditures translate into only a marginally more equal distribution of total fuel 
expenditure in 2008. For the very poor the change is hardly noticeable but there is 
clearly a small shift of expenditures from the very rich to the middle class. 
When we also consider that fuel expenditures accounted for less than one percent54 
of total household expenditures in 2008, it becomes apparent that this expenditure 
category does not form a very significant component of the overall expenditure makeup. 
Therefore, despite its equalizing effects, we can safely dismiss the fuel rationing scheme 
in 2007 as being the reason for the witnessed decrease in national inequality. 
                                                 
54
 The proportion of fuel expenditures in total household expenditure excluding investment 
expenditure is 0.76% in 2008. 
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Figure 4.4.5  Aggregate fuel expenditure by decile, 2007 v 200855 
 
 
A much more likely culprit behind the sudden drop in inequality, is the fall in economic output 
due to the global financial crisis, the subsequent decreases in oil rents and the resulting tax 
revenue increase as a percentage of government revenues between 2007 and 2009. If we 
deflate urban mean household expenditures56 we can see that, in 2008, expenditures fall for 
the very first time during the period under study by almost 8% in real terms. A table of 
deflated mean urban and rural household expenditures is provided in appendix 4C.  This has 
adversely affected the very rich proportionally more than other income groups, decreasing 
income inequality. 
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 Please note that we have not scaled the households for size for this fuel analysis. 
56
 We have used the Urban CPI from the Central bank to deflate the expenditures. The CPI has been 
modified to make 2004 the base year. 
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Table 4.4.3  Oil rents, tax revenues and GDP growth, 2007-2009 
Year 
Tax as % of Gov. 
revenue 
Oil Rent as % 
of Gov. 
revenue 
GDP growth % 
Deflated (2004 Riyals) 
mean urban household 
expenditure57 
2007 13 33 7.8 57,523,939 
2008 16 38 2.3 52,918,712 
2009 19 21 1.8 50,738,916 
Source for tax, oil rents and GDP growth: World Bank 
 
Apart from the significant fall in the income share of the top decile, we can further verify that 
the richest group is behind the observed fall in inequality, by comparing one ‘discretionary’ 
and one ‘non-discretionary’ expenditure category between 2007 and 2008. Let us assume 
that food expenditure is non-discretionary in the most part and unlikely to be affected 
(especially for the rich) by a downturn in economic circumstances. From figure 4.4.6 it is 
evident that nominal food expenditure increases for the rich as well as the poor in 2008. 
 
Figure 4.4.6  Increase in urban household food expenditure 2007 v 2008 
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 The mean urban household expenditures have not been scaled as we wish to look at absolute 
amounts not the distribution in this case. 
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Let us now turn our attention to one of the largest discretionary expenditure categories, 
‘durables’ (20% of all expenditures). We can see from figure 4.4.7 that the top two richest 
deciles have increased their expenditure less than any other income group in nominal terms. 
Their expenditure has actually substantially fallen in real terms. This is also reflected in the 
overall share of durables in expenditures which decreases from 22.4% in 2007 to 20.3% in 
2008. 
Figure 4.4.7  Increase in urban household durables expenditure 2007 v 2008 
 
 
Apart from the economic downturn affecting the rich, it is also noteworthy that expenditures 
on rent increased substantially in nominal terms between 2007 and 2008. Rent accounted 
for 29% of all expenditures in 2008, up from 26.5% in 2007. The nominal rental expenditure 
increase for the top decile was just 13%, half the increase of any other decile. This would 
also contribute to the decrease in the inequality measure. 
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Figure 4.4.8 2007 v 2008 urban expenditure makeup 
 
2007 urban expenditure makeup 2008 urban expenditure makeup 
 
 
 
We can conclude that the fall in the headline inequality figure in 2008 is not due to the 
introduction of fuel rationing and is simply due to a general loss of discretionary expenditure 
share by the richest decile.  
To conclude this section and consolidate our findings we run a regression, for the 
years 1997 to 2007, based on a functional form cited by Pesaran (1976), attributed to 
Ahluwalia (1974)58, used initially for an “explanation of the crosscountry [sic] evidence on 
income distribution.”  
GINI =             
        
Where 
  is the log mean household expenditure59 
   is the uran:rural expenditure ratio 
                                                 
58
 Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Problem," in H. Chenery, et al., eds., 
Redistribution with Growth (London: Oxford University Press, 1974) 
59
 Please note that for the mean household expenditure, we use household data without scaling for 
household size as we are no longer looking at distribution, but the annual mean. 
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The quadratic shape of the equation is due to testing for the inverted U shaped Kuznets 
relationship of inequality and growth. Detailed results are provided in the appendix. 
 
GINI =                              
R2, unadjusted: 0.66 
R2, adjusted:  0.52 
 
The (y) coefficients do no correspond with a Kuznet’s inverted U shape and are not 
significant. Only the p-value of the urban to rural ratio is found to be significant60. We would 
indeed expect this variable to be explanatory of the inequality figure. The inclusion of an 
additional variable of government expenditure lowers the adjusted R2 and is not significant in 
explaining the change in inequality. Full results of the regression are in appendix 4D. 
For the 1997-2007 period, growth (measured in terms of real expenditure) and 
government expenditures do not seem to directly affect changes in income inequality. 
However, as the urban/rural divide seems to be a good indicator of such changes, we go on 
to investigate whether government expenditure is favouring one sector over another. 
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 UR has a P-value of 0.0076 
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4.5 Investigating the urban bias 
Urban bias is a term popularized by Lipton (1977) and used by Bates (1981) in his critique of 
African government policies to the detriment of local farmers. The term specifically refers to 
worsening terms of trade in the agricultural sector when the manufacturing sector is 
protected. We opt for a more general political economy definition of ‘urban bias’ (Eastwood 
and Lipton 2002), also encompassing distributional urban bias of “unmerited public spending 
on goods and services in urban as compared to rural areas” (Corbridge and Jones 2008, p. 
3). 
Our contention that government expenditure in Iran’s oil economy favours the urban 
sector can be investigated by comparing the fluctuations calculated in the annual urban 
household expenditure share to those of government expenditure61. Even at first glance 
there is an apparent link between the two. Changes in government expenditure seem to be 
mirrored by changes in urban income share. For example a fall in 1998 to 1999 leads to a 
fall in urban income share and a sudden rise in 2004 to 2005 or a rise from 1999 to 2000 
leads to a rise in urban income share. The table comparing the two measures is provided in 
appendix 4E. 
 
Figure 4.5.1 Government final consumption expenditure and urban income share 
Constant $US (year 2000)62 
 
                                                 
61
 The reason we have chosen not to focus on oil prices or revenues and opted for final government 
consumption expenditure as a variable, is due to annual oil revenue proceeds not being wholly, 
immediately or automatically included in the government’s annual budget. Therefore, on the 
understanding that oil rents account for a substantial portion of revenues, annual direct government 
expenditures are considered rather than annual oil rents. 
62
 Source World Bank, definition: “General government final consumption expenditure (formerly 
general government consumption) includes all government current expenditures for purchases of 
goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on 
national defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of 
government capital formation.” 
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If we assume a simple linear relationship between the log of government final consumption 
expenditure (GOV) and urban income share (UI), we derive the following results for 1997 to 
2007. Details of the regression are provided in the appendix 4F. 
UI =             
UI = -1.98 + 0.19GOV 
R2, unadjusted: 0.7614 
R2, adjusted:  0.7349 
 
Both the constant and government expenditure variable coefficients are significant. This is 
not to suggest that government expenditure is necessarily the only driving force behind the 
rise in urban income share, but it does seem to indicate it is one of the main factors behind 
both the growth and the downturns in the urban share of income. 
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4.6 Changes within the income distribution 
Although the GINI coefficient has provided a number of valuable insights, it does not 
differentiate between the inequality at the bottom and top of the income scale. In order to 
delve deeper into the fluctuations of inequality for the period under study, we turn to the 
Generalized Entropy (GE) inequality measures. The formula for the family of General 
Entropy measures (GE) is given as: 
  ( )  
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GE is often used for carrying out inequality analysis where additive decomposition is a 
requirement, but it is also useful as it can show differing sensitivities towards different parts 
of the distribution. For lower values of α, the GE measure is more sensitive to changes in the 
lower income household expenditures and for higher values of α (more than 1) more 
sensitive to changes in the higher income households. Table 4.6.1 presents the results of 
the calculated GE values for the period under study. 
 
Table 4.6.1 GE measures for household equivalence expenditure, 1997-2009 
Year GINI GE-1 GE0 GE1 GE2 
1997 0.42996 0.47371 0.32299 0.34542 0.58642 
1998 0.43102 0.47045 0.32606 0.33485 0.50357 
1999 0.42637 0.43695 0.31565 0.33422 0.54025 
2000 0.43181 0.45289 0.32363 0.34047 0.52669 
2001 0.44059 0.45611 0.33519 0.3615 0.60519 
2002 0.44189 0.45847 0.33737 0.36405 0.61293 
2003 0.41878 0.39411 0.30031 0.32049 0.49718 
2004 0.4269 0.41554 0.31237 0.33368 0.53334 
2005 0.42647 0.41255 0.31126 0.33036 0.51186 
2006 0.43819 0.4406 0.32901 0.34455 0.52317 
2007 0.43569 0.44112 0.32733 0.34948 0.59754 
2008 0.41189 0.4037 0.29458 0.30445 0.48408 
2009 0.41258 0.40896 0.29543 0.29996 0.4424 
2010 0.40906 0.38803 0.28901 0.30427 0.47708 
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Figure 4.6.1 GE measures for household equivalence expenditure, 1997-2009 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4.6.1, apart from GE(2) all the other GE measures display 
minimal variance and follow the GINI pattern during this period. The GE(2) measure, is 
clearly more erratic. This seems to suggest that the small fluctuations observed in overall 
inequality could largely be due to or reflected in the income changes among the top earners 
in Iran. Intuitively, this can be explained by a small subset of the population having a 
disproportionately large share of the total income and changes mainly in this group’s 
fortunes impacting the year on year inequality changes. To investigate this further, the top 
income decile of the households can be looked at in more detail.  
The pattern of income share of the top decile should follow a similar pattern as that 
of the GE(2) inequality measure given that it is more sensitive to the changes in the income 
of the rich. Figure 4.6.2 confirms this. 
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Figure 4.6.2 Top decile income share and the GE(2) inequality measure, 1997-2009 
 
 
As GE(2) is the only ‘erratic’ GE inequality measure during this period, it follows that 
changes in the top decile should also dominate changes in the overall GINI figure. To 
investigate this, in figure 4.6.3 the top decile of the equivalence household expenditure 
share is compared to the overall GINI figure, which is equally sensitive to lower and upper 
levels of the income distribution. The table of data for a comparison of the top decile and 
GINI is provided in appendix 4H. 
Correlating the top decile with the GINI or GE(2) figure is problematic as we are 
comparing movements in a slice of the distribution with the whole distribution. This can lead 
to misleading results, as changes in the bottom decile will also affect the income slice of the 
top decile. Therefore a simple correlation of this type is not sufficient to alert us to the 
income groups which are mostly responsible for fluctuations in the overall distribution. 
However, in combination with the findings from the General Entropy measures, in this case 
the GE(2) measure, it is possible to conclude that small fluctuations in overall year on year 
inequality are mostly due to or reflected in the expenditure levels of the higher income 
earners.  
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Figure 4.6.3 Top equivalence expenditure decile and the GINI coefficient 
 
 
As figure 4.2.3 clearly shows the top decile expenditure share seems to be almost perfectly 
correlated to the GINI figure. In fact there is a 0.9563 positive correlation between the two. As 
explained earlier, on its own such a correlation would be misleading and inconclusive, as a 
change in one slice of the pie will also affect the other slices of the pie, but in combination 
with the GE(2) finding it is worthy of note.64 
 
Table 4.6.2 Urban GINI Measurements, 2007 
Overall Urban GINI 0.40758 
Urban GINI without the top decile 0.30394 
Urban GINI without the bottom decile 0.37585 
  
                                                 
63
 A correlation of 0.9491 significant at the 1% level. 
64
 To illustrate this, the correlation for the bottom 6 deciles which accounts for 60% of the 
population and approx 30% of the income share (i.e. equivalent to the top decile in terms of income 
share but 6 times the population) also correlate almost perfectly but negatively at -0.98 with the 
GINI figure. However, the GE measure sensitive to the bottom end of the income scale shows little 
fluctuation for the period under study.   
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Although not directly related to the ‘movements’ in the year on year inequality figures, the 
dominance of the top decile in the overall GINI figure can also be illustrated by removing the 
top decile from the measurement. For the year 2007, the calculated GINI figure for the urban 
areas is 0.40758. Removing the top decile leaves us with a GINI figure of 0.30394. 
Removing the poorest decile results in a GINI figure of 0.37585.  The consensus from the 
measurements in this section is that the observed ‘fluctuations’ in Iran’s income inequality 
year on year are manifested mostly in the plight of the rich. 
 
4.7 Evolution of income distribution 
The calculated GINI and GE figures provide an overview of inequality during the period 
under study, but in order to start delving into the distribution pattern of the observed 
inequality over time, we make use of a ‘Pen Parade’ which in this case simply shows the 
expenditure per household sorted by scale. The horizontal axis ranks households from 
poorest to richest and the vertical access displays the level of household expenditures. A 
Pen Parade is particularly useful for comparing two distributions over time (Haughton and 
Khandker, 2009). 
We have selected four years to compare the evolution of the income inequality 
pattern, 1990, 1997, 2007 and 2009. Separate urban and rural Consumer Price Indexes for 
Iran have been used to deflate the urban and rural expenditure data. The urban CPI is 
derived from the website of the Central Bank of Iran (www.cbi.ir) and the rural CPI from the 
website of the Statistical Center of Iran (www.amar.org.ir). A table of the rural and urban 
deflators is provided in appendix 4I. Rural CPI figures were not available for 2009 and hence 
this year was omitted from the rural Pen Parade analysis. 
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Figure 4.7.1 Pen’s Parade Urban household expenditure, urban households 
 
As can be seen, between 1990 and 1997 (during Rafsanjani’s administration) there is only a 
very slight rise in real household expenditures and the income distribution does not alter 
substantially. Between 1997 and 2007 (Khatami’s government and 2 years into 
Ahmadinejad’s government) there is a significant rise in real urban household expenditures 
without a significant increase in income inequality65. The whole distribution moves up to a 
higher income scale, so that the poorer household are also better off. 
In 2009 (following the global financial crisis), there is a fall in real household 
expenditures. But looking at the Pen’s Parade this seems to occur for the richer households 
not the poorest ones. In fact an analysis of deciles shows that the poorest quintile 
(marginally) gains income share. This is partly reflected in the improvement of the urban 
income distribution GINI figure, from a coefficient of 0.408 in 2007 to 0.382 in 2009. It is 
therefore interesting to note that not only has urban income inequality not increased during 
                                                 
65
 The GINI figure does slightly worsen, from a GINI of 0.43 to 0.436. 
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periods of growth in terms of real expenditures, but during a fall of real expenditures it has 
actually benefitted the ‘non-rich’ households. 
 
Figure 4.7.2 Pen’s Parade Rural household expenditure, rural households 
 
From Figure 4.7.2 it is evident that there is no significant increase in rural household 
expenditures between 1990 and 1997. There seems to be a small rise in expenditures for 
the very poor and a fall for the rich, with households in the middle income range remaining 
the same. This should of course improve overall rural income distribution, as indeed is 
confirmed by the rural GINI coefficient of 0.4268 for 1990 and 0.39405 in 1997. Notice how 
the comparison of the rural GINI figure, though indicating a fall in inequality, does not in itself 
reveal the intricate nature of the change in the distribution. 
Between 1997 and 2007 there is a significant increase of household expenditures 
across the entire income range. The overall distribution is unchanged as confirmed by the 
rural GINI coefficient of 0.39308 for 2007.   
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For the period under study, there is a real rise in real expenditures for both urban and rural 
areas. Following the 2008 fall in real expenditures, it is the rich who bear the brunt in relative 
terms rather than the poor. This again confirms that it is the plight of the rich which mostly 
affects fluctuations in the inequality figure. 
 
4.7.1 Household expenditure decile shares, 1997-2010 
Following from the Pen Parade, we turn our attention to decile analysis, an intuitively simple 
measurement tool, to estimate the share of expenditure by each decile. This allows us to 
see how differently ranked groups within the income distribution have fared throughout the 
period under study.  The table of urban and rural deciles is in appendix 4J and 4K. 
Figure 4.7.3 Decile expenditures, urban households 2007 
 
In 2007, the richest urban decile spent more than 13 times the poorest decile.66 For the rural 
sector the discrepancy was almost the same, with the richest households spending 12 times 
the poorest. In both the urban and rural sectors, the top decile dominates, accounting for 
                                                 
66
 Methodology footnote: These figures are not exaggerated by having used equivalence scales. The 
same calculation was carried out on the household expenditure without the use of equivalence 
scales and the ratio of the richest to the poorest decile was in fact 14.2 
0
20,000,000,000,000
40,000,000,000,000
60,000,000,000,000
80,000,000,000,000
100,000,000,000,000
120,000,000,000,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Aggregated household expenditure by decile (Iranian Riyals), 2007 
152 
 
more than 30% of all expenditures. It spends almost twice the next lower placed decile (9th 
decile). 
 
Figure 4.7.4 Decile expenditures, rural households 2007 
 
 
 
Decile shares, 1997-2010 
Figure 4.7.5 provides a weighted aggregate of urban and rural decile shares 
Figure 4.7.5 Total (urban and rural) household expenditure decile shares, 1997-2010 
 
Table is provided in appendix 4L.  
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All in all, there is not a significant shifting of income shares during this period. Between 1997 
and 2010, the top decile has lost its income share by two percentage points from 32.9% to 
30.9%. The poorest decile’s share has slightly improved from 1.9% to 2.1%.  The middle 
class have been the biggest relative winners, although by a small absolute gain. The middle 
40% of the household population share has moved from a share of 29.6% of total 
expenditures to 30.6%.  However, given the number of expenditure share fluctuations within 
this period, these figures should be interpreted with caution. For example the loss of the top 
decile’s income share occurs suddenly in 2008 and coincides with the global financial crisis 
and this could be reversed in later years and may not be part of a general trend of the rich 
losing income share. 
We can conclude that, unlike previous studies on Iran (Salehi-Isfahani, 2006b, p.25, 
Tabibian, 2000, pp.152-158) which have found a shift of income in favour of the very poor at 
the expense of the rich, the decile analysis in our study reveals no discernible shifts in 
income shares during the 1997-2010 period, apart from highlighting the sudden loss of 
income share by the top decile in 2008. As we have already seen, this also coincides with a 
sudden fall in the GINI index. 
  
154 
 
4.8 The effect of subsidies on income inequality 
Until recently (Dec 2010) Iran had in place a vast subsidies program on basic food and 
energy items. While in theory the subsidies were in place to help the poor, government 
officials argued that in practice, they were leading to wastage of resources and their 
untargeted nature meant that all income groups, not just the poor, were being subsidized 
(Guillaume et al., 2011).  
The lifting of subsidies is politically sensitive in Iran as any improvement in inequality 
may adversely affect the poor. Salehi-Isfahani (2010) argues that although subsidies may 
benefit the rich more in absolute terms, in relative terms (as a % of their total expenditure) 
the poor benefit the most from subsidies. Lifting general subsidies may therefore hurt the 
poor if compensatory payments are not sufficient and not properly targeted. Since late 2010, 
Iran’s government has started to remove many of the subsidies and make fixed monthly 
cash payments in compensation to families (in total 61 million people, 80% of population) 
who have completed a self-assessment form(Guillaume et al., 2011). 
As of July 2012, these cash payments are still not targeted, but the next phase of 
the program aims to target the cash payments to the neediest. It should be noted, that 
recent international sanctions and oil embargoes have led to a significant depreciation in the 
Iranian Riyal, which means that many goods are once again subsidized in real international 
price terms unless their domestic price is raised even further. It is too early to assess the 
impact of lifting subsidies on inequality using household surveys, as the datasets are not 
publicly available yet. However, we can briefly assess the effect the subsidies were having 
on income inequality prior to their lifting by looking at the two heavily subsidized goods of 
fuel and electricity. We will use the 2007 dataset for this purpose.  Tabibian (2000) carries 
out a similar study for the year 1996. 
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4.8.1 Fuel and electricity subsidies 
We will first take a look at transportation fuel expenditure for 2007. We have included 
expenditures relating specifically to petrol, gas oil (a type of diesel fuel for transportation) 
and gas (for gas powered vehicles). In 2007 fuel subsidies were still prevalent. Although 
subsidized fuel was rationed from July 2007, the ration was a generous 120 litters per month 
for every car. This was gradually lowered and limited to certain models of cars in the 
following years. 
If we break down expenditure on transport fuel by overall household expenditure 
deciles, we will see which income ranges are benefitting the most from the fuel subsidies. 
For this particular analysis, we make use of non-scaled fuel expenditure as we wish to look 
at actual fuel usage per household, but we make use of scaled total household expenditure  
to determine a more accurate household decile distribution. The table of results is provided 
in appendix 4M. 
 
Figure 4.8.1 Aggregate urban fuel expenditure by decile, 2007 
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Although the subsidies are implemented to help the poor, due to their untargeted nature, the 
richest households are the main beneficiaries in absolute terms. More than 25% of fuel 
subsidies accrue to the richest 10% and less than 2% of the subsidies benefit the poorest 10% 
of households. Intuitively, it is the rich who have the most usage of fuel driven vehicles. 
 
Figure 4.8.2 Aggregate urban electricity expenditure by decile, 2007 
 
A similar exercise was carried out for electricity usage in 2007. Again, electricity costs were 
not scaled so that actual usage could be determined. The table of findings is provided in 
appendix 4N. The results demonstrate that electricity subsidies are not as pronounced as 
fuel subsidies, but still favour the richer deciles disproportionately. We can therefore 
conclude that, given the rather large premise of compensatory payments being sufficiently 
high and being targeted accurately, the lifting of subsidies should benefit the poorest deciles. 
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4.9 Geographic decomposition of vertical inequality 
We now wish to look at the geographic breakdown of the observed inequality. In particular, 
to find out how much the urban and rural sectors contribute to overall inequality. We have 
already established that the urban/rural divide seems a factor in the observed inequality 
fluctuations, we can now also calculate how much of the underlying inequality can be 
apportioned to the gap in incomes between these two sectors. 
The decomposition of inequality can provide valuable insight into the structure of 
income distribution (Litchfield, 1999). A geographic decomposition can help target present 
and future government policy, by revealing emerging trends in the contribution of specific 
regions to overall inequality. Typically, researchers decompose inequality by distinct 
population groups and measure the inequality prevalent within and between those groups. 
This will indeed be the method adopted by this author. However, this decomposition 
methodology suffers from a number of limitations two of which should be noted with regards 
to this research (Morduch and Sicular, 2002b). 
Primarily, as regards this research, the lack of control for endogeneity renders the 
results derived by this method purely descriptive. i.e. a variable which may have led to the 
observed inequality pattern may have itself been affected by that pattern. Therefore, 
descriptive interpretations are used rather than deterministic ones in evaluating these 
findings. Another concern of population decomposition is the number of samples and hence 
their significance at the end nodes. The more a population is decomposed the smaller the 
samples become. The end nodes in this analysis are the urban and rural sectors of the 
individual provinces. However, we do not decompose these into individual towns or districts 
due to the small sampling problem. 
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A variety of inequality measures are available for decomposition. Unlike the GINI coefficient, 
the General Entropy measures offer the characteristic of being decomposable within and 
between groups (Litchfield, 1999).  As explained in chapter three, GE(1), equivalent to the 
Theil index, has been used to decompose overall inequality into various subgroups. 
 
4.9.1 The urban/rural breakdown 
The decomposed Theil index for each year is calculated using equivalence household 
expenditure data. The observed inequality has in the first instance been decomposed into 
the three distinct groups of: 
1. Inequality within urban areas 
2. Inequality within rural areas 
3. Inequality between the urban and rural sector. 
The full set of results is provided in Appendix 4O. 
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Figure 4.9.1 Contribution to national Iran inequality, urban and rural sectors, 1997-2009 
 
 
Two significant observations emerge from these findings: 
1. There is a consistent trend of a rising population and income share for the urban 
sector. This is reflected in the urban sector’s growing contribution to overall 
inequality. This rise is not just limited to this period under study. Using the same 
methodology, we carry out the calculations for 1990 and derive the urban sector’s 
income share as 71% as opposed to 78% in 1997 and 85% in 2009. Clearly the 
largest and still growing contribution to overall inequality comes from the urban 
sector. 
 
Table 4.9.1 Urban income share and contribution to overall inequality, 1990, 1997, 2009 
Year Income share Contribution to overall inequality 
1990 71% 60% 
1997 78% 69% 
2009 85% 72% 
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Figure 4.9.2 Urban income share and contribution to overall inequality, 1990, 1997, 2009 
 
 
2. If we take a snapshot of inequality in 1997 and 2007, it is striking that despite a 
significant fall in the income and population share of the rural sector, and the overall 
inequality measure being the same, the between inequality contribution of the rural v 
urban sector has also not changed. 
Table 4.9.2 Between rural v urban inequality 1997, 2007 
Year 1997 2007 
Rural income share 22% 18% 
Rural population share 36% 31% 
Overall inequality GE(1) 0.345 0.349 
Overall inequality GINI 0.430 0.436 
Contribution of ‘between rural/urban inequality’ 13.6% 13.3% 
 
A rural sector with a smaller income and population share still leads to the same ‘between’ 
inequality contribution as the one a decade earlier, with overall inequality remaining the 
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same.67 At the same time the ‘within rural inequality’ component of overall rural inequality 
GE(1) falls during this period from 0.268 in 1997 to 0.249 in 2007. 
Using a subset of dummy data to reflect the sample figures, we ran several 
simulations to see how such a situation can come about. Although there are several possible 
distribution shifting scenarios, given that within rural inequality decreases during this period 
but the inequality contribution gap vis a vis the urban sector is preserved, we speculate that 
the most plausible explanation is that on average the population shift68 from the rural to the 
urban sector is dominated by the richest and poorest rural households. 
This is given some credence by a study by Mohtadi (1986) who confirms that rural to 
urban migration in Iran is characterized by both poor and rich migrants. In chapter six we 
also find that the widest gap between the rural and urban income distributions is for the very 
poor and the very rich. Intuitively this suggests that the richest have the means to migrate 
and the poorest do so out of necessity. 
 
4.9.2 The rural urban divide in the richest and poorest decile 
It is noteworthy to assess how the shift of the rural population into the urban sector has 
affected the composition of households in the poorest and richest margins of society. The 
bottom and top deciles were compared for three years to see how the income and 
population share was divided between the urban and rural sectors. 
Table 4.9.3 Poorest decile, % of rural and urban income/population share 
Year Urban pop% Urban income % Rural Pop% Rural income % 
1990 19% 21% 81% 79% 
2007 28% 30% 72% 70% 
2009 29% 31% 71% 69% 
  
                                                 
67
 There have been fluctuations, but the level in 1997 is very similar to that of 2007. There is a very 
significant fall in GE(1) in 2008 and it stays at the same level in 2009. However, the unmistakable 
trend of a rise in the urban income and population share alongside a consistent GE(1) measure holds 
from 1997 to 2007. 
68
 This population shift can be both due to migration and urbanization 
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Figure 4.9.3 Poorest decile, % of rural and urban population share 
 
There is a clear trend of increasing urban share in the poorest decile, with nearly a third of 
the poorest households now being in the urban sector. However, the rural sector still 
dominates the poorest income decile.  
 
Table 4.9.4 Richest decile, % of rural and urban income/population share 
Year Urban pop% Urban income % Rural Pop% Rural income % 
1990 84% 84% 16% 16% 
2007 93% 94% 7% 6% 
2009 95% 95% 5% 5% 
 
Figure 4.9.4 Richest decile, % of rural and urban population share 
 
 
 
The urban’s sector dominating share of the top decile has rapidly increased accounting for 
95% of all the income. If the population shift to the urban sector continues, urban areas 
should completely account for the top income decile in the next number of years.  
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4.9.3 Urban inequality decomposition 
Given that the urban sector constitutes the biggest component of overall inequality (72% by 
2009), it has been decomposed even further into inequality within all the urban sectors of 
provinces in Iran and inequality between the urban sectors of the provinces. 
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Table 4.9.5 Urban components of overall national inequality 
Year Rural 
Between 
urban / rural 
Within urban 
provinces 
Between urban 
provinces 
1997 18% 14% 59.3% 9.2% 
1998 20% 13% 57.2% 9.5% 
1999 19% 13% 59.5% 8.8% 
2000 18% 14% 60.4% 7.5% 
2001 15% 15% 60.7% 9.2% 
2002 15% 15% 58.8% 10.9% 
2003 17% 14% 58.9% 9.9% 
2004 20% 13% 60.2% 6.8% 
2005 15% 13% 65.7% 6.3% 
2006 15% 13% 65.5% 6.4% 
2007 15% 13% 64.4% 7.6% 
2008 14% 15% 63.3% 7.9% 
2009 14% 13% 66.0% 6.3% 
 
Figure 4.9.5 Components of overall national inequality 
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The most striking pattern is the growing contribution of within provincial urban inequality to 
overall inequality. From 59.5% in 1999 to 66% in 2009. This is the continuation of an existing 
trend. The figure for 1990 is 53%. The differences of income within urban areas now account 
for the major component, two thirds, of overall inequality in Iran. 
For 1997-2010, this inequality component is the only driving force behind the urban 
sector’s increasing contribution to inequality, as ‘inter provincial urban inequality’ has 
actually decreased from a contribution of 9.2% to 6.3%. While inequality between urban 
sectors of provinces has actually decreased, the inequality within has increased to the extent 
that the overall contribution of urban inequality shows a significant increase. This is related 
to a rising income and population share of the urban sector discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 
Table 4.9.6 Contribution of within inequality in the urban sector to overall inequality 
Year Contribution to overall inequality 
1990 53.3% 
1997 59.5% 
2009 66.0% 
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4.9.4 Rural breakdown 
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Table 4.9.7 Contribution of within/between rural provincial inequality to overall inequality 
Year Within rural Between rural 
1997 16.7% 1.2% 
1998 18.0% 1.9% 
1999 17.3% 1.7% 
2000 16.5% 1.8% 
2001 13.7% 1.7% 
2002 13.8% 1.5% 
2003 14.8% 2.0% 
2004 18.4% 1.9% 
2005 13.6% 1.7% 
2006 13.7% 1.7% 
2007 12.8% 1.9% 
2008 12.0% 1.8% 
2009 12.5% 1.8% 
 
Figure 4.9.6 Contribution of within/between rural provincial inequality to overall inequality 
 
Apart from a spike in the figures in 2004, in figure 4.9.6 one can clearly observe the 
shrinking contribution of rural inequality to overall inequality. It is this fall in the contribution of 
‘within’ rural provincial inequality to overall inequality which explains the lessening 
contribution of the rural sector to inequality. The ‘between’ rural provincial inequality 
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component is actually constant, despite a shrinking rural sector in terms of income and 
population share. This pattern indicates an increase in inequality between the rural sectors 
of the provinces. This can be more clearly seen if we chart the contribution of within and 
between provincial rural inequality to rural inequality itself. 
 
Figure 4.9.7 Contribution of within/between rural provincial inequality to rural inequality 
 
Clearly there is a widening inequality between the rural sectors of provinces relative to the 
inequality within them. 
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4.9.5 Urban provincial breakdown 
The urban sector commands a major and increasing share of overall income. We have seen 
that the largest and growing component of inequality in Iran is the ‘within inequality’ 
component of urban provinces. A decomposition of this ‘within inequality’ on a provincial 
basis follows. We look at the year 2007. The table of results for this provincial breakdown is 
provided in appendix 4P. 
 
Figure 4.9.8 Contribution of provincial urban sectors to national inequality, 2007 
 
It is striking that the urban areas within the Tehran province account for more than 30% of 
the national income share, despite a 19% population share. No other province displays such 
a proportional discrepancy between population and income shares. Dreger, Rahmani et al. 
(2007, p.10)  demonstrate that the concentration of rent-seeking activities in Iran occurs in 
Tehran. These include “import licenses, subsidized loans, contracts to provide goods and 
services for government sector or implementing development projects, to obtain ownership 
of lands.” In 2007, its contribution to overall inequality was 24%, almost a quarter of the total 
observed national inequality. The other two main contributors to inequality are the urban 
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areas of Khorasan Razavi province (dominated by the city of Mashhad) and the Esfahan 
province (dominated by the city of Esfahan). The urban sectors within these three provinces 
account for 35% of the total national inequality. The other 27 urban provinces account for 29% 
of the contribution to overall inequality. 
 
Figure 4.9.9 Contribution to national inequality, 2007 
 
 
The within urban inequality components dominate the observed national inequality, with 
Tehran alone accounting for almost a quarter of the observed inequality. A handful of cities 
now account for a major share of the observed inequality in Iran. 
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4.10 Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter tell a story about both the small fluctuations and the underlying 
geographic sources of inequality in Iran since President Khatami’s presidency in 1997. 
During this period, Iran’s headline inequality figure has remained consistently high. This 
façade of consistency disguises several underlying major trends which emerge from the raw 
data. 
Primarily, there is no direct relationship between growth or government spending 
and inequality. Upon decomposition however, it becomes evident that government 
expenditure has a bearing on the income share of the urban sector and this has a direct 
effect on the composition of inequality.  
Combined with the finding that the fluctuations in income inequality have been 
dominated by the fortunes of the rich given their disproportionately large income share, this 
goes a long way in explaining why despite numerous rural development programs 
(Sharbatoghlie, 1991) and a drop in the poverty rate since the 1979 revolution (Tabibian, 
2000, Salehi-Isfahani, 2008), the national income inequality figure still remains consistently 
high. The poor and the rural sector are found to account for a very small portion of the 
inequality figure. The urban sector has expanded to dominate the underlying inequality 
contribution from 60% in 1990 to 75% in 2010.  Only 13% of overall inequality can be directly 
attributed to rural areas by 2010.69 
Government policy needs to focus on new inequality alleviating measures within 
major urban centres, rather than rely on rural development programs, to bring about an 
improvement in national income distribution. It also needs to address the disproportionately 
large income share of the richest in society. Indeed, the lifting of general subsidies in late 
2010 may have been the first sign of a policy shift in this direction.  
In 2008, inequality fell due to the first real decrease in household expenditures, with 
the rich bearing the brunt of the expenditure loss. The small fluctuations witnessed in the 
                                                 
69
 An additional 12% of inequality contribution was due to the urban/rural divide in 2010. 
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headline inequality figures can be mostly apportioned to changes at the upper parts of the 
distribution and changes in the rural-urban divide. The rich have not sustained an increase in 
their expenditure relative to other groups during the past two decades and have actually lost 
income share since the fall in real expenditures in 2008. However, the continued dominance 
of the total income share by the rich means that poverty reduction measures will not have a 
significantly measureable effect on the headline inequality figure. 
From a wider perspective, the results in general support our rentier theory 
predictions for income inequality with some caveats. While as predicted, inequality rate is 
not directly linked to the growth rate, it does fall in line with real expenditures after the 2008 
global financial crisis. The fluctuations observed in the inequality figures are reflected in the 
fortunes of the rich rentier class. The urban/rural divide persists and government expenditure 
with an urban bias is evident. More revealing of all, despite successful poverty reduction, 
improvements in health and education, and numerous rural development programs, income 
inequality has remained consistently high. This post 1979 revolution period in Iran can serve 
as a model of how a rentier state’s independent source of income (from oil revenues) can 
overwhelm domestic efforts at tackling income inequality measures. 
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5. Inter-provincial inequalities 
5.1 Introduction 
The results and discussions from the previous chapter provide insight into the structure and 
patterns of vertical economic inequality within Iran while treating all groups as the same. In 
this and the following chapter, the focus will be on deriving a number of horizontal inequality 
measures which are deemed significant in their own right and which are also built upon in 
the context of inequality within a rentier state. 
In this chapter, we are tackling one of the main themes of the regional inequality 
discourse in Iran, that of inter-provincial inequality. We show that measuring inter-provincial 
inequality, by focusing on GDP/capita, for a rentier state such as Iran is misleading. We 
demonstrate the overly simplistic and erroneous notion of Iran’s regional inequality as a rich 
central plateau surrounded by poorer periphery/border provinces. Convergence/divergence 
findings for provincial household expenditures for the 1997-2010 period are reported and 
analysed.  The chapter comes to an end by questioning the link between growth and 
provincial convergence in a rentier state such as Iran. 
Horizontal inequality is of particular interest in Iran due to two main characteristics of the 
Iranian economy and these two aspects in turn also determine the groups which this study 
will focus on. One characteristic is Iran’s vastly varied geographic landscape and the wide 
variety of provinces and corresponding ethnicities. 
The second is the economy’s reliance on external oil revenues and the channelling of 
the revenues into the economy primarily via the public sector. These two factors will be the 
focus of measurement in chapter five and six. There are indeed many other horizontal 
inequalities which are worthy of research in Iran, such as gender, religion, marital status, 
civilian v military, nomad v housebound, self-employed v employed, but such research is 
beyond the scope of this study and the measures of relevance for this research are the ones 
which fall within our extension of the rentier theory framework as it relates to inequality. 
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Horizontal inequality between distinct cultural groups is cited as a potential contributing 
factor to conflict (Stewart, 2000a, Stewart, 2001, Stewart, 2005, Stewart, 2008, Østby, 2004). 
Muller and Seligson (1987) cite it as a cause of the 1979 Islamic revolution. Although the 
‘conflict consequences’ of such horizontal inequality is disputed in the literature (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003), its significance can be judged by the fact that an explicitly stated goal of the 
1979 Iranian constitution and successive Iranian administrations has been to ensure inter-
provincial equality70. 
Addressing growth and poverty are not the only stated economic objectives of Iran’s 
government as demonstrated by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s numerous visits to 
Iran’s provinces. There is a strong desire by the central government to be seen to be 
working towards increased provincial equality. This desire perhaps relates to the finding that 
when it comes to potential disharmony and conflict caused by horizontal inequality “relative 
position rather than absolute is more often observed to be the underlying determinant of 
conflict” (Stewart, 2000a, p.6). 
 
As well as focusing on just two aspects of horizontal inequality, the economic inequality 
measure to be utilized is also confined to household expenditure inequality as this is 
available for all the years under study; it is consistent; it is intuitively understood; it is open to 
a wide range of statistical analysis, and in reflecting the final expenditure outcome of a 
household it is a powerful measure. There are many other economic indicators which can be 
used such as the UN ‘Human Development Index’71, provincial data relating to employment, 
transportation, education, health and GDP/capita. However all of these measures are either 
provided at the provincial level in aggregate format or are more an indication of economic 
development rather than a money metric measure of affluence. 
                                                 
70
 Article 48 of Iran’s constitution specifically addresses regional equality. Current President, 
Mahmoud Ahamdinejad is famed for his numerous trips to Iran’s provinces outside Tehran, to the 
Shahrestans. 
71
 Published regional data for this measure is only available for one year and is in aggregate format. 
See UNDP-BPO 1999. Human Development Report of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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Macro indicators do not provide the rich pattern of data that household expenditure data can 
provide and they may also be skewed by locally based industries with weak linkages to the 
local population; in Iran’s case the oil industry is a good example of such an industry. Our 
research is not concerned with macro measures of provincial economic activity, but rather 
with the micro-distribution of household expenditure levels across the provinces 
 
5.3.1 The regional inequality debate in Iran 
One type of inequality mentioned regularly in literature studies relating to Iran are regional 
inequalities (Amirahmadi,1986; Sharbatgholie, 1991).  Despite the lack of published 
research on the exact extent and structure of regional income inequalities for the past 
decade, which this research partially seeks to address, there is no doubt that numerous 
publications point to an existence of high regional inequality in Iran both pre and post 
revolution. Pesaran (1976) points to high inter-regional and intra-regional inequality; 
Sharbatoghlie (1991) also reports high levels of regional disparities both before and after the 
revolution; Amirahmadi (1986, p.525) lists numerous pre-revolution studies indicative of high 
regional inequality72.  
                                                 
72
 AMIRAHMADI, H. 1986. Regional Planning in Iran: A Survey of Problems and Policies The Journal 
of Developing Areas, 20, 501-530.“Hooshang Amirahmadi and Farhad Atash, "Regional Disparity in 
Iran" (Paper presented at the 18th Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North 
America, San Francisco, 28 November-I December 1984); Akbar Aghajanian, "Ethnic Inequality in 
Iran: An Overview," International Journal of Middle East Studies 15 (May 1983): 211-24; Mohammad 
Hemmasi, "The Identification of Functional Regions Based on Lifetime Migration Data: A Case Study 
of Iran," Economic Geography 56 (July 1980): 223-33; Hamid Kiannejad, "Policies of Spatial 
Discrimination in Promoting Development in Iran," in Growth Pole Strategy and Regional 
Development Planning in Asia,  
526 Hooshang Amirahmadi Conference Proceedings (Nogoya, Japan: United Nations Center for 
Regional Develop-ment, 1975), pp. 157-63; Robert Looney, The Economic Development of Iran (New 
York: Praeger, 1973); Farhad Nourbakhsh, Classification of the Iranian Provinces and a Model for the 
Determination of Priorities to Reduce Regional Differences fin Persian] (Tehran: Plan and Budget 
Organization, Mordad 2536 [1977]); Ehsan Naraghi, "Regional Studies in Iran," in Multidisciplinary 
Aspects of Regional Development (Paris: Montpelier, De-velopment Center for the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 1968), p. 239; Harry W. Richardson, "Regional Planning in 
Iran," Growth and Change: A Journal of Regional Development 6 July 1975): 15-19; R. Olivier, 
"Regional Problems and Decentralization," Employment and Income Policies for Iran, Mission 
Working Paper no. 11 (Geneva: International Labor Organization ILO], February 1973); George E. 
Wright, Jr., "Regional Inequality in the Economic Development of Iran, 1962-1970" (Ph.D. diss., 
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Post revolution references to regional inequality include Farmanesh (2009) with a 
focus on new economic geography, Noorbakhsh (2003) on human development indices, 
Tabibian (2000) and UNDP (2003) on income inequality and poverty, Karbasi and Mojarad 
(2008) on public investment, Lotfi, Faraji et al. (2011) on peripheral analysis and 
Assadzadeh and Paul (2004) on incidents of regional poverty. Although, given the diverse 
objectives of the aforementioned studies, there is inevitability a lack of consistency among 
the studies between ‘what’ is measured and ‘how’ it is measured. Nevertheless this block of 
literature leads to a consensus that a high level of regional inequality existed pre-revolution 
and is still persistent. 
When it comes to the determinants of regional inequality the literature is 
understandably more divided and significantly the conversation has not changed since the 
pre-revolution period. This indicates that not only have regional inequalities in Iran persisted 
but a consensus as to their resolution has not yet emerged. Although it is not the purpose of 
this chapter to investigate the possible determinants and solutions to regional inequality in 
Iran, but rather to investigate its extent and recent evolution, it is deemed essential to assess 
how the issues at the heart of this debate fit into our empirical findings and the rentier theory 
framework more generally. 
Three main themes emerge from the regional inequality literature on Iran: 
1. Inter-provincial inequality (analysed in this chapter) 
2. Ethnic inequality (analysed in chapter six) 
3. The rural-urban divide (analysed in chapter six) 
                                                                                                                                          
University of Michigan, 1977); Nima Nattagh, "Consideration of Some Aspects of Regional 
Development in Iran in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Plan Periods (1962-1978)" (Ph.D. diss., University 
of London, October 1984); Battelle Institute, Battelle Regional Development Project-Unified Report 
(Tehran: Plan and Budget Organization, 1972); See iran, National Spatial Strategy Plan (Tehran: Plan 
and Budget Organization, 1976); and Ital Consult, Report on the Southeastern Iran (Tehran: Plan and 
Budget Organization, 1957).” 
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5.3.2 Centralized or regional planning 
The determinants put forward, rightly or wrongly, in the discourse on regional inequality in 
Iran are commonplace in the general regional inequality literature. Natural resource 
endowment arguments (Piran, 2000, p.60, Sharbatoghlie, 1991, p.37-44), distance from 
market and lack of transportation infrastructure (Farmanesh, 2009, Lotfi et al., 2011), ethnic 
bias (Torof, 2004), conflict: Iran-Iraq war (Sharbatoghlie, 1991), and centralization bias 
(Aghajanian, 1983, Amirahmadi, 1986). The plethora of suggested determinants is too 
varied and large in number to be addressed by this research. However, by focusing on the 
policy recommendations, this study can relate to the discourse more meaningfully. 
We have divided policy recommendations for regional inequality between two camps; 
those prescribing a differing level or mix of sectoral regional investment by the central 
administration, and those who are not so much concerned with specific sectoral policies per 
se, but conclude that a change is required in the policy making process itself; advocating a 
move from centralized to regional planning. In short the first group focus on ‘regional 
development’ policies within the national development plan whereas the second group 
advocate ‘regional planning’.  
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Table 5.3.1 The two main schools of thought on tackling regional inequality in Iran 
Change in policy 
making process 
(Regional 
planning) 
(Amirahmadi, 
1986) 
Sectoral institutions and a drive for centralism 
overpowering regional ones. Switch to regional 
planning. 
 (Aghajanian, 
1983) 
Blames urban bias and centralized government 
 (Sharbatoghlie, 
1991) 
Move to decentralization 
 
Change in 
sectoral 
investment 
(Regional 
development) 
(Karbasi and 
Mojarad, 2008) 
Change in central investment strategy 
 (Farmanesh, 
2009) 
Increase in transportation investment, decrease 
effective distance, decrease need for migration 
(new geography theory) 
 (Lotfi et al., 2011) Central government should reduce inequality 
between peripheral and central regions 
 
Perhaps the most adamant proponent of regional planning has been Amirahmadi (1986). In 
short, he contends that despite numerous and well intentioned policy measures both pre and 
post revolution to tackle regional disparities, the centralized, sectoral and capital oriented 
thrust of the Iranian economy has overwhelmed the impact of regional specific policies. 
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“Iranian planning documents hardly ever mentioned ‘regional planning’; their 
preferred terminology was ‘regional development,’ which primarily meant utilization of 
regional resources for national growth.” (Amirahmadi, 1986, p.512).  
In Iran sectoral institutions consistently win over regional ones, despite 
organizational restructuring since the Islamic revolution. This can be seen by chapter six of 
Iran’s 3rd five year economic plan (2000-2005), which despite citing job creation provisions 
for deprived regions, again prioritized and benefited major urban areas in practice (Lotfi et al., 
2011).  This line of reasoning sits comfortably with rentier theory which predicts that as long 
the central government is the main disburser of revenue coming from an outside source, 
public expenditure and investment would inevitably become concentrated around a select 
number of urban regions (First, 1980). 
Despite the call for regional planning by researchers such as Amirahmadi (1986), 
this would inevitably require or lead to a degree of regional autonomy and that is not in 
keeping with Iran’s political centralization drive over the past 80 years and looks unlikely to 
be reversed in the near future. There is also no consensus on the benefits of increased 
planning autonomy for initially severely disadvantaged regions in an oil economy with a 
weak progressive fiscal system. “In the absence of redistributive fiscal transfers, recent 
reforms in many countries toward greater decentralization may aggravate regional 
disparities” (Ferreira and Walton, 2005, p.204). 
This is perhaps why many post-revolutionary Iran researchers contribute within the 
regional development framework rather than advocate regional planning as a solution73. 
Inherent in most discussions of such research are explicit or implicit references to the 
                                                 
73
 There are also recent new economic geography studies (Farmanesh 2009) which test for 
convergence and polarization to explain the degree of witnessed labour migration and growth of 
urban centers. Despite subsidies and tax breaks to encourage investment in more deprived regions, 
Farmanesh (2009) finds the lack of input resources and distance from market a barrier for most 
firms to invest beyond affluent urban centers. However, please note that new geography 
explanations are not concerned with explaining the ‘initial advantage’ gained by certain regions over 
others.  
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affluent central plateau and the poorer peripheral provinces. The idea of central prosperity 
and peripheral isolation is rooted in economic geographic literature (Getis and Getis, 1966). 
In Iran’s case the ‘centre with the initial advantage’ is deemed to be Tehran and the central 
plateau region. Sharbatoghlie (1991) cites centralization as one of the major factors for the 
booming of Tehran, “Centralization of public investments, either directly…or indirectly 
through the diffusion of oil income…had important implications on the expansion of Tehran” 
(Sharbatoghlie, 1991, p.158). Indeed the inequality between Iran’s provinces has been 
characterized as a divide essentially between the central urban provinces and the rural 
dominated border provinces74 (Lotfi et al., 2011). Despite this contention, there is a lack of 
research on assessing whether this centre/periphery inequality exists at the household level, 
which we will address later in this chapter. 
  
                                                 
74
 Roughly half of the Iranian provinces are border provinces. 
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5.4 Inter-provincial inequality findings 
In presenting inter-provincial measures, we can either use the equivalence expenditure data 
or an aggregate of household expenditure not scaled for household size. Although non-
scaled data would be more suitable for reporting absolute values, given that our concern is 
primarily with making comparisons between provinces, we have opted for scaled 
expenditures.  This is because the mean number of adults and children varied significantly 
from province to province (see Figure 5.1.1) and hence it was deemed necessary to account 
for this using an equivalence scale. For example note the high number of children in Sistan 
and Baluchistan province or the high number of adults in Ilam province. 
 
Figure 5.4.1 Mean number of adults and children in Iran’s provinces, 2010 
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Therefore our reported mean expenditures should not be used for reporting absolute 
provincial means, and are only pertinent in making comparisons with other provinces. Mean 
provincial expenditures using non-scaled household data, suitable for reporting absolute 
values, are presented in appendix 5D for the year 2010. 
Apart from presenting findings on provincial mean household expenditures, there are a 
number of empirical questions which will be addressed specifically in this section. 
1. What picture of divergence/convergence emerges from this dataset? 
2. Is there a separate pattern of divergence/convergence vis-a-vis rural and urban 
areas? 
3. Is there any evidence of polarization between the richest and poorest province? 
4. Does the geographic picture of rich central provinces v poor periphery provinces 
emerge? 
5. How do these figures compare with Iran’s provincial GDP/capita figures, which are 
used to report inter-provincial inequality and more recently to carry out 
divergence/convergence analysis (Araghi and Rahmani, 2011)? 
6. How predominant is Tehran as a province? Tehran is often cited as a primate 
province in rentier theory literature (Dreger et al., 2007, Bjorvatn and Selvik, 2008). 
7. Are there any patterns distinguishing the poorest provinces from the richest ones? 
8. Are provinces’ household well being matched by available inter-provincial migration 
data? 
Our findings are based on equivalence household expenditures, accounting for 
household size, treating children and adults differently and also using different equivalence 
ratios for urban and rural households. The calculated log mean household expenditure for 
each province 1997-2010 is presented in Appendix 5A, 5B and 5C. These are broken down 
into a combined weighted mean of both the rural and urban areas of the province, an urban 
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mean and a rural mean. In the table 5.4.1 we take a close look at the latest year of the 
dataset, 2010. 
Table 5.4.1 shows the mean household expenditure for each province, the weighted 
overall mean (rural and urban combined) and the urban and rural mean consecutively. We 
have also included the household population share of each province to indicate the 
significance of each of the 30 provinces75 in the overall results.  The mean expenditures vary 
considerably; by over a factor of three between the richest (Tehran) and poorest (Sistan & 
Baluchistan) province. In the following sections we take a closer look at the figures and 
investigate the aspects which relate to our study. We first look at how they differ from 
GDP/capita figures, often used in regional inequality analysis, as this has implications for 
other rentier countries. 
  
                                                 
75
 Please note that from mid-2010 (after the period under study) the province of Alborz was added 
to Iran’s list of provinces, making up a total of 31 provinces. Alborz province was previously a part of 
Tehran province. 
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Table 5.4.1 Mean household expenditure by province, 2010 
Sorted by ‘Mean Total’, Riyals equivalence scale 
 
Province Pop share Mean Total Mean Urban Mean Rural 
Sistan and Baluchistan 2.61% 18,994,661 27,059,889 10,480,434 
Khorasan South 0.89% 27,195,973 36,376,087 16,477,825 
Khorasan North 1.11% 28,856,641 38,671,117 18,025,733 
Hormozgan 1.69% 29,119,862 40,661,497 16,345,871 
Ilam 0.63% 31,371,141 35,971,755 22,399,710 
Golestan 2.12% 31,559,451 42,030,950 18,817,899 
Kerman 3.46% 32,626,668 39,148,015 21,612,593 
Lorestan 2.17% 33,829,847 42,375,600 18,019,856 
Bushehr 1.08% 34,075,285 38,356,405 23,839,215 
Qom 1.54% 34,266,149 34,763,911 25,541,192 
Kurdistan 1.91% 34,636,997 40,170,911 24,359,352 
Kohgiluyeh 0.70% 35,086,200 49,926,018 19,391,567 
Hamedan 2.42% 35,617,028 44,291,228 20,965,093 
Yazd 1.50% 35,688,559 37,678,276 26,597,252 
Khorasan Razavi 8.15% 36,020,265 42,117,758 20,486,046 
Semnan 0.92% 36,512,085 39,929,381 24,525,713 
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari 1.09% 37,296,030 45,682,941 26,065,929 
Qazvin 1.68% 37,752,514 42,285,518 26,291,088 
Zanjan 1.33% 38,605,931 43,581,519 29,935,804 
Gilan 3.76% 38,812,642 46,854,347 27,663,460 
Khuzestan 4.94% 39,060,861 45,026,486 22,622,940 
Kermanshah 2.54% 40,090,785 45,638,496 25,751,641 
Azerbaijan East 5.21% 40,239,854 45,569,204 26,316,779 
Azerbaijan West 3.72% 41,319,132 47,332,047 28,983,897 
Markazi 2.08% 41,954,010 48,759,902 24,662,880 
Ardabil 1.59% 43,099,255 49,592,699 31,752,333 
Mazandaran 4.39% 44,563,539 52,972,687 33,290,902 
Esfahan 7.12% 50,129,741 52,937,638 33,684,816 
Fars 5.76% 54,332,375 63,994,327 35,352,269 
Tehran 21.91% 58,983,521 61,438,201 25,593,477 
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Figure 5.4.2 Mean Household Expenditure by Province 2010, sorted by ‘Mean Total’ 
 
 
5.4.1 Comparison to provincial GDP/capita figures 
The benefits of using micro data as opposed to aggregated GDP data in assessing inter-
provincial income inequality are manifold (Azzoni, 2001).  Although household survey data 
will not be used here to construct demographic cohorts or focus on determinants, even for 
simple mean comparisons and convergence/divergence analysis household data can be 
more revealing of the ‘real economic experience’ of households across the provinces rather 
than aggregated GDP data. It also allows for horizontal inequality comparisons along 
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particular segments of the income distribution axis rather than just the mean, as can be seen 
in the urban-rural analysis in the next chapter. Household data is also imperative for 
measuring inequalities within provinces and conducting non-geographic group inequality 
comparisons. 
Assessing provincial income inequality or conducting provincial 
convergence/divergence research using GDP figures (Araghi and Rahmani, 2011, 
Farmanesh, 2009) can be especially problematic in Iran’s case, given the large contribution 
of oil to the GDP. Numerous provinces have some degree of oil, gas or other mining output, 
and for certain provinces such as Khuzestan, Bushehr, Ilam and Kohgiluyeh Boyer-Ahmad 
natural resource output, with few linkages with the domestic economy, dominates their GDP. 
Below is a figure of GDP/capita for Iran’s provinces (2007) with and without the inclusion of 
oil output in the GDP. A table of the data is provided in appendix 5E. 
 
Figure 5.4.3 Provincial GDP per capita with and without oil, 2007 
 
Data source: (SCI, 2009) 
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But even the use of non-oil GDP per capita can be misguided when assessing inequality. 
Certain provinces may be home to a disproportionate number of isolated ‘industrial 
complexes’ or other high output activities with little linkages to the domestic economy. There 
is also always a very small proportion of the oil which does filter through to the local 
economy. By using household data, the final expenditure of households is being compared 
across provinces, allowing for a comparison based on economic resources which have 
accrued to the households. 
  
188 
 
Table 5.4.2 presents a provincial ranking based on GDP (with and without oil) and scaled 
household expenditure. 
 
Table 5.4.2 Provincial ranking 2007 (1 is highest) 
Provinces 
Ranking 
GDP/capita 
oil 
Ranking 
GDP/capita 
non oil 
Ranking 
household 
expenditure 
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad 1 29 19 
Khuzestan 2 7 23 
Bushehr 3 3 11 
Ilam 4 24 13 
Tehran 5 1 1 
Markazi 6 2 12 
Esfahan 7 5 2 
Yazd 8 4 14 
Semnan 9 6 20 
Hormozgan 10 9 9 
Qazvin 11 8 4 
Mazandaran 12 10 3 
Kerman 13 11 22 
Fars 14 13 10 
Azerbaijan East 15 12 15 
Gilan 16 14 5 
Qom 17 16 24 
Khorasan Razavi 18 15 7 
Zanjan 19 17 17 
Hamedan 20 18 18 
Khorasan South 21 19 29 
Khorasan North 22 20 28 
Ardabil 23 21 8 
Golestan 24 22 27 
Kermanshah 25 23 16 
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari 26 25 26 
Lorestan 27 28 21 
Kurdistan 28 26 25 
Azerbaijan West 29 27 6 
Sistan and Baluchistan 30 30 30 
 
It is noteworthy how the rankings of the household expenditure and non-oil GDP/capita differ. 
Oil rich Khuzestan province is ranked 7th highest (out of 30 provinces) even when looking at 
non-oil GDP/capita, but only ranks 23rd if using household expenditure data. Conversely, 
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Khorasan Razavi (home to Iran’s second largest city Mashhad), ranks only 15th in terms of 
non-oil GDP/capita but rises to 7th if looking at household expenditures. It is clear that even 
non-oil GDP/capita cannot be a suitable proxy for considering inter-provincial income 
inequality at the household level. 
It follows that using convergence/divergence analysis with a view to assessing inter-
provincial income convergence for households is problematic if using GDP figures. This 
problem is further aggravated if the oil component is not removed from the provincial GDP. 
 
5.4.2 Centre v periphery 
In this section we investigate whether Iran’s regional inequality characterization of central 
versus periphery (Lotfi et al., 2011) is a valid one. We find this characterization to be 
unwarranted. Such a misleadingly simple perspective on Iran’s regional inequality disguises 
a much more complex picture and may result in misguided regional development policies. 
If we take the classic approach of using GDP/capita data to assess regional 
inequalities, and map the inequalities for 2010 (see figure 5.4.4), then to a large degree the 
picture which emerges is indeed of a rich centre vs a poorer periphery. But as we have 
already noted GDP/capita figures, even non-oil based measurements, do not provide a fair 
reflection of household incomes, especially in a rentier state. 
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Figure 5.4.4 Provincial non-oil GDP/capita, 2010 
 
Index for non-oil GDP/capita (Riyals) 
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191 
 
But if prepare a thematic map based on household expenditures the picture is quite different. 
Figure 5.4.5 shows provincial weighted mean expenditures (weighted total of urban and rural) 
for 2010. 
 
Figure 5.4.5 Provincial household mean expenditures, 2010  
 
Index for mean household expenditures (Riyals) 
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Figure 5.4.5 does not seem to be a simple one of central provinces having higher income 
households than the periphery provinces. Qom province, for example, which is sandwiched 
between the rich states of Tehran and Esfahan, with good transport links to both, has 
relatively low household expenditure levels; whereas the border provinces of Azerbaijan 
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(East and West), Ardabil, Kermanshah and Mazandaran all exhibit above average mean 
household expenditures. This is not to say that previous analysis has been incorrect. The 
difference in the results is partly due to the unduly focus on GDP/capita, but also due to the 
changes in inter-provincial divisions during the past 20 years. To test for this, Figure 5.4.6 
displays a thematic map of provincial mean household expenditure for 1990. The data has 
been prepared in the same way as the 1997-2010 dataset.76  
Figure 5.4.6 Provincial household mean expenditures 1990 (weighted overall mean) 
 
Index for mean household expenditures (Riyals) 
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76
 Equivalence expenditures to account for household sizes, adults and children, and different scales 
for rural and urban areas. The provincial sampling (stratification) weights however were estimated 
using national census data of 1986, unlike the 1997-2010 dataset for which the exact weights were 
available from the Statistical Centre of Iran. 
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It is immediately evident that the geographic picture of rich centre provinces v poorer 
periphery provinces is more apparent in 1990. This comparison makes it clear that one of 
the primary reasons for this difference between 1990 and 2010 is a change in provincial 
subdivisions. In 1990 Iran had 24 provinces and inter-provincial calculations were carried out 
on this basis.77 
For instance all the north eastern ‘Khorasan’ provinces were simply treated as one 
province in 1990, leading to an overall low household mean. Whereas if the Khorasan 
districts, were to be accounted for separately (as is the case in the 2010 thematic map), the 
two provinces of Khorasan North and South would display much lower expenditure levels 
than the much richer Khorasan Razavi. Similarly in 1990, Qom province was a part of 
Tehran province, so the high mean expenditure level of Tehran province was also being 
reflected geographically for the Qom area. In the 2010 thematic map, when this is no longer 
the case and Qom is represented by its own province, it is geographically characterized by a 
low mean household expenditure. Another example is the separation of Golestan province 
from Mazandaran province. In 1990, when both areas were part of the administrative 
Mazandaran province, the province’s mean household expenditure is in the medium range. 
But in 2010, we notice a much poorer Golestan province and a very rich Mazandaran 
province. 
In short, the amalgamation of vast areas under one administrative province in the 
past was obscuring major differences in household expenditures between adjacent areas, 
leading to a thematic picture open to misinterpretation. The central v periphery division is 
further negated, if thematic maps of mean household income are drawn up separately for 
urban and rural areas in 2010.  See Figures 5.4.7 and 5.4.8. 
  
                                                 
77
 Although in our thematic map (Figure 5.4.6) all 30 provinces are geographically presented along 
the same borderlines as 2010 for comparative reasons. 
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Figure 5.4.7 Provincial urban household mean expenditures, 2010 
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As well as the central provinces, the urban thematic map indicates relatively high urban 
household incomes for the border provinces of the North West and South West. Qom 
province, which is centrally located, has a very low urban household expenditure mean.  
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Figure 5.4.8 Provincial rural household mean expenditures, 2010 
 
Index (Riyals) 
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The rural thematic map, points to richer rural areas in the north western and central 
provinces. Qom’s rural sector also has a relatively high expenditure level compared to its 
relatively low urban expenditure level. In fact Qom has the lowest urban to rural discrepancy 
of any province.  
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5.4.3 Rural population 
Although not conclusive, the poorest provinces in our findings tend to have a higher rural 
population share or relatively lower urban populations. As we move from left to right along 
figure 5.4.9, i.e. from lower to higher household expenditures, the square dots representing 
the rural population share tend to move from the top to the bottom. Of the lowest thirteen 
provinces in terms of household expenditure, twelve of them have rural populations above 
30%78. Provincial urban and rural population/expenditure shares are provided in appendix 
5F. 
 
Figure 5.4.9 Poorest provinces dominated by a high rural population 
 
  
                                                 
78
 Qom province is the odd one out with a rural population share of 5%. 
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5.5 Convergence/divergence of provinces over time 
Apart from looking at a snapshot of inter-provincial inequality in Iran, it is also of interest to 
find out how it has evolved over the period under study 1997-2010. To do this, the dataset is 
tested for Sigma convergence and Esteban and Ray (1994) polarization. A brief comparison 
with GDP growth is also made, with results being conflicting on the effect of growth on the 
observed convergence/divergence. 
At least two broad concepts of convergence exist in the literature, beta and sigma 
convergence. Beta(β) convergence analysis is often grounded in economic growth theory, 
testing whether “poor  countries  or  regions  tend  to grow  faster  than  rich  ones” (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, p. 223). Neo-classic theory holds that this should be the case as 
homogenous regions converge towards a steady state of capital at a falling growth rate. This 
is due to the mechanism of diminishing returns to capital, with regions furthest from their 
steady state, growing the fastest. Beta convergence captures the speed with which 
logarithm per-capital output tends to its steady state. Absolute or unconditional β 
convergence suggests that all regions are converging to an identical and common steady 
state, whereas conditional convergence refers to each region converging to its own steady 
state. 
Sigma convergence is essentially a dispersion measure and explores whether 
regions are dispersing or converging towards a variance of output over time (Lee, Pesaran 
and Smith 1997).  
As it becomes evident later in this section, the household expenditure rankings of 
many of Iran’s provinces alter from year to year and therefore rather than opting for a 
regression based Beta(β) convergence methodology79, sigma (σ) convergence analysis is 
being used at the household expenditure level to assess whether provinces are converging 
towards or diverging away from a common household expenditure level; in effect testing 
                                                 
79
 Beta(β) convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for sigma (σ) convergence SALA-I-
MARTIN, X. X. 1996. Regional cohesion: evidence and theories of regional growth and convergence. 
European Economic Review, 40, 1325-1352. 
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whether the dispersion of provincial mean household expenditures reduces or increases 
over the period under study. Exogenous factors are, by definition, also a dominant factor in 
growth in rentier states, and using an endogenous growth model to explain convergence 
may not be appropriate (Charles Ka-Yui and Danny T, 1996). 
The dispersion measure used in this study is the standard deviation of the log mean 
of each province, giving rise to the sigma (σ) value. The condition for sigma (σ) convergence 
between the two periods of t and t + 1 is: 
          
where  
  
  
 
 
 ∑[  (    )   ]
 
 
   
 
and 
   
 
 
 ∑   (   )
 
  
 
  is the mean household  expenditure in time   for each province  . 
 
The sigma (σ) value was calculated for the urban, rural and weighted mean of both regions 
for each province. Rather than just taking a snapshot of two years and comparing the sigma 
values, the measure was calculated for all the years under study, 1997-2010. This large 
dataset provides a more revealing pattern for the whole period and guards against a simple 
convergence or divergence conclusion; in case of significant fluctuations being present, 
which indeed proved to be the case. The results are presented in table and figure 5.5.1. 
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Table 5.5.1 Provincial convergence/divergence, 1997-2010 
 
Sigma 
National 
Sigma 
Urban 
Sigma 
Rural 
1997 0.24 0.21 0.22 
1998 0.24 0.21 0.25 
1999 0.24 0.20 0.24 
2000 0.22 0.17 0.23 
2001 0.22 0.18 0.22 
2002 0.23 0.19 0.22 
2003 0.23 0.20 0.25 
2004 0.22 0.20 0.23 
2005 0.22 0.20 0.23 
2006 0.23 0.20 0.24 
2007 0.25 0.22 0.26 
2008 0.25 0.20 0.28 
2009 0.24 0.19 0.27 
2010 0.21 0.17 0.26 
 
Figure 5.5.1 Provincial convergence/divergence, yearly trends 1997-2010 
 
As can be observed from figure 5.5.1, there is clear evidence of both convergence and 
divergence during this period. The sigma values are also higher for the rural than the urban 
areas, suggesting greater rural inter-provincial inequality. This could be related to the larger 
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part played by the public sector in urban areas than rural areas, a topic discussed in the next 
chapter. 
At first glance, looking at the national sigma values, apart from the year on year 
variations, there seems to be no particular trend of convergence or divergence. But once the 
figures are broken down into an urban and rural divide, and charted on a scatter diagram, a 
clear trend appears for the rural sector. 
 
Figure 5.5.2 Provincial convergence/divergence, scatter diagram 1997-2010 
 
 
Looking at figure 5.5.2, there is a clear sign of divergence in the inter-provincial rural areas. 
The reason the national sigma values do not reflect this trend, is because they are offset by 
a small rate of convergence in the urban areas. Given the larger weight afforded to the 
urban population, the national trend is of no convergence or divergence. 
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5.5.1 Provincial expenditure rankings 
Although the sigma values provide useful information on the dispersion of the whole 
provincial distribution, it is not clear whether provinces tend to keep their household 
expenditure rankings in relation to each other year on year or do they alter places 
significantly. To find out, provinces were sorted according to their mean household 
expenditures for each year of the period 2005-201080. The table of results is provided in 
appendix 5H. 
The findings reveal that the very top and bottom provinces tend to keep their ranking, 
whereas the middle ranked provinces vary, change places regularly, and to a large degree. 
We can illustrate this, if rather messily, in figure 5.5.3. It is a snapshot of years 2007 and 
2010 showing how the middle ranking provinces changed places significantly in just 3 years. 
Provinces are listed in order of household expenditure, with the highest being at the top. 
Notice how the top and bottom of the diagram is characterized by fairly straight lines, 
whereas the middle is crisscrossed and in many cases with long diagonal lines, indicating 
that provincial inequality in the middle of the distribution is fluid whereas it seems to be 
‘locked in’ at the poles of the distribution. 
  
                                                 
80
 The period of 2005-2010 was chosen, as the number of provinces during this period remained 
uniform.  
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Figure 5.5.3 Inter-provincial rankings 2007 v 2010 
 
 
The above results suggest that the poorest provinces seem to be stuck at the bottom, and 
the richest provinces, to a large extent, keep their position at the top. 
Although we have found no significant national trend of inter-provincial convergence 
or divergence (although we have found rural divergence), the question which arises is 
whether there has been an increase in polarization during this period? 
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5.5.2 Polarization 
Esteban and Ray (1994) distinguish between dispersion and polarization by citing how a 
group within a distribution can become increasingly homogenized with respect to a particular 
attribute but two different groups may be characterized by increasing hetrogeniety with 
respect to that attribute, leaving inequality unaltered within the distribution but increasing 
polarization. The Esteban and Ray (1994) equation has been used to measure for 
household expenditure inter-provincial polarization for the years 1990 and 2007. 
 
   ∑∑  
   
 
   
  |     |
 
   
 
 
Where there are   provinces with the     province having expenditure    and population   . 
The parameter   in effect denotes a weight for polarization. Esteban and Ray (1994, p.830) 
note that “intra-group homogeneity accentuates polarization”. Higher values for   represent 
more intra-group homogeneity (Keefer and Knack, 2000), i.e. a higher weight for polarization. 
We set a value of 0.5 and 1.5 for  .81 
 
Table 5.5.2 Inter-provincial polarization 1990 and 2007 
 Year Urban       Urban       Rural       Rural       
1990 0.110717 0.127542 0.087976 0.149082 
2007 0.123704 0.122488 0.115080 0.135382 
 
No notable increase is found in inter-provincial polarization between 1990 and 2007. 
Although if the polarization weight is set very high at       82 the degree of rural 
polarization seems to have increased slightly. Noorbakhsh (2003) conducts a similar study, 
although looking at regional consumption expenditure per capita and income per capita for 
                                                 
81
 If the parameter     the equation is equivalent to the GINI coefficient. 
82
 The maximum value for   is 1.6 ESTEBAN, J. & RAY, D. 1994. On the Measurement of Polarization. 
Econometrica, 62, 819-51. 
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the years 1991 and 2001 from household surveys. Although he finds no increase in 
polarization in rural areas, he finds more than a ten-fold increase in polarization in regional 
urban areas. Our results, although looking at a slightly different dataset both in terms of the 
years being studied and the variables, do not show a similar pattern. We find no pattern of 
increased inter-provincial urban polarization. 
One clue may lie in the possibility that the 1991 dataset used by Noorbaksh (2003) 
could be flawed. Tabibian (2000) completely dismisses the 1991 household survey data as 
being erroneous and in his own study omits that particular year from his research 
(interpolating the data from the other years). Hence, this is an area which merits further 
empirical research. 
Although we have found no evidence of increased polarization among the provinces 
as a whole, in the next section we pay attention to the gap between consistently the richest 
and the poorest province in our dataset. 
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5.5.3 The gap between the richest and poorest province 
 
The urban dominance in Tehran 
Immediately apparent from table 5.4.1, presented earlier in this chapter, is Tehran province’s 
large share of the household population, accounting for more than a fifth of all Iranian 
households. A cursory glance at the overall mean expenditure highlights how, as expected, 
the province dominated by the capital city commands the highest overall household 
expenditure. However, this hides a more intricate picture. 
For the year 2010, Tehran does not have the highest urban mean household 
expenditure, with Fars province being at the top. Tehran also only ranks 13th among the 
provinces in terms of rural household expenditure, slightly above the overall average.  In fact 
both the mean urban and rural household expenditure is higher in Fars province than in 
Tehran, but due to the latter’s much larger urban sector relative to its rural sector, the overall 
weighted expenditure mean is higher for Tehran. It is noteworthy then that Tehran’s 
statistical hierarchical position in the inter-provincial rankings is largely due to the almost 
total urban dominance of the province. Its rural expenditure rankings are below many of the 
other top ranked urban provinces.  
Although the finding of a high degree of urbanization in the primate city of Tehran 
supports the rentier theory’s prediction of urban bias, the relatively lower rural income of 
households in Tehran and the fact that in 2010 it does not even command the highest mean 
urban expenditure, raises questions regarding the extent to which state rents benefit the 
capital city disproportionately. 
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Table 5.5.3 Tehran and Fars province, population & expenditure share, 2010 
 
Urban 
household 
population 
share 
Rural 
household 
population 
share 
Urban 
household 
expenditure 
share 
Rural 
household 
expenditure 
share 
Fars 66% 34% 78% 22% 
Tehran 93% 7% 97% 3% 
 
As can be seen from table 5.5.3, urban areas in Tehran province account for 93% of 
households, compared to the 66% in Fars province. There is even a higher dominance in 
Tehran’s expenditure share with 97% of total expenditures arising from urban households. 
This dominance can ‘skew’ the overall weighted mean expenditure blotting out the plight of 
the rural sector, and in the year 2010 even obscuring the fact that Tehran did not have the 
highest urban household mean expenditure. 
 
Sistan and Baluchistan 
If there is any province which deserves targeted attention from policy makers, it is Sistan 
and Baluchistan. We have found that it consistently exhibits the lowest GDP/capita (with and 
without oil), the lowest scaled and non-scaled mean household expenditure, the lowest 
provincial UN HDI figure (0.54) (UNDP-BPO, 1999)  and the most unequal provincial GINI 
(0.48)83. As you may have noticed earlier figure 5.4.1 the province also has a high number of 
children per household. As we will see in chapter six, in terms of ethnicity its mean 
household expenditure is diverging from both the dominant Persians and also all other non-
Persian ethnicities combined. 
A measure of polarization could still be hiding household expenditure 
convergence/divergence between consistently the top province in terms of expenditure, 
Tehran, and the lowest ranked province Sistan & Baluchistan.  
                                                 
83
 This is the latest calculated GINI figure for 2010. 
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Figure 5.5.4 Tehran : Sistan & Baluchistan mean household expenditure ratio 
  Weighted total of urban and rural. Expenditures scaled for household size 
 
 
In figure 5.5.4 the ratio of the inter-provincial mean expenditure is charted on a scatter 
diagram. A table of the data is provided in appendix 5I. There is a considerable expenditure 
gap and some evidence of divergence. Although a pattern of divergence emerges, there are 
also signs of fluctuation during this period (similar to the national sigma chart); for instance 
despite the divergence trend, the figure for 2010 is actually similar to the figure for 1990 (not 
represented in the chart, see table in appendix 5I). We must also bear in mind that Tehran 
has a much larger urban population than Sistan & Baluchistan and this greatly affects the 
ratio. In fact the urban and rural ratios on their own are lower than the weighted total of both 
urban and rural areas. 
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5.5.4 Convergence and growth 
The findings of this section should serve as a caution in the studies of convergence in 
predominantly rentier states. Due to the dominance of exogenous factors on growth in a 
rentier economy (Beblawi, 1987),  picking a different snapshot pair of years may give rise to 
completely contradictory results when studying causation. To illustrate this point, we run a 
simple linear regression of the derived dispersion Sigma values on Iran’s growth rate. We do 
this for two different periods, of 1997-2010 and also 2000-2007 and make a comparison. In 
effect we are looking at the effects of the growth rate on the convergence/divergence of 
Iran’s provinces using a simple linear regression model. 
σi = b0 + b1xi + ui 
Sample size = 14 
where σ is the dispersion value, and x is the gdp growth rate. 
 
Running the regression on the 1997-2010 dataset, we have a p value of 0.92 and a R2 
of .0009 Full results are presented in appendix 5J. For this period, the national growth rate is 
not at all significant in explaining the observed inter-provincial dispersion rates. But running 
the exact same regression for a different period of 2000-2007, we have a p value of 0.00 
and a R2 of .9113. Full results are presented in appendix 5K. For this latter period the 
national growth rate is highly significant in explaining the inter-provincial dispersion rates. 
Growth seemingly leads to inter-provincial divergence and not convergence. 
  
209 
 
Plotting this data on a chart, the reason behind such a large discrepancy becomes clear: 
 
Figure 5.5.5 National sigma values and the GDP growth rate 
 
Between the years of 2000 and 2007 there seems to be a positive correlation between 
growth and dispersion; more growth leading to more inter-provincial divergence. But this 
relationship breaks down when the broader dataset of 1997-2010 is utilized. 
We can therefore conclude that no simple relationship exists between growth and 
inter-provincial inequality in Iran. Moreover, no general conclusions can be reached by 
picking a pair of snapshot years given the propensity of exogenous factors on growth in a 
rentier state and the lack of linkages with the domestic economy. 
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5.6 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we switched to a focus on horizontal inequalities by investigating Iran’s inter-
provincial inequalities for the years 1997-2010. The benefits and diverging results of using 
household expenditure data over GDP/capita figures, in a rentier state such as Iran, were 
demonstrated.  As expected, high levels of provincial inequalities were found. These were 
accentuated by the use of scaled household data which accounted for differing family sizes 
between the provinces. 
Our findings do not support the generally cited picture of a central rich region and 
poorer periphery regions. Instead, we find the poorest provinces to have high rural 
populations, although this explanation is not enough to determine why urban areas also 
have such a varied level of expenditures. For the period under study, there seems to be no 
national convergence, divergence or polarization of household expenditures. But when 
broken down into rural and urban sectors, a picture of divergence between rural areas and 
modest convergence between urban areas emerges. Despite a lack of overall divergence, 
the bottom and top placed provinces in the expenditure rankings, seem firmly rooted in place 
and there are signs of divergence between the richest province Tehran and the poorest 
province Sistan & Baluchistan. 
Finally we find no simple relationship between growth and regional convergence in a 
rentier state such as Iran, with contradictory findings based on the period under analysis. In 
the next chapter we turn our attention to other manifestations of horizontal inequality within a 
rentier state, namely intra-provincial inequality differences (comparison of vertical inequality 
within provinces), the rural-urban divide, ethnic expenditure inequality and the inequality gap 
between the public and private sector. 
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6. Horizontal inequalities 
6.1 Introduction 
Following last chapter’s focus on inter-provincial inequalities, the focus of this chapter will be 
on four other horizontal inequalities, intra-provincial, ethnicity, the urban/rural divide and the 
private and public sector. As noted in the last chapter there is a wide range of horizontal 
inequalities to investigate, but given the limited scope of this research, we have selected 
these four areas as we argue that they are of particular significance to Iran and have wider 
implications for rentier states as a whole. 
We find a wide spread of within inequalities for the provinces; inequalities which are 
not directly related to expenditure levels or related to other provinces, pointing to more local 
deterministic factors. Unlike a previous intra-provincial study on Iran (Pesaran, 1976), 
researching a narrow period before the revolution, we find no evidence of Kuznet’s inverted 
U shaped inequality curve for Iran’s provinces. As with national vertical inequality, the urban-
rural ratio is deemed a significant determinant of underlying intra-provincial inequality. There 
is some evidence of geographic clustering of inequalities for the urban sector. 
Ethnic inequalities, though still persistent, seem to have decreased in scale; 
although the picture differs considerably between the ethnic regions. The urban rural divide 
is found to be growing in real terms and we make a number of comparisons between the 
internal distributions of the two sectors. 
Finally we compare inequalities between public and private sector led households. 
We find a significant and growing advantage of public sector households over the private 
sector, although the proportion of public sector households is shrinking. 
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6.2 Inequality within the provinces 
In this section, we will not be overly concerned with the political ramifications of our 
findings, and the focus will be on primarily measuring and analysing the distribution of 
income within the provinces. 
Apart from standard economic concerns of unequal local income distribution and 
issues of political conflict, intra-provincial inequality is particularly significant in Iran when it 
comes to securing a job or a business contract. Iran has a traditional culture of family 
networking. If we assume (and this is not always the case) that families will tend to be 
closely bunched together in the overall income distribution, then a higher intra-provincial 
inequality can be to the relative detriment of future earnings for those at the bottom of the 
income scale, not only in absolute terms but also in terms of social mobility. 
Provincial GDP per capita and aggregated mean household expenditure data at the 
provincial level hide the distribution of income within the province. Household expenditure 
micro data provides us with the benefit of finding out the distribution of expenditures within 
Iran’s provinces.  
Table 6.2.1 presents the GINI measurements for each of Iran’s provinces in 2010. Three 
GINI figures are provided for each province, the urban, the rural and the combined 
measurement. Also included is the ratio of the mean urban to rural household expenditure 
for each province. 
 
Table 6.2.1 Urban-Rural expenditure ratios and provincial GINI, 2010 
Sorted by combined GINI, ascending order 
 
Province 
Combined 
urban and 
rural GINI 
Urban 
GINI 
Rural 
GINI 
Ratio of mean 
urban to rural 
expenditures 
Qom 0.32 0.32 0.37 1.36 
Zanjan 0.33 0.33 0.29 1.46 
Kurdistan 0.33 0.31 0.31 1.65 
Qazvin 0.34 0.31 0.36 1.61 
213 
 
Ilam 0.36 0.34 0.33 1.61 
Semnan 0.36 0.35 0.34 1.63 
Azerbaijan West 0.37 0.35 0.34 1.63 
Mazandaran 0.37 0.35 0.34 1.59 
Gilan 0.37 0.33 0.37 1.69 
Yazd 0.37 0.35 0.42 1.42 
Bushehr 0.37 0.36 0.34 1.61 
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari 0.37 0.35 0.33 1.75 
Esfahan 0.37 0.37 0.36 1.57 
Azerbaijan East 0.38 0.36 0.36 1.73 
Ardabil 0.38 0.37 0.35 1.56 
Khuzestan 0.39 0.37 0.30 1.99 
Kermanshah 0.39 0.37 0.37 1.77 
Tehran 0.39 0.38 0.31 2.4 
Khorasan South 0.40 0.37 0.29 2.21 
Kerman 0.40 0.37 0.37 1.81 
Khorasan Razavi 0.40 0.37 0.38 2.06 
Hamedan 0.41 0.38 0.33 2.11 
Hormozgan 0.42 0.34 0.34 2.49 
Fars 0.42 0.39 0.39 1.81 
Khorasan North 0.42 0.39 0.34 2.15 
Lorestan 0.42 0.39 0.30 2.35 
Markazi 0.43 0.39 0.45 1.98 
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad 0.44 0.42 0.29 2.57 
Golestan 0.45 0.42 0.37 2.23 
Sistan and Baluchistan 0.48 0.43 0.41 2.58 
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The first noticeable characteristic of the provincial GINI figures is the wide range, from 0.32 
to 0.48. This is equivalent to the inequality difference between relatively low income 
inequality Canada and the very high income inequality South American country of Peru. 
Clearly the provinces have very different expenditure distributions and further research is 
warranted to investigate possible determinants for such a large difference. 
In this section, we do take a look at a variety of factors, but this list is by no means 
exhaustive as we are concerned with identifying patterns rather than determinants per se. In 
order to guard against the year of 2010 being an anomaly, or suffering from a sampling error, 
the analysis was carried out for all the years of 1997 to 2010. The results are presented in 
appendix 6A. 
Although we cannot rule out the possibility and indeed probability of provincial 
sampling errors for certain years, looking at the pattern of the dataset as a whole, the annual 
standard deviation of the GINI coefficients suggests that although intra-provincial inequalities 
have fluctuated, the dispersion has remained consistent. The wide range of GINI coefficients 
has also remained consistently high giving rise to a difference of between 0.12 and 0.20 for 
the lowest and highest GINI. The mean provincial GINI has fluctuated between 0.38 and 
0.40. We can deduce that for the whole period under study, there has been a wide gulf 
between the within inequality distribution of the individual provinces. 
 
6.2.1 Are annual intra-provincial GINI alterations related? 
Although the underlying GINI figures vary, pointing to a local explanation for the observed 
inequality, a question which arises, is whether the year to year fluctuations are independent 
of another or related to other provinces. If there is a high degree of correlation this would 
suggest that changes in the observed variations may largely be due to national factors rather 
than localized ones. To test for this we run a correlation between all the provinces for the 
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year 1998 to 201084. The full set of results is presented in appendix 6B.  The correlation 
findings are not significant, indicating that year on year changes of within provincial 
inequality are not directly related to each other. 
We find that year on year fluctuations in provincial expenditure distributions seem to 
be largely independent of one another. Thus even if national factors determine these 
fluctuations, individual provinces are impacted by them to a different degree due to local 
determinants. 
If we assume that local determinants are integral in explaining the underlying 
provincial inequality, these findings also support the rentier theory’s assumption of few 
linkages of the local economy with the oil industry. The oil rich provinces of Khuzestan, Ilam, 
Bushehr and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad have wide varying GINI figures as is the case 
with other provinces. They do not display higher GINI figures, as might have been expected 
if oil rents were directly and disproportionately accruing to the local population. 
 
6.2.2 Inequality and mean household expenditure 
Correlation tests also indicate no direct relationship solely between the mean provincial 
household expenditures and the associated GINI. See appendix 6C. We cannot therefore 
assert that provinces are less or more unequal solely based on mean expenditure levels. 
Figure 6.2.1 shows the log means of household expenditure for each province 
alongside their associated GINI coefficient for 2010. The province with the highest inequality 
is actually the poorest, Sistan and Baluchistan with a very high GINI of 0.48, whereas the 5th 
poorest province Ilam has a relatively low GINI of 0.36. There are rich provinces such as 
                                                 
84
 Please note that the province of Khorasan was subdivided into three povinces in 2005 by the 
annual household survey. In this particular correlation calculation we have only used the results of 
the most populous of these 3 provinces (Khorasan Razavi) and ignored the other two. The reason for 
choosing 1998 rather than 1997 as the starting date is to avoid the complication of two other 
provincial alterations between 1997 and 1998. 
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Fars and Markazi with a high inequality and others such as Mazandaran and Esfahan with 
relatively lower inequality. 
We also tested for a correlation between variations in mean expenditure and the 
GINI of individual provinces for 1997-2010. This was carried out for the four most populated 
provinces Tehran, Khorasan Razavi, Esfahan and Fars. Results are presented in the 
appendix 6D. No significant correlation was found for any of the provinces. Therefore, 
annual income distribution variations do not seem to be directly and solely linked to 
variations in the mean household expenditure.  
 
Figure 6.2.1 Log mean of household expenditure and associated GINI, 2010 
 
6.2.3 Urban to rural ratio 
Apparent from the 2010 figures and also prevalent in the previous years under study is the 
slightly lower level of rural inequality relative to urban inequality for most provinces. But even 
more apparent is the much higher level of overall provincial inequality (weighted combined 
inequality of urban and rural areas) over the individual urban and rural sectors. For example 
Sistan and Baluchistan province has an urban and rural GINI of 0.427 and 0.412 
respectively. But this jumps to 0.484 for both sectors combined. This suggests that the urban 
to rural mean expenditure plays a significant factor in determining the overall provincial 
inequality. This becomes visually apparent if we chart a graph of urban to rural expenditure 
ratio for each province alongside its associated GINI. 
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Figure 6.2.2 Urban-Rural expenditure ratios and provincial GINI, 2010 
 
Similar to the national GINI figures and the relationship between urban and rural mean 
expenditures, at the provincial level the chart above suggests that the urban-rural divide is 
evident in the differing provincial expenditure distributions. 
In fact there is a 0.83 positive correlation, significant at the 1% level between the 
urban: rural ratio and the provincial GINI. Although this in itself does not explain the 
determinants of the provincial inequality figures observed, it does point to one of the factors 
of significance. 
Also significant is the income and population share of the rural and urban sector in 
the province as this determines the likely impact of the urban to rural divide on inequality as 
a whole. For provinces where the proportion of the rural population and income is small such 
as Qom and Tehran, then the GINI figure is not affected significantly by this urban/rural 
divide. It is important to reaffirm that this is only one significant factor in explaining the intra-
provincial inequality as it cannot be used to explain the widely varying income distributions 
within solely the urban or rural sectors of each province. 
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6.2.4 Kuznets and the rentier state 
The different level of mean expenditures and wide varying income distributions of these 
separate provinces, but operating under the same administrative and commercial conditions, 
present an opportunity to test for Kuznet’s relationship between inequality and level of 
income. 
Our extension of rentier theory would suggest that this non-linear relationship should 
not exist. This exercise was indeed carried out by Pesaran (1976) on Iran’s provinces for the 
year of 1971. We use the same model as Pesaran (attributed to Ahluwalia85) for comparative 
purposes for the year 2010. 
GINI =              
     
Where 
  is the log mean household expenditure 
   is the uran:rural expenditure ratio 
For the inverted U-shaped Kuznets relationship we would expect the coefficient of   to be 
positive and that of    to be negative. 
GINI Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Ur 0.077247 
.0129286     
5.97 
0 0.050672 0.103822 
Y -2.1501 
1.710983    -
1.26 
0.22 -5.66708 1.366873 
y2 0.061482 
.0491532     
1.25 
0.222 -0.03955 0.162518 
_cons 19.03743 
14.89977     
1.28 
0.213 -11.5895 49.66434 
 
The only variable of significance is the Urban to Rural ratio. The    is actually positive not 
negative (although not significant). Unlike Pesaran (1976) (looking at 1971) we find no 
evidence of Kuznet’s theory for 2010, almost 40 years later. However, interestingly these 
                                                 
85
 Ahluwalia, "Income Inequality: Some Dimensions of the Problem," in H. Chenery, et al., eds., 
Redistribution with Growth (London: Oxford University Press, 1974) 
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findings are in keeping with Pesaran’s overall conclusion (1976, p. 277) that “there are 
considerable variations in regional expenditure inequality” and  which also point to the 
urban:rural expenditure ratio as an important determinant of intra-provincial inequality. 
 
6.2.5 The geography of intra-provincial inequality 
Below we have drawn thematic maps based on Iran’s intra-provincial inequality for 2010. 
The overall inequality map, which is dominated by urban inequality due to the higher share 
of the urban population, seems to indicate a degree of provincial clustering. 
Figure 6.2.3 Provincial GINI (rural and urban weighted), thematic map 2010 
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Figure 6.2.4 Urban provincial GINI, thematic map 2010 
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Notice how the low inequality provinces of Kurdistan, Zanjan and Qazvin are grouped 
together. Similarly the central provinces of Esfahan, Semnan and Yazd display the same 
level of inequality as do the eastern provinces of Khorasan Razavi, Khorasan South and 
Kerman. The southern provinces of Hormozgan and Fars also fall in the same inequality 
grouping. However, this clustering largely comes to an end when looking at rural areas. 
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Figure 6.2.5 Rural provincial GINI, thematic map 2010 
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Numerous adjoining provinces have contrasting inequality distributions. This geographic 
representation of intra-provincial inequality hints at rural areas being isolated, with few 
linkages and a lack of integration with adjacent regions. The visual representation of 
inequality within rural provinces also seems to indicate a higher range and contrast of 
inequality than urban areas. This is indeed borne out by the data, which indicates a higher 
standard deviation for the rural GINI coefficients than the urban ones (0.039 v 0.030) and a 
bigger difference between the highest and lowest GINI (0.16 v 0.12). This is despite the 
mean rural GINI being lower than the mean urban GINI. 
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In conclusion to this section, the wide range of within provincial inequality seems to be 
clustered at an urban level but dispersed among rural areas. This seems to support the 
rentier theory of urbanization clustering at the expense of an isolated rural sector (Wick and 
Bulte, 2006). 
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6.3 Ethnic inequality findings 
The ruling elite in a rentier state, the favoured classes and burgeoning urban centres 
may be dominated by a particular ethnicity. In this section we explore whether the Persians 
are improving their economic wellbeing in Iran relative to other ethnicities and how all other 
ethnicities are performing in relation to each other. 
Ethnicity is often defined in terms of language, race and/or religion. For the purposes of 
this study, our definition of ethnicity is different, though nominally based on race and 
language it is actually shaped by geography. It views ethnicity as a ‘geographic environment’ 
where a particular race or language is dominant. This builds on the ideologies of “cultural 
capital” and “ethnic capital” which put environment at the forefront of ethnic studies, as 
described by (Robinson, 2002, p.3) 86. In essence, we are looking at all households, 
regardless of individual ethnicity, which are located in a geographic region dominated by a 
particular ethnicity, rather than the individual ethnic makeup of a household. 
To a large extent this definition has been forced on us due to the lack of ethnic micro 
data availability in Iran’s annual household surveys, the ten year census or indeed the lack 
of any other major nationwide survey relating to ethnicity. However, our approach does 
actually fit rather well into the “ethnic capital” concept. From an empirical point of view, not 
taking a geographic approach can also be fraught with difficulties as defining the race of an 
individual or a household can be problematic. Inter-marriage, fading ethnic identification of 
second generation migrants and a lack of identifiable ethnic communities and networks can 
make ethnic divisions inaccurate. For instance in the capital city Tehran there are a wide 
variety of ethnicities present and have in the most integrated. 
                                                 
86
  Robinson (2002) attributes the notion of “cultural capital” to JOHNSON, H. G. 1973. The theory of 
income distribution, London, England, Gays-Mills. and that  of “ethnic capital” to BORJAS, G. J. 1999. 
Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy, Princeton University Press. 
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Unlike Tehran, fifteen of Iran’s thirty one provinces can be defined by their distinct 
ethnic dominant populations (See table prepared below)87. Therefore, in Iran‘s case, 
sustained inter-provincial differences can result in entrenched differing economic fortunes 
not just between geographic regions, but more critically between distinct ethnicities. 
 
Table 6.3.1 Iran’s ethnically dominant provinces 
Ethnicity Predominant provinces* 
Azeris East Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan, 
Kurds West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, Kurdistan, Ilam 
Lurs/Bakhtiaris Lorestan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Kuh-Gilu-Boir Ahmed 
Arabs Khuzestan 
Baloochis Sistan and Baluchistan 
Turkmens Golestan** 
Gilaks Gilan 
Mazandaranis Mazandaran 
Source: Multiple sources have been used to prepare this table. 
* The provinces listed are the ones which are primarily dominated by the referenced ethnicity. Please note that 
these ethnicities may also prevail in other provinces.  
**The south of Golestan province is dominated by Persians 
 
  
                                                 
87
 The other 15 provinces are treated as being dominated by Persians. 
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Figure 6.3.1 Map of the ethnically dominated provinces 
Ethnic provinces are shaded, non-ethnic (Persian) dominated provinces are 
presented in white 
 
 
Pre-revolution (Aghajanian, 1983) and post revolution (UNDP-BPO, 1999) regional studies 
point to the generally accepted consensus that ethnic provinces are relatively more deprived. 
These studies look at a wide range of measures such as education, job opportunities, 
natural resources and health indicators. Our focus remains on household income 
(expenditure) inequality. 
While some authors (Torof, 2004) cite ethnic prejudice itself as a cause for inter-
ethnic economic inequalities in Iran, others such as Aghajanian (1983) do not see ethnicity 
itself as the cause of the ethnic inequality, but more as an effect of political and economic 
centralization with an urban and regional bias towards the central Persian88 provinces. The 
ethnic regions are generally more reliant on rural areas through agriculture, than the Persian 
                                                 
88
 The word ‘Persian’ is used in the context of ethnicity here. 
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regions, as the calculations later in this section will show. Iran’s placement of non-
agricultural industrialization at the heart of its development plans has not only affected 
provincial inequality but it has exacerbated the inter-ethnic divide. 
In Iran’s rentier economy this bias was further aggravated, by a shift from the 1960s 
“in the source of governnent [sic] expenditure from domestically generated revenue to 
foreign loans and oil revenue” (Aghajanian, 1983, p.221).  Although Iran’s oil fields are 
predominantly located in the ethnic provinces of Khuzestan, Hormozgan and the Caspian 
region, given the lack of linkages between the oil industry and the local economy (Mahdavy, 
1970), effective control of oil revenues lies in the hands of the political administration in 
Tehran.  Bjørnskov (2008) asserts that political ideology of government to some extent 
determines the relationship between income inequality and growth, adversely under right 
wing governments and favourably under left wing governments. It seems that in Iran’s case, 
it is more the ‘rentier’ nature of the state and its resultant urban bias which has affected 
ethnic inequality. 
Coupled with industrialization policies with an urban bias (Dreger et al., 2007), 
peripheral ethnic regions are disadvantaged economically. Eleven of Iran’s fifteen ethnic 
provinces lie in the extreme periphery. In short, it is argued that ethnic provinces have 
suffered, on both counts of reliance on agriculture, and being located in the periphery rather 
than the central plateau89. Both these disadvantages have been accentuated by the rentier 
effects of urban bias industrialization and the disbursement of the vast share of investment 
revenues via the primate city, Tehran.  In addition, networking is deemed more effective 
within groups of the same ethnicity (Stewart, 2001, p.4). In an economy where networking 
plays a large part in advancing economic fortunes, members of lesser advantaged groups in 
Iran face a networking disadvantage. If there is a lack of mobility between these groups, 
ethnically defined provinces may find it difficult to catch up. 
                                                 
89
 In chapter five, we find that the central v periphery characterization of inequality among Iran’s 
provinces is overly simplistic. 
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The question which then arises, is whether in recent years, the ethnic regions have 
indeed been economically disadvantaged compared to Persian regions in terms of 
household expenditure and if so, whether this relationship is improving or worsening in their 
favour. 
To test for this, we have selected provinces which are dominated by a particular 
ethnicity and grouped them together to assess inter-ethnic inequalities. For example the 
ethnic Lurs, are deemed to be dominant in the Lorestan, Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Kuh-
Gilu-Boyer Ahmed provinces. These three provinces have been grouped together according 
to their respective sampling weights to represent the Lur dominated grouping. Equivalence 
household expenditures are used, accounting for the difference in the household size, adults 
and children. Difference equivalence scales have been used for rural and urban households. 
This has been carried out for eight major ethnicities in Iran, as well as the dominant Persians, 
on an annualized basis for the period of 1998-2010. We have measured the inequality 
between the dominant Persian provinces and the dominant Ethnic provinces. We have also 
measured the inequality between the various ethnic provinces themselves.  We are able to 
report on how each ethnic grouping has fared against the Persians and against all the other 
ethnicities combined (excluding the Persians). 
Given our ‘environmental’ definition of ethnicity, it is noteworthy to point out a 
number of caveats regarding our approach of assessing inter-ethnic inequality using purely 
administrative provincial borders. 
1. We are using provincial borders for our study. There may be enclaves of an ethnic 
group which are not affected by the dominant ethnicity. 
2. Although for certain provinces the dominant ethnicity is clear cut, due to the lack of 
data availability, in a few cases, it can be difficult to define an ethnically dominant 
province or group of provinces. For example is West Azerbaijan province dominated 
by Kurds or Azeri Turks? (We opted for Kurds). What is the percentage of Arabs 
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living in Hormozgan province? (We opted for a non-dominant percentage and did 
not treat it as ethnic). 
3. If all of Iran’s counties (districts within the provinces) had been present in the sample 
and weighted appropriately for the period of study 1998-2010, it would have been 
possible to have a more accurate geographic breakdown of the ethnicities. 
4. Our study does not represent ethnicities which do not dominate a whole province, 
such as the Qashqais, Georgians, Pashtuns or Armenians nor the numerous 
religious minorities. 
 
6.3.1 Ethnic / Persian inequality 
 
Rural and urban share by ethnicity 
Before presenting the inter-ethnic mean household expenditure comparison, it is pertinent to 
look at the ethnic and Persian rural and urban share of the household population and 
expenditure. 
Table 6.3.2 Ethnic urban and rural share, 2010 
 
Urban Pop Rural Pop 
Urban expenditure 
share 
Rural expenditure 
share 
Persian 79% 21% 89% 11% 
Ethnic 64% 36% 76% 24% 
 
Table 6.3.3 Ethnic urban and rural share, 1998 
 
Urban Pop Rural Pop 
Urban expenditure 
share 
Rural expenditure 
share 
Persian 70% 30% 84% 16% 
Ethnic 55% 45% 66% 34% 
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These figures support Aghajanian’s (1983) assertion of the central Persian regions being 
more urbanized than the mostly peripheral ethnic regions. For the last year of our study 
2010, the rural income share in the ethnic regions is just more than double that of the 
Persian regions. It is a similar situation in the first year 1998, with 34% of the income for the 
ethnic regions deriving from the rural regions rather than the 16% for the Persian regions. 
The figures also reveal that both ethnic and Persian regions have increased their share of 
urban population and expenditure share during this period. 
The full set of results for ethnic mean household expenditures for 1998-2010 are 
presented in appendix 6E. Below we take a look at a number of notable findings. 
 
Figure 6.3.4 Persian : Ethnic mean household expenditures, 1998-2010 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 6.3.4 the ratio of mean household expenditures of Persian to 
ethnically dominated regions has been falling steadily, although there is still a significant 
difference in 2010 by a factor of 1.25. 
We can break down this trend further by comparing the urban and rural regions of 
the Persian and ethnic groups separately. After this breakdown, it becomes clear that mean 
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household expenditures in rural regions of Persian and Ethnic regions do not differ 
significantly and have not changed in relation to each other for the period under study. 
It is clearly the urban areas which have been solely responsible for the reduction in 
the expenditure ratio of Persian to ethnic regions. The ratio of Persian to ethnic expenditures 
in urban areas has fallen from a high of 1.4 to less than 1.2. We can conclude that the ethnic 
horizontal inequality between Persian and ethnic dominated provinces is solely an urban one 
and it is an inequality, while still substantial, which has been proportionally decreasing 
between the two groups.   
 
Figure 6.3.5 Persian : Ethnic mean household expenditures, 1998-2010 rural 
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Figure 6.3.6 Persian : Ethnic mean household expenditures, 1998-2010 urban 
 
 
6.3.2 Internal income distribution of ethnic regions 
Expenditure inequality is slightly lower within the ethnic than the Persian provinces. Although 
this is partly due to the larger ethnic rural component, the lower GINI is also in existence for 
the urban regions. This should not be interpreted as the ethnic provinces being more 
homogenous than the Persian ones as the difference for 2010 is only 0.015 on the GINI 
index and the variations within the ethnic grouping are considerable. 
In fact the province with the highest GINI inequality 0.48, Sistan & Baluchistan, is 
within the ethnic grouping, as is Kurdistan which has a relatively low GINI of 0.37 (low 
compared to other ethnicities).  The intra-ethnic inequality measurements negate the notion 
of ethnic income homogeneity in Iran with all the major ethnicities displaying relatively high 
GINI coefficients throughout the period under study. Intra-ethnic GINI figures are provided in 
appendix 6G for 1998-2010.  
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6.3.3 Ethnic regional convergence 
While we have looked at the ethnic grouping as a whole, we can break down this further to 
investigate how different ethnicities have performed in relation to each other and to the 
Persians during this period. While the ethnic grouping in effect was a weighted average of 
the major ethnic regions, we will now test for ethnic Simga (σ) convergence between all the 
ethnic regions (including the Persians) between 1998-2010, while treating all regions equally. 
We are testing to see whether ethnic mean household expenditures have tended to 
converge during this period. The Simga (σ) convergence methodology utilized is the same 
as the inter-provincial convergence demonstrated in chapter five. 
 
Figure 6.3.7 Sigma divergence of all nine ethnic regions (including Persians) 
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Figure 6.3.8 Sigma convergence for 8 ethnic regions (excluding Baloochis) 
 
Figure 6.3.7 shows the sigma results for all the ethnic regions. It is clear that not only is 
there no convergence between the ethnic regions, there even appears to be a slight 
divergence. At first this may seem like a contradiction to our existing finding that the Persian 
to ethnic mean household expenditure ratio has been steadily decreasing. But in the sigma 
convergence analysis we are treating all ethnic regions equally, rather than taking a 
weighted average, as in the case of the aggregate ethnic grouping. 
This distinction becomes clear, when we remove the Baloochi ethnic group from the 
convergence analysis, as illustrated in Figure 6.3.8. Without the Baloochis, there seems to 
be a slight convergence of the ethnic groups. This analysis makes it clear that while the 
aggregate ethnic grouping has improved its expenditure ratio against the dominant Persians 
for the period under study, the experience of individual ethnic groups may have been 
different. It is this analysis of individual ethnic groups that we now turn to in the next section. 
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6.4 Individual ethnic group inequalities 
Between 1998-2010 the dominant Persian regions display a higher level of mean household 
expenditure over the other eight major ethnicities. For the final year of 2010, the ethnic 
ranking, in order of highest expenditure, is shown in appendix 4F and figure 6.4.1. Most 
striking of all is the low mean expenditure of the Baloochis in relation to the other ethnicities.  
 
Figure 6.4.1 Ethnic mean household expenditure, in Riyals 2010 
We are using an equivalence scale. These figures have been scaled for 
household size and should be used for comparative purposes rather than to 
indicate absolute mean values. 
 
 
 
More revealing still is the trend of the evolution of mean household expenditure for the 
ethnicities vis a vis the Persians and other ethnicities for the period of 1998-2010. The 
results are presented in Appendix 4G. They reveal that most ethnic regions have improved 
their expenditure ratio against the dominant Persians. Notable improvements are found for 
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the Kurdish and Lur ethnicities. The Baloochis, however, show a worsening trend of 
expenditure ratio to the Persians and also to all the other ethnicities. The results are 
graphically presented in figure 6.4.2. Each ethnic region has fared differently. 
 
Figure 6.4.2 Mean household expenditure ratios of ethnically dominant regions 
Kurds 
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Lurs 
 
 
Arabs 
 
 
Turkmens 
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Gilaks 
 
 
Mazandaranis 
 
 
Apart from the Baloochis, all other ethnicities have either kept their relative position against 
the dominant Persians or improved their position. 
Our findings suggest that in general ethnicity is playing a lesser role in determining 
the economic fortune of a household. However, the extent of this disadvantage depends on 
the ethnicity. In fact perhaps a more important finding is that researchers should be wary of 
grouping all of Iran’s ethnic groups under one heading when it comes to making income 
inequality comparisons. 
We can also conclude that it should not be assumed that a rentier state will favour 
the dominant ethnicity. The improving Persian : ethnic expenditure ratio is indicative of this. 
Indeed, in Iran’s case many of the top officials are not ethnic Persians. This builds on 
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Robinson’s assertion  (2002, p.10)  that  when it comes to income redistributing transactions 
ethnicity is “just one factor that serves as a barrier to trust” referring to redistributive 
measures taken by the central government. 
We leave it to other researchers to carry out an ethnic winners and losers analysis 
based on these figures as this falls outside the scope of our research. However this study 
does point to the need for addressing the economic needs of specific ethnic groups, as 
some seem to have fared considerably better than others. 
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6.5 Rural-urban inequality 
The rural-urban divide is at the heart of the regional inequality discourse in Iran.  This is why 
we have taken the rural/urban dimension into consideration for all the inequality analysis 
carried out so far. The debate surrounding urban dominance is touched upon by central-
periphery discussions (Lotfi et al., 2011, Sharbatoghlie, 1991), internal migration studies 
(Karbasi and Fahimi-Fard, 2011, Mohtadi, 1986, Mohtadi, 1990), agricultural development 
literature (Majd, 1992, Haleh, 1981, Karbasi and Mojarad, 2008) and recently by new 
economic geography explanations (Farmanesh, 2009). Rapid rural-urban migration coupled 
with increased urbanization over the past four decades has made this disparity perhaps the 
most apparent horizontal inequality in the eyes of the general public and hence it is of 
particular concern to officials. It must be noted that although the population share of rural 
areas has fallen, in absolute terms, given the increase in Iran’s population, the number of 
people living in rural areas has increased since 1960 and only declined slightly in absolute 
terms since 1991 (World Bank).90 
The most significant pre-revolution policy attempt at tackling rural deprivation came 
in the form of a series of land reform legislations in 1963 termed the ‘White Revolution’.  Its 
motivation (Mahdavy, 1965) as well as its performance have been questioned. Although it 
met some of its objectives such as emancipating a subset of rural agricultural workers and 
reducing the economic and political clout of some landlords (Doroudian 1976), but it was not 
successful in reducing the inequality rate in Iran. It also failed to stop the decline of the 
agricultural sector relative to the booming urban service sector (Mahdavy 1970); the 
agricultural sector grew in absolute terms. The disengagement of the rural populace is often 
cited as one of the causes of the 1979 revolution (Muller and Seligson, 1987). Although the 
rural dimension of the revolution is disputed (Majd, 1992), nevertheless this ‘rural deprivation’ 
mandate was used by the post-revolutionary administration to initiate numerous rural 
development and industrialization programs in the 1980s (Sharbatoghlie, 1991). 
                                                 
90
 Increased from 14.6 million in 1960 to 24 million in 1991. In 2011 it stood at 23.1 million. 
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Significantly in order to avoid the customary problem of these programs fizzling out 
and being neglected by government ministries and sectoral policies, special organizations 
outside the government bureaucracy were setup to administer them. Significant among 
these were ‘Jahad-e Sazandegi’ (The construction crusade) which focused on infrastructure 
and medical services in rural areas and the ‘Bonyad-e Maskan’ (Housing Foundation).  The 
failure of these policies to mitigate rural-urban inequality and cease the migration flows to 
urban centres, have been blamed partially on the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and lower oil 
revenues in the 1980s (Mojtahed and Esfahani, 1989). However, the continuing inequality 
and urban migration trends in the 1990s (Karbasi and Fahimi-Fard, 2011)91 indicate that the 
urban areas have simply overwhelmed rural areas in terms of economic activity. Notably, 
this migration wave, and indeed the efforts to mitigate it had already started before the 
revolution (Weinbaum, 1977) and cannot be solely attributed to low oil revenues or the Iran-
Iraq war. Indeed, rentier theory suggests that oil rents would increase rural to urban 
population flows and not decrease them. 
The idea that oil accelerates rural-urban migration and urban agglomeration is 
confirmed by  Karl (2004) who finds that oil dominated economies experience one of the 
highest rates of urban to rural migration: 
“So rapid is the outflow from the country side that some landlords, most notably 
those in Iran, have been compelled to import foreign workers to till their lands. This 
especially rapid rural-to urban migration means that cities are filled with a relatively small 
middle and professional class when compared to the vast majority of under-skilled and 
underemployed workers” (Karl, 2004, p.13). 
The inequality effect of migration from rural areas to urban ones in Iran, depends on 
whether rural migrants are from the top or bottom of the income distribution. This is 
                                                 
91
 Karbasi and Fahimi-Fard’s (2011) article is concerned more with an empirical cause of the 
migration, but they reproduce FAO data showing the extent of such migration. 
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confirmed by Mohtadi (1986) who finds a duel effect in income inequality from rural migration, 
i.e. the rural rich improving inequality and the rural poor migrants worsening it. 
Despite the recognition of a significant urban-rural divide, it is surprising that little 
quantitative research has been published on this inequality beyond comparison of the 
headline figures. In this study we have attempted to consider and publish the urban/rural 
dimension of each piece of research carried out so far. In this section, however we wish to 
go a step further and explicitly compare the horizontal inequality between these two sectors 
in terms of mean expenditure and income distribution evolution. The methodology adopted is 
in parts adopted from a study by Stewart, Brown et al. (2009) measuring inequality between 
black and white South Africans. 
 
6.5.1 Comparison of urban and rural mean expenditures 
Household expenditures within urban and rural sectors in Iran have different characteristics. 
To account for these differences we have adopted the following methodology in making our 
comparison: 
1. We have made use of our equivalence scale (see chapter three) for each household 
in the sample to account for the higher number of individuals (especially children) in 
urban households. 
2.  We have used different weights in the equivalence scales for urban and rural 
households to account for the higher portion of food expenditure in rural households 
3. Crucially, for a time series comparison, we have used a separate urban and rural 
CPI to arrive at 2004 constant prices for the expenditure data as these two sectors 
experience distinct inflation rates. The source for the CPI figures are the Central 
Bank of Iran the Statistical Centre of Iran.92  
                                                 
92
 The rural CPI figures have been combined from two tables relating to two overlapping periods. 
The headline inflation rate often quoted for Iran as a whole is the urban inflation rate provided by 
the Central Bank of Iran. 
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Figure 6.5.1 Urban and rural household expenditures 1997-2007 
In constant 2004 Riyals, equivalence scale93 
 
 
A separate urban and rural CPI has been used to prepare the data. The table relating to this 
chart has been provided in appendix 6H. 
As can be seen from figure 6.5.1 the rural/urban divide has steadily increased in 
absolute and relative terms during this period. In absolute terms, the difference between 
mean urban and rural household expenditure (accounting for inflation) increased from 6.7 
million Riyals to 12.7 million Riyals94 (in constant 2004 prices), an increase of nearly 90%.  It 
is interesting to note that despite the numerous enacted rural development measures, this 
household expenditure divide continues to grow and could be an explanatory factor for the 
constant increasing population share of the urban sector. 
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 The reason the analysis is only carried out up to 2007 rather than 2010, is due to rural CPI figures 
only being available until 2007 at the time of publication. 
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 Please note that these figures have been scaled down according to separate urban and rural 
equivalence scales and should not be quoted as absolute differences. 
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6.5.2 Geographic manifestation of the urban/rural divide 
The large urban and rural disparity does not manifest itself in a uniform fashion 
geographically. There are wide variations between the provinces. The poorest and richest 
provinces, Sistan Baluchistan and Tehran, both have a large urban/rural divide.  But 
Tehran’s neighbouring province of Qom, or the central provinces of Esfahan and Yazd have 
a much lower urban to rural ratio. This provincial variety in the urban/rural divide provides 
policy makers and researchers with an opportunity of identifying the factors which augment 
this disparity. 
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Figure 6.5.2 Urban : Rural mean household expenditure ratio by province, 2010 
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6.5.3 Comparison of rural and urban inequality along their distribution 
Although we have compared rural/urban mean household expenditures, this does not tell the 
story of how these two sectors compare at different points along their income distribution. 
The insight into inter-distribution variations is crucial in economic and political policy 
formation for addressing inequalities (Stewart et al., 2009, p.7).  Apart from the political 
implications, in order to harness effective economic remedies, policy makers need to know 
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whether this rural/urban divide is more apparent between the rich, the poor, or along the 
whole distribution. They also wish to know how this relationship is evolving over time. 
 
Mean decile comparison 
In order to make such inter-distribution comparisons, the weighted mean expenditure of 
each urban decile is derived and compared to the rural one. To see how this relationship has 
evolved over time, the analysis is carried out for three intermittent years for the period under 
study 1997, 2003 and 2010 and the results are presented in Figures 6.5.3, 6.5.4 and 6.5.5 
respectively. 
In 1997, the decile range of urban:rural mean ratios is from 1.93 to 2.21. This is not 
a very wide variation but a significant one given its distinct U shape. The urban/rural 
discrepancy seems to be highest between the poorest and richest groups. The very poor 
and the very rich deciles in the rural sector, are the most disadvantaged relative to their 
counterpart deciles in urban areas. 
 
Figure 6.5.3 Urban : Rural mean household expenditure ratio by decile, 1997 
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 This fits well with our finding in chapter four, that on average the population shift from the 
rural to the urban sector is most likely dominated by the richest and poorest rural households. 
This U shape merits further research to identify the determinants behind such a pattern of 
inequality. However, the descriptive explanation for the enhanced disparities at the poles of 
the distribution, which fits well with rentier theory’s prediction of urban bias, is that the urban 
rich are disproportionately rich and the rural poor are disproportionately poor. The middle 
classes are bunched closer together. 
 
Figure 6.5.4 Urban : Rural mean household expenditure ratio by decile, 2003 
 
 
Figure 6.5.5 Urban : Rural mean household expenditure ratio by decile, 2010 
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In 2003, there is a similar range of inequality with the same distinct U shaped relationship. 
By 2010, however the bottom scale of the inequality range has shifted to a higher level of 
1.99 but the upper level of the range has shifted down to 2.10. This indicates a worsening of 
the whole distribution but is also characteristic of a less distinct U shape. The richer group in 
the rural sector is not as disadvantaged as in 1997 or 2003 in relative terms. But of all the 
rural sector deciles, the poorest one exhibits the biggest discrepancy to its urban counterpart. 
This supports and adds to our earlier finding in chapter four that following the real 
mean household expenditure decrease from 2008, it is the richest households which have 
borne the brunt in relative terms. It further shows that it is the urban rich who have been 
affected more than the rural rich.  
 
6.5.4 Urban to rural alpha means comparison 
Clearly whereas between 1997 and 2003 the U shape inequality has prevailed, by 2010 
there seems to have been a shift in terms of the inter-distribution discrepancy. To analyse 
this further we use a “general means” methodology based on alpha (α) parametric means 
(Foster and Székely, 2001) for the urban and rural sector. Essentially rather than comparing 
rural and urban household expenditures along 10 points (the deciles) in the distribution, with 
the use of α means we are comparing the whole distribution but giving a different weight to 
various portions of the distribution by setting a value for the parameter α. 
Foster and Székely (2001, p.11) present their parametric “general means” in the 
following equation: 
  ( )    (  
        
 )       for     
  ( )   (     )
   
 for     
When     the general means becomes the standard mean, for     it represents the 
geometric mean and for      the harmonic mean. For the purposes of this study, for 
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values of     more weight is given to the households with higher expenditures and 
conversely for values of    .  
 
Our methodology: 
1. We calculated the ‘general means’ for the years of 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 
and 2010 for the urban and rural sector respectively. 
2. For each year the value of alpha ( ) was set from -5 to 5 respectively (in increments 
of 1, a total of eleven alpha values).  
3. The ratio of urban to rural expenditure was then calculated for each alpha ( ) value. 
This methodology allows us to see the evolution of urban to rural disparity in Iran for the 
various points of the distribution between 2001 and 2010. The full set of results is presented 
in appendix 6I. Figure 6.5.6 is a succinct representation of the findings. It confirms the U 
shape finding of the decile ratio analysis and it also confirms that the U shape has become 
less distinct towards the end of the period under study. 
 
Figure 6.5.6 Urban to rural parametric general means ratio, 2001-2010 
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In 2001, the most discrepancy is found when the urban:rural ratio is weighted towards the 
higher expenditure households. In 2003, the U shape is slightly flattened, but the poorer and 
richer households still produce higher urban:rural ratios. By 2005 the richer households do 
not display any higher discrepancy than other parts of the distribution. By 2007 and 2008, 
the U shape relationship is reduced further, apart for lower income households. By 2010, 
however, the U shape inequality between the two distributions seems to be appearing again. 
In conclusion to this section, the gap and ratio of urban to rural expenditures has 
increased for the period under study. Geographically, there are wide variations between the 
provinces hinting at localized determinants for much of this underlying horizontal inequality. 
The respective poorest and richest groups of the two sectors display the largest discrepancy 
in expenditures, hinting at a ‘disproportionately’ rich urban elite and a very disadvantaged 
rural group at the bottom of the rural distribution. In effect the U shape of the distribution 
comparison between the two sectors highlights a polarized inequality beyond the already 
wide inequality gap indicated by the annual mean measurements. The alpha means analysis 
suggests an improvement of this polarization in recent years, but the 2010 figures suggest a 
possible return to the U shape. 
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6.6 Public to private sector household inequality 
Iran is a resource rich country, where oil and hence direct government expenditures 
dominate the economy. Many groups and sectors can be losers and winners in such a 
rentier economy (Mahdavy, 1970). The focus of this section is on public wage earners v 
private wage earners as this data is readily available and it relates directly to the rentier 
economy theory for resource rich states. 
Public / private sector inequality is of particular interest in Iran, as rentier states do 
not have a strong fiscal system (Luciani, 1987) and government expenditure takes centre 
stage in redistribution policies. Between 1997 and 200995 the average contribution of direct 
taxation (taxes on income, profits and capital gains96) to government revenue was only 
13.7%. For the same period, the average contribution of total tax revenue (including tariffs) 
to Iran’s GDP was just 7.6%. This weak fiscal base greatly accentuates the income 
inequality effects of government expenditure, a major component of which is public sector 
employment. We therefore deduce that public sector wages should have a significant impact 
on inequality in Iran if there is a high level of horizontal inequality between public and private 
sector wage earners. 
It is perhaps telling that when Mahdavy  (1970) briefly addresses income inequality 
in his pioneering article on the rentier state, his focus is on public and private wage 
differentials. Similarly Behdad (1989, p.330) speculates there should have been 
improvements in income inequality in the immediate years following the 1979 revolution by 
focusing on the role of public sector wages, noting that, “Between 1977 and 1980, real wage 
and salary payments per worker in "large" manufacturing establishments (with 50 or more 
workers) increased 43.4 percent (64.2 percent for blue-collar workers). During this same 
period, employment in these establishments increased 14.2 percent, in spite of a 19.3 
percent decline in real output.”  
                                                 
95
 No figures were available for 2010 from the World Bank at time of publication. 
96
 Source: World Bank, “Taxes on individuals, on the profits of corporations and enterprises, and on 
capital gains, whether realized or not, on land, securities, taxes on income, profits and capital gains” 
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While a finding that the public sector mitigates income differentials, its reliance on 
government revenues makes it vulnerable to oil shocks in a rentier state (Karl, 2004), and 
such a finding should therefore not be interpreted as a ‘policy tool’ for reducing inequality. 
However, it does provide clues as to the effect of future privatization programs (as stipulated 
in Iran’s fourth 5 year economic development plan 2005-2010) on inequality. 
In this section, we wish to measure the level, pattern and evolution of public/private 
sector horizontal inequality for the period 1997-2010. In particular we wish to investigate 
whether such an inequality is in existence, what pattern it takes, whether it is becoming more 
prominent and as with previous analysis consider its rural/urban dimensions. 
 
6.6.1 Methodology 
As before, we are utilizing household equivalence expenditure data in this analysis. A few 
points relating to our methodology should be noted: 
1. The head of the household is assessed as being a public sector wage earner, a 
private wage earner or other (which includes self-employment, cooperative workers, 
unemployed, joint private and public sector workers). The classification of the whole 
expenditure data for the household is determinant upon the head of the household97. 
There are methodological complications in determining who should be considered 
as the head of a household. (Beaman and Dillon, 2009). We have simply chosen the 
individual identified as household head by the Statistical Centre of Iran.  
2. The reason ‘self-employment and entrepreneurial’ jobs are not included in our 
inequality analysis is that in many cases they overlap and are in addition to public 
and private wage earnings. Our inequality analysis is therefore between household 
                                                 
97
 There are a very small number of household heads who are listed both in the private and public 
sector. This could be due to them working in both simultaneously or moving from one to the other 
within the period of the same year. These households are very few in number and have been 
included in both groups for the urban public to private sector time series comparison. However, they 
have been put in the ‘other’ category when it comes to GINI comparisons, decile comparisons, 
household population shares etc. 
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heads who are exclusively either private sector wage earners OR public sector 
wage earners. 
3. The line between private and public companies in Iran can be blurred. This is due to 
the recent privatization programs and the ownerships of many companies by semi-
official organizations (Bjorvatn and Selvik, 2008). We have accepted the 
public/private classification provided by the Statistical Centre of Iran. Those in the 
‘cooperative’ sector have been put in the ‘other’ category. 
4. As we are solely considering the employment sector of the household head, but 
measuring the expenditure of the whole household. Therefore in some cases we are 
classifying a household as a public sector household when it may have secondary 
private sector income through another household member (and vice versa). 
5. By looking at household expenditures rather than monetary income as a proxy for 
wage earnings we are accounting for non-salary perks which wage earners may 
receive, especially public sector workers. 
 
6.6.2 Public and private wage earner inequality in urban areas 
Expenditures of households with a public or private wage earner at the head were compared. 
Equivalence expenditure is used to account for different household sizes. The urban CPI 
has been used to deflate the time series data, at 2004 constant prices. The full results are 
provided in appendix 6J. 
Figure 6.6.1 shows that there is a significant gap between public and private sector 
household expenditures. This gap has been increasing in both real terms and proportionally 
for the period under study. The expenditure gap in real terms has increased from 4 million 
Riyals (in 2004 constant prices) in 1997 to over 11 million Riyals98 in 2009. Furthermore the 
                                                 
98
 Please note that these expenditures have been scaled down for household size and makeup. Rural 
and urban households have different scales. 
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ratio of public to private sector household expenditures has increased steadily from 1.3 in 
1997 to 1.6 by 2009. By 2010, (in 2010 nominal prices), there is almost a 30 million Riyals 
gap between annual public and private household expenditures, and the ratio of 
expenditures is 1.7. 
 
Figure 6.6.1 Public & private sector urban household expenditure, urban 1997-2009 
Expenditures deflated by urban CPI to constant 2004 Riyals. Equivalence expenditures have 
been used. 
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6.6.3 Decile comparison of public and private sector households 
A comparison of the distribution of public and private sector headed households reveals that 
it is the poorest households which are experiencing the biggest horizontal inequality. 
Remarkably and without exception, for every consecutive poorer decile the mean 
expenditure ratio of public to private sector increases. This hints at a more equal distribution 
of expenditures within the public sector v the private sector which we investigate in the next 
section. 
 
Figure 6.6.2 Urban public : private sector households mean decile expenditure, 2010 
Expenditure in 2010 Riyals. 
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horizontal inequality augmenting effect in terms of its wage differentials with the private 
sector. 
 
6.6.5 Rural / urban dimensions of public/private sector inequality 
 
Table 6.6.1 Urban and rural household expenditure, by public & private sector 2010 
  In 2010 Riyals 
2010, mean 
expenditure 
Public Sector Private Sector Other 
Public : 
Private 
Urban 69,184,432 40,638,508 51,026,445 1.7 
Rural 43,660,051 21,439,887 25,407,890 2.04 
Urban : Rural 1.6 1.9 2.0  
 
The ratio of public sector household expenditures to private ones is even more pronounced 
in rural areas. For 2010, the expenditure of public sector headed households is 2.04, more 
than double that of private sector headed households. This has increased from a ratio of 
1.64 in 1997. Similar to urban households, the public/private sector discrepancy has risen 
both in real terms and proportionally for the period under study. Public sector households in 
urban areas also show less discrepancy with their counterparts in the rural sector compared 
to private sector headed households. An expenditure ratio of 1.6 for the public sector 
compared to 1.9 for the private sector. 
More revealing still is the very low representation of public sector headed 
households in rural areas by 2010. As table 6.6.2 shows only 11% of them are in rural areas 
as opposed to the 89% in the urban sector. This figure would be expected to be closer to the 
27% which represents the rural household population for 2010.  This finding clearly 
highlights that the public sector is very much biased towards urban areas.  
Table 6.6.2 also reveals the relatively lower inequality among all (urban and rural) 
public sector households as opposed to private headed ones. The GINI for the ‘Other’ 
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category is understandably very high as it includes every other type of household, such as 
unemployed, self-employed, cooperative workers or a combination of publicly and privately 
headed household. 
 
Table 6.6.2 Proportion of public and private sector headed households, 2010 
 
Urban Rural GINI 
Public Sector 89% 11% 0.33 
Private Sector 71% 29% 0.38 
Other 72% 28% 0.42 
 
6.6.6 The drop in public sector headed households 
The figures reveal that both the urban and rural sectors have witnessed a fall in exclusively 
public sector headed households. 
 
Table 6.6.3 Share of urban households by job type of the household head 
Year Public Sector Private Sector Other* 
1997 25% 23% 52% 
2003 19% 27% 54% 
2010 12% 29% 58% 
*Other includes any household which is not exclusively headed by a job in the public or private sector. This includes 
the unemployed, freelance, mix of public and private etc. 
 
Table 6.6.4 Share of rural households by job type of the household head 
Year Public Sector Private Sector Other 
1997 12% 30% 59% 
2010 4% 34% 62% 
 
For urban areas we compare the years of 1997, 2003 and 2010. There has been a steady 
fall from 25% in 1997 of all urban household heads working exclusively in the public sector 
to 12% in 2010. This cannot be solely related to the urban sector’s rising share of the 
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population during this period as a similar drop can be seen in the rural sector, a drop from 12% 
in 1997 to 4% in 2010. The proportion of private sector and freelance jobs has increased 
during this period. 
To conclude our findings in this section, we have found a growing expenditure gap 
between the private sector and public sector headed households. This horizontal inequality 
is more pronounced the poorer the household. In the rural areas the gap is even wider. 
Public sector headed households are better off, have less inequality between themselves, 
and are becoming more exclusive, with only 12% of urban households now being headed 
exclusively by a public sector worker. 
 
6.7 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we reported our findings on four horizontal inequalities relating to Iran: 
1. Intra-provincial inequality comparisons 
We found a very wide spread of inequality within the provinces. This did not seem 
related to the level of expenditure of the province and can partially be explained by 
the degree of the rural/urban divide within the province. There was some evidence 
of similarly ranked urban areas (in terms of within inequality) being clustered 
geographically. For rural areas this pattern did not exist, and a picture of a 
disintegrated rural sector emerged. 
2. Ethnic inequalities 
The household expenditure gap between Persian and non-Persian regions seems to 
be falling. This gap only seems to exist between the urban areas. Ethnic regions are 
no more homogenous in terms of inequality than Persian ones. We provided a 
ranking and a convergence/divergence analysis of ethnic regions in relation to the 
dominant Persians and all other non-Persian ethnicities combined. The performance 
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of the various ethnic regions differs during this period. Whether this is strictly due to 
the ethnicity of the region or completely unrelated factors deserves further research. 
3. The rural urban divide 
The gap in real terms between urban and rural households is constantly increasing. 
The biggest difference is between the poles of the two distributions, i.e. the rich 
urban v rich rural and the poor urban v the poor rural. 
4. Public v private sector households 
Exclusively public sector headed households have been shrinking as a proportion of 
total households. However, their privileged position in terms of household 
expenditure has increased significantly in real terms from 1997 to 2009. Public 
sector households have a decreasing vertical inequality effect as they have a lower 
GINI than private households, but an increasing horizontal inequality effect as there 
is a large and growing expenditure gap between them and other households. The 
poorer the household the bigger the relative gap between the private and public 
sector. The relative gap is also larger in rural areas. 
 
The ‘intra-provincial’, ‘urban/rural’’ and public/private sector’ findings are in keeping with our 
rentier inequality predictions, with the proviso that many of these patterns may also be 
apparent in non-rentier states. However, the expenditure convergence trend of ethnic with 
Persian dominated regions is perhaps a signal that the distribution of oil rents does not 
necessarily have a strong ethnic determination, or if it does, this is mitigated when the ruling 
administration is itself composed of mixed ethnicities. We should note that there is a notable 
exception in the ethnic convergence analysis, the Baloochis, whose plight has significantly 
worsened in relative terms during the 1997-2009 period. 
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7. Asset Index 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we create an urban and a rural wealth asset index for Iran to allow future 
researchers to have a simple to measure wealth variable for inequality studies. The micro 
household expenditure analysis carried out in the previous chapters provides an invaluable 
opportunity for calibrating such a wealth index. A wealth index can be of particular value for 
studying a rentier state which is prone to macroeconomic shocks that lead to fluctuations in 
household money metric data, obscuring more long-term underlying inequality patterns. 
The income inequality analysis carried out in the previous chapters has relied first 
and foremost on household expenditure data. It is apparent that this approach has 
numerous benefits such as accommodating decomposition analysis and giving rise to widely 
cited headline inequality measures. Expenditure itself is also a readily understood tangible 
concept and easy to interpret. Nevertheless, this approach is by no means comprehensive, 
nor always the best option. 
Another recent and increasingly common methodology for measuring income 
inequality is through the use of an asset index. The pros and cons of this approach will be 
discussed later in this chapter, but two benefits should be noted at the outset. The first, 
which relates directly to Iran is that, as demonstrated in chapter four, oil price windfalls 
inevitably lead to fluctuations in direct government expenditure which impact household 
inequality expenditures. While, in most instances, we may wish to capture this fluctuation, 
there are times when it may be more suitable to use an inequality measure which is more 
likely to reflect an ‘underlying inequality’ less prone to temporary fluctuations. This could be 
the case when looking at the effects of inequality on health or education indicators for 
example. Unlike expenditures, durable assets are reflective of accumulated wealth rather 
than a proxy for income and are less prone to short term variations (Rutstein et al., 2004). 
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The second advantage of an asset index is a practical one. It is very simple and 
cheap to collect asset data. As acknowledged in chapter 3, collecting expenditure data is a 
complicated and intricate procedure involving hundreds of questions, all of which can be 
adversely affected by recall issues. It is beyond the capabilities and resources of most 
surveyors to carry out an expenditure survey alongside their own survey. Finding out if a 
household has a selection of assets, on the other hand, is a procedure which can be carried 
out in a matter of minutes by an individual field researcher. This means that surveys on 
education, health, gender, employment etc. can be coupled with a simple asset 
questionnaire so that the resulting indicators can be associated with a ‘wealth index’. 
Given the paucity of published research specifically addressing inequality in Iran, we 
did not come across any asset indices for Iran. Given the importance accorded to this 
methodology in recent literature, it was therefore deemed beneficial for the purposes of this 
and future research to create an asset index for Iran. This wealth index can be used not only 
in measuring the effects of wealth but also as a control variable for indicators highly 
correlated with household wealth. The household expenditure data analysis carried out in 
the previous chapters also presented us with an invaluable dataset for calibrating the asset 
mix which shapes the index. 
 
7.2  Why an asset index?  
There are a number of recognized shortfalls in taking a money metric approach (utilizing 
income and expenditure data) in estimating income inequality (McKenzie, 2005, Moser and 
Felton, 2007, Prakongsai, 2006, Rutstein et al., 2004, Sahn and Stifel, 2003). We have 
categorized the shortfalls which pertain to Iran’s income and expenditure data under the 
three headings of volatility, accuracy and practicality. 
  
262 
 
Volatility 
1. Like many other developing countries, Iran has an informal labour market where 
incomes are volatile. Many in the informal sector may also engage in barter and 
other non-monetary trade. Expenditure data has the effect of ‘smoothing out’ this 
volatility and captures non-monetary trade to some extent, but not as much a wealth 
index would. 
2. The number of small family businesses in Iran has substantially increased since the 
1979 revolution (Nomani and Behdad, 2006). The income from such businesses can 
be irregular and uneven during the year. 
3. Income, especially in Iran’s rural sector, can be seasonal. Again expenditure data 
would smooth this out to some degree but would be subject to more fluctuations 
than asset data. 
4. Regular oil price fluctuations would exhibit themselves on income and expenditure 
data more than on an asset index. 
Accuracy 
1. Asset data provided during a survey is not subject to the same recall and 
measurement problems which plague expenditure and income surveys. 
2. Expenditures are usually made by all individuals in the household, whereas the 
expenditure household survey is usually carried out with one individual household 
member who may not recall or be privy to expenditures of other individuals. Assets 
on the other hand are ‘visible’ and difficult to forget. 
3. Work done to increase wealth directly, such as house improvement, or other asset 
augmenting work may not be reflected in expenditure or income data. 
4. Asset data may offer a better understanding of a household’s long term (more 
permanent) standard of living rather than annual expenditure or income data. 
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5. When it comes to cross country inequality comparisons based on expenditure data, 
Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) are error prone (Sahn and Stifel, 2003). 
6. Expenditure and income data tend to be of a lower quality for regions which are 
poorer (Prakongsai, 2006). 
Practicality 
1. An asset data questionnaire can often be completed by just one household 
respondent in a few minutes. 
2. Asset data are less prone to interviewer or reporting bias. Their ‘physicality’ makes 
them easily verifiable and less open to subjective interpretation. 
3. As highlighted in chapter 3, provinces in Iran may be subject to different consumer 
price indexes and even if this data can be obtained, it makes inequality analysis very 
complex. Rural, regional and seasonal price differences all have a negative impact 
on the accuracy of inequality analysis. However, asset data across different 
provinces are more easily comparable, with the caveat that the quality of assets may 
significantly differ. 
7.3 Asset index shortfalls 
Despite numerous positives, an asset index should strictly be seen as a complimentary 
methodology to money metric income inequality analysis, appropriate for certain 
circumstances.  As noted, an asset index is an indicator of long term wealth and does not 
capture short term fluctuations and should not be used for researching outcomes related to 
current resources available to households (Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006).  By not being a 
money metric measure, it is not cardinal in nature and does not give rise to the easily 
understood inequality measures such as the GINI coefficient.  Whereas as money metric 
approaches are the same for all groups across a time dimension, the ideal asset mix to 
derive a wealth index may differ by sector, geographically, by gender, across time, etc. 
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Asset questionnaires for rural and urban households are often the same (as is the case with 
our asset data) despite the often differing asset mix of rural and urban households. 
In many cases (such as in this case), asset data has not been collected for the 
purposes of forming an asset index and thus suffers from a number of shortfalls, including 
the exclusion of assets which may be exclusive to the rich such as the possession of a 
holiday home, extra cars and the latest technological gadgets (Moser, 1998). Additionally, 
asset information does not often contain wealth distinguishing information regarding the 
quality of particular assets, for example there are many types of colour televisions, many 
models of cars (Falkingham and Namazie, 2001). 
Finally, an asset index is a purely relative measure and does not allow for absolute 
comparisons which may be necessary for certain analysis, such as the measurement of 
poverty. For the purposes of this research into income inequality this is not an issue.  
 
7.4 Creating an asset index 
Arriving at a wealth index inevitably involves the aggregation of a mix of assets in some 
manner. One way is to simply sum up all the assets. In effect each asset is being afforded 
the same weight. This approach benefits from simplicity but is only appropriate if all the 
assets have approximately the same value.  Another approach is to weight the assets by 
their price. However, this approach suffers from the same complications and drawbacks as 
money metric methodologies. The recent and commonly adopted approach as put forward 
by Filmer and Pritchett (1998) is to use the statistical technique of Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA). 
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Principal Component Analysis 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a commonly used mathematical tool for deriving 
simple patterns from complex data. The method leads to the formation of a series of linear 
representations of the underlying data. It is hoped that the variance along a handful of these 
linear representations can be used to approximate the whole data set. For the purposes of 
creating an asset index, only one of these linear representations is commonly used. This is 
the linear relationship which explains the most data variance, termed the “first principal 
component”. Filmer and Pritchett (1998, p.116) pioneered the technique of PCA “to 
determine the weights for an index of the asset variables” by considering the first principal 
component of a mix of household assets. 
If we assume that household wealth is the main factor influencing the variation 
witnessed in the asset mix of households, then PCA can be used to model this ‘wealth’ 
variable.  Intuitively, if owning one asset is significantly correlated to owning many other 
assets, then this asset is given a positive weight and if it indicates having fewer assets it is 
given a negative weight. Assets which are not significantly correlated to other assets will 
have a weight close to zero. For example, a washing machine may indicate the ownership of 
many other assets whereas a motorbike may not. 
In mathematical terms, PCA “seeks a linear combination of variables such that the 
maximum variance is extracted from the variables” (Prakongsai, 2006, p.7). Having removed 
this variation, it seeks a second linear combination explaining most of the remaining 
variance and so on, leading to the creation of a series of uncorrelated principal components 
ordered in decreasing explanatory power of the observed variation. 
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For a set of assets   to    (Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006): 
                             
                            
. 
. 
. 
                            
 
For our purposes it is the first of these components (   ), the one which explains the most 
variation and hence contains the most information common to all assets, which is used in 
constructing the asset index. Apart from this intuitive explanation, the first principal 
component is confirmed by analysis as being the PCA component of choice in 
approximating a measure of wealth by McKenzie (2005). 
The individual factor scores derived from the first principal component are used to 
derive a wealth score for each household (asset index). Every factor score is normalized by 
its mean and standard deviation for each household (even if the household does not 
possess that asset). Therefore, by design the mean wealth score for all the households as a 
whole is zero.  
 
The asset index derived for each household is as follows: 
Reproduced from: (Filmer and Pritchett, 1998, Prakongsai, 2006): 
 
A j = f1*(a j1-a1) / (s1)+…+ f n*(ajn - an)/ (sn) 
Where 
A j  is the asset index for each household (j =1,…….,n) 
fi  is the factor for each asset (i =1,……,n) 
ai  is the mean of ith asset of household (i =1,……,n) 
si  is the standard deviation of ith asset of household (i =1,……,n)  
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Weaknesses of PCA based asset indexes 
There are a number of criticisms of the ‘family of PCA methodologies’ for arriving at an asset 
index. For a start PCA limits itself by looking for a purely ‘linear’ relationship of variables to 
maximize variance.  There are questions over its use for dealing with discrete data, the 
arbitrary nature of the assets selected to input into the PCA and the fact that the first 
principle component often explains a very small proportion of the total variance observed in 
the dataset (Howe et al., 2008). PCA use as an appropriate proxy for consumption 
expenditure is questioned. 
However, as Rutstein, Johnson et al. (2004, p.10) point out “the wealth index was 
never meant to predict household income”, it is intended as a longer-run proxy for wealth. 
Despite the theoretical criticisms, in practice, the PCA methodology has been found to be 
robust enough in acting as a proxy for wealth in studies by (Sahn and Stifel, 2003, McKenzie, 
2005, Prakongsai, 2006, Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). Howe, Hargreaves et al.(2008, p. 
1) who present many of the deficiencies of the PCA approach to creating an asset index 
acknowledge, “Despite the limitations of PCA, alternative methods also all had 
disadvantages.” 
Staying within the PCA family, but making improvements to the method, Kolenikov 
and Angeles (2004, 2009) include the use of ordinal and polychoric principle components 
analysis99. Apart from leading to a better estimation of its coefficients, the polychoric PCA 
allows for the use of ordinal variables, such as the quality of household construction, or the 
quality of the heating system within the household. The standard PCA approach (Filmer and 
Pritchett, 1998) deals with ordinal variables by introducing a dummy variable for each one. 
This inevitably leads to the introduction of unnecessary correlations into the PCA analysis. 
  
                                                 
99
 Ordinal PCA and Polychoric PCA are actually two different methodologies, but as they are both 
intended for dealing with ordinal and categorical variables, and both put forward by Kolenikov and 
Angeles (2004) and Kolenikov and Angeles (2009) they are lumped together here. 
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7.5 Creating an asset index for Iran 
In creating the asset wealth index for Iran, in the main, we followed the methodology outlined 
by Filmer and Pritchett (1998). The ordinal and polychoric approach as suggested by 
Kolenikov and Angeles (2004) may yield more accurate results, but it was felt that given the 
lack of substantial ordinal data (ordering of categories) the classic PCA approach was 
sufficient. Future researchers may wish to adopt the Kolenikov and Angeles (2004) 
methodology and compare results. Perhaps, more pertinent to the final shape of the asset 
index is the preparation and selection of assets to be included in the final index (Howe et al., 
2008), where the focus of this study lay. 
 
7.5.1 The data 
We have made use of data from the asset questionnaire which is included in the annual 
household income and expenditure survey for 2010100 as carried out by the Statistical 
Centre of Iran (SCI)101. As this questionnaire is not designed for the purposes of constructing 
an asset index in Iran, from our perspective it suffers in three areas. If a survey was to be 
designed specifically for the formation of an asset index in Iran, ideally the following should 
be modified:  
 
Inclusion of more assets 
Assets which are not common, but may be a good indicator of a household’s level of wealth 
in Iran have not been comprehensively included in the survey. For example the 
questionnaire fails to find out if a household is in possession of a dedicated dining table, a 
holiday home, ski equipment or a laptop (possible wealth indicators). Although it is not 
                                                 
100
 As far as this author is aware there are currently no exclusively designed surveys or survey 
sections for the purposes of constructing an asset index in Iran. 
101
 Please note that the raw data did not actually have descriptive asset columns.  i.e. it was not clear 
which asset a particular data column referred to. However, through analysis, it was ascertained that 
the data columns matched the order of the questions on the questionnaire form.  This was 
confirmed by analysing the frequency of assets. 
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possible to include all assets in such a questionnaire, it is clear that if the purpose of the 
survey had been to draw up an asset index, other asset questions would have also been put 
forward to the households. This is backed up by the fact that two seemingly mundane 
durable assets, sewing machines and hoovers, which were covered by the survey actually 
proved to be very good indicators of wealth levels. It is acknowledged that too many 
questions would defeat the purpose of carrying out an asset questionnaire which is 
supposed to be simple in nature and easy to carry out. However, some other asset 
questions, which are unlikely to yield variation in the data, could be left out all together. 
 
More in-depth information 
Certain assets which are included in the survey could prove to be much better wealth 
indicators if more was known about them. For example if a household owns a car, is it an 
Iranian manufactured car or imported? How many cars does the household own? Does the 
TV have a flat or protruding screen? (For the year 2010, this would produce more variation 
than asking whether the TV is colour or black and white). These qualitative questions would 
help to increase the variation within the data and provide more wealth information. 
 
Different urban and rural questionnaire 
The urban and rural questionnaires were the same, despite these two groups probably 
possessing a broadly different asset mix. i.e. there may be assets which should be asked 
about in rural areas and not in urban ones, and vice versa. We mitigated this problem to 
some extent by creating a separate asset index for the urban and rural sectors, based on a 
different mix of assets selected from the list of total available assets. 
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The 2010 household income and expenditure survey includes a one page asset 
questionnaire (image of questionnaire in appendix 7A). This consists of seven sections 
dedicated to physical capital asset ownership. Below we explain how we processed the data 
from each section of the questionnaire. It should be noted at the outset that the objective of 
this exercise was to formulate an ‘economic’ asset index as opposed to a ‘socio-economic’ 
one.  Only physical capital will be considered. We are not including data which relates to 
human capital, social capital or financial capital. This allows researchers to quickly and 
simply form the asset index as a proxy for long run wealth. 
 
Section 1 
The first asset question relates to how the household has taken possession of their home: 
1. Freehold and leasehold 
2. Leasehold 
3. Rental (monthly payment) 
4. Rental (fixed deposit payment) 
5. In return for work 
6. Without payment 
7. Other - specify 
 
In the case of option 7, ‘other’, we found that the overwhelming response was inheritance. 
Based on the options above, we created a simple dummy variable of ‘Ownership’. If a user’s 
response was number 1,2 or 7 we categorized them as owners assigning the value of ‘1’ 
and anything else assigning the value of ‘0’. 
 
Sections 2 and 3 
These two sections deal with the number of rooms and the size of the house (in square 
meters) respectively. A variable for each one was created. Please note that the raw data 
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was not standardized, and when it came to carrying out the PCA analysis, rather than using 
the covariance matrix, the correlation matrix102 was used to account for the non-
standardization of the raw data. 
 
Section 4 
This section looks into the building material used in the construction of the house. 
Options include: 
1. Steel 
2. Reinforced Concrete 
3. Other 
a. Iron & brick or iron & stone 
b. Wood & brick or wood & stone 
c. Concrete blocks (with roof of any material) 
d. Brick, or stone & brick 
e. Wooden 
f. Cob & wood 
g. Cob & mud 
h. Other 
In effect ten differing building materials (including other) are presented here. A dummy 
variable was created for each one. At first glance the above list appears to be ordinal in 
nature and it may be better to use the ordinal PCA approach suggested by Kolenikov and 
Angeles (2004). However, although the above building materials are listed in a theoretical 
order of quality, in practice many poorer or richer households do not choose the construction 
material used in their buildings of dwelling. This is specially true of urban households who 
live in households of multiple occupation or big blocks of flats. Indeed in practice, when 
                                                 
102
 The statistics package Stata gives the option of using the co-variance or correlation matrix when 
running a PCA. 
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individual household construction variables were tested against household expenditure 
rankings, many of them displayed no particular relation to household expenditure levels. 
One or two of the construction material were also very rarely reported in the survey. 
Nevertheless, taking this commonly practiced dummy variable approach for orindal data, as 
suggested by Filmer and Pritchett (1998), inadverdently introduces a set of variables into the 
PCA which are perfectly negatively correlated with eachother. 
 
Section 5 
This section inquires into the ownership of over 20 durable assets such a car, a TV, fridge 
etc. A dummy variable was created for each one. 
 
Section 6 
This section focusses on the ownership of utility based assets such as an air conditioning 
unit, a telephone, an internet connection etc. A dummy variable was again created for each 
one. 
 
Section 7 
This section inquires into the nature of the main fuel used separately for cooking, heating 
and hot water. Although ten answer options are presented for each one, Over 90% of urban 
households responded with the answer ‘natural gas’ for all three. Three dummy variables 
were created for cooking, heating and hot water to indicate whether the households used 
natural gas or an alternative fuel source. 
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7.5.2 Selection of assets to include in the index 
In all fifty one asset variables were initially created from the annual household survey. The 
full list of assets along with their mean, standard deviation and sample frequency is provided 
in appendix 7B and 7C for both the urban and rural sectors. From this pool of assets, a 
process of selection was carried out to arrive at the final list of assets. This selection process 
is often criticized as being arbitrary (Howe et al., 2008), and no specific formulaic approach 
exists for choosing the variables to include in the final asset index. In the absence of a set 
process for asset selection, we outline our selection/rejection methodology, which took into 
account the following: 
 
1. The list of assets must not be too large or overly complicated to make it impractical 
to collect by a researcher. We selected a list of thirty assets for the urban and rural 
sectors. The final list of thirty assets differed between the two sectors although they 
were selected from the same larger asset mix. 
2. Apart from inter-variable correlation, more variation in the distribution of an asset  
leads to the probability of a higher weighting in PCA (McKenzie, 2005). Intuitively, if 
hardly any households have central cooling or if all households have access to 
electricity, then these two assets are unlikely to provide much information regarding 
the wealth of the households. To check for variation, the weighted mean, standard 
deviation and frequency of all asset variables were calculated. As a result a number 
of assets were dropped from the list. For the urban areas these included electricity, 
piped water, no durables (variable for households with no durables), house 
constructions of brick or stone/brick and central cooling. For the rural areas these 
included boiler packages, central cooling, wooden houses and sewage. 
3. Essential to the success of an asset index is its ability to differentiate between a 
wide range of wealth levels for households. McKenzie (2005, p.10) points to two 
potential data problems in this regard, those of “clumping and truncation”.  If there 
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are too few effective assets indicators, then households may be ‘clumped’ together 
in a few groups and the asset index will fail to produce a representatively wide 
distribution. Even if there are enough assets to provide a wide distribution, there 
may be sudden sharp differences between differing wealth levels and the index may 
be ‘truncated’. For example, this happens when assets which differentiate between 
the middle class and the rich are not included, or assets which can differentiate 
between the poor and the very poor. 
McKenzie  (2005) recommends plotting a histogram or probability density 
function of the final asset index to look for signs of clumping or truncation. Figure 
7.5.1 displays the histogram for our final asset index for urban and rural areas. As 
can be seen there is no major skewing to the left or right or other major signs of 
clumping or truncation for the urban index. The rural index is not skewed but shows 
small signs of truncation in the middle of the distribution. This perhaps reflects on 
the fact that a separate asset questionnaire is necessary for rural areas to 
differentiate more smoothly between middle income wealth groups. 
For comparison we have included the histograms (see figure 7.5.2) for the 
urban and rural socio-economic asset indexes of Brazil and Ethiopia created by 
Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006). As can be seen, the histogram of both Iran’s urban 
and rural asset index compares very favourably and despite the earlier highlighted 
data shortfalls, this indicates a relatively reliable raw dataset and an appropriate 
selection of assets in both indices.  
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Figure 7.5.1 Histogram of Iran’s asset index, 2010  
 
Urban Rural 
  
 
Figure 7.5.2 Asset indexes for Brazil and Ethiopia 
Reproduced from Vyas and Kumaranayake  (2006) 
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4. The expenditure inequality analysis carried out in chapter four helped us to 
determine which assets were differentiating effectively between wealth levels. In 
short, the earlier analysis proved very useful in allowing us to calibrate the asset 
index. The frequency of all 51 assets was compared against the equivalence 
expenditure ranking of households to determine this. The final 30 selected assets 
were plotted against the eventual asset wealth index to get a picture of how they 
had contributed to the index. By checking individual asset ownership by the derived 
asset index wealth ranking, we are also verifying the internal coherence of the index 
(Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006). A few pertinent examples are provided below for 
urban and rural areas. 
 
Figure 7.5.3 Frequency of urban asset variables by asset wealth percentiles, 2010 
  
Access to the Internet in the household is 
an effective asset for distinguishing the 
middle class from the rich. The frequency of 
Internet access rises exponentially along 
the higher wealth percentiles. 
As expected, the very poor have a high 
frequency of mud houses. This falls sharply 
by the time we reach the second poorest 
quintile (the 20 mark). This asset provides a 
good way of distinguishing between the poor 
and the very poor. 
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As households become more wealthy the 
ownership of motorbikes increases, but falls 
again among the much wealthier 
households. It peaks in the second quintile 
(the lower middle class). This asset 
distinguishes well between the lower middle 
class and other wealth groups. Note that this 
asset does not distinguish well between the 
very rich and the very poor. 
The frequency of cellphones is minimal for 
the very poorest households, but leaps 
upwards as we make a small move up the 
wealth index. It provides a good asset for 
distinguishing the poor from the very poor. 
  
The frequency of fridges is actually highest 
for the poor. At first this may seem counter 
intuitive but it should be noted that the 
survey also has a separate question for a 
‘Fridge Freezer’, which is more expensive 
and as can be seen on the right diagram is 
more prominent among the wealthy. The 
According to the data, fridge freezers are 
favoured by the middle classes. The very 
rich buy both a standalone fridge and 
freezer, with the poor just buying a fridge. 
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lower number of fridge freezers for the very 
wealthy as opposed to the middle class 
suggests that the very wealthy would have 
enough funds or space for a separate fridge 
and a separate freezer.  
 
 
Figure 7.5.4 Frequency of rural asset variables by asset wealth percentiles, 2010 
  
Interesting to note that unlike urban 
households, where the middle income 
groups are the most prominent owners of 
motorbikes, for the rural areas it is the 
wealthiest group. 
Unlike urban areas, an infrastructural asset 
such as natural gas (as a heating fuel) is a 
wealth distinguisher along almost the whole of 
the distribution in the rural sector. 
 
5. A number of utility assets in urban areas failed to distinguish sufficiently between 
wealth levels. This makes sense as access to piped water, electricity or natural gas 
is now almost universal in urban areas. These assets were excluded from the index.  
Other telecommunication assets were included as the data revealed they are not yet 
universal in nature, and provided revealing wealth distinguishing information. These 
included the possession of telephones, cellphones and access to the Internet. 
6. Finally, unlike our household expenditure analysis which was subjected to rescaling 
according to household size and makeup, assets are deemed to be utilized by all at 
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the household level (Filmer and Pritchett, 1998, McKenzie, 2005, Vyas and 
Kumaranayake, 2006) and no scaling was carried out to adjust for household size or 
makeup. Sampling weights were used as provided by the Statistical Center of Iran. 
 
This selection process led to two lists of thirty assets for urban and rural areas to be 
subjected to principal component analysis in order to construct the asset index. 
7.5.3 Differences in the urban and rural asset mix 
Unlike the urban asset mix, many of the ‘infrastructural and utility access’ assets proved 
significant in distinguishing between expenditure levels in rural areas. For example the asset 
variables, piped gas, heating fuel, hot water fuel and cooking fuel differed across the whole 
expenditure distribution among households. We chose ‘heating fuel by natural gas’ as a 
proxy for all four variables in the rural index. Similarly, unlike urban areas, the availability of 
a dedicated bathroom or kitchen also differed throughout the distribution according to 
household expenditure. We included ‘Kitchen’ in the rural asset mix. From the list of durable 
assets, the ownership of a ‘Colour TV’ and a ‘Bicycle’ which were inconsequential in drawing 
up the urban asset index, were also significant in constructing the rural asset index. 
Four variables which were present in the urban index, ‘central heating’, ‘central 
cooling’, ‘packaged boiler heating’ and ‘wooden’ constructed houses were almost non-
existent in rural households and were excluded from the asset mix. 
Table 7.5.1 Differences in the rural and urban asset mix 
In rural not in urban In urban not in rural 
Heating fuel natural gas Central cooling 
Kitchen Boiler 
Colour TV Wooden 
Bicycle Central heating 
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7.6 Iran urban asset index, 2010 
Table 7.6.1 Our asset index terminology 
Factor score Weight given to each asset 
Wealth score The total score for an asset mix of an individual household 
Wealth index The distribution of wealth scores for all households 
 
The urban asset index was derived from the first principal component of PCA on the final list 
of 30 urban assets. The eigenvalue for each principal component indicates the amount of 
the total variance explained, as the total sum of all eigenvalues equals the number of assets. 
The first eigenvalue is 3.95, the next highest eigenvalue is 2.36. Therefore, the first principal 
component explains the most variation in the underlying data by a sizeable margin. 
Figure 7.6.1 Scree plot of eigenvalues after pca 
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11% (Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006)to 27% (McKenzie, 2005). Inclusion of fewer assets 
typically leads to a higher proportion of the variation being explained by the first principal 
component, but inclusion of too few assets leads to the problems of clumping and truncation.  
We aimed for a balance between the two. 
The final list of assets in the urban asset index are presented in table 7.6.2 with their 
associated ‘factor scores’ as derived from the first principal component of the PCA. The 
factor scores provide the weights for the assets. The mean for the wealth asset index as a 
whole is 0 (by design) and the standard deviation is 1.99. The poorest household has a 
wealth score of -6.5 and the richest +8.78. The distribution of the wealth scores is shown by 
the histogram represented in figure 7.5.1 (earlier). 
As the factor scores are normalized by their mean and standard deviation in deriving 
the wealth score for each household, the factor score for a particular asset divided by its 
corresponding standard deviation indicates its effect on the wealth score. Apart from 
‘household size’ and ‘number of rooms’ all other assets have a value of 0 or 1. Therefore, 
the difference between owning or not owning that asset is reflected in the ‘factor score/SD’ 
value. For ‘household size’, the value of each extra m2 is reflected, and for the variable 
‘number of rooms, the value of each extra room. For example the addition of a dishwasher to 
a household would increase its wealth score by 0.916, or the addition of a black and white 
TV would reduce its score by 0.772. 
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Table 7.6.2 Iran urban asset index, 2010 
  Household assets Factor score Mean103 Standard 
Deviation (SD) 
Factor Score / 
SD 
1 Household size (m2) 0.272 96.395 49.253 0.006 
2 Number of rooms 0.250 3.456 1.128 0.221 
3 Iron & brick or iron & stone -0.083 0.545 0.498 -0.167 
4 Steel 0.146 0.214 0.410 0.356 
5 Reinforced Concrete 0.082 0.110 0.313 0.260 
6 Cob & wood -0.086 0.013 0.114 -0.749 
7 Cob & mud -0.073 0.012 0.107 -0.683 
8 Wooden -0.013 0.000 0.014 -0.911 
9 Ownership 0.117 0.660 0.474 0.246 
 
Durable Assets  
10 Electric fan 0.008 0.435 0.496 0.016 
11 Sewing machine 0.212 0.583 0.493 0.430 
12 Fridge Freezer 0.113 0.388 0.487 0.232 
13 Computer 0.320 0.375 0.484 0.662 
14 Car 0.293 0.373 0.484 0.606 
15 Motorbike -0.006 0.179 0.383 -0.015 
16 VHS machine 0.199 0.634 0.482 0.413 
17 Fridge -0.087 0.638 0.480 -0.181 
18 Music stereo 0.167 0.351 0.477 0.350 
19 Freezer 0.210 0.287 0.452 0.464 
20 Washing machine 0.320 0.760 0.427 0.748 
21 Hoover 0.301 0.860 0.347 0.867 
22 Black and white TV -0.079 0.011 0.102 -0.772 
23 Dishwasher 0.137 0.023 0.150 0.916 
  
Utility access  
24 Fixed water cooler 0.158 0.612 0.487 0.325 
25 Central cooling 0.052 0.006 0.079 0.650 
26 Boiler 0.087 0.012 0.110 0.792 
27 Internet 0.258 0.161 0.368 0.701 
28 Telephone 0.231 0.876 0.330 0.700 
29 Cellphone 0.212 0.884 0.321 0.662 
30 Central heating 0.137 0.052 0.222 0.615 
 
  
                                                 
103
 Please note that the raw data was not standardized, and when it came to carrying out the PCA 
analysis, rather than using the covariance matrix, the correlation matrix
103
 was used to account for 
the non-standardization of the raw data. 
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7.6.1 Coherence and robustness 
In order to gauge the validity and dependability of the urban asset index, it is common 
practice to evaluate it against a money metric index. We have used the expenditure analysis 
carried out in previous chapters to make a number of comparisons. As already noted, an 
asset index is focussed on wealth as opposed to household expenditure data which is 
commonly used as a proxy for income. Therefore, we would expect a different specific 
ranking of households but we would expect the overall groups (quintiles) to match. i.e. we 
would expect the wealthiest group to also spend the most on average, but the specific 
ranking of households within the whole distribution may be different. On this basis two 
questions present themselves. 
1. Are the expenditure based household decile groups in line with the asset index 
calculated rankings? 
2. Where in the distribution are the differences in the rankings most prominent?  
Mean wealth asset index score of expenditure deciles 
To find out how expenditure ranked household groups compare with asset index ranked 
households, we create weighted deciles based on expenditure data and calculate the mean 
asset index score for each decile. The table is provided in appendix 7D. The wealth index 
mean scores are in line with the household expenditure data and increase consistently with 
each of the ten deciles. For instance, a household in the seventh expenditure decile could 
move to the richest decile by adding a fridge freezer, central heating and a computer. A 
move from the second poorest decile to the poorest decile could be achieved by owning a 
black and white TV and not owning a fixed water cooler.  
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Figure 7.6.2 Urban mean wealth index score by household expenditure deciles, 2010 
 
 
7.6.2 Ranking differences with expenditure based data 
Specific rankings differ between the two. Table 7.6.3 shows the proportion of households104 
which are ranked within the same quintile whether using the asset index or expenditure 
based methodology. It is evident that the expenditure rankings of the poorest and richest 
households are more in line with the asset index than the centre quintiles. 
We can therefore deduce that the expenditure rankings for Iran’s urban areas 
distinguish wealth better at the two extremes of the distribution rather than the middle of the 
distribution. As expected the percentage of households ranked in the same quintile is slightly 
higher when households are ranked by expenditure without taking household size and 
makeup into account. This is because we have not rescaled the asset index according to 
size or makeup either. 
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 We have used weights to calculate the % of households in the population, not % of households in 
the sample. The two sets of figures did not actually differ significantly, but this table is more 
accurate of the underlying population. 
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Table 7.6.3 Percentage of urban households ranked the same by asset index as expenditure  
Percentage of urban households ranked in the same quintile by asset index 
as ranked by expenditure methodology 
 Percentage of urban households ranked the 
same by asset index as expenditure 
Quintiles Expenditure scaled 
for household size 
Expenditure not scaled 
for household size 
1 (poorest) 52% 59% 
2 29% 33% 
3 25% 29% 
4 26% 30% 
5 (richest) 48% 55% 
 
Figure 7.6.3 Percentage of urban households ranked the same by asset index as expenditure  
Percentage of urban households ranked in the same quintile by asset index 
as ranked by expenditure methodology (not scaled for household size) 
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The spearman rank correlations for the sample data between the expenditure distribution 
and the urban asset index are 0.59 (p < .0001, N = 18,701) for equivalence household 
expenditure and 0.68 (p < .0001, N = 18,701) for non-scaled household expenditure data. 
This indicates a significant amount of consistency between the two distributions. It compares 
to a spearman rank correlation of 0.64 for Nepal, 0.56 for Indonesia and 0.43 for Pakistan as 
reported by (Filmer and Pritchett, 1998).  
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7.7. Iran rural asset index, 2010 
The final list of assets in the rural asset index, along with their factor scores are presented in 
table 7.7.1. The first Eigenvalue of the PCA is 4.83, more than double the next highest 
Eigenvalue which is 1.94. The first principal component explains 16.1% of the variation. The 
total number of households in the sample is 19,584. The mean of the asset index is zero (by 
design) and the standard deviation is 2.2. The maximum wealth score of a household is 9.03 
and the minimum is -6.17.  
 
Figure 7.7.1 Scree plot of eigenvalues after pca 
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Table 7.7.1 Iran rural asset index, 2010 
  Household assets Factor 
score 
Mean Standard 
Deviation (SD) 
Factor Score / SD 
1 Household size (m2) 0.29 82.24 42.30 0.01 
2 Number of rooms 0.28 3.26 1.19 0.24 
3 Iron & brick or iron & stone 0.15 0.40 0.49 0.31 
4 Steel 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.25 
5 Reinforced Concrete 0.06 0.05 0.22 0.28 
6 Cob & wood -0.14 0.11 0.32 -0.44 
7 Cob & mud -0.07 0.04 0.20 -0.36 
8 Ownership 0.04 0.85 0.36 0.11 
  
Durable Assets  
9 Electric fan 0.09 0.56 0.50 0.18 
10 Sewing machine 0.23 0.42 0.49 0.47 
11 Fridge Freezer 0.15 0.20 0.40 0.38 
12 Computer 0.22 0.10 0.30 0.72 
13 Car 0.21 0.18 0.38 0.54 
14 Motorbike 0.10 0.31 0.46 0.21 
15 VHS machine 0.19 0.49 0.50 0.39 
16 Fridge -0.10 0.81 0.39 -0.25 
17 Music stereo 0.14 0.23 0.42 0.33 
18 Freezer 0.19 0.13 0.33 0.56 
19 Washing machine 0.29 0.38 0.49 0.60 
20 Hoover 0.31 0.54 0.50 0.61 
21 Black and white TV -0.09 0.02 0.14 -0.67 
22 Dishwasher 0.03 0.00 0.03 1.04 
23 Colour TV 0.20 0.93 0.25 0.79 
24 Bicycle 0.12 0.08 0.27 0.45 
  
Utility access  
25 Fixed water cooler 0.14 0.26 0.44 0.32 
26 Heating fuel natural gas 0.19 0.40 0.49 0.38 
27 Kitchen 0.26 0.82 0.39 0.66 
28 Internet 0.14 0.03 0.17 0.81 
29 Telephone 0.22 0.70 0.46 0.48 
30 Cellphone 0.25 0.73 0.44 0.57 
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The asset with the most positive effect on a change in a household’s wealth score is a 
dishwasher and the asset with most negative value is a black and white TV. Interestingly as 
with the urban areas, ownership of a standalone fridge decreases the wealth score. By 
contrast unlike the urban areas, the ownership of a motorbike increases the wealth score. 
The differing factor scores and indeed the differing optimum mix of assets for the rural sector 
confirms the necessity of deriving separate asset indexes for urban and rural areas. 
The mean decile rural asset scores underline how a change in just a handful of 
assets can determine the position of a household in a particular wealth decile. For example, 
a household in the eighth decile can move to the richest decile by the addition of a freezer, 
washing machine and dishwasher. 
 
Table 7.7.2 Mean decile wealth scores of rural households, 2010 
Deciles Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
1 -3.85 0.02 -3.89 -3.82 
2 -2.40 0.01 -2.41 -2.38 
3 -1.57 0.01 -1.58 -1.56 
4 -0.87 0.00 -0.88 -0.86 
5 -0.25 0.00 -0.26 -0.25 
6 0.35 0.00 0.34 0.36 
7 0.95 0.00 0.94 0.96 
8 1.57 0.01 1.56 1.58 
9 2.31 0.01 2.30 2.33 
10 3.76 0.02 3.71 3.80 
 
7.7.1 Internal coherence 
In table 7.7.3 we present the ownership percentage of a number of assets in rural areas by 
the asset index quintiles. Intuitively, the results confirm the internal coherence of the asset 
index. Ownership rises with higher wealth quintiles for the assets ‘car’, ‘computer’ and 
‘natural gas heating fuel’, but falls for ‘black and white TV’ and ‘cob & mud house’. 
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Households with a kitchen rise steeply as we move from the poorest quintile to richer 
quintiles, but level off quickly. 
 
Table 7.7.3 Percentage of asset ownership by wealth quintiles, rural households 2010 
 
Quintiles poorest > richest 
1 2 3 4 5 
Computer 0.01% 0.38% 1.87% 6.83% 41.26% 
Cob & mud house 10.18% 5.02% 3.13% 2.14% 0.81% 
Black and white TV 7.83% 0.93% 0.41% 0.62% 0.14% 
Car 1.43% 4.88% 10.56% 18.86% 51.85% 
Kitchen 36.82% 79.09% 94.14% 98.13% 99.68% 
Natural gas as the heating fuel 12.84% 24.92% 39.61% 55.36% 68.26% 
 
Mean wealth asset index score of expenditure deciles 
Similar to the urban index, we test for consistency of rural wealth group rankings with 
household expenditures by creating weighted deciles based on rural expenditure data and 
calculating the mean rural asset index score for each decile. The table of results is provided 
in appendix 7E.  As can be seen in figure 7.7.2 the rural wealth index is consistent with the 
overall expenditure group rankings. For each higher expenditure decile, the mean wealth 
score rises consecutively. 
 
Figure 7.7.2 Rural mean wealth index score by household expenditure deciles, 2010 
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7.7.2 Ranking differences with expenditure based data 
Approximately half of the poorest and richest households in the rural sector are ranked in the 
same quintile whether using the expenditure rankings or the asset index rankings. For the 
remaining three middle quintiles, approximately a quarter are ranked the same. Similar to 
the urban index, it shows that the rural index is best matched with household expenditure at 
the extremes of the distribution. 
 
Figure 7.7.3 Percentage of rural households ranked the same by asset index as expenditure 
Percentage of rural households ranked in the same quintile by asset index 
as ranked by expenditure methodology (not scaled for household size) 
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Table 7.7.4 Percentage of rural households ranked the same by asset index as expenditure 
 
Quintiles Expenditure scaled 
for household size 
Expenditure not scaled 
for household size 
1 (poorest) 49% 57% 
2 26% 29% 
3 25% 27% 
4 27% 29% 
5 (richest) 46% 49% 
 
The spearman rank correlations for the sample data between the expenditure distribution 
and rural asset index are 0.51 (p < .0001, N = 19,584) for equivalence household 
expenditure and 0.60 (p < .0001, N = 19,584) for non-scaled household expenditure data. 
Although this indicates a significant amount of consistency between the two distributions, the 
correlation is less than it was with the urban index. This seems to indicate that either rural 
wealth or expenditure indicators need improvement, or in rural areas expenditures are not as 
good a sign of long run wealth as they are in urban areas. 
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7.8 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we created two wealth based asset indices for the urban and rural sectors of 
Iran. Micro data from the 2010 SCI annual household survey was used. An asset index is a 
complementary methodology alongside money metric measures as it cannot provide insight 
into absolute differences nor give rise to universally understood inequality figures. 
Nevertheless, asset indices may prove particularly useful for inequality research in 
rentier states which are prone to macroeconomic shocks. By focusing on durable assets 
rather than expenditures, short terms shocks may be filtered to reveal the underlying trend of 
inequality. Wealth indices can act as a proxy for wealth for a wide range of research studies 
not only in economics but also other disciplines. The asset index can also act as a “control 
variable in estimating effects of variables potentially correlated with household wealth, such 
as maternal education” (Filmer and Pritchett, 1998). Unlike the intricate and cumbersome 
process of analysing raw expenditure or income data, once an asset index has been created, 
researchers can quickly and easily estimate the wealth rank of a particular household. This 
simplicity should encourage more Iran researchers, of all fields, to take into account the 
inequality and wealth aspects of the studies they carry out. 
Both the derived urban and rural indices in this study were found to be consistent 
and provide reliable approximations for household expenditure groupings, and may be used 
by future researchers. The urban index is partially better calibrated than the rural index, due 
to the assets listed in the survey questionnaire. 
Ideally, in the future, the SCI should include a dedicated questionnaire for drawing 
up an asset index, with separate questionnaires for urban and rural areas. Researchers can 
improve this index by making use of polychoric principle components analysis (Kolenikov 
and Angeles, 2009, Kolenikov and Angeles, 2004) and explore methodologies for combining 
the two indices into one index (Rutsein, 2008). 
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8. Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present a structured conclusion of the major findings of this research. 
Although our empirical analysis has been centred on Iran, there are wider theoretical 
implications from this study for other rentier states. 
In the introduction to this thesis, we noted that the motivation for the research was 
partially driven by the desire to gain an understanding of the overall inequality patterns in 
Iran. This would assist future analysis on a particular branch of inequality, which may 
otherwise prove too challenging to study in isolation, given the absence of published papers 
on the wider trends of income distribution. We attempt to present the ‘big picture’ of Iran’s 
inequality patterns in this chapter. 
Our findings are categorized into the four groupings of methodology, literature, 
empirical results and the insights gained from the creation of the asset index. A number of 
policy implications relating to Iran and other rentier states are then explored. We suggest 
research areas which naturally follow on from this thesis, and finish the chapter by delving 
into the wider implications arising from this study. 
8.2 Place of findings in the overall literature 
The bulk of the research in this thesis relates specifically to Iran and fits into the Iranian 
economy literature family. The findings can also be interpreted as a case study for income 
inequality in rentier states, as the thesis explores the mechanisms through which income 
distribution is shaped in a rentier setting. 
 In relation to household survey literature, several methodological conclusions arise 
pertaining to inequality measurements and the derivation of an asset index. Finally, as 
regards income inequality literature in general, this study relates the story of how structural 
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challenges can prevent the success of otherwise well formulated policies aimed at improving 
income distribution. 
8.3 Hypothesis and specific research questions 
This thesis had two major objectives. The primary objective was to empirically ascertain the 
main patterns and trends of vertical and horizontal inequality in Iran. The secondary 
objective was to find out if a relationship exists between the rentier nature of a state and its 
income distribution by surveying and extending rentier theory literature. 
 We hope that we have broadly met both these objectives; and hence largely 
confirmed our hypothesis that a rentier state, such as Iran, develops a unique pattern of 
structural inequality, which is difficult to alter as long as the economy is reliant on oil 
revenues. 
 Specifically we sought the answers to the following research questions (reproduced 
from the introduction): 
 
Descriptive empirical questions 
1. What are the recent levels and trends of urban and rural national inequality? 
2. What are the geographic component contributions to overall inequality? 
3. What are the levels of inequality between the provinces? 
4. What is the pattern of inequality within the provinces? 
5. What are the trends of urban/rural disparity? 
6. What is the level of ethnic inequality? 
 
Analytical empirical Questions 
1. What factors account for the small year on year fluctuations in the national inequality 
measure? 
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2. What structural effect does direct government expenditure of a rentier state have on 
income distribution? 
3. How are subsidies affecting inequality, and what is the likely effect of their removal? 
4. Are urban or rural areas within provinces converging? Is there evidence of 
polarization? 
5. Are inequalities within provinces related to income levels? 
6. What are the differences of the urban/rural divide along the national income 
distribution? 
7. Are ethnic inequalities converging or diverging? 
8. What are the income distribution differences between private and public sector 
headed households? 
9. Can an effective asset index be created for Iran from existing household data to 
provide an alternative measure less prone to oil shocks? 
In addressing these broad questions, a considerable amount of data was analysed and only 
the results relating to our hypothesis were presented in the thesis.  
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8.4 Summary of Findings 
This study presents a wide range of findings which come together to present a picture of 
income inequality in Iran specifically, and for a rentier state in general. In broad terms, the 
findings support our extension of rentier theory as it relates to income distribution.  We find 
consistent income inequality with fluctuations linked to the fortunes of the richest groups. Oil 
rents and government expenditure have a structural and not a direct impact on income 
distribution. The urban bias of government spending is apparent and has substantially raised 
the urban sector’s share of overall income. 
 Although government subsidies, prevalent in most rentier states, are found to benefit 
the rich in absolute terms, the removal of such subsidies is not expected to significantly 
reduce inequality given that fuel and utilities comprise a small proportion of overall 
expenditure for the rich. A decomposition of inequality reveals that income disparities in Iran 
are now dominated by the urban sector, with three major cities contributing to over one third 
of the observed inequality. As expected in a rentier setting, there is a growing urban/rural 
gap in real terms, which is also not decreasing in relative terms. 
 There are major inter-regional disparities with a minor sign of urban convergence 
and a major trend of rural divergence. Together with the finding of considerable variations of 
within inequalities for adjoining rural areas, the results point to a picture of rural regions 
which show signs of dispersion and isolation in terms of relative income. We found no simple 
geographic characterization of provincial inequality, and the commonly accepted ‘rich central 
v poorer periphery model’ no longer seems apt for Iran. Although there are no signs of 
polarization, a number of provinces seem rooted to the bottom of the provincial rankings, 
with the poorest, Sistan and Baluchistan, diverging away from other provinces.  
 Inequality within the provinces varied widely and was not related directly to 
expenditure levels. As expected, given the high urban unemployment rates, we found no 
sign of the Kuznets inverted U shaped inequality curve. In ethnic terms, there is a rapidly 
shrinking gap between Persian dominated and ethnic dominated regions, with some 
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ethnicities doing better than others. This negates the notion of a Persian rentier class 
diverging from other ethnic groups. The ethnic regions were also no more homogenous than 
the Persian dominated ones, in terms of income distribution. 
 In line with our rentier theory predictions, public sector headed households are very 
much advantaged over private ones, creating a significant horizontal inequality. The within 
income distribution of public sector households is, however, much more equal, having a 
decreasing effect on vertical inequality. In Iran’s case, the number of exclusively public 
headed households is declining. 
 In the following sections we present these findings and their significance in more 
detail. 
 
8.4.1 Methodology findings 
The methodology carried out in the preparation and analysis of the raw household micro 
data led to a number of insights. 
 
Define a wider expenditure aggregate 
In rentier states, where substantial food and utility subsidies may exist, the consumption 
aggregate should not be defined too narrowly as this will lead to misleading inequality 
findings. Indeed if such a narrow measure is used, inequality is bound to be underestimated. 
For instance, we recommend the inclusion of expenditure on durables. It became evident 
that the choice of expenditure components can significantly impact the ultimate inequality 
measure. 
 
Use an equivalence scale 
By not using an equivalence scale (many Iran researchers and the SCI do not seem to use 
them) inequality is underestimated for Iran. Not scaling household expenditure will also 
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misrepresent the rural contribution to inequality and will underestimate inter-provincial 
inequality between provinces. The urban/rural divide will also be underestimated. The 
differing expenditure makeup and family household makeup of the urban and rural sector 
and of certain provinces lead to this misrepresentation. 
 
Do not use GDP/capita figures to assess income distribution 
Regional GDP/capita figures can be very misleading in a rentier state. In Iran’s case we 
even found the removal of the oil component still led to vastly different provincial rankings 
from expenditure based inequality measures. For instance, this can be due to isolated 
industrial complexes which are based in a province for tax purposes with little linkages to the 
local economy. 
 
Beware of using snapshot years 
Given the macroeconomic fluctuations of a rentier state, researchers should be wary of 
using snapshot years for reporting trends such as convergence/divergence and inequality 
patterns. For more constant trends such as population shifts the use of snapshot years is 
acceptable. 
 
Misleading population and income shares 
The use of official weights from the SCI household surveys for the years 1998-2004 leads to 
an unrealistically constant annual urban and rural population share. See appendix 3C. 
 
8.4.2 Literature findings 
A review of the literature points to vertical and horizontal inequalities being regarded as 
significant concerns in Iran’s political economy discourse, both pre and post revolution. 
Since the 1979 revolution, the limited published research suggests a high level of inequality 
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with no equalizing trends apparent in the income distribution pattern, despite poverty 
reduction and rural development programs. Existing evaluation of inequality in Iran has 
emerged through the prism of post-revolutionary policy appraisals or as a mere side statistic 
in poverty analysis.  
 Given the constancy of inequality, in spite of changes both in policies and the ruling 
administrations adopting them, closer attention should be paid to long-term structural 
barriers, which may be hampering income redistribution. By carrying out a review of rentier 
theory we hypothesized the main structural barrier to be the dominance of oil exports in the 
Iranian economy. We are suggesting that an extension of the implicit inequality implications 
of rentier theory can serve as the theoretical framework, underpinning the structural nature 
of inequality in Iran. A reliance on oil exports brings about its own dominant socio-political 
structures which are difficult to shift, even after an Islamic revolution.  
 As most income distribution research relating to Iran usually forms the secondary 
objective of a wider poverty study, there is a tendency to focus on economic policies rather 
than underlying economic structures. The variations in the poverty rate lend themselves to 
observing what has changed rather than what remains the same.  Our empirical study, and 
findings by Nomani and Behdad (2006, p.33) and Salehi-Isfahani (2008, p. 29) however 
point to principally structural determinants of income distribution. When it comes to inequality 
in Iran, and possibly other rentier states, there is a need for more focus on the entrenched 
structures of the economy rather than short-term government policy. A decoupling of income 
inequality from poverty research is necessary in order to take this intuitive step. 
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8.4.3 Creation of an asset index 
We suggest that an asset index can prove especially useful in a rentier state as it can ‘ride 
above’ the income distribution fluctuations deriving from frequent macroeconomic shocks. 
For instance, the asset index can be used as a wealth proxy, less prone to short-term 
shocks, in studies on education levels.  
 Given the lack of such indices for Iran, we created a separate asset based wealth 
index for the urban and rural sector respectively. Both indices were shown to be coherent 
and in keeping with rankings based on household expenditure. The urban asset index was 
deemed to be more accurately calibrated than the rural index. Ideally a separate asset 
questionnaire should be used for assets in rural households to build up a more definitive 
rural index. The asset indices should also prove useful for future researchers who wish to 
find a quick and practical way of estimating income/wealth distribution. 
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8.4.4 Empirical study findings 
Table 8.4.1 Summary of empirical findings 
 
Category Finding Importance 
Vertical inequality 
1997-2010 
  
National inequality Consistently high (above 0.40 
GINI) annual inequality with 
fluctuations and a noticeable drop 
in 2008 (but still above 0.40). 
Despite poverty alleviating 
measures, a high level of 
inequality still persists. 
Successive pre and post 
revolution administrations 
have been unable 
successfully tackle the 
high rate of inequality. 
Fluctuations in inequality The inequality measure which is 
most sensitive to the top of the 
distribution is also the most 
volatile.  
The fortune of the rich 
mostly determines the 
annual fluctuations in the 
inequality rate.  
Drop in inequality in 
2008 
There is a significant and 
sustained105 drop in inequality in 
2008. This is found to be 
predominantly due to a fall in the 
real expenditures of the richest 
groups. 
Poverty alleviation is 
unlikely to significantly 
reduce inequality. 
Effective taxation of the 
rich is much more likely to 
bring about a fall in 
inequality. 
                                                 
105
 Sustained until 2010 which the last year of the period under research. 
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Oil rents/Gov. 
expenditure and 
inequality 
There seems to be no direct link 
between either the level of oil rents 
or government expenditure or oil 
led growth to the observed year on 
year fluctuations in income 
inequality. 
Oil rents may determine 
the underlying structures 
of inequality but do not 
directly cause an increase 
or decrease in the 
inequality figure.  
Gov. expenditure and 
urban bias 
Although government expenditure 
may not have directly affected 
changes in the inequality figure, it 
has affected its composition by 
heavily favouring the urban sector. 
As predicted by rentier 
theory, government 
expenditures have a 
significant urban bias; 
leading to a rise in the 
urban composition of 
inequality by increasing 
urban income share. 
Subsidies The subsidies prevalent until 2010 
clearly benefited the richest groups 
in absolute terms. The fuel 
rationing scheme introduced in 
2007 had a negligible effect on 
income inequality and the 
subsequent observed drop in the 
2008 inequality figure was not due 
to this scheme. 
Although subsidies may 
be benefitting the rich in 
absolute terms, their 
abolition may not have a 
very significant impact on 
inequality. This is due to 
the low percentage of 
household expenditures 
accounted for by fuel and 
utilities (although this 
percentage rises modestly 
once subsidies are lifted). 
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Urban rural divide The high ratio of urban to rural 
income almost mirrors the annual 
fluctuations in the GINI figure. 
The urban rural divide 
plays a significant role in 
Iran’s annual inequality 
fluctuations. 
Decomposition by 
urban/rural sector 
The urban sector’s share of 
income and hence its contribution 
to overall inequality has risen 
consistently. From a 60% 
contribution to overall inequality in 
1990 to almost 75% in 2010. 
It is the urban sector that 
is key to reducing overall 
inequality. Rural 
development programs 
should not be expected to 
have a significant impact 
on overall inequality. 
Decomposition by the 
urban provinces 
While the ‘between’ contribution of 
urban provinces has been falling, 
their ‘within’ contribution is on the 
rise. By 2010, the inequality ‘within’ 
three major urban provinces 
(Tehran, Mashhad and Esfahan) 
accounts for 35% of all inequality 
in Iran. 
This indicates that the 
urban sectors of provinces 
are becoming more 
homogenous in relation to 
each other but have 
consistently high unequal 
income distributions. The 
key to achieving a 
significant inequality drop 
in Iran lies within these 
major urban areas. 
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Decomposition by the 
rural provinces 
In contrast to urban areas, the rural 
sector displays a pattern of 
growing inequality between the 
provinces and a lowering of 
inequality ‘within’ them. 
The income and 
population transfer to 
urban areas has led to a 
more locally homogenous 
but nationally fragmented 
rural sector. 
Inter-provincial inequality   
Choice of measure GDP 
v household 
expenditures 
GDP/capita can lead to misleading 
results for provincial inequality in a 
rentier state. Even if the oil 
component is removed the 
provincial rankings are still very 
different from an analysis based on 
household expenditures. 
Researchers should be 
cautious of regional 
inequality studies based 
on GDP, especially in a 
rentier state. 
Significant inter-
provincial inequality 
Major differences exist between 
provincial mean household 
expenditures. These differences 
were accentuated due to the use of 
equivalence scales that took into 
account urban and rural 
differences in household makeup. 
The mean household expenditure 
of the richest and poorest province 
differed by more than a factor of 
three. 
As well as a high level of 
prevailing vertical 
inequality, geographic 
horizontal inequalities are 
also high. 
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Rich central v poor 
periphery? 
The traditionally accepted picture 
of a rich central region v poor 
periphery does not emerge. We 
find this simplistic misconception to 
have been based on GDP/capita 
figures and former administrative 
boundaries. 
Regional inequality in Iran 
cannot be characterized 
by a simple geographic 
explanation. The picture of 
regional inequality which 
emerges is much more 
intricate and requires 
further research. 
Geographic 
characterization of inter-
provincial inequalities 
As stated we found no simple 
geographic pattern to the inter-
provincial inequalities. Instead, 
what was noticeable was the 
relatively larger rural sector of the 
poorest provinces. 
One significant, if 
expected, factor explaining 
inter-provincial differences 
is the size of the rural 
population in the province. 
Convergence/Divergence We found evidence of significant 
inter-provincial rural divergence 
and a modest convergence of 
urban areas. Combined together 
this leads to an overall result of no 
convergence or divergence 
between the provinces. 
Urban areas may be 
becoming more 
homogenous in relation to 
each other (but exhibiting 
high within inequality). 
Rural areas are becoming 
more fragmented. 
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Polarization Unlike a previous study, we found 
no evidence of inter-provincial 
polarization. However, there is a 
trend of divergence between 
Tehran (the richest) and Sistan 
and Baluchistan (the poorest) 
province. 
In line with the 
convergence/divergence 
results there is no overall 
trend of polarization 
between Iran’s provinces. 
Provincial mobility The very top and bottom ranked 
provinces in terms of household 
expenditure seem to be firmly 
rooted in place. The middle ranked 
provinces change places regularly. 
A key to improving inter-
provincial inequality is to 
provide special assistance 
to the poorest provinces 
that seem firmly stuck at 
the bottom. 
Growth and inter-
provincial convergence 
We find no clear-cut link between 
growth and inter-provincial 
convergence in Iran. There is a 
very significant positive correlation 
for 2000-2007 but no correlation 
for the other years in our study. 
Growth alone (oil led 
growth) will not achieve 
convergence between 
Iran’s provinces and 
reduce horizontal 
inequalities. 
Inter-provincial inequality 
and migration data 
We find that, in the main, the latest 
available provincial migration data 
are in line with the inter-provincial 
rankings based on household 
expenditure. 
Ranking provinces by 
household expenditure is 
an acceptable method of 
gauging inter-provincial 
inequalities. 
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The poorest province 
Sistan and Baluchistan 
We found that the ethnic province 
of Sistan and Baluchistan ranks 
worst in all our inequality 
calculations. It has the lowest 
mean household expenditure, the 
highest level of internal inequality, 
the lowest GDP/capita figure, the 
lowest UN HDI figure and exhibits 
the highest number of children per 
household. In terms of ethnicity, its 
expenditure is decreasing in 
relation to the dominant Persians 
and relative to all other ethnicities. 
Sistan and Baluchistan 
province requires targeted 
policy attention. It is clear 
that any central sectoral 
policies aimed at reducing 
inequality are bypassing 
this province. 
Intra-provincial (within) 
inequality 
  
Spread of intra-provincial 
inequality 
The level of inequality within the 
provinces varies widely, from a 
GINI of 0.32 to a GINI of 0.48 in 
2010. 
This wide gulf of within 
provincial inequality 
provides fertile research 
ground for policy makers 
to investigate a number of 
the underlying causes of 
inequality in Iran. 
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Relationship to 
expenditure levels and to 
other provinces 
We find no direct relationship 
between expenditure levels and 
the degree of inequality. We also 
find that the levels of intra-
provincial inequality do not move 
together; i.e. changes in their 
within inequalities do not seem 
related to each other. 
Local determinants are a 
key to reducing overall 
inequality in Iran. 
Inequality and Kuznets Unlike a previous study we find no 
evidence of Kuznets’s inverted U 
shaped inequality curve for Iran’s 
provinces. 
Increasing expenditure 
levels will not by 
themselves decrease the 
high within inequalities 
prevalent in many of Iran’s 
provinces. 
The Urban/Rural factor One significant factor in 
determining within provincial 
inequality is the degree of the 
urban-rural divide in the province. 
This factor naturally becomes less 
significant the lesser the provincial 
share of the rural sector in terms of 
population and income. 
Similar to the national 
picture, on the provincial 
level, the urban/rural 
divide is a significant 
factor in determining the 
level of inequality. 
Although this is becoming 
less important as the rural 
sector shrinks. 
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Inequality clustering There is some evidence of urban 
inequality geographic clustering. 
However there is no such evidence 
for rural areas with widely different 
inequality rates for adjoining 
provinces. 
This builds on the finding 
of urban sector 
convergence, and 
provides support to the 
notion of an increasingly 
shrinking and fragmented 
rural sector. 
Ethnic Inequalities   
Persians v other 
ethnicities 
There is a rapidly shrinking but still 
sizeable gap between the 
dominant Persian population and 
all other ethnicities combined. 
Despite persistently high 
inter-provincial inequality, 
the expenditure gap 
between ethnic regions is 
closing. This could be due 
to a conscious policy focus 
by the ruling 
administration or simply a 
reflection of its possible 
multi-ethnic makeup. 
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Urban/rural dimensions 
of the ethnic gap 
The ethnic gap is only prevalent 
among the urban areas and there 
is no significant ethnic divide 
between the rural sectors. 
Coupled with the finding 
that government 
expenditure is biased 
towards urban areas, the 
finding of the solely urban 
nature of ethnic inequality 
highlights how a change in 
the provincial distribution 
of government expenditure 
can impact economic 
ethnic inequality. 
Within ethnic inequality As with the Persian dominated 
regions the ethnic dominated 
provinces also exhibit widely 
different internal inequality rates. 
They are not more homogenous 
than the Persian regions. 
Ethnic regions are prone 
to the same inequality 
determinants as the 
Persian ones. 
Ranking of ethnicities We provided a ranking of all ethnic 
dominated regions according to 
their mean household equivalence 
expenditure. 
There is considerable 
inequality between the 
various ethnic regions. 
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Ethnic 
convergence/divergence 
With the stark exception of 
Baloochis, the mean household 
expenditure of most ethnicities has 
converged towards that of the 
Persians. However, there are still 
significant differences in the 
performance of various ethnicities. 
This builds on our earlier 
finding that the province of 
Sistan and Baluchistan 
requires special policy 
attention. 
Rural/urban Divide   
The rural urban gap There is a growing gap between 
urban and rural households in 
terms of expenditure. This gap has 
grown in real terms by a factor of 2 
between 1997 and 2010. 
In line with rentier 
predictions on inequality, 
the urban bias of the 
economy is leading to an 
expanding urban sector 
and a shrinking rural one. 
Geographic 
representation of the 
rural/urban gap 
There is no simple geographic 
pattern to provincial rural/urban 
disparities. This gap is also not 
dependent on the provincial mean 
household expenditure level. For 
instance, both the richest and 
poorest province have a large 
rural/urban divide. 
The determinants of the 
gap between urban and 
rural areas in Iran’s 
provinces are not simple 
ones. Local factors seem 
to be playing a key role in 
determining the size of this 
gap. This area merits 
further research. 
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Distribution comparison 
of the rural/urban divide 
The biggest gap between urban 
and rural sectors is exhibited 
between the richest and poorest 
households. i.e. the gap is at its 
highest between the richest urban 
to the richest rural and the poorest 
urban to the poorest rural 
households. There is a distinct U 
shaped curve that characterizes 
the decile ratios of these two 
distributions. 
This finding suggests that 
the rural poor and rural 
rich may feel the most 
incentive to move to urban 
areas. This is in line with 
our suggestion in chapter 
four that rural to urban 
migration is probably 
characterized mostly by 
the top and bottom rural 
income groups. 
Private v Public Sector 
Households 
  
The public / private gap There is a significant and growing 
gap between the wealthier public 
sector and the poorer private 
sector households. This gap in 
expenditures has increased in real 
terms by a factor of almost 3 from 
1997 to 2009. 
This finding sits very well 
with rentier theory, which 
predicts a bias in rent 
distribution towards the 
public sector. 
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Distribution comparison 
of public and private 
sector households 
The poorer the households the 
larger the relative gap between 
public and private sector headed 
family expenditures. In 2010 for 
example there is a 1.5 difference 
for the richest decile but a much 
larger 2.0 difference for the poorest 
decile. 
This finding confirms the 
gap between public and 
private sector households 
and highlights how 
accentuated this horizontal 
inequality is for poorer 
households. 
Within inequality in 
private and public sector 
households 
Public sector households exhibit a 
significantly lower inequality than 
private headed households. 
The public sector has the 
dual effect of reducing 
vertical inequality, but as 
we have seen from the 
previous findings, it 
increases horizontal 
inequalities. 
Rural/urban dimensions The gap between the public and 
private sector is even more 
pronounced in rural areas. 
Prevalence of the public 
sector household 
The proportion of exclusively public 
sector headed households has 
been shrinking for the period under 
study. It has halved in urban areas 
between 1997-2010 and shrunk 
even further (by a factor of three) 
in rural areas. 
The importance of public 
sector wage rises as an 
allocative tool to decrease 
vertical inequality is 
becoming less significant. 
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8.5 Policy implications for Iran 
In this research study, we have not specifically focussed on income inequality determinants 
per se; nor have we explored a number of noteworthy categories of potential inequality such 
as gender, religious, sectoral (manufacturing, agricultural, services) and occupational. We 
are therefore not in a position to recommend an exhaustive list of equality augmenting policy 
recommendations. 
 Rather, by researching the rentier characteristics, specific vertical and horizontal 
patterns, and recent regional trends of inequality in Iran, we can at best suggest where the 
focus and direction of government policy should lie, in order to bring about a significant 
impact on income distribution. 
 This study also points to numerous existing policies that on the surface may seem to 
improve income distribution but have clearly failed to create a significant downward shift in 
income inequality. These include consistent oil-led economic growth, expansion of higher 
education availability, rural infrastructural investment, rural development and housing 
programs, successful poverty alleviation and the promotion of industry outside the major 
urban areas. 
 
8.5.1 Structural change 
Robinson (2002, p.10) divides inequality decreasing policy recommendations into two 
categories: 
 
Category 1 Increasing “human-capital-augmenting investment” 
  These relate to improvement of education, health, housing etc. 
 
Category 2 Stimulating “transactions that directly or indirectly redistribute income” 
  These relate to both private and public sector transactions.  
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 However, as the literature review and the empirical study have demonstrated, 
despite measures by the post-revolutionary administration in engaging in “human-capital-
augmenting investment” (category 1 policies), inequality has remained stubbornly high. We 
have also argued throughout that economic transactions that can alter redistribution 
(category 2 policies) are suppressed and overwhelmed in a rentier state. 
 Hence, given our rentier inequality hypothesis, our primary policy recommendation 
for income inequality reduction is to bring about the major structural change of substantially 
decreasing economic dependence on oil export revenues. In essence, our findings indicate 
that inequality in a rentier state is an entrenched problem not shifted with basic sectoral 
policy changes. In his pioneering article, Mahdavy (1970, p.466) alludes to this idea of 
chronic economic difficulties within a rentier state even if government policy is not flawed: 
“Even with the best of organizations, [use of italics are this author’s addition] Rentier States 
will still have a number of special problems which they will have to solve if their economic 
growth is to continue smoothly” 
 As long as the economy is dominated by a revenue stream, without domestic 
linkages, accruing directly to the state, not only will there be a high level of inequality but 
also a formidable parallel perception of unfairness in society. As Karl (2004, p.15) suggests, 
in a rentier state the rich are only perceived as being rich due to privilege or a connection to 
the state. 
 The path to less oil-dependence for Iran, whether through a lowering cap of oil 
revenues in each successive annual budget, or a push towards international economic 
integration, or by adopting other mechanisms is beyond the scope of this study. What is 
clear, is that the rentier nature of the state is the primary structural barrier to overcome in 
order to successfully implement income inequality reduction policies. A decreased 
dependence on oil should also lead to less macroeconomic volatility and hence less 
inequality fluctuations, and the emergence of clearer longer term trends in the income 
distribution. Beyond this primary recommendation of a structural shift to a non-oil dominated 
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economy, in the following sections, we make a number of policy suggestions based on the 
research carried out; subject to three caveats:  
 
1. The following recommendations only relate to inequality. For instance the 
proposition of a policy focus on urban areas is not to suggest that rural development 
programs should be dropped. Or the suggestion that poverty-alleviating measures 
do no impact favourably on inequality should not be misconstrued as the author 
suggesting these measures be abandoned.  
2. We make the following policy recommendations with the acknowledgement of their 
possible ineffectiveness or impracticality unless there is a move towards non-oil 
dependence, and also without any regard for their political viability. 
3. The policy implication of every single finding has not been explored, only those 
relating to the major patterns and trends. Other researchers may spot additional 
policy recommendations based on the empirical findings. 
8.5.2 Urban focus 
The decomposition of inequality in chapter four, made it evident that the nature of inequality 
in Iran has morphed into an urban one. In chapter three, we found that the methodology 
adopted by the SCI substantially overestimates the contribution of rural areas to inequality. 
There is no paradox if extensive post-revolutionary rural development programs 
(Sharbatoghlie, 1991) have failed to bring about a more egalitarian distribution of income; as 
it is clearly the urban sector which accounts for the overwhelming share of income (85% by 
2010). 
 The thrust of government redistribution policies should have a major bearing on 
urban areas if there is to be any signficant lowering of the national GINI. As the findings in 
chapter four demonstrate, more than a third of all inequality in Iran can be attributed to 
inequality within just three urban population centres. The recent lifitng of universal subsidies 
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is a policy step in the right direction, but unlikely to have a signficant impact given the low 
proportion of expenditures on utilities and fuel. More effective would be the creation of urban 
sector employment, which should also lead to private sector wage increases for existing 
employees. As noted earlier in this study, Iran’s unemployment rate has averaged above 
12.5% for the 1997-2009 period. Given that new manufacturing industry is barred from 
locating in major urban centres, such as the capital city Tehran, (for environmental and 
regional development reasons), employment generation policies in urban areas should be a 
priority for the government. 
 
8.5.3 Fiscal tools to target the rich 
In the literature review, we highlighted the tendency of welfare researchers on Iran to 
primarily focus on poverty and treat inequality very much as a secondary side issue. The 
notion of policy following research is apt in this case. The focus on rural development and 
poverty reduction programs while admirable and necessary, should not be deemed sufficient 
for meaningful inequality reduction. 
 This empirical study has indeed demonstrated that major changes in Iran’s income 
distribution can only be brought about by a focus on urban areas and the very rich; the exact 
opposite of poverty reduction policies. Alleviating the plight of the poor will have a limited 
effect on the headline inequality figure. Our findings show a noticeable fall in the GINI figure 
only when the top decile loses income share. 
 Iran needs to introduce fiscal tools for targeting the richest income groups. These 
could include: 
 A progressive income tax to be enforced for all. At the moment only officially 
registered employees pay income tax. Many rich entrepreneurs do not pay income 
tax. 
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 A rising scale stamp duty on property transactions. The current rate is very low. This 
also has the advantage of being a difficult tax to evade. 
 Capital gains tax on most investments 
The introduction of such taxes is politically difficult in a rentier state, as by definition, it is the 
richest groups who command the most political clout. Even when a non-progressive VAT 
tax106 was introduced in 2008 at a rate of only 3%, the rich merchant classes of the ‘Bazaar’ 
vehemently protested the measure. 
 
8.5.4 Provincial targeting 
Two main policy recommendations emerge from the provincial inequality findings. The first 
relates to the finding that GDP/capita figures are not the appropriate measure for identifying 
regional inequality in a rentier state such as Iran. This is the case even if the oil component 
is removed.  Policy makers should rely on measures that calculate inequality from the 
household level up. 
 Numerous policy recommendations have already been put forward in the literature 
to tackle Iran’s high regional disparity, such as: a move towards decentralization 
(Amirahmadi, 1986),  increasing agricultural R&D investment (Karbasi and Mojarad, 2008), 
better transportation (Farmanesh, 2009) and targeting border regions (Lotfi et al., 2011). 
Apart from dismissing the traditional central v border characterization of provincial inequality 
in Iran, we cannot comment specifically on these recommendations, as we have not carried 
out an extensive study on the determinants of regional inequality. We can however note that 
during the 1997-2010 period there has been no discernible overall household expenditure 
convergence among the provinces. Although, we find small-scale urban convergence and 
                                                 
106
 The VAT rate was initially introduced at a rate of 3% (1.5% VAT and 1.5% excise) with many 
exemptions. It is currently 5% (2012), although it is expected to increase further in the coming years. 
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considerable rural divergence. The aforementioned policy recommendations have to be 
appraised against this backdrop.  
 Apart from a consistently high level of inter-provincial inequality, our findings 
suggest that certain provinces seem to be rooted to the bottom of the regional rankings year 
on year. General sectoral policy has not only failed to reduce regional inequality but it seems 
to have failed certain provinces more than others. This lends support to proponents of 
targeted regional assistance. Unlike countries such as South Africa or Malaysia (Stewart 
2001) Iran has not adopted a targeted policy approach for specific ethnicities or provinces. 
 Thus, the second policy recommendation is the formulation of a framework for 
researching and tackling determinants, which are holding back economic prosperity in these 
specific regions. The exact nature of the directed policy, whether in the shape of more 
economic autonomy or surplus central investment funding requires further discussion and 
research, but it is evident that the needs of certain provinces are not being adequately 
addressed by sectoral policy implemented at the national level. This idea also applies to 
certain ethnic groups such as the Baloochis or Turkmens who seem to be falling behind 
other ethnicities. 
 
8.5.5 Urban-rural integration 
Both the trend of considerable divergence among rural areas and the pattern of diverse 
within inequalities between adjoining rural provinces (unlike urban provinces), point to a 
fragmentation of the rural sector. The consistently increasing share of the urban sector in 
terms of both income and population also supports this finding. Policies aimed at achieving a 
degree of integration between these rural areas and their urban counterparts may mitigate 
their further demise. 
 China could act as a model for Iran in this regard. China’s experimental CURD 
“Coordinated Urban-Rural Development” zones, have been setup to direct a set of 
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experimental policies aimed at narrowing the gap between these two sectors (Salverda et al., 
2011, Schultz, 1961). These include public finance relief both in terms of tax relaxation and 
extra funding, decentralization for a handful of ‘experimental’ rural areas, improved social 
security, infrastructural funding and multiple other micro policies directed towards meeting 
specific local requirements. 
 This new approach emerges from a realization that “Macro-level national policy 
making is ill at addressing a myriad of local specificities” (Salverda et al., 2011, p.357). The 
concept of local policy delegation is one that Iran’s national policy makers need to embrace. 
It is still too early to judge the success of the “CURD” zones, but such innovative non-
sectoral programs may also prove effective in tackling inter-provincial inequalities. Indeed 
China sees “CURD” as one of the tools for reducing inequality between the coastal and 
inland regions (Sheng 2011).  
 
8.5.6 Horizontal inequality monitoring 
In certain circumstances, reductions in the headline vertical inequality measure may be more 
efficiently brought about by policies targeting specific horizontal inequalities; the Malaysian 
favourable treatment of the indigenous Bumiputera (Stewart, 2001), is an example of this. 
These policies can only be implemented if there is continuous research on the extent and 
nature of major perceived inter-group inequalities. 
 For instance, the close monitoring of ethnic, gender, religious, private/public sector, 
functional and occupational disparities, would allow administrators to evaluate the likely 
income distribution effects of any targeted policies, and to also assess the impact of existing 
policies. Neglecting horizontal inequalities will not only hamper the general drive for an 
egalitarian society but may also lead to disharmony and conflict. 
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8.5.7 Lifting of sanctions and global economic integration 
Iran has been under some form of sanctions regime for almost its whole post-revolutionary 
existence. Sanctions have intensified tremendously since 2010. We do not yet have the data 
to evaluate the effect of this latest round of sanctions on income distribution. However, we 
can speculate that sanctions are likely to result in both augmenting and diminishing 
inequality tendencies. 
 Sanctions will have countless distributary effects on the economy, such as limiting 
the import and export of goods to a select number of powerful groups; others will simply be 
priced out of such transactions. They close off international markets, placing export and 
import reliant industries at a disadvantage. By drawing down foreign currency reserves, 
sanctions lead to a depreciation of the local currency, disproportionately affecting those with 
a higher cash savings asset mix, and those who are dependent on imported goods. Most 
export-oriented industries cannot take advantage of the depreciation due to sanctions. 
Overall, economic growth is diminished. In the case of sanctions on oil exports, the state will 
gradually become less rentier in nature. 
 The net effect of these outcomes on income distribution also depends on the 
government’s re-allocation of resources in reaction to the sanctions regime. In Iran’s case, 
based on its record during the Iran-Iraq war period, the government will probably implement 
safeguards for the poorer groups (such as rations, direct cash payments, price controls on 
basic foodstuffs etc.). Coupled with declining oil revenues, we speculate that a restrictive 
international sanctions regime may actually reduce income inequality significantly, with the 
very large caveat that the economic wellbeing of the whole population will also decrease. 
 Given the prediction of a likely fall in inequality during the sanctions regime, why do 
we advocate a lifting of sanctions and integration with the global economy, specifically in 
relation to income distribution? The answer is that the long-term prosperity of many 
disadvantaged groups lies in access to new markets. 
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 For instance, new export markets for manufacturing, services and agriculture; 
tourism for the provinces; liberal global business culture may benefit women; ethnicities such 
as the Arabs and Azeri Turks may find a competitive advantage in trade with their regional 
ethnic counterparts; investment by multi-nationals may allow many private sector wage 
earners to catch-up with their public sector counterparts. Assuming there is no substantial 
increase in oil exports, increased trade would also lower the dominance of oil revenues on 
the economy. This rather rosy picture of the effects of global economic integration on 
inequality is in contrast with the experience of many countries; see for example (Schütz et al., 
2008) who finds that the economic integration component of globalization increases 
inequality. But given Iran’s investment in human-capital augmentation to create a large 
skilled workforce, many groups and geographical regions may be able to improve their 
relative ranking by gaining access to bigger markets, and not having to operate within a 
closed rentier setting. 
 
8.6 Limitations and future research questions 
As noted in the introductory chapter, the approach to this study has been based upon 
carrying out research on several major vertical and horizontal income distribution patterns in 
Iran, rather than narrowly focusing on one aspect in particular. This was due to the 
unavailability of published studies on a wide range of potential major disparities, which made 
the significance and analysis of one particular inequality measure difficult to judge in 
isolation. This broad approach was also influenced by the desire to analyse various aspects 
of income distribution within a rentier framework. 
 Following our findings on Iran’ dominant inequality patterns and trends, future 
research can perhaps be more focussed on one particular aspect of income distribution such 
as gender or occupation. Such specialization can only take place within a broader 
understanding and framework of inequality in Iran. 
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 Several other research areas also methodically follow from this study: 
 Apart from the rural/urban divide, what are the other significant factors contributing 
to such a wide variation of inequality within the provinces? Why do we witness an 
urban clustering of such ‘within’ inequality? 
 We suggested that GDP/capita is not an effective method of gauging inter-regional 
inequalities for rentier states. Future research can however look at the components 
of the GDP for each province and investigate the impact of regional sectoral policy 
on provincial expenditure inequalities. 
 Despite a significant increase in the availability of higher education, why has this not 
translated into an improvement in Iran’s income distribution pattern? Although we 
have put forward the rentier nature of the economy as the main culprit, the exact 
mechanisms that are preventing education from influencing economic prospects in a 
rentier setting need further exploration. 
 Future household datasets (post 2010) may be used to investigate the duel effects 
of sanctions and the lifting of general subsidies on income distribution. Should a 
prolonged period of effective ‘oil export’ sanctions be imposed on Iran, this would 
provide a valuable opportunity for studying whether any rentier characteristics of the 
Iranian economy begin to dissolve, such as the constancy of high income inequality. 
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8.7 Wider implications and final word 
 
This research indicates the need for a clear set of accepted standards in the preparation and 
reporting of inequality figures. Such standards will prove particularly advantageous for 
carrying out cross-country comparisons. Seemingly minor methodological choices in the 
processing and aggregation of micro household data not only result in a differing headline 
figure, but also significantly distort the contribution of the inequality components to the final 
measure. Thus, the lack of clear methodological standards, may in some cases be leading 
to policy distortions and erroneous research conclusions. 
This study is yet another reminder of the intricate nature of inequality. Unlike poverty, 
whose treatment may be more universal in nature, we have argued that inequality is very 
much dependent on the structure of the national state and is not always easily shifted by 
government sectoral policy. What works in India, may not work in Iran. Our central policy 
recommendation of a need for structural change, in order to bring about improvements in 
income distribution, is likely to be applicable to other rentier states. 
 Mahdavy (1970, p.466), in his pioneering paper on the rentier state, reaches the 
conclusion that it is not the commonly cited “availability of capital” which is crucial to 
economic development, but rather the process of obtaining it. Following our research 
findings, we can extend this analogy to inequality. Policies leading to consistent growth, 
human capital investment, rural infrastructural development and poverty reduction may not 
in themselves have a significant impact on income distribution, if the state structure within 
which they are implemented is flawed. The rentier state is an example of such a flawed 
structure. 
  
326 
 
Bibliography 
 
ABDEL-FADIL, M. 1987. The Macro-behaviour of Oil-rentier States in the Arab 
Region. In: BEBLAWI, H. & LUCIANI, G. (eds.) Nation, state, and 
integration in the Arab world ; v.2. London: Croom Helm. 
ACEMOGLU, D., EGOROV, G. & SONIN, K. 2013. A Political Theory of 
Populism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, 771-805. 
ACEMOGLU, D. & ROBINSON, J. A. 2002. The political economy of the Kuznets 
curve. Review of Development Economics, 6, 183-203. 
ADELMAN, I. & MORRIS, C. T. 1973. Economic growth and social equity in 
developing countries, Stanford University Press. 
AGHAJANIAN, A. 1983. Ethnic Inequality in Iran: An Overview. International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, 15, 211-224. 
AGHION, P. & BOLTON, P. 1997. A theory of trickle-down growth and 
development. The Review of Economic Studies, 64, 151-172. 
AHLUWALIA, M. S. 1976. Inequality, poverty and development. Journal of 
Development Economics, 3, 307-342. 
ALESINA, A. & GLAESER, E. L. 2004. Fighting poverty in the US and Europe: A 
world of difference, Oxford University Press Oxford. 
ALESINA, A. & PEROTTI, R. 1994. The political economy of growth: a critical 
survey of the recent literature. The World Bank Economic Review, 8, 351-371. 
AMIRAHMADI, H. 1986. Regional Planning in Iran: A Survey of Problems and 
Policies The Journal of Developing Areas, 20, 501-530. 
AMUZEGAR, J. 2005. Iran's Third Development Plan: An Appraisal. Middle East 
Policy, 12, 46-63. 
ANAND, S. & KANBUR, S. R. 1993. Inequality and development A critique. 
Journal of Development Economics, 41, 19-43. 
ANAND, S. & RAVALLION, M. 1993. Human development in poor countries: on 
the role of private incomes and public services. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 7, 133-150. 
ARAGHI, M. K. & RAHMANI, T. 2011. Regional Economic Growth, Migration, 
and Convergence in Iran. Conference on Interdisciplinary Business Research. 
Society of Interdisciplinary Business Research (SIBR). 
ARBIA, G., DOMINICIS, L. D. & PIRAS, G. 2005. The relationship between 
Regional Growth and Regional Inequality in EU and transition countries - a 
Spatial Econometric Approach. European Regional Science Association. 
ASSADZADEH, A. 1997. Income Distribution and Poverty in Iran. PhD 
dissertation, University of Western Sydney. 
ASSADZADEH, A. & PAUL, S. 2004. Poverty, Growth, and Redistribution: a 
Study of Iran. Review of Development Economics, 8, 640-653. 
ATKINSON, A. B. 1975. The economics of inequality, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
AZZONI, C. 2001. Economic growth and regional income inequality in Brazil. The 
Annals of Regional Science, 35, 133-152. 
BARRO, R. J. & SALA-I-MARTIN, X. 1992. Convergence. Journal of Political 
Economy, 100, 223-51. 
BEAMAN, L. & DILLON, A. 2009. Do household definitions matter in survey 
design? Results from a randomized survey experiment in Mali Northwestern 
University, International Food Policy Research Institute. 
327 
 
BEBLAWI, H. 1987. The Rentier State in the Arab World. In: BEBLAWI, H. & 
LUCIANI, G. (eds.) Nation, state, and integration in the Arab world ; v.2. 
London: Croom Helm. 
BEHDAD, S. 1989. Winners and Losers of the Iranian Revolution: A Study in 
Income Distribution. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 21, 327-
358. 
BEHDAD, S. 1994. A Disputed Utopia: Islamic Economics in Revolutionary Iran. 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 36, 775-813. 
BEHDAD, S. (ed.) 2000. From Populism to Economic Liberalism: The Iranian 
Predicament: I.B. Tauris. 
BELLÙ, L. G. & LIBERATI, P. 2006a. The Atkinson Index. Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations. 
BELLÙ, L. G. & LIBERATI, P. 2006b. Inequality Analysis, The Gini Index. 
EASYPol, Online resource materials for policy making. Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 
BJÖRKLUND, A. 1991. Unemployment and income distribution: time-series 
evidence from Sweden. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 93, 457-
465. 
BJØRNSKOV, C. 2008. The growth–inequality association: Government ideology 
matters. Journal of Development Economics, 87, 300-308. 
BJORVATN, K. & SELVIK, K. 2008. Destructive Competition: Factionalism and 
Rent-Seeking in Iran. World Development, 36, 2314-2324. 
BORJAS, G. J. 1999. Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American 
Economy, Princeton University Press. 
BOYD, R. L. 1988. Government involvement in the economy and the distribution of 
income: A cross-national study. Population Research and Policy Review, 7, 
223-238. 
BRUNO, M., RAVALLION, M. & SQUIRE, L. 1996. Equity and growth in 
developing countries: old and new perspectives on the policy issues, World 
Bank-free PDF. 
BULÍŘ, A. 1998. Income inequality: does inflation matter?, International Monetary 
Fund. 
CARLOS, R. A. 2001. Economic growth and regional income inequality in Brazil. 
The Annals of Regional Science, 35, 133-152. 
CARRINGTON, W. J. & DETRAGIACHE, E. 1999. How Extensive Is the Brain 
Drain? Finance and Development, International Monetary Fund, 36. 
CHARLES KA-YUI, L. & DANNY T, Q. 1996. Convergence, Endogenous Growth, 
and Productivity Disturbances. Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
Department of Economics. 
CHENERY, H., AHLUWALIA, M. S., DULOY, J., BELL, C. & JOLLY, R. 1974. 
Redistribution with growth; policies to improve income distribution in 
developing countries in the context of economic growth, Oxford University 
Press. 
CONCEIÇÃO, P. & FERREIRA, P. 2000. The Young Person’s Guide to the Theil 
Index: Suggesting Intuitive Interpretations and Exploring Analytical 
Applications. University of Texas Inequality Project Working Paper 14. 
CORNIA, G. A. & KIISKI, S. 2001. Trends in income distribution in the post-World 
War II period: Evidence and interpretation. WIDER Discussion 
Papers//World Institute for Development Economics (UNU-WIDER). 
328 
 
CORTINOVIS, I., VELLA, V. & NDIKU, J. 1993. Construction of a socio-
economic index to facilitate analysis of health data in developing countries. 
Social Science &amp; Medicine, 36, 1087-1097. 
COUDOUEL, A., HENTSCHEL, J. S. & WODON, Q. T. 2002. Poverty 
Measurement and Analysis. In: KLUGMAN, J. (ed.) A Sourcebook for Poverty 
Reduction Strategies. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
COWELL, F. 1998. Measurement of Inequality. Distributional Analysis Research 
Programme Discussion Paper. STICERD. 
COWELL, F. A. 2000. Measurement of inequality. Handbook of income distribution, 
1, 87-166. 
DAVID, S. J. & STEPHANIE, S. 1999. note: Inequality and the business cycle: A 
consumption viewpoint. Empirical Economics, 24, 173-180. 
DEATON, A. 1997. The analysis of household surveys : a microeconometric 
approach to development policy, Baltimore, MD, Published for the World 
Bank [by] Johns Hopkins University Press. 
DEATON, A. & ZAIDI, S. 2002. Guidelines for constructing consumption 
aggregates for welfare analysis, Washington, DC, World Bank. 
DEININGER, K. & SQUIRE, L. 1996. A New Data Set Measuring Income 
Inequality. World Bank Economic Review, 10, 565-91. 
DEININGER, K. & SQUIRE, L. 1998. New ways of looking at old issues: 
inequality and growth. Journal of Development Economics, 57, 259-287. 
DORNBUSCH, R. & EDWARDS, S. 1991. The macroeconomics of populism. The 
macroeconomics of populism in Latin America. University of Chicago Press. 
DOROUDIAN, R. (ed.) 1976. Modernization of Rural Economy in Iran: Aspen 
Institute for Humanistic Studies. 
DREGER, C., RAHMANI, T. & ECKEY, H.-F. 2007. Economic Convergence and 
Rent-Seeking in Iran. DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. 
 R  E,  . &  RI I A A , P.  . 199 . ido hood  nd  o ert  in rur l Indi   
some inferences from household survey data. Journal of Development 
Economics, 54. 
ENGEL, E. 1895. Die Lebenskosten Belgischer Arbeiter-Familien Fniher und Jetrt. 
Bulletin de L'Institute International de Statistique, 9. 
ESPING-ANDERSEN, G. & MYLES, J. 2009. Economic inequality and the welfare 
state. The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality, 639-664. 
ESTEBAN, J. & RAY, D. 1994. On the Measurement of Polarization. Econometrica, 
62, 819-51. 
ESTEBAN, J. M. 1997. Un análisis de las desigualdades interregionales en Europa: la 
década de los 80. Barcelona: Mimeo, Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica. 
FALKINGHAM, J. & NAMAZIE, C. 2001. Measuring health and poverty: a review 
of approaches to identifying the poor. London School of Economics. 
FARMANESH, A. 2009. Regional Dimensions of Economic Development in Iran - 
A New Economic Geography Approach. SSRN eLibrary. 
FEARON, J. D. & LAITIN, D. D. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. 
American Political Science Review, 97, 75-90. 
FERREIRA, A. 2000. Convergence in Brazil: Recent Trends and Long-Run 
Prospects. Applied Economics, 32, 479-89. 
FERREIRA, F. H. G. & WALTON, M. 2005. World Development Report 2006 - 
Equity and Development. World Bank. 
FIELDS, G. S. 1997. Accounting For Income Inequality and its Change. American 
Economic Association annual meeting. New Orleans. 
329 
 
FILMER, D. & PRITCHETT, L. 1998. Estimating wealth effects without 
expenditure data - or tears : with an application to educational enrollments in 
states of India. The World Bank. 
FIRST, R. 1974. Libya : the elusive revolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
FIRST, R. 1980. Libya: class and state in an oil economy. In: NORE, P. & TURNER, 
T. (eds.) Oil and class struggle. London: Zed Press. 
FOSTER, J. E. & SZÉKELY, M. 2001. Is Economic Growth Good for the Poor? 
Tracking Low Incomes Using General Means. Inter-American Development 
Bank, Research Department. 
GARAIBEH, H. 1987. Government Income Sources and the Development of the 
Taxation System - the Case of Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait. In: BEBLAWI, H. 
& LUCIANI, G. (eds.) Nation, state, and integration in the Arab world ; v.2. 
London: Croom Helm. 
GERAMI, A., SEKHAVAT, M. B., HARANDI, F. & MOHSENKHANI, Z. F. 2002. 
Master Sample and Its Application in Sample Surveys Particularly in the 
Household Surveys. Technical Designs and Statistical Methods Research 
Group. Tehran: Statistical Research Center. 
GETIS, A. & GETIS, J. 1966. Christaller's Central Place Theory. Journal of 
Geography, 65, 220-226. 
GRAVIER-RYMASZEWSKA, J., TYROWICZ, J. & KOCHANOWICZ, J. 2010. 
Intra-provincial inequalities and economic growth in China. Economic 
Systems, 34, 237-258. 
GRAY, M. 2011. A Theory of" late Rentierism" in the Arab States of the Gulf, 
Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University, 
School of Foreign Service in Qatar. 
GREGORIO, J. D. & LEE, J. 2002a. Education and income inequality: new 
evidence from cross-country data. Review of income and wealth, 48, 395-416. 
GREGORIO, J. D. & LEE, J. W. 2002b. Education and income inequality: new 
evidence from cross‐country data. Review of income and wealth, 48, 395-416. 
GREGORY, M. 2009. Gender and Economic inequality. The Oxford Handbook of 
Economic Inequality, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
GUILLAUME, D., ZYTEK, R. & FARZIN, M. R. 2011. Iran–The Chronicles of the 
Subsidy Reform. In: GELBARD, E. (ed.). International Monetary Fund. 
GUPTA, I. & MITRA, A. 2004. Economic growth, health and poverty: An 
exploratory study for India. Development Policy Review, 22, 193-206. 
GUSTAFSSON, B. & JOHANSSON, M. 1999. In search of smoking guns: What 
makes income inequality vary over time in different countries? American 
Sociological Review, 585-605. 
HALEH, A. 1981. An assessment of agricultural development policies in Iran. World 
Development, 9, 1097-1108. 
HAUGHTON, J. H. & KHANDKER, S. R. 2009. Handbook on poverty and 
inequality, Washington, DC, World Bank. 
HERTOG, S. 2013. The private sector and reform in the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
HILLS, J. 2004. Inequality and the State, Oxford University Press. 
HIRSCHMAN, A. O. 1958. The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven, 
CT, Yale University Press. 
HOWE, L. D., HARGREAVES, J. R. & HUTTLY, S. R. 2008. Issues in the 
construction of wealth indices for the measurement of socio-economic 
position in low-income countries 
Emerg Themes Epidemiol, 5. 
330 
 
HUBER, E. & STEPHENS, J. D. 2001. Development and crisis of the welfare state: 
parties and policies in global markets, University of Chicago Press. 
ILO. 2005. Islamic Republic of Iran, Household Expenditure and Income Survey, 
2003, General Information and Basic Definitions [Online]. Available: 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/SSM6/E/325A.html. 
IVERSEN, T. & SOSKICE, D. 2006. Electoral institutions and the politics of 
coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others. American 
Political Science Review, 100, 165. 
JAFARI, F., EFTEKHAR, H., POURREZA, A. & MOUSAVI, J. 2010. Socio-
economic and medical determinants of low birth weight in Iran: 20 years 
after establishment of a primary healthcare network. Public Health, 124, 153-
158. 
JENCKS, C. 2002. Does inequality matter? Daedalus, 131, 49-65. 
JIAN, T., SACHS, J. D. & WARNER, A. M. 1996. Trends in regional inequality in 
China. China Economic Review, 7, 1-21. 
JOHNSON, H. G. 1973. The theory of income distribution, London, England, Gays-
Mills. 
KAASA, A. 2003. Factors influencing income inequality in transition economies. 
University of Tartu Economics and Business Administration Working Paper 
Series. 
KALDOR, N. 1966. Causes of the slow rate of economic growth of the United 
Kingdom, Cambridge U.P. 
KALDOR, N. 1970. The Case for Regional Policies. Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, 17, 337-48. 
KANBUR, R. 2000. Income distribution and development. Handbook of income 
distribution, 1, 791-841. 
KANBUR, R. & ZHANG, X. 2005. Fifty Years of Regional Inequality in China: a 
Journey Through Central Planning, Reform, and Openness. Review of 
Development Economics, 9, 87-106. 
KARBASI, A. & MOJARAD, S. 2008. Impact of Public Investments on Iran Rural 
Income Inequality. American-Eurasian Journal of Agricultural & 
Environmental Sciences (JAES). 
KARBASI, A. R. & FAHIMI-FARD, S. M. 2011. Estimation of Rural-Urban 
Migration in Iran. Iranian Journal of Economic Research, 16, 97-113. 
KARL, T. L. 2004. Oil-Led Development: Social, Political, and Economic 
Consequences. Encyclopedia of Energy Technology and the Environment, 4, 
661-672. 
KARSHENAS, M. 1990. Oil, state and industrialization in Iran, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
KAWACHI, I., KENNEDY, B. P., LOCHNER, K. & PROTHROW-STITH, D. 
1997. Social capital, income inequality, and mortality. American Journal of 
Public Health, 87, 1491-1498. 
KEEFER, P. & KNACK, S. 2000. Polarization, politics, and property rights : links 
between inequality and growth. The World Bank. 
KHORSHIDI, M., FEE, L. Y. & SOLTANI, F. 2010. Ethnic Secessionism in Iran: 
Accusation or Fact. Journal of Politics and Law, 3. 
KOLENIKOV, S. & ANGELES, G. 2004. The Use of Discrete Data in Principal 
Component 
Analysis: Theory, Simulations, and Applications to Socioeconomic Indices. Working 
Paper of 
331 
 
MEASURE/Evaluation project, No. WP-04-85. Carolina Population Center, 
University of 
North Carolina. 
KOLENIKOV, S. & ANGELES, G. 2009. SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
MEASUREMENT WITH DISCRETE PROXY VARIABLES: IS 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS A RELIABLE ANSWER? Review 
of Income and Wealth, 55, 128-165. 
KORPI, W. & PALME, J. 1998. The paradox of redistribution and strategies of 
equality: Welfare state institutions, inequality, and poverty in the Western 
countries. American Sociological Review, 661-687. 
KRUEGER, A. O. 1974. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. 
American Economic Review, 64, 291-303. 
KRUGMAN, P. 1993a. FIRST NATURE, SECOND NATURE, AND 
METROPOLITAN LOCATION. Journal of Regional Science, 33, 129. 
KUZNETS, S. 1955. Economic Growth and Income Inequality. The American 
Economic Review, 45, 1-28. 
LANCASTER, G., RAY, R. & VALENZUELA, M. R. 1999a. A CROSS-
COUNTRY STUDY OF EQUIVALENCE SCALES AND EXPENDITURE 
INEQUALITY ON UNIT RECORD HOUSEHOLD BUDGET DATA. 
Review of Income & Wealth, 45. 
LANCASTER, G., RAY, R. & VALENZUELA, R. 1999b. A cross-country study of 
equivalence scales and expenditure inequality on unit record household 
budget data. Review of Income and Wealth, 45, 455-482. 
LANJOUW, P. 2009. Constructing a Consumption Aggregate for the Purpose of 
Welfare Analysis: Principles, Issues and Recommendations Arising from the 
Case of Brazil. Measuring Poverty, Income Inequality and Social Exclusion: 
Lessons from Europe. Paris. 
LAZEAR, E. 1995. Culture and Language. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Inc. 
LEE, C.-S. 2005. Income inequality, democracy, and public sector size. American 
Sociological Review, 70, 158-181. 
LEIGH, A., JENCKS, C., SMEEDING, T., SALVERDA, W. & SMEEDING, T. 
2009. Health and economic inequality. The Oxford Handbook of Economic 
Inequality, 384-405. 
LEVY, F. & MURNANE, R. J. 1992. US earnings levels and earnings inequality: A 
review of recent trends and proposed explanations. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 30, 1333-1381. 
LIN, T. 2009. Intra-provincial inequality in financing compulsory education in China: 
exploring the role of provincial leaders (1994–2001). Asia Pacific Journal of 
Education, 29, 321-340. 
LITCHFIELD, J. A. 1999. Inequality: Methods and Tools [Online]. World Bank. 
Available: http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequal/index.htm. 
LONG, G. & NG, M. K. 2001. The political economy of intra-provincial disparities 
in post-reform China: a case study of Jiangsu province. Geoforum, 32, 215-
234. 
LOTFI, S., FARAJI, A. M., AZIMI, A., ZIARI, K. & MOUSAVI, M. 2011. Spatial 
Analyze of Regional Disparities Between Central 
and Border Regions of Iran. Journal of Advances in Developmental Research, 2. 
332 
 
LUCIANI, G. 1987. Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework. In: 
BEBLAWI, H. & LUCIANI, G. (eds.) Nation, state, and integration in the 
Arab world ; v.2. London: Croom Helm. 
LYNCH, J. W., SMITH, G. D., KAPLAN, G. A. & HOUSE, J. S. 2000. Income 
inequality and mortality: importance to health of individual income, 
psychosocial environment, or material conditions. BMJ: British Medical 
Journal, 320, 1200. 
MACHIN, S. & VIGNOLES, A. 2004. Educational inequality: the widening socio-
economic gap. Fiscal Studies, 25, 107-128. 
MAHDAVY, H. 1965. The Coming Crisis in Iran. Foreign Affairs, the Council on 
Foreign Relations. 
MAHDAVY, H. 1970. The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in 
Rentier States: The Case of Iran. In: COOK, M. A. (ed.) Studies in Economic 
History of the Middle East. London: Oxford University Press. 
MAJBOURI, M. & SALEHI-ISFAHANI, D. 2008. The Effects of Oil Shocks on 
Poverty and Education in Iran: Evidence from the 1992-95 Panel. 
Unpublished, permission required to cite or quote. 
MAJD, M. G. 1992. On the Relationship between Land Reform and Rural-Urban 
Migration in Iran, 1966-1976. Middle East Journal, 46, 440-455. 
MALAN, A. 2000. Changes in Income Distribution in South Africa: A Social 
Accounting Matrix Approach. 13th International Conference of Input-Output 
Techinques. Macerata, Italy. 
MALONEY, S. 2000. Agents or Obstacles? Parastatal Foundations and Challenges 
for Iranian Development. In: ALIZADEH, P. (ed.) The Economy of Iran. 
London - New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 
MARTÍNEZ, R., AYALA, L. & RUIZ‐HUERTA, J. 2001. The impact of 
unemployment on inequality and poverty in OECD countries. Economics of 
Transition, 9, 417-447. 
MCCARTY, N. & PONTUSSON, J. 2009. The political economy of inequality and 
redistribution. Handbook on Economic Inequality, 665-692. 
MCGREGOR, P. P. L. & BOROOAH, V. K. 1992. Is Low Spending or Low Income 
a Better Indicator of Whether or Not a Household is Poor: Some Results 
From the 1985 Family Expenditure Survey. Journal of Social Policy, 21, 53-
69. 
MCKENZIE, D. 2005. Measuring inequality with asset indicators. Journal of 
Population Economics, 18, 229-260. 
MEHRAN, F. 1975. Taxes and Incomes: Distribution of Tax Burdens in Iran. 
Geneva: ILO. 
MIDWINTER, E. 2006. Age and Inequality. The Political Quarterly, 77, 109-115. 
MILANOVIC, B. 1994. Determinants of cross-country income inequality: an" 
augmented" Kuznets' hypothesis, World Bank-free PDF. 
MILESI-FERRETTI, G. M., PEROTTI, R. & ROSTAGNO, M. 2002. Electoral 
systems and public spending. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 609-
657. 
MOHTADI, H. 1986. Rural stratification, rural to urban migration, and urban 
inequality: Evidence from Iran. World Development, 14, 713-725. 
MOHTADI, H. 1990. Rural inequality and rural-push versus urban-pull migration: 
The case of Iran, 1956-1976. World Development, 18, 837-844. 
MOJTAHED, A. & ESFAHANI, H. S. 1989. Agricultural policy and performance in 
Iran: The post-revolutionary experience. World Development, 17, 839-860. 
333 
 
MORADI, M. A. 2009. Oil Resource Abundance, Economic Growth and Income 
Distribution in Iran. Ecomod 2009. Ottawa, Canada. 
MORDUCH, J. & SICULAR, T. 2002a. Rethinking Inequality Decomposition, With 
Evidence from Rural China. Economic Journal, 112, 93-106. 
MORDUCH, J. & SICULAR, T. 2002b. RETHINKING INEQUALITY 
DECOMPOSITION, WITH EVIDENCE FROM RURAL CHINA. The 
Economic Journal, 112, 93-106. 
MOSER, C. & FELTON, A. 2007. The Construction of an Asset Index Measuring 
Asset Accumulation in Ecuador. SSRN eLibrary. 
MOSER, C. O. N. 1998. The asset vulnerability framework: Reassessing urban 
poverty reduction strategies. World Development, 26, 1-19. 
MOSTOFI, K. & AFARY, J. 2008. Iran : People : Ethnic Groups [Online]. 
Encyclopedia Britannica. Available: 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/293359/Iran. 
MULLER, E. N. & SELIGSON, M. A. 1987. Inequality and Insurgency. The 
American Political Science Review, 81, 425-451. 
MURPHY, K. M., SHLEIFER, A. & VISHNY, R. W. 1993. Why is rent-seeking so 
costly to growth? American Economic Review, 83, 409. 
MYRDAL, G. 1957. Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, London, 
Duckworth,. 
NAJAFI, B. & SHOOSHTARIAN, A. 2006. Determinants of Poverty for Rural and 
Urban Households in Iran. Oil: Its impact on the global economy. Kuwait. 
NOMANI, F. & BEHDAD, S. 2006. Class and labor in Iran : did the revolution 
matter?, Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press. 
NOMANI, F. & BEHDAD, S. 2007. Class and labor in Iran: did the revolution 
matter? Middle East journal, 61, 162-163. 
NOORBAKHSH, F. 2003. The Dynamics of Spatial Inequality and Polarisation in 
Iran. Department of Economics, University of Glasgow. 
ØSTBY, G. 2004. Do Horizontal Inequalities Matter for 
Civil Conflict? : Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW). 
ØSTBY, G. 2006. Horizontal Inequalities, Political Environment and Civil Conflict: 
Evidence From 55 Developing Countries. CRISE Working Paper. University of 
Oxford. 
OTTAVIANO, G. I. P. & PUGA, D. 1998. Agglomeration in the global economy: A 
survey of the `new economic geography'. World Economy, 21, 707. 
PEROTTI, R. 1996. Growth, income distribution, and democracy: what the data say. 
Journal of Economic growth, 1, 149-187. 
PERSSON, T. & TABELLINI, G. 1991. Is inequality harmful for growth? Theory 
and evidence. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
PERSSON, T. & TABELLINI, G. 2003. The economic effects of constitutions, 
Munich Lectures in Economics. Wiley Online Library. 
PESARAN, M. H. (ed.) 1976. Income Distribution and Its Major Determinants in 
Iran: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies. 
PESARAN, M. H. & GAHVARY, F. 1978. Growth and income distribution in Iran. 
In: STONE, R. & PETERSON, W. (eds.) Econometric Contributions to 
Public Policy. Macmillan. 
PIRAN, P. 2000. Poverty Alleviation in Sistan & Baluchestan, The Case of Shirabad. 
Tehran, Iran: Allameh Tabatabaii University. 
334 
 
POVERTY, P. O., FAMILY ASSISTANCE: CONCEPTS, I. N., METHODS, M. & 
COUNCIL, N. R. 1995. Measuring Poverty:A New Approach, The National 
Academies Press. 
PRAKONGSAI, P. 2006. An Application of the Asset Index for Measuring 
Household Living Standards in Thailand. SSRN eLibrary. 
PUGA, D. 1999. The rise and fall of regional inequalities. European Economic 
Review, 43, 303-334. 
RAVALLION, M. 2001. Growth, inequality, and poverty : looking beyond averages. 
The World Bank. 
RAVALLION, M. & DATT, G. 2002. Why has economic growth been more pro-
poor in some states of India than others? Journal of Development Economics, 
68, 381-400. 
REUTER, U. 2004. The Effects of Intraregional Disparities on Regional 
Development in China: Inequality Decomposition and Panel-Data Analysis. 
Econometric Society. 
ROBINSON, B. 2002. Income Inequality and Ethnicity: An International View. 
Second Inequality and Pro-Poor Growth. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
RUTSEIN, S. O. 2008. The DHS Wealth Index: Approaches for Rural and Urban 
Areas. 
RUTSTEIN, S. O., JOHNSON, K. & : 2004. The DHS Wealth Index. DHS 
Comparative Reports. Calverton, Maryland: ORC Macro. 
SACHS, J. D. 1989. Social conflict and populist policies in Latin America. National 
Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
SACHS, J. D. & WARNER, A. M. 1995. Natural Resource Abundance and 
Economic Growth. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
SADEGHI, J. M., TOODEHROOSTA, M. & AMINI, A. 2001. Determinants of 
poverty in rural areas: Case of Savejbolagh farmers in iran. Economic 
Research Forum, Cairo, Egypt, Working Paper 0112. 
SAHN, D. E. & STIFEL, D. 2003. Exploring Alternative Measures of Welfare in the 
Absence of Expenditure Data. Review of income and wealth, 49, 463-489. 
SALA-I-MARTIN, X. X. 1996. Regional cohesion: evidence and theories of 
regional growth and convergence. European Economic Review, 40, 1325-
1352. 
SALEHI-ISFAHANI, D. 2006a. Iran's Third Development Plan: A reappraisal. 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of 
Economics. 
SALEHI-ISFAHANI, D. 2006b. Revolution and redistribution in Iran: poverty and 
inequality 25 years later. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 
Department of Economics. 
SALEHI-ISFAHANI, D. 2007. Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? 
Middle East Journal, 61, 162-163. 
SALEHI-ISFAHANI, D. 2008. Poverty, inequality, and populist politics in Iran. 
Journal of Economic Inequality. 
SALEHI-ISFAHANI, D. 2010. Will Iran’s poor lose from subsidy reform? [Online]. 
Available: http://djavad.wordpress.com/2010/03/15/will-irans-poor-lose-
from-the-subsidy-reform/. 
SALVERDA, W., NOLAN, B. & SMEEDING, T. M. 2011. The Oxford handbook 
of economic inequality, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
SALWAY, S., PLATT, L., CHOWBEY, P., HARRISS, K. & BAYLISS, E. 2007. 
Long-term ill health, poverty and ethnicity. 
335 
 
SCHULTZ, T. W. 1961. Investment in Human Capital. The American Economic 
Review, 51, 1-17. 
SCHÜTZ, G., URSPRUNG, H. W. & WÖßMANN, L. 2008. Education Policy and 
Equality of Opportunity. Kyklos, 61, 279-308. 
SCI 2000. Country Report of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Twelfth session of the 
ESCAP Committee on Statistics. 
SCI 2003. The 1381 Statistical Yearbook of Iran. Tehran, Iran: Statistical Centre of 
Iran  
SCI 2009. Chekideh Yaftehay-e Hesab Tolid Ostanhay-e Keshvar dar sal-e 1386 (In 
Persian, translation: Summary of Provinical GDP Accounts 2007). Statistical 
Center of Iran. 
SEERS, D. 1978. The life-cycle of a petroleum economy. Journal of African 
Development, 1. 
SHARBATOGHLIE, A. 1991. Urbanization and regional disparities in post-
revolutionary Iran, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press. 
SHI, L. & SAI, D. 2009. An Empirical Analysis of Income Inequality between a 
Minority and the Majority in Urban China: The Case of Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region. Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi 
University. 
SLESNICK, D. T. 1994. Consumption, Needs and Inequality. International 
Economic Review, 35, 677-703. 
SOLOW, R. 1956. A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 70, 65-94. 
STERN, R. 2006. The Iranian petroleum crisis and United States national security 
[Online]. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America. Available: 
http://www.pnas.org/content/104/1/377.full#xref-ref-34-1. 
STEWART, F. 2000a. Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities. Oxford 
Development Studies, 28, 245-262. 
STEWART, F. 2000b. Income Distribution and Development. Queen Elizabeth 
House, University of Oxford. 
STEWART, F. 2001. Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of 
Development. Working Paper. Oxford: University of Oxford. 
STEWART, F. 2005. Policies towards Horizontal Inequalities in Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction. CRISE WORKING PAPER 7. University of Oxford. 
STEWART, F. 2008. Horizontal inequalities and conflict : understanding group 
violence in multiethnic societies, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
STEWART, F., BROWN, G. & COBHAM, A. 2009. The Implications of Horizontal 
and Vertical Inequalities for Tax and Expenditure Policies. University of 
Oxford. 
STEWART, F., BROWN, G. & MANCINI, L. 2005. Why Horizontal Inequalities 
Matter: Some Implications for Measurement. CRISE WORKING PAPER No. 
19. 
SULLIVAN, C. 2011. Ethnicity and Income Inequality in China. Population 
Association of America's Annual Conference. 
TABIBIAN, M. 2000. Faghr va touzie daramad dar Iran (in Persian - Translation: 
Poverty and income distribution in Iran), Institute for Research in Planning 
and Development, Tehran, Iran. 
336 
 
TAKAHIRO, A. 2003. Decomposing regional income inequality in China and 
Indonesia using two-stage nested Theil decomposition method. The Annals of 
Regional Science, 37, 55-77. 
THORP, R., CAUMARTIN, C. & GRAY-MOLINA, G. 2006. Inequality, Ethnicity, 
Political Mobilisation and Political Violence in Latin America: The Cases of 
Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru*. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 25, 453-
480. 
TILAK, J. B. G. 1989. Education and Its Relation to Economic Growth, Poverty, and 
Income Distribution. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POVERTY, EQUITY, 
AND GROWTH. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
TOROF, Y. A. B. 2004. National Inequality in Iran [Online]. Available: 
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=yusof%20azizi%20bani%20toro
f&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iran
-
bulletin.org%2FIB_MEF_0%2FNational%2520inequality%2520in%2520Ira
n.doc&ei=j5UyT7_0IouE8gOQ84CQBw&usg=AFQjCNEIkj16WGXIHKnL
5WbHdOUgCQqkMg&sig2=yplJjzetpau9sHzUdnakPQ. 
TULLOCK, G. 1967. THE WELFARE COSTS OF TARIFFS, MONOPOLIES, 
AND THEFT. Western Economic Journal, 5, 224-232. 
UNDP-BPO 1999. Human Development Report of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
UNDP 2003. United Nations Common Country Assessment for the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. 
VAKILI-RAD, S. 1978. Main features of the family budget survey of urban areas in 
Iran. In: BROWN J, M. W., ET AL. ED (ed.) Multi-purpose household 
surveys in developing countries. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
VOITCHOVSKY, S. 2009. Inequality and economic growth. The Oxford Handbook 
of Economic Inequality, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
VYAS, S. & KUMARANAYAKE, L. 2006. Constructing socio-economic status 
indices: how to use principal components analysis. Health Policy and 
Planning, 21, 459-468. 
WAN, G. & ZHOU, Z. 2005. Income Inequality in Rural China: Regression-based 
Decomposition Using Household Data. Review of Development Economics, 9, 
107-120. 
WEDGWOOD, R. 2007. Education and poverty reduction in Tanzania. International 
Journal of Educational Development, 27, 383-396. 
WEINBAUM, M. G. 1977. Agricultural Policy and Development Politics in Iran. 
Middle East Journal, 31, 434-450. 
WICK, K. & BULTE, E. 2006. Contesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the 
natural resource curse. Public Choice, 128. 
WILLIAMSON, J. G. 1965. Regional Inequality and the Process of National 
Development: A Description of the Patterns. Economic development and 
cultural change, 13, 1. 
WORLD BANK, S. 1990. World Development Report, 1990, Oxford University 
Press. 
YATES, D. A. 1996. The rentier state in Africa : oil rent dependency and 
neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon, Trenton, N.J., Africa World Press. 
YU, L., LUO, R. & ZHANG, L. 2007. Decomposing Income Inequality and Policy 
Implications in Rural China. China & World Economy, 15, 44-58. 
  
337 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 3A Iranian Solar Hejri Years and the Gregorian Equivalent 
1354* 21. March 1975 – 20. March 1976 
1355 21. March 1976 – 20. March 1977 
1356 21. March 1977 – 20. March 1978 
1357 21. March 1978 – 20. March 1979 
1358* 21. March 1979 – 20. March 1980 
1359 21. March 1980 – 20. March 1981 
1360 21. March 1981 – 20. March 1982 
1361 21. March 1982 – 20. March 1983 
1362* 21. March 1983 – 20. March 1984 
1363 21. March 1984 – 20. March 1985 
1364 21. March 1985 – 20. March 1986 
1365 21. March 1986 – 20. March 1987 
1366* 21. March 1987 – 20. March 1988 
1367 21. March 1988 – 20. March 1989 
1368 21. March 1989 – 20. March 1990 
1369 21. March 1990 – 20. March 1991 
1370* 21. March 1991 – 20. March 1992 
1371 21. March 1992 – 20. March 1993 
1372 21. March 1993 – 20. March 1994 
1373 21. March 1994 – 20. March 1995 
1374 21. March 1995 – 19. March 1996 
1375* 20. March 1996 – 20. March 1997 
1376 21. March 1997 – 20. March 1998 
1377 21. March 1998 – 20. March 1999 
1378 21. March 1999 – 19. March 2000 
1379* 20. March 2000 – 20. March 2001 
1380 21. March 2001 – 20. March 2002 
1381 21. March 2002 – 20. March 2003 
1382 21. March 2003 – 19. March 2004 
1383* 20. March 2004 – 20. March 2005 
1384 21. March 2005 – 20. March 2006 
1385 21. March 2006 – 20. March 2007 
1386 21. March 2007 – 19. March 2008 
1387* 20. March 2008 – 20. March 2009 
1388 21. March 2009 – 20. March 2010 
1389 21. March 2010 – 20. March 2011 
1390 21. March 2011 – 19. March 2012 
1391* 20. March 2012 – 20. March 2013 
Years marked with an asterisk * denote a Hejri leap year 
Source: Persian calendar by Holger Oertel, http://www.ortelius.de/kalender/pers_en.php 
Copied from Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_calendars  
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Appendix 3B Household sample numbers 
Year Urban Rural Total 
1990 9,085 9,345 18,430 
1997 10,967 10,982 21,949 
1998 8,285 9,192 17,477 
1999 12,731 14,733 27,464 
2000 12,320 14,621 26,941 
2001 12,337 14,624 26,961 
2002 15,114 17,038 32,152 
2003 10,959 12,175 23,134 
2004 11,619 12,915 24,534 
2005 12,925 13,970 26,895 
2006 14,175 16,735 30,910 
2007 15,018 16,265 31,283 
2008 19,381 19,707 39,088 
2009 18,665 18,203 36,868 
2010 18,701 19,584 38,285 
Total 202,282 220,089 422,371 
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Appendix 3C Anomalies in the data 
Figures for certain urban households in 1378 for non-food expenditure reported by SCI differ 
from the author’s figures. The author checked and verified these measurements manually 
and the author’s figures remain the same. The database used by the author is the latest 
database made available by SCI. 
 
A choice of weights 
The household survey data is stratified by province. Although from 2008 onwards, it is 
stratified at the PSU level. Before the official annual household survey weights were 
released by the SCI, this author calculated the provincial stratified weights using census 
data for the total number of households in each province. The total number of households in 
each province was simply divided by the sample number.  
Comparison of sample weights 2007 – Calculated v official weights 
 
The official SCI weights seem to be based on a calendar year from a reference year in the 
past. For example when the author used the total household numbers data from 2001 to 
calculate the weights for 2007, there was almost an identical match with the official SCI 
weights. Note how in the chart below you can hardly see the blue line as it aligns perfectly 
with the red line of the official weights. 
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For 1998-2004, the author found that when carrying out inequality calculations using the SCI 
official weights, this would lead to the awkward and unlikely result of exactly the same 
population share between rural and urban areas year on year. 
 
Year Pop Share Urban Pop Share Rural 
1998 0.64323 0.35677 
1999 0.64323 0.35677 
2000 0.64323 0.35677 
2001 0.64323 0.35677 
2002 0.64323 0.35677 
2003 0.64323 0.35677 
2004 0.64323 0.35677 
 
Nevertheless, the author chose to use the official weights as provided by the SCI for the 
years available. For the years, they were not available, the author calculated weights using 
census data.  
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Appendix 3D Stata Modules and Commands 
FASTGINI 
cap run http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/f/fastGINI.ado 
view http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/f/fastGINI.hlp 
 
INEQDECO 
cap run http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/i/ineqdeco.ado 
view http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/i/ineqdeco.hlp 
 
Calculating basic inequality for each year 
cap run http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/i/ineqdeco.ado 
log using x:\phd\vanalysis\results\1388.smcl 
insheet using x:\phd\vanalysis\results\data\1388t.csv 
ineqdeco eehewi [w=w], bygroup(ru) 
clear 
insheet using x:\phd\vanalysis\results\data\1388u.csv 
ineqdeco eehewi [w=w], bygroup(pc) summarize 
clear 
insheet using x:\phd\vanalysis\results\data\1388r.csv 
ineqdeco eehewi [w=w], bygroup(pc) summarize 
clear 
log close 
 
For rural urban share of each province 
insheet using x:\phd\vanalysis\results\data\1388t.csv 
ineqdeco eehewi [w=w] if pc==0, bygroup(ru) 
 
Ethnic inequality 
insheet using x:\phd\vanalysis\results\data\1389t.csv 
ineqdeco eehewi [w=w], bygroup(ethnic) 
 
Alpha general means 
insheet using x:\phd\vanalysis\results\data\1386u.csv 
gen eehewi1 = (eehewi^-5) 
gen eehewi2 = eehewi1*w 
egen eehewi3 = total(eehewi2) 
egen totalw = total(w) 
gen eehewi4 = (eehewi3/totalw) 
gen eehewi5 = eehewi4^(1/-5) 
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cap run http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/v/vallist.ado 
vallist eehewi5, sort 
clear 
 
Weighted Average 
insheet using x:\phd\vanalysis\results\data\1386u.csv 
mean eehewi [pweight = w] 
clear 
 
Mean decile incomes 
insheet using x:\phd\vanalysis\results\data\1386u.csv 
xtile decile=eehewi[aw=w], n(10) 
mean eehewi [pweight = w], over(decile) 
 
Pen's Parade 
view http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/a/alorenz.hlp 
view http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/_/_pecats.hlp 
cap run http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/a/alorenz.ado 
cap run http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/_/_matchval.ado 
cap run http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/_/_pecats.ado 
cap run http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/_/_pecatsal.ado 
cap run http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/_/_ebin.ado 
insheet using x:\phd\vanalysis\results\data\pentotal.csv 
alorenz realeehewi [pw=w], by(year) points(100) view gp 
 
Proportions to wealth graph 
insheet using x:\phd\vanalysis\asset\final\finalrpc3.csv 
xtile decile=pc1[aw=w], n(100) 
total  motorbike [pweight=w], over(decile) 
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Appendix 4A Atkinson inequality measures, 1997 to 2010 
The Atkinson index of inequality (Atkinson, 1975, p.48) results from the following formula: 
I = 1 - [∑ (
  
 
)
   
 
     ]
 
   
 
where 
   is the “income of those in the ith income range” 
   is the “proportion of the population with incomes in the ith range” 
  is the “mean income” 
  is the “weight attached by society to inequality in the distribution”, an inequality 
aversion paramater 
 
Intuitively, the income inequality index reports what proportion of total income society would 
be willing to give up (depending on the society’s inequality aversion) in order to achieve 
income equality and reap its associated aggregate social welfare gain. The results for 
household expenditures in Iran (urban and rural) follow the same pattern as the national 
GINI figure.  
Year ε = 0.5 ε = 1 ε = 2 
1997 0.15268 0.27602 0.4865 
1998 0.15176 0.27824 0.48477 
1999 0.14913 0.27069 0.46636 
2000 0.15246 0.27648 0.47528 
2001 0.15916 0.2848 0.47705 
2002 0.16012 0.28636 0.47833 
2003 0.14328 0.25941 0.44079 
2004 0.14862 0.26829 0.45387 
2005 0.14785 0.26748 0.45208 
2006 0.15496 0.28037 0.46842 
2007 0.15489 0.27915 0.46872 
2008 0.13829 0.25515 0.44672 
2009 0.13788 0.25579 0.44992 
2010 0.13707 0.25099 0.43696 
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It can be shown that the Atkinson index is a member of the General Entropy class of 
measures (Bellù and Liberati, 2006a) and hence it can also be decomposed into additive 
subgroups. For simplicity, in this study we only decompose the GE(1) measure and all 
decomposition results are based on this calculation. 
 
Appendix 4B Mean urban : rural household expenditure (Equivalence Scale) 
Year Urban : Rural National GINI 
1997 2.02 0.42996 
1998 1.98 0.43102 
1999 1.94 0.42637 
2000 2.02 0.43181 
2001 2.13 0.44059 
2002 2.15 0.44189 
2003 2.00 0.41878 
2004 1.94 0.4269 
2005 2.00 0.42647 
2006 2.04 0.43819 
2007 2.10 0.43569 
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Appendix 4C Deflated urban and rural mean expenditures 
(Not scaled for household size as we are interested in actual mean expenditure) 
Year Mean urban deflated Mean rural deflated 
1997 38,461,538 25,794,025 
1998 40,697,674 26,689,052 
1999 42,248,062 27,234,520 
2000 43,470,790 26,802,975 
2001 45,370,370 26,528,894 
2002 48,400,000 28,391,256 
2003 49,019,608 29,649,600 
2004 53,600,000 34,400,000 
2005 56,250,000 34,375,000 
2006 56,761,134 33,919,039 
2007 57,523,940 33,917,886 
2008 52,918,712 30,114,566 
2009 50,738,916 30,049,261 
2010 51,270,815 30,631,025 
 
Separate urban and rural CPI (constant 2004 prices) were used to compute the deflated 
expenditures. As no rural CPI figures were available for 2008-2010, the urban CPI was used 
for the rural sector for these three years. 
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Appendix 4D Regression of GINI on expenditure, urban: rural 
Regression of GINI on average household expenditure (y), urban to rural ratio (UR) 
Regression Statistics 
   Multiple R 0.815012 
   R Square 0.664244 
   Adjusted R 
Square 0.520349 
   Standard Error 0.004848 
   Observations 11 
   
     ANOVA 
      df SS MS F 
Regression 3 0.000326 0.000109 4.616164 
Residual 7 0.000165 2.35E-05 
 Total 10 0.00049     
     
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 20.8365 29.50564 0.706187 0.502892 
ureehewi 0.082026 0.022126 3.707238 0.007582 
y -2.34385 3.364294 -0.69668 0.508468 
y2 0.066759 0.095868 0.696365 0.508656 
 
With the inclusion of (log of) government expenditure as a variable 
Regression of GINI on average household expenditure (y), urban to rural ratio (UR), log Gov 
Expenditure 
Regression Statistics 
   Multiple R 0.815352 
   R Square 0.6648 
   Adjusted R 
Square 0.441333 
   Standard Error 0.005232 
   Observations 11 
   
     ANOVA 
      df SS MS F 
Regression 4 0.000326 8.14E-05 2.974935 
Residual 6 0.000164 2.74E-05 
 Total 10 0.00049     
       Coefficients Standard t Stat P-value 
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Error 
Intercept 18.6332 38.76119 0.480718 0.647743 
y -2.10316 4.360243 -0.48235 0.64665 
y2 0.059785 0.124896 0.478678 0.649112 
ureehewi 0.079953 0.031661 2.525337 0.044962 
log gov 0.005622 0.056394 0.099695 0.923834 
 
 
Appendix 4E Government final consumption expenditure & urban income share 
GVT EXP Final Consumption Government Expenditure constant 2000 $US 
(Source: World Bank) 
Urban Share Urban share of household equivalent expenditure 
 
Year Final Consumption Government Expenditure Urban income share 
1997 12,904,430,000.00 0.78436 
1998 13,422,240,000.00 0.78135 
1999 12,547,640,000.00 0.77753 
2000 14,055,840,000.00 0.78463 
2001 14,418,010,000.00 0.7925 
2002 14,736,510,000.00 0.79475 
2003 14,826,350,000.00 0.78303 
2004 15,019,210,000.00 0.77736 
2005 16,767,420,000.00 0.81293 
2006 18,014,740,000.00 0.81612 
2007 17,234,670,000.00 0.81985 
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Appendix 4F Regression of urban income share on government expenditure 
 
Regression of urban income share on the log of final consumption government expenditure 
1997-2007 
 
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 11 
    
F(  1,     9) = 28.72 
Model 0.001918343 1 0.001918343 Prob > F = 0.0005 
Residual 0.000601212 9 0.000066801 R-squared = 0.7614 
    
Adj R-squared = 0.7349 
Total 0.002519555 10 0.000251956 Root MSE = 0.00817 
 
ui Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
govlog 0.1185164 0.022116 5.36 0 0.0684864 0 
_cons -1.982365 0.517934 -3.83 0.004 -3.154014 -1 
 
There is also a significant 0.88 correlation between final consumption government 
expenditure and the urban income share, suggesting that it favours the urban sector.  
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Appendix 4G GE measures for household equivalence expenditure, 1997-2009 
Year GINI GE-1 GE0 GE1 GE2 
1997 0.42996 0.47371 0.32299 0.34542 0.58642 
1998 0.43102 0.47045 0.32606 0.33485 0.50357 
1999 0.42637 0.43695 0.31565 0.33422 0.54025 
2000 0.43181 0.45289 0.32363 0.34047 0.52669 
2001 0.44059 0.45611 0.33519 0.3615 0.60519 
2002 0.44189 0.45847 0.33737 0.36405 0.61293 
2003 0.41878 0.39411 0.30031 0.32049 0.49718 
2004 0.4269 0.41554 0.31237 0.33368 0.53334 
2005 0.42647 0.41255 0.31126 0.33036 0.51186 
2006 0.43819 0.4406 0.32901 0.34455 0.52317 
2007 0.43569 0.44112 0.32733 0.34948 0.59754 
2008 0.41189 0.4037 0.29458 0.30445 0.48408 
2009 0.41258 0.40896 0.29543 0.29996 0.4424 
2010 0.40906 0.38803 0.28901 0.30427 0.47708 
 
Appendix 4H Top equivalence expenditure decile and the GINI coefficient 
Year Top decile GINI 
1997 32.9% 0.42996 
1998 32.5% 0.43102 
1999 32.5% 0.42637 
2000 33.0% 0.43181 
2001 34.0% 0.44059 
2002 34.1% 0.44189 
2003 32.3% 0.41878 
2004 32.8% 0.4269 
2005 32.6% 0.42647 
2006 33.0% 0.43819 
2007 33.0% 0.43569 
2008 30.6% 0.41189 
2009 30.6% 0.41258 
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Appendix 4I Urban and rural CPI table (constant 2004 prices) 
Year Urban CPI Rural CPI 
1997 36.4 33.6 
1998 43.0 41.6 
1999 51.6 51.4 
2000 58.2 59.3 
2001 64.8 66.0 
2002 75.0 76.8 
2003 86.7 88.0 
2004 100.0 100.0 
2005 110.4 112.0 
2006 123.5 125.9 
2007 146.2 147.4 
2008 183.3 
 
2009 203.0 
 
2010 228.2 
 
 
The CBI was used as the source for the urban inflation rate and the SCI for the rural inflation 
rate. 
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Appendix 4J Decile expenditures, urban households 2007 
Total expenditure 
Iranian Riyals Deciles % of expenditures 
8,358,449,905,664 1 2.32% 
13,193,284,943,872 2 3.66% 
16,793,098,780,672 3 4.66% 
20,289,591,181,312 4 5.63% 
24,133,347,835,904 5 6.69% 
28,900,040,114,176 6 8.01% 
35,109,807,849,472 7 9.73% 
43,407,619,653,632 8 12.03% 
57,756,400,746,496 9 16.01% 
112,759,257,694,208 10 31.26% 
 
Appendix 4K Decile expenditures, rural households 2007 
Total expenditure 
Iranian Riyals Deciles % of expenditures 
1,946,404,126,720 1 2.46% 
3,059,761,545,216 2 3.86% 
3,864,490,934,272 3 4.88% 
4,631,914,086,400 4 5.84% 
5,450,801,086,464 5 6.88% 
6,465,475,575,808 6 8.16% 
7,754,504,732,672 7 9.78% 
9,493,899,378,688 8 11.98% 
12,522,985,881,600 9 15.80% 
24,069,590,220,800 10 30.37% 
 
  
352 
 
Appendix 4L Total (urban & rural) household expenditure decile shares, 1997-2010 
Year Decile 1 Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Decile 10 
1997 1.92% 3.31% 4.39% 5.45% 6.61% 7.93% 9.63% 11.92% 15.91% 32.93% 
1998 1.84% 3.19% 4.32% 5.41% 6.63% 8.02% 9.75% 12.12% 16.26% 32.46% 
1999 1.97% 3.32% 4.42% 5.48% 6.62% 7.98% 9.66% 12.02% 16.08% 32.45% 
2000 1.93% 3.25% 4.33% 5.42% 6.61% 7.91% 9.55% 11.91% 16.12% 32.96% 
2001 1.92% 3.21% 4.23% 5.30% 6.44% 7.77% 9.45% 11.74% 15.92% 34.02% 
2002 1.90% 3.22% 4.25% 5.28% 6.39% 7.70% 9.39% 11.78% 16.03% 34.06% 
2003 2.10% 3.50% 4.54% 5.57% 6.69% 7.95% 9.62% 11.90% 15.85% 32.29% 
2004 2.05% 3.37% 4.41% 5.44% 6.56% 7.89% 9.56% 11.91% 16.02% 32.79% 
2005 2.05% 3.37% 4.43% 5.45% 6.54% 7.85% 9.54% 11.92% 16.22% 32.62% 
2006 1.97% 3.17% 4.18% 5.23% 6.37% 7.74% 9.54% 12.10% 16.65% 33.03% 
2007 1.96% 3.21% 4.23% 5.29% 6.44% 7.78% 9.58% 12.17% 16.34% 32.99% 
2008 2.04% 3.42% 4.50% 5.61% 6.80% 8.19% 9.93% 12.39% 16.47% 30.64% 
2009 2.02% 3.42% 4.49% 5.55% 6.78% 8.18% 9.99% 12.42% 16.53% 30.60% 
2010 2.12% 3.51% 4.59% 5.67% 6.84% 8.20% 9.88% 12.22% 16.12% 30.86% 
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Appendix 4M Fuel expenditure by household expenditure deciles 
Aggregated fuel expenditure (in Iranian Riyals) by household expenditure deciles in urban 
areas, 2007 
Deciles 2007 Urban 2007 Urban % 
1 133,458,812,928 1.9% 
2 278,026,452,992 4.0% 
3 338,964,774,912 4.9% 
4 374,766,829,568 5.4% 
5 557,008,158,720 8.0% 
6 576,109,346,816 8.3% 
7 749,672,660,992 10.7% 
8 922,621,509,632 13.2% 
9 1,280,894,959,616 18.4% 
10 1,766,344,097,792 25.3% 
 
 
Appendix 4N Electricity expenditure by household expenditure deciles 
Aggregated electricity expenditure (in Iranian Riyals) by household expenditure in urban 
areas, 2007 
Deciles 2007 Urban 2007 Urban % 
1 380,618,014,720 5.3% 
2 519,312,834,560 7.2% 
3 583,262,273,536 8.1% 
4 583,806,025,728 8.1% 
5 668,165,537,792 9.3% 
6 720,437,837,824 10.0% 
7 743,214,350,336 10.3% 
8 832,066,879,488 11.5% 
9 1,007,784,427,520 14.0% 
10 1,175,027,712,000 16.3% 
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Appendix 4O Contribution to national inequality, urban and rural sectors, 1997-2009 
Year 
Urban 
contribution 
Rural 
contribution 
Between 
contribution 
Income 
share urban 
Pop share 
urban
107
 
Income 
share rural 
Pop 
share 
rural 
1997 68% 18% 14% 78% 64% 22% 36% 
1998 67% 20% 13% 78% 64% 22% 36% 
1999 68% 19% 13% 78% 64% 22% 36% 
2000 68% 18% 14% 78% 64% 22% 36% 
2001 70% 15% 15% 79% 64% 21% 36% 
2002 70% 15% 15% 79% 64% 21% 36% 
2003 69% 17% 14% 78% 64% 22% 36% 
2004 67% 20% 13% 78% 64% 22% 36% 
2005 72% 15% 13% 81% 68% 19% 32% 
2006 72% 15% 13% 82% 69% 18% 31% 
2007 72% 15% 13% 82% 69% 18% 31% 
2008 71% 14% 15% 84% 71% 16% 29% 
2009 72% 14% 13% 85% 73% 15% 27% 
 
  
                                                 
107
 Please note that it is curious that between the calendar years of 1998-2004, using the weights 
and the raw household survey data provided by the SCI, the population share of the urban and rural 
sectors remain constant. There is a sudden adjustment in 2005 (sudden rise in the urban sector 
share). Much more likely is a gradual increase from 1998 to 2005. 
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Appendix 4P Contribution of provincial urban sectors to national inequality, 2007 
 
Listed in order of contribution to inequality 
Province 
Contribution to overall 
inequality 
Overall income 
share 
Overall population 
share 
Tehran 23.9% 30.5% 19.0% 
Khorasan Razavi 5.9% 6.4% 5.5% 
Esfahan 5.3% 7.0% 5.7% 
Gilan 3.5% 2.8% 2.0% 
Mazandaran 3.3% 3.2% 2.3% 
Fars 3.1% 3.8% 3.6% 
Azerbaijan East 2.9% 3.5% 3.6% 
Khuzestan 2.0% 2.8% 3.4% 
Azerbaijan West 1.9% 2.6% 2.3% 
Hamedan 1.1% 1.5% 1.5% 
Kerman 1.1% 1.7% 1.9% 
Markazi 1.1% 1.5% 1.4% 
Kermanshah 0.9% 1.7% 1.8% 
Yazd 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% 
Hormozgan 0.8% 1.0% 0.8% 
Sistan and Baluchistan 0.6% 0.7% 1.3% 
Golestan 0.6% 0.9% 1.1% 
Qazvin 0.6% 1.3% 1.1% 
Lorestan 0.6% 1.2% 1.3% 
Ardabil 0.6% 1.0% 0.9% 
Qom 0.5% 1.0% 1.4% 
Zanjan 0.5% 0.8% 0.8% 
Kurdistan 0.4% 0.9% 1.2% 
Bushehr 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 
Khorasan North 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 
Ilam 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 
Semnan 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 
Khorasan South 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari 0.2% 0.5% 0.6% 
 
Appendix 4Q National inequality composition, 2007 
Between rural and urban provinces 13% 
Within 30 rural provinces 13% 
Between 30 rural provinces 2% 
Between 30 urban provinces 8% 
Tehran urban province 24% 
Khorasan Razavi urban province 6% 
Esfahan urban province 5% 
27 other urban provinces 29% 
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Appendix 5A Provincial household expenditures, 1997-2010 
Log mean provincial household expenditures, weighted total of urban and rural 1997-2010 
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Markazi 15.00 15.25 15.53 15.67 15.97 16.30 16.44 16.57 16.65 16.79 17.07 17.02 17.33 17.55 
Gilan 15.11 15.38 15.71 15.90 16.07 16.05 16.20 16.61 16.70 16.96 17.19 17.29 17.40 17.47 
Mazandaran 15.08 15.44 15.68 15.94 15.97 16.26 16.43 16.78 17.01 17.14 17.31 17.33 17.34 17.61 
Azerbaijan E 15.18 15.47 15.65 15.82 15.85 16.14 16.30 16.62 16.72 16.88 17.00 17.29 17.40 17.51 
Azerbaijan W 14.93 15.10 15.41 15.57 15.80 16.04 16.31 16.65 16.80 16.95 17.16 17.28 17.34 17.54 
Kermanshah 15.11 15.20 15.38 15.62 15.79 16.16 16.33 16.42 16.51 16.76 16.99 17.14 17.26 17.51 
Khuzestan 15.15 15.47 15.42 15.70 15.84 16.03 16.13 16.47 16.58 16.74 16.84 17.24 17.40 17.48 
Fars 15.34 15.50 15.71 15.86 15.88 16.09 16.28 16.62 16.89 16.89 17.09 17.27 17.53 17.81 
Kerman 14.95 15.20 15.69 15.81 15.88 16.12 16.37 16.59 16.67 16.73 16.85 17.12 17.05 17.30 
Khorasan Raz 15.03 15.30 15.64 15.68 15.73 15.93 16.11 16.37 16.71 16.79 17.12 17.19 17.26 17.40 
Esfahan 15.24 15.41 15.64 15.87 16.01 16.22 16.42 16.81 16.96 17.15 17.34 17.44 17.60 17.73 
Sistan & Bal 14.69 14.97 15.19 15.39 15.41 15.58 15.76 16.06 16.25 16.32 16.36 16.46 16.48 16.76 
Kurdistan 14.80 15.03 15.02 15.52 15.55 15.92 16.25 16.44 16.60 16.59 16.80 17.01 17.26 17.36 
Hamedan 14.96 15.18 15.37 15.49 15.72 16.03 16.32 16.40 16.54 16.62 16.91 16.96 17.12 17.39 
Chaharmahal 14.96 15.12 15.22 15.38 15.48 15.60 15.83 16.31 16.47 16.75 16.77 17.04 17.20 17.43 
Lorestan 14.98 15.14 15.45 15.69 15.79 16.02 16.21 16.49 16.64 16.77 16.85 17.23 17.37 17.34 
Ilam 15.25 14.99 15.71 15.88 15.99 16.28 16.62 16.76 16.85 16.93 17.07 17.21 17.32 17.26 
Kohgiluyeh 14.70 15.35 15.30 15.37 15.71 15.91 16.07 16.48 16.57 16.66 16.90 16.80 16.97 17.37 
Bushehr 14.99 15.13 15.58 15.63 15.84 16.13 16.58 16.73 16.84 16.90 17.08 17.24 17.37 17.34 
Zanjan 14.74 14.92 15.21 15.48 15.80 16.22 16.26 16.29 16.53 16.72 16.96 17.28 17.24 17.47 
Semnan 15.26 15.38 15.60 15.54 15.80 15.98 16.12 16.45 16.61 16.78 16.88 17.14 17.33 17.41 
Yazd 15.35 15.61 15.80 15.86 15.96 16.20 16.23 16.32 16.61 16.78 17.04 17.05 17.12 17.39 
Hormozgan 15.13 15.55 15.48 15.58 15.90 16.02 16.24 16.72 16.82 17.05 17.10 17.02 17.16 17.19 
Tehran 15.76 16.00 16.21 16.38 16.57 16.85 16.96 17.13 17.25 17.40 17.63 17.78 17.80 17.89 
Ardabil 15.27 15.39 15.52 15.93 16.09 16.19 16.49 16.77 16.89 16.94 17.11 17.29 17.37 17.58 
Qom 15.37 15.49 15.68 15.81 16.04 16.22 16.31 16.52 16.63 16.74 16.81 17.06 17.17 17.35 
Qazvin 
 
15.43 15.69 15.81 16.02 16.13 16.42 16.81 16.99 17.11 17.24 17.48 17.37 17.45 
Golestan 
 
14.96 15.44 15.74 15.74 15.89 16.07 16.23 16.46 16.60 16.73 16.93 17.07 17.27 
Khorasan N 
 
       16.22 16.39 16.63 16.92 17.03 17.18 
Khorasan S 
        
16.43 16.50 16.62 16.74 16.78 17.12 
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Appendix 5B Provincial urban household expenditures, 1997-2010 
Log mean provincial household expenditures, urban 1997-2010 
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Markazi 15.2 15.5 15.7 15.9 16.2 16.5 16.6 16.8 16.8 17 17.3 17.2 17.5 17.7 
Gilan 15.3 15.5 15.9 16.1 16.3 16.3 16.4 16.8 16.9 17.2 17.5 17.5 17.6 17.7 
Mazandaran 15.3 15.6 15.8 16.1 16.1 16.5 16.6 17 17.2 17.3 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.8 
Azerbaijan East 15.3 15.6 15.8 16 16 16.3 16.5 16.8 16.9 17.1 17.2 17.4 17.5 17.6 
Azerbaijan West 15.1 15.3 15.6 15.8 16 16.3 16.6 16.9 17 17.1 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.7 
Kermanshah 15.2 15.3 15.5 15.8 16 16.3 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.9 17.1 17.3 17.4 17.6 
Khuzestan 15.3 15.6 15.5 15.9 16 16.2 16.2 16.6 16.7 16.9 17 17.4 17.5 17.6 
Fars 15.6 15.6 15.9 16.1 16.1 16.3 16.5 16.8 17.1 17.1 17.2 17.4 17.7 18 
Kerman 15.1 15.4 15.9 16.1 16.1 16.3 16.6 16.8 16.9 17 17.1 17.4 17.2 17.5 
Khorasan Razavi 15.3 15.6 15.9 15.9 16 16.2 16.4 16.6 16.9 17 17.3 17.4 17.4 17.6 
Esfahan 15.3 15.5 15.8 16 16.1 16.3 16.5 16.9 17 17.2 17.4 17.5 17.7 17.8 
Sistan & Baluch 15 15.3 15.5 15.7 15.8 15.9 16.1 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8 16.8 17.1 
Kurdistan 14.9 15.3 15.3 15.8 15.8 16.2 16.5 16.7 16.8 16.8 17 17.2 17.4 17.5 
Hamedan 15.2 15.5 15.7 15.8 15.9 16.3 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8 17.2 17.2 17.3 17.6 
Chaharmahal 15.2 15.4 15.5 15.7 15.8 15.9 16.1 16.6 16.7 17 17 17.3 17.4 17.6 
Lorestan 15.2 15.3 15.6 15.9 16 16.2 16.4 16.7 16.8 17 17.1 17.5 17.6 17.6 
Ilam 15.5 15.1 15.9 16.1 16.2 16.5 16.8 17 17 17.1 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.4 
Kohgiluyeh 15 15.6 15.7 15.7 16.1 16.3 16.5 16.9 16.9 17 17.3 17.2 17.3 17.7 
Bushehr 15.2 15.3 15.7 15.8 16 16.3 16.8 16.9 17 17 17.2 17.3 17.5 17.5 
Zanjan 14.9 15.2 15.5 15.8 16.1 16.5 16.5 16.6 16.8 17 17.2 17.5 17.4 17.6 
Semnan 15.4 15.5 15.7 15.7 15.9 16.1 16.3 16.6 16.7 16.9 17 17.2 17.4 17.5 
Yazd 15.4 15.7 15.9 15.9 16 16.3 16.3 16.4 16.7 16.8 17.1 17.1 17.2 17.4 
Hormozgan 15.5 15.9 15.8 15.9 16.3 16.4 16.6 17.1 17.2 17.4 17.4 17.3 17.5 17.5 
Tehran 15.8 16.1 16.3 16.4 16.6 16.9 17 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.7 17.8 17.8 17.9 
Ardabil 15.4 15.5 15.7 16.1 16.3 16.3 16.7 16.9 17.1 17.1 17.3 17.5 17.5 17.7 
Qom 15.4 15.5 15.7 15.8 16.1 16.3 16.3 16.6 16.7 16.8 16.8 17.1 17.2 17.4 
Qazvin 
 
15.6 15.9 16 16.2 16.3 16.6 17 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.6 17.5 17.6 
Golestan 
 
15.2 15.7 16 16.1 16.2 16.4 16.6 16.8 16.9 17 17.3 17.3 17.6 
Khorasan North 
        
16.5 16.7 17 17.3 17.3 17.5 
Khorasan South 
        
16.8 16.9 17 17.1 17.1 17.4 
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Appendix 5C Provincial rural household expenditures, 1997-2010 
Log provincial mean household expenditures, rural 1997-2010 
Province 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Markazi 14.7 14.9 15.2 15.3 15.5 16 16.1 16.2 16.2 16.3 16.5 16.6 16.6 17 
Gilan 14.9 15.2 15.5 15.7 15.8 15.8 15.9 16.4 16.4 16.6 16.7 16.9 17 17.1 
Mazandaran 14.8 15.3 15.6 15.8 15.8 16 16.3 16.6 16.7 16.9 17 17 17.1 17.3 
Azerbaijan East 14.8 15.1 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.7 15.8 16.3 16.3 16.4 16.6 16.9 17 17.1 
Azerbaijan West 14.6 14.8 15.1 15.1 15.4 15.6 15.8 16.2 16.4 16.5 16.8 16.9 17 17.2 
Kermanshah 14.8 14.9 15.2 15.2 15.3 15.8 16 16 16.1 16.3 16.6 16.7 16.8 17.1 
Khuzestan 14.8 15 15.1 15.3 15.4 15.7 15.9 16 16.1 16.3 16.3 16.8 17 16.9 
Fars 14.9 15.2 15.4 15.5 15.5 15.8 16 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.8 16.8 17.2 17.4 
Kerman 14.7 14.9 15.3 15.4 15.6 15.8 16 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.7 16.9 
Khorasan Razavi 14.5 14.8 15.2 15.2 15.1 15.4 15.7 15.9 16.1 16.2 16.5 16.6 16.6 16.8 
Esfahan 14.9 15 15.2 15.4 15.6 15.9 16.1 16.4 16.7 16.8 17 17.1 17.2 17.3 
Sistan & Baluch 14.4 14.6 14.8 14.9 14.9 15.2 15.3 15.7 15.9 15.9 16 15.9 16 16.2 
Kurdistan 14.6 14.6 14.6 15.1 15.2 15.5 15.9 16 16.3 16.2 16.5 16.6 16.9 17 
Hamedan 14.6 14.7 14.9 15.1 15.4 15.7 16 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.7 16.9 
Chaharmahal 14.7 14.7 14.9 15 15.1 15.3 15.5 16 16.1 16.3 16.5 16.7 16.9 17.1 
Lorestan 14.6 14.8 15.2 15.4 15.4 15.6 15.9 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.4 16.6 16.8 16.7 
Ilam 14.7 14.7 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.8 16.2 16.4 16.5 16.5 16.6 16.8 16.9 16.9 
Kohgiluyeh 14.5 15.1 14.9 15.1 15.4 15.5 15.7 16.1 16.1 16.2 16.4 16.2 16.4 16.8 
Bushehr 14.7 14.8 15.3 15.4 15.6 15.9 16.3 16.4 16.6 16.6 16.8 17 17 17 
Zanjan 14.5 14.5 14.8 15 15.4 15.8 15.9 15.9 16 16.3 16.4 16.8 16.8 17.2 
Semnan 15 15 15.3 15.2 15.4 15.6 15.7 16 16.2 16.3 16.5 16.8 16.9 17 
Yazd 15.2 15.1 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 16 16.1 16.4 16.5 16.7 16.8 16.9 17.1 
Hormozgan 14.7 15.1 15.2 15.2 15.4 15.6 15.8 16.3 16.3 16.6 16.7 16.6 16.7 16.6 
Tehran 15.1 15.4 15.6 15.7 15.8 16.1 16.3 16.5 16.7 16.8 17 17.1 17 17.1 
Ardabil 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.6 15.8 16 16.3 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.8 17 17 17.3 
Qom 15.2 15.4 15.5 15.5 15.6 15.8 15.9 16 16.2 16.4 16.5 16.8 16.7 17.1 
Qazvin 
 
15.2 15.3 15.6 15.7 15.8 16.1 16.5 16.6 16.8 17 17.1 17 17.1 
Golestan 
 
14.6 15.1 15.4 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.9 16 16.2 16.4 16.4 16.6 16.8 
Khorasan North 
        
15.9 16 16.2 16.4 16.5 16.7 
Khorasan South 
        
16 16 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.6 
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Appendix 5D Mean provincial household expenditures, 2010 
Annual mean provincial household expenditures (not scaled for household size) Riyals, 2010 
Province Mean expenditure 
Markazi 100,000,000 
Gilan 91,100,000 
Mazandaran 110,000,000 
Azerbaijan East 98,800,000 
Azerbaijan West 113,000,000 
Kermanshah 103,000,000 
Khuzestan 108,000,000 
Fars 136,000,000 
Kerman 81,000,000 
Khorasan Razavi 86,500,000 
Esfahan 113,000,000 
Sistan and Baluchistan 54,600,000 
Kurdistan 87,700,000 
Hamedan 87,900,000 
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari 94,500,000 
Lorestan 90,100,000 
Ilam 93,000,000 
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-
Ahmad 
103,000,000 
Bushehr 89,000,000 
Zanjan 97,900,000 
Semnan 84,500,000 
Yazd 85,000,000 
Hormozgan 76,100,000 
Tehran 129,000,000 
Ardabil 111,000,000 
Qom 85,400,000 
Qazvin 93,900,000 
Golestan 81,000,000 
Khorasan North 70,500,000 
Khorasan South 65,100,000 
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Appendix 5E Provincial GDP/capita with and without oil, 2007 
Provinces GDP/capita including oil GDP/capita non-oil 
Kohgiluyeh 143,628,599 18,623,304 
Khuzestan 114,018,346 34,711,354 
Bushehr 76,694,476 41,766,100 
Ilam 69,767,762 21,119,351 
Tehran 56,601,719 56,054,705 
Markazi 44,057,837 41,776,513 
Esfahan 40,961,482 38,563,572 
Yazd 38,826,515 38,802,736 
Semnan 38,668,886 37,965,147 
Hormozgan 35,432,639 32,658,939 
Qazvin 33,947,556 33,900,148 
Mazandaran 32,268,919 32,147,907 
Kerman 31,320,088 31,278,627 
Fars 28,580,500 26,497,123 
Azerbaijan East 28,239,158 27,693,359 
Gilan 26,222,963 26,028,020 
Qom 25,613,500 25,381,937 
Khorasan Razavi 25,568,730 25,483,315 
Zanjan 25,243,538 25,085,630 
Hamedan 24,621,568 24,614,516 
Khorasan South 24,168,037 24,168,037 
Khorasan North 23,458,653 23,458,653 
Ardabil 22,285,768 22,279,271 
Golestan 22,111,132 22,095,220 
Kermanshah 22,032,115 21,830,550 
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari 20,752,456 20,715,520 
Lorestan 19,067,348 18,906,310 
Kurdistan 19,054,140 19,051,375 
Azerbaijan West 19,015,977 19,009,100 
Sistan and Baluchistan 11,095,335 11,099,758 
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Appendix 5F Provincial rural & urban expenditure share 
Sorted by mean expenditure 
Province 
Urban 
population 
share 
Rural 
population 
Share 
Urban 
expenditure 
share 
Rural 
expenditure 
Share 
Sistan and Baluchistan 51% 49% 73% 27% 
Khorasan South 54% 46% 72% 28% 
Khorasan North 52% 48% 70% 30% 
Hormozgan 53% 47% 73% 27% 
Ilam 66% 34% 76% 24% 
Golestan 55% 45% 73% 27% 
Kerman 63% 37% 75% 25% 
Lorestan 65% 35% 81% 19% 
Bushehr 71% 29% 79% 21% 
Qom 95% 5% 96% 4% 
Kurdistan 65% 35% 75% 25% 
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad 51% 49% 73% 27% 
Hamedan 63% 37% 78% 22% 
Yazd 82% 18% 87% 13% 
Khorasan Razavi 72% 28% 84% 16% 
Semnan 78% 22% 85% 15% 
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari 57% 43% 70% 30% 
Qazvin 72% 28% 80% 20% 
Zanjan 64% 36% 72% 28% 
Gilan 58% 42% 70% 30% 
Khuzestan 73% 27% 85% 15% 
Kermanshah 72% 28% 82% 18% 
Azerbaijan East 72% 28% 82% 18% 
Azerbaijan West 67% 33% 77% 23% 
Markazi 72% 28% 83% 17% 
Ardabil 64% 36% 73% 27% 
Mazandaran 57% 43% 68% 32% 
Esfahan 85% 15% 90% 10% 
Fars 66% 34% 78% 22% 
Tehran 93% 7% 97% 3% 
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Appendix 5H Provincial rankings by household expenditure 2005-2010  
Provincial 
expenditure 
rank 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1 Tehran Tehran Tehran Tehran Tehran Tehran 
2 Mazandaran Esfahan Esfahan Qazvin Esfahan Fars 
3 Qazvin Mazandaran Mazandaran Esfahan Fars Esfahan 
4 Esfahan Qazvin Qazvin Mazandaran Gilan Mazandaran 
5 Ardabil Hormozgan Gilan Azerbaijan East Azerbaijan East Ardabil 
6 Fars Gilan 
Azerbaijan 
West 
Gilan Khuzestan Markazi 
7 Ilam 
Azerbaijan 
West 
Khorasan 
Razavi 
Ardabil Bushehr 
Azerbaijan 
West 
8 Bushehr Ardabil Ardabil 
Azerbaijan 
West 
Lorestan Azerbaijan East 
9 Hormozgan Ilam Hormozgan Zanjan Ardabil Kermanshah 
10 Azerbaijan West Bushehr Fars Fars Qazvin Khuzestan 
11 Azerbaijan East Fars Bushehr Bushehr Mazandaran Gilan 
12 Khorasan Razavi Azerbaijan East Markazi Khuzestan 
Azerbaijan 
West 
Zanjan 
13 Gilan Markazi Ilam Lorestan Semnan Qazvin 
14 Kerman 
Khorasan 
Razavi 
Yazd Ilam Markazi 
Chaharmahal 
and Bakhtiari 
15 Markazi Yazd Azerbaijan East 
Khorasan 
Razavi 
Ilam Semnan 
16 Lorestan Semnan Kermanshah Kermanshah Kurdistan 
Khorasan 
Razavi 
17 Qom Lorestan Zanjan Semnan 
Khorasan 
Razavi 
Yazd 
18 Yazd Kermanshah Hamedan Kerman Kermanshah Hamedan 
19 Semnan 
Chaharmahal 
and Bakhtiari 
Kohgiluyeh and 
Boyer-Ahmad 
Qom Zanjan 
Kohgiluyeh and 
Boyer-Ahmad 
20 Kurdistan Qom Semnan Yazd 
Chaharmahal 
and Bakhtiari 
Kurdistan 
21 Khuzestan Khuzestan Lorestan 
Chaharmahal 
and Bakhtiari 
Qom Qom 
22 
Kohgiluyeh and 
Boyer-Ahmad 
Kerman Kerman Hormozgan Hormozgan Bushehr 
23 Hamedan Zanjan Khuzestan Markazi Yazd Lorestan 
24 Zanjan 
Kohgiluyeh and 
Boyer-Ahmad 
Qom Kurdistan Hamedan Kerman 
25 Kermanshah Hamedan Kurdistan Hamedan Golestan Golestan 
26 
Chaharmahal and 
Bakhtiari 
Golestan 
Chaharmahal 
and Bakhtiari 
Golestan Kerman Ilam 
27 Golestan Kurdistan Golestan 
Khorasan 
North 
Khorasan 
North 
Hormozgan 
28 Khorasan South 
Khorasan 
South 
Khorasan 
North 
Kohgiluyeh and 
Boyer-Ahmad 
Kohgiluyeh and 
Boyer-Ahmad 
Khorasan 
North 
29 
Sistan and 
Baluchistan 
Khorasan 
North 
Khorasan 
South 
Khorasan 
South 
Khorasan 
South 
Khorasan 
South 
30 Khorasan North 
Sistan and 
Baluchistan 
Sistan and 
Baluchistan 
Sistan and 
Baluchistan 
Sistan and 
Baluchistan 
Sistan and 
Baluchistan 
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Appendix 5I Tehran : Sistan and Baluchistan mean household expenditure ratio 
Weighted total of rural and urban, scaled for household size 
Rural and Urban 
Sistan and 
Baluchistan 
Tehran Ratio 
1990 385,488 1,166,150 3.03 
… … … … 
1997 2,388,601 7,006,055 2.93 
1998 3,164,400 8,912,974 2.82 
1999 3,945,600 11,001,928 2.79 
2000 4,807,596 12,978,586 2.70 
2001 4,927,978 15,758,003 3.20 
2002 5,848,687 20,698,716 3.54 
2003 6,999,590 23,153,029 3.31 
2004 9,392,633 27,578,382 2.94 
2005 11,404,495 31,168,492 2.73 
2006 12,187,079 36,008,732 2.95 
2007 12,782,152 45,149,088 3.53 
2008 14,102,456 52,881,527 3.75 
2009 14,328,158 53,595,615 3.74 
2010 18,994,661 58,983,521 3.11 
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Appendix 5J Regression of sigma on GDP growth rate, 1997-2010 
σi= b0 + b1xi + ui 
Source SS df       MS 
 
Number of obs 14 
    
F(  1,    12) 0.01 
Model 1.39E-06 1  1.3923e-06 
 
Prob > F 0.9203 
Residual 0.001600631 12  .000133386 
 
R-squared 0.0009 
    
Adj R-squared -0.0824 
Total 0.001602023 13  .000123233 
 
Root MSE 0.01155 
sigmanatio~l Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
gdpgrowth 0.0001262 
.0012349     
0.10 
0.92 -0.0025644 0.002817 
_cons 0.230736 
.0065344    
35.31 
0 0.2164988 0.244973 
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Appendix 5K Regression of sigma on GDP growth rate, 2000-2010 
σ = b0 + b1x + u 
Source SS df       MS 
 
Number of 
obs 
8 
    
F(  1,     6) 61.64 
Model 0.00058 1  .000579962 Prob > F 0.0002 
Residual 5.65E-05 6  9.4086e-06 R-squared 0.9113 
    
Adj R-
squared 
0.8965 
Total 0.000636 7  .000090916 Root MSE 0.00307 
      
      
sigmanatio~l Coef. Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
      
gdpgrowth 0.004065 
.0005177     
7.85 
0 0.002798 0.005332 
_cons 0.202283 
.0034043    
59.42 
0 0.193953 0.210613 
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Appendix 6A Provincial GINI figures 1997-2010 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Markazi 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.38 0.43 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.38 0.44 0.43 
Gilan 0.38 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.43 0.45 0.39 0.41 0.37 
Mazandaran 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.37 
Azerbaijan East 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.38 0.38 
Azerbaijan West 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 
Kermanshah 0.30 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.41 0.39 0.43 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.39 
Khuzestan 0.35 0.38 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.39 
Fars 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.36 0.39 0.42 
Kerman 0.41 0.39 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.40 
Khorasan Razavi 0.43 0.46 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.41 0.43 0.40 
Esfahan 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Sistan and Baluchistan 0.37 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.48 
Kurdistan 0.31 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.33 
Hamedan 0.40 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.44 0.35 0.39 0.41 
Chaharmahal & Bakhtiari 0.40 0.41 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.29 0.31 0.36 0.37 
Lorestan 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.39 0.35 0.41 0.40 0.42 
Ilam 0.42 0.35 0.41 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Kohgiluyeh & Boyer. 0.45 0.37 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.49 0.44 
Bushehr 0.31 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.43 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.37 
Zanjan 0.42 0.40 0.45 0.46 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.37 0.33 
Semnan 0.41 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.36 
Yazd 0.44 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.32 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.36 0.35 0.37 
Hormozgan 0.42 0.46 0.39 0.36 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.42 0.42 
Tehran 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.35 0.37 0.39 
Ardabil 0.40 0.36 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.36 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.37 0.38 
Qom 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.43 0.33 0.29 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.32 
Qazvin 
 
0.39 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.34 
Golestan 
 
0.41 0.44 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.46 0.44 0.45 
Khorasan North 
        
0.40 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.42 
Khorasan South 
        
0.44 0.43 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.40 
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Appendix 6B STATA output, correlation between provincial GINI figures, 1998-2010 
Only figures with an asterix * are significant at the 5% level 
             |  markazi    gilan mazand~n azer~ast azer~est kerman~h khuzes~n 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     markazi |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
       gilan |   0.1507   1.0000  
             |   0.6230 
             | 
  mazandaran |  -0.0541   0.3862   1.0000  
             |   0.8607   0.1924 
             | 
azerbaij~ast |  -0.3181   0.2221   0.5233   1.0000  
             |   0.2896   0.4657   0.0665 
             | 
azerbaij~est |  -0.0849  -0.2318   0.1577   0.3993   1.0000  
             |   0.7827   0.4460   0.6068   0.1765 
             | 
  kermanshah |   0.1712  -0.3274   0.1682   0.3739   0.5937*  1.0000  
             |   0.5760   0.2749   0.5829   0.2082   0.0324 
             | 
   khuzestan |   0.5175   0.4021   0.3771  -0.1084  -0.4673  -0.0022   1.0000  
             |   0.0701   0.1732   0.2041   0.7245   0.1073   0.9944 
             | 
        fars |   0.5085   0.3037   0.3209  -0.3219  -0.4461  -0.2157   0.7342* 
             |   0.0760   0.3130   0.2850   0.2834   0.1266   0.4791   0.0043 
             | 
      kerman |  -0.1669  -0.2131  -0.0405   0.0929   0.2720   0.0615  -0.2331  
             |   0.5858   0.4845   0.8955   0.7628   0.3687   0.8418   0.4435 
             | 
khorasanra~i |  -0.1100   0.4261   0.6349*  0.4826   0.3711   0.1668  -0.0249  
             |   0.7204   0.1466   0.0197   0.0948   0.2119   0.5859   0.9358 
             | 
     esfahan |   0.0981   0.1230   0.7485*  0.4580   0.0150   0.2497   0.2392  
             |   0.7497   0.6890   0.0032   0.1155   0.9611   0.4106   0.4313 
             | 
sistanandb~n |   0.1464  -0.4864  -0.8635* -0.3185   0.0212   0.1291  -0.3648  
             |   0.6333   0.0919   0.0001   0.2888   0.9452   0.6743   0.2203 
             | 
   kurdistan |  -0.4237  -0.3288  -0.0158   0.1526   0.0170  -0.0173  -0.4027  
             |   0.1490   0.2727   0.9592   0.6187   0.9559   0.9553   0.1725 
             | 
     hamedan |   0.3164   0.4625   0.3441  -0.0526  -0.5984* -0.4417   0.3753  
             |   0.2923   0.1116   0.2496   0.8645   0.0307   0.1308   0.2064 
             | 
chaharmaha~i |  -0.2416   0.0768  -0.0009  -0.1146  -0.6704* -0.1300   0.1526  
             |   0.4264   0.8031   0.9978   0.7092   0.0122   0.6721   0.6186 
             | 
    lorestan |   0.0569  -0.0068  -0.4106  -0.1918  -0.3250   0.0957   0.3991  
             |   0.8536   0.9825   0.1634   0.5302   0.2786   0.7558   0.1768 
             | 
        ilam |  -0.1053  -0.1085   0.2180   0.2951   0.5562*  0.3191  -0.3813  
             |   0.7320   0.7243   0.4743   0.3276   0.0484   0.2880   0.1986 
             | 
kohgiluyeh~d |   0.6624*  0.1122  -0.0853  -0.1443   0.1800   0.3653   0.3934  
             |   0.0136   0.7152   0.7818   0.6382   0.5563   0.2196   0.1836 
             | 
     bushehr |  -0.0099  -0.3562  -0.2821  -0.2191   0.1754   0.0846  -0.5805* 
             |   0.9745   0.2323   0.3504   0.4721   0.5666   0.7834   0.0375 
             | 
      zanjan |  -0.2767   0.0717   0.1957   0.4204   0.0156  -0.2242  -0.3505  
             |   0.3601   0.8159   0.5216   0.1526   0.9598   0.4616   0.2403 
             | 
      semnan |   0.6053*  0.1514  -0.0756  -0.3181  -0.2364   0.2240   0.7292* 
             |   0.0284   0.6215   0.8061   0.2895   0.4368   0.4619   0.0047 
             | 
        yazd |  -0.3062   0.5301   0.3474   0.1592  -0.5366  -0.5572*  0.1284  
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             |   0.3090   0.0624   0.2449   0.6035   0.0587   0.0479   0.6759 
             | 
   hormozgan |   0.0435   0.3295   0.5413   0.2511   0.2160   0.1937   0.4051  
             |   0.8878   0.2716   0.0561   0.4079   0.4785   0.5260   0.1697 
             | 
      tehran |   0.0330   0.0271   0.3386   0.4207   0.2314   0.4554  -0.2449  
             |   0.9148   0.9299   0.2578   0.1523   0.4468   0.1178   0.4199 
             | 
     ardabil |   0.0666  -0.2599   0.0697   0.1789   0.3829   0.6179* -0.1354  
             |   0.8289   0.3912   0.8211   0.5587   0.1966   0.0244   0.6592 
             | 
         qom |   0.2929   0.0427   0.2997   0.2774   0.2547   0.6879*  0.2810  
             |   0.3314   0.8897   0.3198   0.3588   0.4010   0.0094   0.3524 
             | 
      qazvin |  -0.4275   0.0556   0.4381   0.3554  -0.2504  -0.2418  -0.1861  
             |   0.1451   0.8569   0.1343   0.2334   0.4093   0.4261   0.5427 
             | 
    golestan |  -0.0160  -0.6939* -0.1423   0.1167   0.5723*  0.7193* -0.3311  
             |   0.9586   0.0085   0.6429   0.7043   0.0410   0.0056   0.2692 
             | 
             |     fars   kerman khoras~i  esfahan sistan~n kurdis~n  hamedan 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
        fars |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
      kerman |  -0.3637   1.0000  
             |   0.2219 
             | 
khorasanra~i |   0.0339  -0.3478   1.0000  
             |   0.9123   0.2442 
             | 
     esfahan |   0.2250  -0.1319   0.5516   1.0000  
             |   0.4598   0.6674   0.0507 
             | 
sistanandb~n |  -0.2563  -0.1726  -0.5751* -0.5892*  1.0000  
             |   0.3979   0.5729   0.0397   0.0341 
             | 
   kurdistan |  -0.2379   0.1301   0.1878   0.3232  -0.1167   1.0000  
             |   0.4337   0.6719   0.5389   0.2814   0.7042 
             | 
     hamedan |   0.6381* -0.1517   0.1565   0.4631  -0.4240   0.1220   1.0000  
             |   0.0189   0.6209   0.6097   0.1111   0.1488   0.6913 
             | 
chaharmaha~i |   0.1388  -0.2769   0.0247   0.1657  -0.1400   0.4049   0.4312  
             |   0.6511   0.3597   0.9361   0.5885   0.6483   0.1699   0.1413 
             | 
    lorestan |   0.1912  -0.1017  -0.5125  -0.4924   0.4487  -0.4454  -0.2683  
             |   0.5314   0.7409   0.0733   0.0874   0.1241   0.1272   0.3754 
             | 
        ilam |  -0.2300   0.4598   0.3685   0.2185  -0.2105   0.0337  -0.0493  
             |   0.4496   0.1139   0.2154   0.4732   0.4901   0.9130   0.8730 
             | 
kohgiluyeh~d |   0.3182   0.3356  -0.1125  -0.0983   0.0496  -0.3372   0.0514  
             |   0.2893   0.2623   0.7143   0.7493   0.8720   0.2598   0.8677 
             | 
     bushehr |  -0.3198   0.2481  -0.0839  -0.2153   0.1985   0.2471   0.0486  
             |   0.2868   0.4137   0.7853   0.4800   0.5155   0.4157   0.8748 
             | 
      zanjan |  -0.1673   0.3711   0.1726   0.4872  -0.2797   0.6439*  0.4090  
             |   0.5848   0.2118   0.5729   0.0913   0.3546   0.0175   0.1653 
             | 
      semnan |   0.2980   0.0657  -0.2398  -0.0947  -0.0562  -0.2990  -0.0127  
             |   0.3228   0.8312   0.4301   0.7584   0.8552   0.3211   0.9670 
             | 
        yazd |   0.2991  -0.4155   0.3690   0.3779  -0.3881   0.0652   0.5934* 
             |   0.3208   0.1580   0.2147   0.2030   0.1900   0.8324   0.0325 
             | 
   hormozgan |  -0.0281  -0.1678   0.4097   0.2218  -0.4640  -0.5353  -0.2743  
             |   0.9273   0.5838   0.1645   0.4664   0.1102   0.0594   0.3644 
             | 
      tehran |   0.0351  -0.1820   0.5126   0.5493  -0.1040   0.2790   0.3455  
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             |   0.9093   0.5518   0.0732   0.0518   0.7352   0.3560   0.2476 
             | 
     ardabil |  -0.3541   0.3220  -0.2180   0.1034   0.0894   0.1118  -0.3409  
             |   0.2352   0.2833   0.4744   0.7368   0.7715   0.7162   0.2543 
             | 
         qom |  -0.1215  -0.0677   0.2780   0.4996  -0.1220  -0.2178  -0.2218  
             |   0.6926   0.8260   0.3577   0.0821   0.6912   0.4748   0.4665 
             | 
      qazvin |  -0.0900   0.2799   0.1526   0.6108* -0.5150   0.5461   0.5235  
             |   0.7701   0.3544   0.6187   0.0266   0.0717   0.0535   0.0663 
             | 
    golestan |  -0.3582   0.3393  -0.2122   0.0588   0.3265   0.3734  -0.5207  
             |   0.2295   0.2567   0.4864   0.8487   0.2763   0.2088   0.0681 
             | 
             | chahar~i lorestan     ilam kohgil~d  bushehr   zanjan   semnan 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
chaharmaha~i |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
    lorestan |   0.0979   1.0000  
             |   0.7503 
             | 
        ilam |  -0.2746  -0.2760   1.0000  
             |   0.3639   0.3614 
             | 
kohgiluyeh~d |  -0.2944   0.3321   0.3551   1.0000  
             |   0.3289   0.2676   0.2337 
             | 
     bushehr |   0.1914  -0.4380   0.3159  -0.0326   1.0000  
             |   0.5310   0.1344   0.2931   0.9158 
             | 
      zanjan |   0.0367  -0.4999   0.2970  -0.1777   0.0233   1.0000  
             |   0.9054   0.0819   0.3244   0.5613   0.9397 
             | 
      semnan |   0.0712   0.4136  -0.3224   0.6256* -0.2463  -0.4718   1.0000  
             |   0.8172   0.1601   0.2827   0.0222   0.4173   0.1036 
             | 
        yazd |   0.4311  -0.0764  -0.0493  -0.4517  -0.3320   0.3507  -0.4127  
             |   0.1414   0.8041   0.8730   0.1212   0.2678   0.2400   0.1610 
             | 
   hormozgan |  -0.2777  -0.0023   0.0215  -0.0273  -0.4615  -0.4311   0.2702  
             |   0.3583   0.9941   0.9445   0.9294   0.1124   0.1413   0.3720 
             | 
      tehran |   0.2789  -0.3556   0.5060   0.0339   0.3858   0.3247  -0.3902  
             |   0.3562   0.2331   0.0777   0.9125   0.1929   0.2791   0.1874 
             | 
     ardabil |  -0.1073  -0.1438  -0.1084   0.0449   0.2201  -0.0010   0.1886  
             |   0.7272   0.6392   0.7246   0.8843   0.4700   0.9975   0.5372 
             | 
         qom |  -0.0929   0.0941   0.2467   0.3202  -0.3150  -0.1426   0.3900  
             |   0.7628   0.7598   0.4165   0.2861   0.2946   0.6420   0.1878 
             | 
      qazvin |   0.4016  -0.5054   0.1943  -0.4375   0.1151   0.7899* -0.4552  
             |   0.1738   0.0781   0.5247   0.1349   0.7080   0.0013   0.1180 
             | 
    golestan |  -0.2252  -0.0714   0.1356   0.1488   0.2388   0.0731   0.0345  
             |   0.4594   0.8166   0.6586   0.6276   0.4321   0.8125   0.9109 
             | 
             |     yazd hormoz~n   tehran  ardabil      qom   qazvin golestan 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
        yazd |   1.0000  
             | 
             | 
   hormozgan |   0.0588   1.0000  
             |   0.8487 
             | 
      tehran |   0.2099  -0.2336   1.0000  
             |   0.4912   0.4423 
             | 
     ardabil |  -0.6040* -0.0054   0.1233   1.0000  
             |   0.0288   0.9860   0.6883 
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             | 
         qom |  -0.1261   0.5565*  0.2497   0.3365   1.0000  
             |   0.6813   0.0482   0.4107   0.2609 
             | 
      qazvin |   0.5322  -0.2160   0.3651   0.0449  -0.0945   1.0000  
             |   0.0612   0.4784   0.2199   0.8841   0.7587 
             | 
    golestan |  -0.7348* -0.2561   0.1781   0.7616*  0.2562  -0.0794   1.0000  
             |   0.0042   0.3984   0.5604   0.0025   0.3981   0.7966 
             | 
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Appendix 6C Correlation between mean household expenditure & provincial GINI, 2010 
 
Mean household expenditure GINI 
   
expenditure 1 
 
GINI -0.2695 
 
Significance 0.1498 1 
 
Appendix 6D  Correlation of expenditures between 4 major provinces & GINI, 1997-2010 
Correlation between mean expenditures and GINI 1997-2010 for the four most populous 
provinces of Tehran, Khorasan, Esfahan and Fars 
Tehran logmean 
 tehranGINI 1 
 logmean -0.4281 1 
Significance 0.1267 
  
Khorasan 
Razavi logmean 
 khorasanra~i 1 
 logmean -0.2281 1 
Signifiance 0.4328 
  
Esfahan logmean 
 GINI 1 
 logmean -0.5199 1 
Significance 0.0567 
  
Fars logmean  
Fars 1 
 
farslogmean 0.154 1 
Signifiance 0.5991 
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Appendix 6E Log mean equivalence expenditure by ethnicity, 1998-2010 nominal Riyals 
Please note that these figures have been scaled for household size, and hence should be 
used for comparative purposes not as absolute figures. 
 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Persian 15.63 15.87 16.01 16.17 16.41 16.57 16.80 16.97 17.09 17.31 17.45 17.53 17.67 
Azeris 15.38 15.56 15.80 15.90 16.16 16.33 16.61 16.73 16.87 17.02 17.29 17.37 17.52 
Kurds 15.11 15.36 15.60 15.76 16.07 16.33 16.55 16.69 16.82 17.03 17.18 17.30 17.47 
Lurs 15.17 15.37 15.56 15.70 15.90 16.09 16.44 16.58 16.74 16.84 17.11 17.26 17.37 
Arabs 15.47 15.42 15.70 15.84 16.03 16.13 16.47 16.58 16.74 16.84 17.24 17.40 17.48 
Baloochis 14.97 15.19 15.39 15.41 15.58 15.76 16.06 16.25 16.32 16.36 16.46 16.48 16.76 
Turkmens 14.96 15.44 15.74 15.74 15.89 16.07 16.23 16.46 16.60 16.73 16.93 17.07 17.27 
Gilaks 15.38 15.71 15.90 16.07 16.05 16.20 16.61 16.70 16.96 17.19 17.29 17.40 17.47 
Mazandaranis 15.44 15.68 15.94 15.97 16.26 16.43 16.78 17.01 17.14 17.31 17.33 17.34 17.61 
 
Appendix 6F Ethnic mean household expenditure and ranking, in Riyals 2010 
These figures have been scaled for household size 
Rank Ethnicity Mean Expenditure 
1 Persians 47,100,086 
2 Mazanadaranis 44,563,539 
3 Azeri Turks 40,531,465 
4 Arabs 39,060,861 
5 Gilaks 38,812,642 
6 Kurds 38,805,252 
7 Lurs 35,006,037 
8 Turkmens 31,559,451 
9 Baloochis 18,994,661 
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Appendix 6G Ethnic regional GINI and mean expenditures, 1998-2010 
Figures in nominal Riyals 
Total ethnic group 
  
Persian 
      
Ethnic 
    
  
Persian: 
Ethnic 
  
Mean 
GINI 
Persian 
Pop share 
  
Mean GINI Ethnic Pop share     
1998 6,096,371 0.43 0.58   4,407,648 0.41 0.42   1.38 
1999 7,819,874 0.43 0.58   5,305,425 0.40 0.42   1.47 
2000 9,022,792 0.44 0.58   6,709,036 0.41 0.42   1.34 
2001 10,531,766 0.45 0.58   7,558,850 0.41 0.42   1.39 
2002 13,491,132 0.45 0.58   9,387,119 0.40 0.42   1.44 
2003 15,796,330 0.42 0.58   11,265,148 0.39 0.42   1.40 
2004 19,768,456 0.43 0.58   15,319,914 0.41 0.42   1.29 
2005 23,424,254 0.42 0.59   17,657,483 0.41 0.41   1.33 
2006 26,457,499 0.44 0.59   20,654,274 0.43 0.41   1.28 
2007 33,017,716 0.44 0.59   24,101,250 0.42 0.41   1.37 
2008 38,155,038 0.40 0.60   28,980,687 0.41 0.40   1.32 
2009 41,147,854 0.41 0.60   31,965,653 0.41 0.40   1.29 
2010 47,441,210 0.41 0.60   37,469,611 0.40 0.40   1.27 
 
Azeris 
  Azeris 
      
Non Azeri 
Ethnic 
  
    
Persian: 
Azeris 
Azeris : Ethnic 
Non Azeris 
  Mean GINI 
Pop 
share 
  Mean GINI 
Pop 
share   
  
  
1998 4,783,890 0.41 0.09   4,307,075 0.40 0.33   1.27 1.11 
1999 5,734,770 0.40 0.09   5,190,658 0.39 0.33   1.36 1.10 
2000 7,243,089 0.42 0.09   6,566,279 0.40 0.33   1.25 1.10 
2001 8,006,115 0.42 0.09   7,439,293 0.40 0.33   1.32 1.08 
2002 10,444,035 0.42 0.09   9,104,597 0.40 0.33   1.29 1.15 
2003 12,404,646 0.40 0.09   10,960,550 0.39 0.33   1.27 1.13 
2004 16,291,275 0.41 0.09   15,059,503 0.41 0.33   1.21 1.08 
2005 18,411,214 0.40 0.08   17,461,552 0.42 0.32   1.27 1.05 
2006 21,189,580 0.42 0.08   20,514,816 0.43 0.32   1.25 1.03 
2007 24,603,124 0.40 0.08   23,970,716 0.42 0.32   1.34 1.03 
2008 32,307,492 0.41 0.08   28,132,839 0.41 0.32   1.18 1.15 
2009 34,997,990 0.38 0.08   31,203,617 0.41 0.32   1.18 1.12 
2010 40,531,464 0.37 0.08   36,682,303 0.40 0.32   1.17 1.10 
 
Kurds 
  Kurds       
Non Kurd 
Ethnic 
      
Persian: 
Kurds 
Kurds: Other 
ethnicities 
  Mean GINI 
Pop 
share 
  Mean GINI Pop share       
1998 3,677,169 0.36     4,599,868 0.41     1.66 0.80 
1999 4,517,352 0.37     5,512,800 0.40     1.73 0.82 
2000 5,814,795 0.39     6,944,348 0.41     1.55 0.84 
2001 6,848,322 0.40     7,745,820 0.41     1.54 0.88 
2002 9,364,463 0.41     9,393,081 0.40     1.44 1.00 
2003 12,044,085 0.39     11,060,177 0.39     1.31 1.09 
2004 15,122,379 0.41     15,372,232 0.41     1.31 0.98 
2005 17,404,767 0.40     17,722,095 0.42     1.35 0.98 
2006 20,070,175 0.40     20,803,803 0.43     1.32 0.96 
2007 24,872,044 0.38     23,904,218 0.42     1.33 1.04 
2008 28,969,368 0.38     28,983,593 0.41     1.32 1.00 
2009 32,445,689 0.38 0.08   31,843,257 0.41 0.32   1.27 1.02 
2010 39,375,584 0.37 0.08   36,976,744 0.41 0.32   1.20 1.06 
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Lurs 
  
Lurs 
      
Non Lurs 
Ethnic       
Persian 
Lurs 
Lurs:Other 
ethnicities 
  
Mean GINI 
Pop 
share   
Mean GINI Pop share 
      
1998 3,893,873 0.37     4,465,320 0.41     1.57 0.87 
1999 4,711,807 0.38     5,372,059 0.40     1.66 0.88 
2000 5,715,798 0.38     6,820,527 0.41     1.58 0.84 
2001 6,581,055 0.38     7,668,608 0.41     1.60 0.86 
2002 8,042,775 0.39     9,538,023 0.40     1.68 0.84 
2003 9,722,314 0.36     11,438,332 0.39     1.62 0.85 
2004 13,828,309 0.35     15,487,862 0.41     1.43 0.89 
2005 15,897,607 0.38     17,854,201 0.42     1.47 0.89 
2006 18,706,130 0.40     20,871,889 0.43     1.41 0.90 
2007 20,571,188 0.36     24,495,596 0.42     1.61 0.84 
2008 27,015,826 0.40     29,198,803 0.41     1.41 0.93 
2009 31,349,427 0.42     32,033,720 0.40     1.31 0.98 
2010 35,006,037 0.41 0.04   37,741,847 0.40 0.36   1.36 0.93 
 
Arabs 
  
Arabs 
      
Non Arabs 
Ethnic 
  
    
Persians: 
Arabs 
Arabs:Other 
Ethnicities 
  
Mean GINI 
Pop 
share 
  Mean GINI 
Pop 
share 
  
    
1998 5,343,906 0.40     4,226,957 0.40     1.14 1.26 
1999 5,048,738 0.35     5,354,964 0.40     1.55 0.94 
2000 6,440,901 0.36     6,760,784 0.42     1.40 0.95 
2001 7,698,014 0.36     7,531,993 0.42     1.37 1.02 
2002 9,120,059 0.32     9,438,660 0.41     1.48 0.97 
2003 10,413,143 0.31     11,429,579 0.40     1.52 0.91 
2004 15,148,552 0.39     15,353,095 0.41     1.30 0.99 
2005 17,048,367 0.40     17,776,898 0.41     1.37 0.96 
2006 20,323,559 0.42     20,718,979 0.43     1.30 0.98 
2007 22,103,056 0.40     24,493,150 0.42     1.49 0.90 
2008 29,075,950 0.38     28,961,760 0.41     1.31 1.00 
2009 33,883,394 0.40     31,580,906 0.41     1.21 1.07 
2010 36,524,866 0.40 0.07   37,658,597 0.40 0.33   1.30 0.97 
 
Baloochis 
  
Baloochis 
      
Non 
baloochi 
ethncities 
  
    
Persian: 
Baloochis 
Baloochis: 
Other 
Ethnicities 
  
Mean GINI 
Pop 
share 
  Mean GINI Pop share   
    
1998 3,164,400 0.41     4,481,213 0.40     1.93 0.71 
1999 3,945,600 0.43     5,385,888 0.39     1.98 0.73 
2000 4,807,596 0.45     6,821,547 0.40     1.88 0.70 
2001 4,927,978 0.46     7,714,523 0.40     2.14 0.64 
2002 5,848,687 0.46     9,596,494 0.39     2.31 0.61 
2003 6,999,589 0.46     11,517,548 0.38     2.26 0.61 
2004 9,392,633 0.43     15,671,666 0.40     2.10 0.60 
2005 11,404,494 0.41     18,092,362 0.41     2.05 0.63 
2006 12,187,078 0.41     21,238,342 0.42     2.17 0.57 
2007 12,782,152 0.43     24,887,520 0.41     2.58 0.51 
2008 14,102,456 0.46     30,041,309 0.40     2.71 0.47 
2009 14,328,158 0.47 0.03   33,288,751 0.39 0.37   2.87 0.43 
2010 18,994,660 0.48 0.03   38,764,914 0.39 0.37   2.50 0.49 
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Turkmens 
  
Turkmens 
      
Non 
Turkmen 
ethnic 
  
    
Persian: 
Turkmen 
Turkmen: 
Other 
ethnicities 
  
Mean GINI 
Pop 
share 
  Mean GINI Pop share   
    
1998 3,137,729 0.41     4,477,277 0.40     1.94 0.70 
1999 5,081,037 0.44     5,317,728 0.39     1.54 0.96 
2000 6,845,764 0.47     6,701,539 0.40     1.32 1.02 
2001 6,850,134 0.46     7,597,709 0.40     1.54 0.90 
2002 7,984,245 0.46     9,464,038 0.40     1.69 0.84 
2003 9,546,810 0.46     11,359,363 0.39     1.65 0.84 
2004 11,162,567 0.47     15,548,522 0.40     1.77 0.72 
2005 14,069,016 0.46     17,856,866 0.41     1.66 0.79 
2006 16,180,141 0.45     20,903,135 0.43     1.64 0.77 
2007 18,390,726 0.42     24,418,690 0.41     1.80 0.75 
2008 22,494,608 0.46     29,350,465 0.40     1.70 0.77 
2009 25,793,710 0.44     32,321,307 0.40     1.60 0.80 
2010 31,559,450 0.45 0.02   37,802,632 0.39 0.38   1.50 0.83 
 
Gilaks 
  
Gilaks 
      
Non Gilak 
Ethnic 
  
    
Persian:Gilaks 
Gilaks:Other 
ethnicities 
  
Mean GINI 
Pop 
share 
  Mean GINI Pop share   
    
1998 4,767,534 0.43     4,367,847 0.40     1.28 1.09 
1999 6,654,955 0.39     5,156,175 0.39     1.18 1.29 
2000 8,021,196 0.40     6,563,918 0.41     1.12 1.22 
2001 9,504,459 0.40     7,343,677 0.41     1.11 1.29 
2002 9,351,427 0.37     9,391,067 0.40     1.44 1.00 
2003 10,817,389 0.38     11,314,668 0.39     1.46 0.96 
2004 16,392,701 0.36     15,205,075 0.41     1.21 1.08 
2005 17,910,419 0.40     17,630,089 0.41     1.31 1.02 
2006 23,288,179 0.43     20,368,692 0.43     1.14 1.14 
2007 29,188,175 0.45     23,550,521 0.41     1.13 1.24 
2008 32,355,276 0.39     28,625,835 0.41     1.18 1.13 
2009 36,177,075 0.41     31,530,460 0.40     1.14 1.15 
2010 38,812,642 0.37 0.04   37,329,478 0.40 0.36   1.22 1.04 
 
Mazandaranis 
  
Mazandaranis   
    
Non 
Mazandarani 
Ethnic 
    
  
Persian: 
Mazanadarani 
Mazandarani: 
Other 
Ethnicities 
  
Mean GINI 
Pop 
share 
  Mean GINI Pop share   
    
1998 5,066,002 0.4     4,325,754 0.40     1.20 1.17 
1999 6,465,067 0.38     5,161,176 0.39     1.21 1.25 
2000 8,387,722 0.39     6,500,221 0.41     1.08 1.29 
2001 8,642,788 0.39     7,424,017 0.41     1.22 1.16 
2002 11,509,666 0.38     9,123,092 0.40     1.17 1.26 
2003 13,643,533 0.36     10,969,297 0.39     1.16 1.24 
2004 19,464,288 0.41     14,802,789 0.41     1.02 1.31 
2005 24,402,190 0.42     16,821,867 0.41     0.96 1.45 
2006 27,747,889 0.42     19,774,424 0.42     0.95 1.40 
2007 32,816,019 0.41     23,021,343 0.41     1.01 1.43 
2008 33,704,341 0.38     28,388,803 0.41     1.13 1.19 
2009 33,821,497 0.35     31,732,755 0.41     1.22 1.07 
2010 44,563,539 0.37 0.04   36,588,756 0.40 0.35   1.06 1.22 
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Appendix 6H Urban & rural household expenditures 1997-2007108 
In constant 2004 Riyals, equivalence expenditures  
Year 
Urban 
deflated 
Rural 
deflated 
Urban:Rural 
1997 14,482,929 7,771,163 1.86 
1998 15,235,844 7,947,182 1.92 
1999 15,866,678 8,215,585 1.93 
2000 16,892,218 8,201,100 2.06 
2001 17,746,914 8,194,272 2.17 
2002 19,466,667 8,827,573 2.21 
2003 19,492,503 9,609,765 2.03 
2004 21,700,000 11,200,000 1.94 
2005 22,644,928 11,160,714 2.03 
2006 23,238,866 11,200,432 2.07 
2007 24,076,607 11,396,410 2.11 
 
 
Appendix 6I Urban to Rural parametric ‘general means’ ratio, 2001-2010 
alpha 2010 2009 2007 2005 2003 2001 
-5 2.02 1.88 2.11 2.94 2.60 1.91 
-4 2.22 2.02 2.08 2.68 2.39 1.96 
-3 2.29 2.15 2.05 2.29 2.19 2.10 
-2 2.17 2.16 2.03 2.03 2.04 2.16 
-1 2.07 2.11 2.02 1.97 1.97 2.07 
0 2.03 2.08 2.05 1.95 1.96 2.06 
1 2.02 2.06 2.09 2.00 2.00 2.12 
2 2.01 1.93 2.14 2.04 2.08 2.29 
3 1.96 1.64 2.14 2.03 2.16 2.58 
4 1.99 1.63 2.08 1.95 2.23 2.98 
5 2.16 1.80 2.04 1.84 2.32 3.36 
  
                                                 
108
 The reason the analysis is only carried out up to 2007 rather than 2010, is due to rural CPI figures 
only being available until 2007 at the time of publication. 
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Appendix 6J Urban public & private sector wage earning household-heads 
Years: 1990, 1997-2009 
Expenditures deflated by urban CPI to constant 2004 Riyals. 
Equivalence expenditures have been used. 
 
Year Public deflated Private deflated Public : Private Absolute Difference 
1990 13,705,390 10,276,196 1.33 3,429,194 
… … … … … 
1997 15,909,294 11,836,552 1.34 4,072,742 
1998 16,853,828 12,571,716 1.34 4,282,112 
1999 17,985,260 13,021,310 1.38 4,963,950 
2000 19,759,450 13,231,703 1.49 6,527,747 
2001 20,524,691 13,831,400 1.48 6,693,292 
2002 22,933,333 14,933,333 1.54 8,000,000 
2003 23,298,731 15,916,955 1.46 7,381,776 
2004 27,200,000 17,400,000 1.56 9,800,000 
2005 29,438,406 18,206,522 1.62 11,231,884 
2006 31,255,061 18,380,567 1.70 12,874,494 
2007 31,805,746 19,151,847 1.66 12,653,899 
2008 28,641,571 18,876,159 1.52 9,765,412 
2009 29,211,823 17,783,251 1.64 11,428,571 
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Appendix 7A Asset questionnaire in 2010 household survey 
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Appendix 7B Weighted mean and standard deviations, urban household survey 2010 
 
Asset variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Frequency in 
sample 
Household characteristics 
1 Household size 96.39544 49.25321 3 700 18701 
2 Number of rooms 3.455899 1.128216 1 15 18701 
3 Ownership 0.659512 0.473886 0 1 12783 
4 Steel 0.214362 0.41039 0 1 2685 
5 Reinforced Concrete 0.110355 0.31334 0 1 1854 
6 Iron & brick or iron & stone 0.545369 0.497951 0 1 10591 
7 Wood & brick or wood & stone 0.055704 0.229355 0 1 1379 
8 Concrete blocks 0.035234 0.184376 0 1 1294 
9 Brick, or stone & brick 0.004884 0.069715 0 1 96 
10 Wooden 0.000194 0.013938 0 1 4 
11 Cob & wood 0.013216 0.1142 0 1 361 
12 Cob & mud 0.01153 0.106759 0 1 313 
13 Other construction material 0.009212 0.095536 0 1 130 
Utility access 
14 Fixed water cooler 0.611513 0.487419 0 1 8958 
15 Sewage 0.25491 0.435822 0 1 4606 
16 Internet 0.161436 0.367943 0 1 2575 
17 Telephone 0.876046 0.329538 0 1 16088 
18 Cellphone 0.883626 0.320682 0 1 16427 
19 Fixed gas cooler 0.114991 0.31902 0 1 2835 
20 Hot water fuel natural gas 0.908823 0.287869 0 1 15340 
21 Heating fuel natural gas 0.908966 0.287666 0 1 15342 
22 Cooking fuel natural gas 0.909907 0.286322 0 1 15377 
23 Piped natural gas 0.91638 0.276824 0 1 15485 
24 Central heating 0.052215 0.222467 0 1 341 
25 Kitchen 0.967167 0.178203 0 1 17902 
26 Bathroom 0.978003 0.146677 0 1 18161 
27 Boiler 0.012186 0.109717 0 1 116 
28 Central cooling 0.00631 0.079187 0 1 48 
29 Electricity 0.999986 0.003811 0 1 18700 
30 Piped water 0.996021 0.062952 0 1 18619 
Durable assets 
31 Radio 0.048795 0.215445 0 1 1275 
32 Portable water cooler 0.036576 0.187724 0 1 848 
33 Colour TV 0.972847 0.162532 0 1 18201 
34 Dishwasher 0.022878 0.149518 0 1 304 
35 Oven 0.983538 0.127249 0 1 18403 
36 Portable gas cooler 0.01636 0.126858 0 1 697 
37 Black and white TV 0.010595 0.10239 0 1 215 
38 Electric fan 0.435302 0.49581 0 1 9912 
39 Sewing machine 0.583489 0.492994 0 1 10336 
40 Fridge Freezer 0.387934 0.487293 0 1 6450 
41 Computer 0.374632 0.484041 0 1 6244 
42 Car 0.372863 0.483579 0 1 6903 
43 VHS machine 0.6343 0.481639 0 1 11483 
44 Fridge 0.638389 0.48048 0 1 12767 
45 Music stereo 0.350508 0.477142 0 1 6557 
46 Freezer 0.286606 0.452188 0 1 5051 
47 Washing machine 0.759797 0.427218 0 1 12975 
48 Motorbike 0.179139 0.383479 0 1 3901 
49 Hoover 0.859729 0.347278 0 1 15263 
50 Bicycle 0.120248 0.32526 0 1 2321 
51 No durables 0.000104 0.010211 0 1 3 
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Appendix 7C Weighted mean and standard deviations, rural household survey 2010 
Household characteristics 
1 Household size 82.23755 42.29967 6 500 19584 
2 Number of rooms 3.255958 1.193705 0 15 19584 
3 Ownership 0.849683 0.357391 0 1 16780 
4 Steel 0.03923 0.194146 0 1 632 
5 Reinforced Concrete 0.048884 0.21563 0 1 890 
6 Iron & brick or iron & stone 0.402491 0.490412 0 1 7996 
7 Wood & brick or wood & stone 0.193559 0.395098 0 1 3468 
8 Concrete blocks 0.113631 0.317371 0 1 2133 
9 Brick, or stone & brick 0.006395 0.079717 0 1 125 
10 Wooden 0.003883 0.062192 0 1 57 
11 Cob & wood 0.11249 0.315976 0 1 2546 
12 Cob & mud 0.042547 0.20184 0 1 1109 
13 Other construction material 0.036976 0.188708 0 1 633 
Utility access 
14 Fixed water cooler 0.264494 0.441075 0 1 5338 
15 Sewage 0.016473 0.127289 0 1 283 
16 Internet 0.031019 0.173373 0 1 564 
17 Telephone 0.704257 0.456388 0 1 13925 
18 Cellphone 0.732291 0.442776 0 1 13995 
19 Fixed gas cooler 0.114456 0.318372 0 1 2075 
20 Hot water fuel natural gas 0.399013 0.489708 0 1 7228 
21 Heating fuel natural gas 0.401967 0.490308 0 1 7294 
22 Cooking fuel natural gas 0.403352 0.490583 0 1 7322 
23 Piped natural gas 0.414139 0.492585 0 1 7531 
24 Central heating 0.002543 0.05036 0 1 31 
25 Kitchen 0.815713 0.387728 0 1 16021 
26 Bathroom 0.791439 0.40629 0 1 15534 
27 Boiler 0.000346 0.018587 0 1 7 
28 Central cooling 0.000453 0.021267 0 1 17 
29 Electricity 0.995107 0.069781 0 1 19488 
30 Piped water 0.931012 0.25344 0 1 18361 
Durable assets 
31 Radio 0.043643 0.204304 0 1 1146 
32 Portable water cooler 0.034483 0.18247 0 1 739 
33 Colour TV 0.931273 0.252996 0 1 18164 
34 Dishwasher 0.001093 0.033048 0 1 19 
35 Oven 0.942692 0.232437 0 1 18508 
36 Portable gas cooler 0.033602 0.180206 0 1 832 
37 Black and white TV 0.019889 0.139623 0 1 465 
38 Electric fan 0.561039 0.496273 0 1 10904 
39 Sewing machine 0.4161 0.492923 0 1 7828 
40 Fridge Freezer 0.197015 0.397754 0 1 3747 
41 Computer 0.10068 0.300913 0 1 1856 
42 Car 0.175142 0.380099 0 1 3495 
43 VHS machine 0.489599 0.499905 0 1 9278 
44 Fridge 0.806713 0.394886 0 1 15916 
45 Music stereo 0.231475 0.421786 0 1 4614 
46 Freezer 0.127612 0.333666 0 1 2548 
47 Washing machine 0.381442 0.485753 0 1 7216 
48 Motorbike 0.314577 0.464359 0 1 6406 
49 Hoover 0.538652 0.498517 0 1 10266 
50 Bicycle 0.078736 0.269333 0 1 1464 
51 No durables 0.002646 0.051367 0 1 52 
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Appendix 7D Urban mean wealth index score by household expenditure deciles, 2010 
Household expenditure deciles Mean wealth index score 
1 -2.37666 
2 -1.29833 
3 -0.77106 
4 -0.36101 
5 -0.00366 
6 0.331973 
7 0.502428 
8 0.873206 
9 1.161598 
10 1.943304 
 
Appendix 7E Rural mean wealth index score by household expenditure deciles, 2010 
Household expenditure deciles Mean wealth index score 
1 -2.325582 
2 -1.24924 
3 -0.761508 
4 -0.3495054 
5 -0.0057517 
6 0.2431082 
7 0.5090931 
8 0.8580307 
9 1.266229 
10 1.855072 
 
